[202]*202OPINION
By the Court,
Thompson, C. J.:
The Reno, Nev., Municipal Code, 12-112-1, creates a crime called “disorderly conduct” for which one may be punished by a fine not to exceed $500, by imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, or by both. The part of the ordinance with which this proceeding is concerned prohibits persons of evil reputation from consorting for an unlawful purpose. A person of evil reputation is defined as one who has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or has the general reputation in the community as a prostitute, panderer, narcotics user, burglar or thief. Proof that the accused bears an evil reputation and is found consorting with any person of evil reputation is prima facie evidence “that such consorting was for an unlawful purpose.”
The district court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. The City has brought this proceeding in certiorari to review that ruling. The proceeding is authorized. NRS 34.020(3).1
[203]*203The ordinance is reproduced in the footnote.2 Its constitutionality is challenged on the premise that it fails to satisfy the demands of due process. The main contention is that due process is denied since the effect of the law is to make status a crime (as distinguished from conduct or attempted action). We are referred to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) [holding unconstitutional a statute which imposed criminal penalties for the condition of being addicted to the use of narcotics]; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) [where, in a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote: “Does ‘indigence’ as defined by the application of the California statute constitute a basis for restricting the freedom of a citizen, as crime or contagion warrant its restriction? We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man’s mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. ‘Indigence’ in itself is neither a source of rights or a basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact — constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color.”]; Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) [where Justice Douglas, dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted, expressed his [204]*204view that the personal condition of being a vagrant cannot constitutionally be made a crime]; Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds — Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 557 (1960) [espousing the theme that the crime of status should be held to deny due process of law]; 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 102 (1962); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603 (1956).
It is suggested that the rationale expressed in the cited authorities should control the resolution of the enactment before us since its effect is to make criminal the mere state of being an ex-convict, or of having an “evil reputation.”
Subordinately, the disorderly conduct ordinance is attacked on the ground that its language is so vague and indefinite as to violate due process. It is submitted that the terms “evil reputation,” “general reputation,” “consorting,” “moral turpitude,” “unlawful purpose,” are unclear and uncertain for a valid penal law. In this regard the following authorities are offered. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) [holding New Jersey’s “gangster” act unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness]; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) [where, inter alia, the court wrote: “And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”]; Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) Black, dissenting [where the term “dissolute person” was, by Justice Black, found too vague and uncertain]; Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) [where the court hinted that the phrase “injurious to public morals” might attempt to cover so much that it effectively covers nothing]; People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934) [where the Illinois Vagabond Act was struck down]; cf. In re Laiolo, 83 Nev. 186, 426 P.2d 726 (1967).
Finally, a constitutional challenge is aimed at sub-section (c) of the ordinance which allows proof that the defendant bears an evil reputation and is found consorting with any person of evil reputation to be prima facie evidence that “such consorting was for an unlwful purpose.” It is argued that proof of the mere association of persons of evil reputation bears no rational connection to the fact presumed — that the association was for an unlawful purpose — and must be struck down on the authority of Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Carter v. State, 82 Nev. 246, 415 P.2d 325 (1966); People v. Licavoli, 250 N.W. 520 (Mich. 1933); Ex parte Smith, 36 [205]*205S.W. 628 (Mo. 1896). It is suggested that the association of such persons does not necessarily point to an unlawful purpose; that the sub-paragraph is wholly incompatible with the presumption of innocence, and with the burden cast upon the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Contra: State v. Salerno, 142 A.2d 636 (N.J. 1958); People v. Pieri, 199 N.E. 495 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1936).
The district court relied upon each of the mentioned constitutional standards in striking down the ordinance.
The traditional concept of a crime contemplates action or the failure to act. Indeed, our legislature defines a crime as “an act or ommission forbidden by law.” NRS 193.120. An attempt to commit a crime likewise requires the doing of an act accompanied by the requisite intent. NRS 208.070. These basic constituents of a crime were ignored by the framers of the disorderly conduct ordinance, since that offense is defined in terms of being rather than in terms of acting. Punishment is prescribed for one’s status, or personal condition. The enactment does not demand the doing of an act or the presence of criminal intent in order to punish for disobedience.
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[202]*202OPINION
By the Court,
Thompson, C. J.:
The Reno, Nev., Municipal Code, 12-112-1, creates a crime called “disorderly conduct” for which one may be punished by a fine not to exceed $500, by imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, or by both. The part of the ordinance with which this proceeding is concerned prohibits persons of evil reputation from consorting for an unlawful purpose. A person of evil reputation is defined as one who has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, or has the general reputation in the community as a prostitute, panderer, narcotics user, burglar or thief. Proof that the accused bears an evil reputation and is found consorting with any person of evil reputation is prima facie evidence “that such consorting was for an unlawful purpose.”
The district court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. The City has brought this proceeding in certiorari to review that ruling. The proceeding is authorized. NRS 34.020(3).1
[203]*203The ordinance is reproduced in the footnote.2 Its constitutionality is challenged on the premise that it fails to satisfy the demands of due process. The main contention is that due process is denied since the effect of the law is to make status a crime (as distinguished from conduct or attempted action). We are referred to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) [holding unconstitutional a statute which imposed criminal penalties for the condition of being addicted to the use of narcotics]; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) [where, in a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote: “Does ‘indigence’ as defined by the application of the California statute constitute a basis for restricting the freedom of a citizen, as crime or contagion warrant its restriction? We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man’s mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. ‘Indigence’ in itself is neither a source of rights or a basis for denying them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact — constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color.”]; Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) [where Justice Douglas, dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted, expressed his [204]*204view that the personal condition of being a vagrant cannot constitutionally be made a crime]; Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds — Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 557 (1960) [espousing the theme that the crime of status should be held to deny due process of law]; 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 102 (1962); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603 (1956).
