City of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Press Co.
322 A.2d 390, 14 Pa. Commw. 551, 1974 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 861
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 18, 1974
DocketAppeal, No. 787 C.D. 1973
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases
This text of 322 A.2d 390 (City of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Press Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
City of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 322 A.2d 390, 14 Pa. Commw. 551, 1974 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 861 (Pa. Ct. App. 1974).
Opinion
Opinion
We affirm the final order of the court below upon the comprehensive and scholarly adjudication of Judge Loran L. Lewis, those portions of which we deem it necessary here to reproduce, follow:
“The plaintiff, the Pittsburgh Press Company, brings this suit in equity praying that this Court restrain and enjoin the defendant, the City of Pittsburgh, and its [553]*553Chief Executive and Financial Officers from levying, imposing, assessing and collecting the Business Privilege Tax from the plaintiff based on its gross receipts from advertising.
...
“Pursuant to the Local Tax Enabling Act, the City of Pittsburgh in 1968 enacted the Business Privilege Tax Ordinance No. 675 which imposes a six mill tax on gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in business within the City and which limits the scope of the tax to persons or businesses which are within the taxing powers of the City of Pittsburgh.
“Plaintiff contends that its gross receipts from advertising are not subject to the taxing powers granted to the defendants by the Local Tax Enabling Act in that the printing and circulating of advertisements in the Pittsburgh Press constitute manufacturing at least to the same degree as, and in many respects to a greater degree than, the printing and circulating of the news content which is admittedly manufacturing; that if the printing and circulating of advertising does not constitute manufacturing, then the receipt of advertising revenues constitutes a ‘privilege, act or transaction related to the business of manufacturing”; and that the imposition of said tax upon plaintiff constitutes an infringement upon and a suppression of the plaintiff’s and the public’s guaranteed right of free speech and press.
“The dispositive issue is whether or not plaintiff’s gross receipts from advertising are subject to tax or, more specifically, whether or not advertisements appearing in a general newspaper are manufactured. The law of Pennsylvania has held, and the defendants admit, that the printing and circulation of news, including editorial, sports and features in a newspaper, constitute manufacturing; therefore, circulation receipts are tax exempt.
...
[554]*554“The City of Pittsburgh (‘City’), pursuant to authority granted to it by the Local Tax Enabling Act, Act of December 31,1965, P. L. 1257, §1 et seq. (53 P.S. §6901 et seq.), (‘Enabling Act’), enacted Ordinance Number 675, approved December 27, 1968, entitled ‘Business Privilege Tax Ordinance’ (‘Ordinance’), which imposes an annual tax upon the privilege of conducting business in the City.
“The Enabling Act, in part, provides: ‘. . . The duly constituted authorities of . . . cities of the second class . . . may, in their discretion, by ordinance or resolution, for general revenue purposes, levy, assess and collect or provide for the levying, assessment and collection of such taxes as they shall determine on persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property within the limits of such political subdivision (s). . . . Such local authorities shall not have authority by virtue of this act:
* * « #
“ ‘(4) To levy, assess and collect a tax on goods and articles manufactured in such political subdivision or on the by-products of manufacture ... or on any privilege, act or transaction related to the business of manufacturing. . . .’” (Emphasis supplied.)
“The words ‘shall not have authority’ such as are set forth in the Enabling Act have been construed to be a limitation on the power of a municipality to tax; therefore, any doubt relating to their construction will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, Pittsburgh Press Company (Tress’). Directory Publishing Co., Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 205 Pa. Superior Court 423 [211 A. 2d 509] (1965).
“The law of this Commonwealth has held, and the City admits, that the printing and circulating of a newspaper constitutes manufacturing. Commonwealth v. J. B. Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. 513 [27 A. 10] (1893); Commonwealth v. Mann, 150 Pa. 64 [24 A. 601] (1892). [555]*555Accordingly, the City does not tax the Press’s receipts from circulation.
“The defendant seems to indicate that the plaintiff newspaper is engaged in two separate lines of endeavor; viz, the printing of news and editorials, which the defendant admits is manufacturing, and the selling of advertising. However, it will be shown that the plaintiff does much more than merely sell ads, it manufactures ads which become an integral part of a newspaper and go through the same process as the printing of news and editorials.
“Is the printing and circulation of advertisements in a general newspaper manufacturing? The City contends that it is not, arguing first, that the ad undergoes no real physical transformation from the time it is submitted to the Composing Eoom until it is printed in the newspaper or, in other words, no new and different product is produced. Second, the City contends that an advertiser buys only space from a newspaper and that gross receipts from the sale of space are not gross receipts from the sale of a manufactured product. Finally, defendants urge that a newspaper can be manufactured by one not engaged in the sale of advertising.
“As authority for its position, the City relies in part upon Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Company, 284 Pa. 180 [130 A. 405] (1925); Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Company, 421 Pa. 614 [220 A. 2d 832] (1966); and Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Company, 292 Pa. 447 [141 A. 148] (1928). In Commonwealth v. Weiland Packing Company, supra . . . the Court stated: ‘The elemental meaning of the term “to manufacture” is “to make” ... to make and produce something as a new construction out of existing materials,’ and ‘If, however, there is merely a superficial change in the original materials or substances and no substantial and well signalized transformation in form, qualities and adaptability in use, quite different from the originals, [556]*556it cannot properly and with reason be held that a new article or object has emerged, — a new production been created.’ The Court concluded that cutting and processing pork products was not manufacturing.
“In Commonwealth v. Tetley Tea Company, supra, p. 616, it was stated: ‘We have defined “manufacturing” to be the application of skill and labor to materials so that there results a new, different and useful product. Philadelphia School District v. Parent Metal Products, Inc., 402 Pa. 361 [167 A. 2d 257] (1961).’ The Court held that the cleaning, blending and processing of tea was not manufacturing, since you start with tea and end with tea.
“The Court in Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Company, 284 Pa. 180, 181 [130 A. 405, 406] (1925), quoted Commonwealth v. J. Frank Boyer Plumbing & Heating Company, 23 Dauphin Co. R. 296, 297 as follows: ‘The words of the statute [manufacture] are indeed so familiar in use and meaning that they are confused by attempts at definition. Their first sense as used is fabrication or composition, — a new article is produced of which the imported material constitutes an ingredient or part.
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322 A.2d 390, 14 Pa. Commw. 551, 1974 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-pittsburgh-v-pittsburgh-press-co-pacommwct-1974.