It is suggested that the rationale expressed in the cited authorities should control the resolution of the enactment before us since its effect is to make criminal the mere state of being an ex-convict, or of having an “evil reputation.”
Subordinately, the disorderly conduct ordinance is attacked on the ground that its language is so vague and indefinite as to violate due process. It is submitted that the terms “evil reputation,” “general reputation,” “consorting,” “moral turpitude,” “unlawful purpose,” are unclear and uncertain for a valid penal law. In this regard the following authorities are offered. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) [holding New Jersey’s “gangster” act unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness]; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) [where, inter alia, the court wrote: “And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”]; Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) Black, dissenting [where the term “dissolute person” was, by Justice Black, found too vague and uncertain]; Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) [where the court hinted that the phrase “injurious to public morals” might attempt to cover so much that it effectively covers nothing]; People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301 (Ill. 1934) [where the Illinois Vagabond Act was struck down]; cf. In re Laiolo, 83 Nev. 186, 426 P.2d 726 (1967).
Finally, a constitutional challenge is aimed at sub-section (c) of the ordinance which allows proof that the defendant bears an evil reputation and is found consorting with any person of evil reputation to be prima facie evidence that “such consorting was for an unlwful purpose.” It is argued that proof of the mere association of persons of evil reputation bears no rational connection to the fact presumed — that the association was for an unlawful purpose — and must be struck down on the authority of Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Carter v. State, 82 Nev. 246, 415 P.2d 325 (1966); People v. Licavoli, 250 N.W. 520 (Mich. 1933); Ex parte Smith, 36 [205]*205S.W. 628 (Mo. 1896). It is suggested that the association of such persons does not necessarily point to an unlawful purpose; that the sub-paragraph is wholly incompatible with the presumption of innocence, and with the burden cast upon the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Contra: State v. Salerno, 142 A.2d 636 (N.J. 1958); People v. Pieri, 199 N.E. 495 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1936).
The district court relied upon each of the mentioned constitutional standards in striking down the ordinance.
The traditional concept of a crime contemplates action or the failure to act. Indeed, our legislature defines a crime as “an act or ommission forbidden by law.” NRS 193.120. An attempt to commit a crime likewise requires the doing of an act accompanied by the requisite intent. NRS 208.070. These basic constituents of a crime were ignored by the framers of the disorderly conduct ordinance, since that offense is defined in terms of being rather than in terms of acting. Punishment is prescribed for one’s status, or personal condition. The enactment does not demand the doing of an act or the presence of criminal intent in order to punish for disobedience. These requisites are sought to be supplied by inference from the mere fact that the defendant has an evil reputation and is found consorting with another who bears the same burden. To punish for reputation offends one’s sense of fundamental fairness and does not square with the constitutional safeguards of life, liberty and property. State v. Kartz, 13 R.I. 528 (1882).
The justification for such proscription must be found, if at all, within the police power of a municipality to legislate for the public welfare and safety. The cases of People v. Pieri, 199 N.E. 495 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1936) and State v. Salerno, 142 A.2d 636 (N.J. 1958) may be read to support this view, though in Salerno the court did not undertake to resolve the constitutional challenge. In any event, it is apparent that the exercise of governmental power in this fashion confronts the revered doctrine that one may not be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law. One force must yield to the other. Our role is to decide which has the greater stature in the matter at hand.
The aim of the ordinance is to prevent crime. Armed with the authority which it bestows, an officer may harass a reputed criminal, and, perhaps, force him to leave town. He may arrest and jail on mere suspicion. He may round up individuals for interrogation, and otherwise use its protections in any [206]*206manner which his fancy may suggest. It is questionable whether this so-called tool of crime prevention is effective. Commentators have reported that it is not. The casual relation between the assumption of a proscribed status and the propensity for future criminal conduct has not been demonstrated. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 625-627 (1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1203, 1226 (1953); Note, Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 102, 134 (1962).
This type of law is not needed to grant an officer the right to stop persons and make some inquiries incident to a legitimate investigation. A citizen’s freedom may be temporarily interrupted for that purpose. People v. Mickelson, 380 P.2d 658 (Cal. 1963); cf. People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1964) dealing with the New York “stop and frisk” statute. The vice of the ordinance before us is that it allows the forceful detention of persons belonging to the class described without any showing of probable cause — not a mere temporary interruption to answer questions. One possessing an evil reputation maybe arrested, booked, arraigned, put to the expense of bail and counsel, or, if indigent, he must languish in jail awaiting trial — all because of the officer’s subjective, on the spot evaluation, aided, of course, by the presumption that the defendant had some unlawful purpose in mind. In our judgment the interests of a free society are not promoted by such an ordinance. We share the view of the district court that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face since its effect is to make status a crime thereby violating due process. This proceeding is dismissed and the judgment below is affirmed.
Zenoff, L, concurs.