City of New Iberia v. Romero

391 So. 2d 548, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 4669
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 12, 1980
DocketNo. 7906
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 391 So. 2d 548 (City of New Iberia v. Romero) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of New Iberia v. Romero, 391 So. 2d 548, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 4669 (La. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

LABORDE, Judge.

This appeal involves an eviction action filed by the City of New Iberia against Exalta Romero, Sr.1 based on a lease from the City to Romero. The lease covers a strip of land located in the City of New Iberia. The trial court, after sustaining Romero’s exception of thirty (30) years acquisitive prescription, ordered dismissal of the City’s eviction action. The City appeals. We affirm. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling.

On January 14, 1980, the City of New Iberia filed a motion to evict Exalta Romero, Sr. from a strip of land located in New Iberia pursuant to a lease dated May 23, 1972.2 The City alleged that the lease was for a period of one (1) year and continued from year to year after the primary term.

Romero filed peremptory exceptions of 10 years liberative prescription, 30 years acquisitive prescription, and no right of action. He alleged that the property in question, Wana Alley, acquired by the City on April 3, 1903, was not being used for any public purpose, and had been abandoned by nonuse for a period in excess of ten (10) years. Romero further alleged that on April 26, 1940, he acquired a certain town lot bounded by Wana Alley and since that time had been in uninterrupted possession of that portion of Wana Alley described as “A” on the plat of survey of Alvin C. Ba-deaux, City Engineer, dated March 1972 and attached to the lease.

[549]*549The City of New Iberia contends that since Romero executed a lease on May 23, 1972, he is a precarious possessor and may not acquire his lessor’s property by prescription. Romero contends that the City has no standing to bring an eviction proceeding since he acquired ownership of the strip of land by 30 year acquisitive prescription pri- or to executing the lease on May 23, 1972.

In his reasons for judgment the trial court concluded that:

“The exception of thirty year acquisitive prescription is sustained, and the City’s eviction action will be dismissed.”

In reaching the conclusion that Romero’s plea of thirty years prescription was well founded, the trial court discussed two basic concepts which must be considered when acquisitive prescription arises involving a public body. We take the liberty of quoting in part from the trial judge’s well-written opinion.

First the state and its political subdivisions have a dual personality. They act as sovereign, and in a private capacity. (LSA-C.C. art. 450 Comments)
Secondly, things under the civil law have been traditionally divided into three categories: Common, public and private. (LSA-C.C. art. 448)
Common things may not be owned by anyone (LSA-C.C. art. 449). Public things are those things which are owned by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons. They include such things as streets and squares. (LSA-C.C. art. 450) Private things are things owned by private persons, or by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons. (LSA-C.C. art. 453).
Two recent Court of Appeal (Third Circuit) cases recognized these distinctions and hold that acquisitive prescription may run against a public body as to private things it owns, but not as to public things. In the case of Town of Broussard v. Broussard Volunteer Fire Dept., 357 So.2d 25 (1978) the Court held that acquisitive prescription as to the things in question ran against the municipality in favor of the Volunteer Fire Department, as they were private things owned by the City in the capacity of a private person. According to the Court in Broussard, public property to which all inhabitants of a City are entitled in common, such as public streets and walks, is not subject to acquisitive prescription. Public property not used by the people in common, which is used for their benefit by the administrators of the City, is subject to acquisitive prescription.
An immediate precursor to the Brous-sard case was that of Prothro v. City of Natchitoches, 265 So.2d 242, (C. of A.-3, 1972), which was cited by defendant in an attempt to show that prescription does run against a city.
A careful reading of Prothro reveals that the Court impliedly followed the same logic later specifically endorsed in Broussard. The property involved was originally acquired by the City for use in drilling water wells. Such a use falls into the category of administrative use defined in Broussard. As such, the property could not be considered “hors de commerce”, and insusceptible of prescription, and the Court decided that the prescription did run against the City.
As previously discussed, a street is a public thing owned by a political body in its capacity as a public person (LSA-C.C. art. 450, supra) and is consequently not susceptible of prescription. Both Proth-ro, and Broussard, supra, cited by defendant, are accordingly distinguishable from the instant matter in the sense that the property in dispute here was acquired by the plaintiff for use as a public street, but indistinguishable in the sense that the said property has not been put to use as a public street since at least 1940, and probably never was.3 Indeed, the first evidence of any use at all by the City is its lease to defendant in 1972. This certainly demonstrates an intention to own as a [550]*550private person, to put to administrative use, and not for the use of the people in common. In fact, the lease spells out that the property was not then being used for public purposes. The next question, then, is whether a thing acquired by a public body as a public thing but subsequently owned as a private thing is subject to acquisitive prescription. The answer is found in the case of Louisiana Highway Commission v. Raxdale, 12 So.2d 631, C. of A.(2), 1943. In that case, the City of Alexandria had purchased property “as a street of said town”, but had never used it as such, and in fact had never possessed it at all, vendors and their heirs having retained possession up to the time of the litigation. The argument was made that the property was a public acquisition and not subject to acquisitive prescription. The Court, relying on the principles announced above and on former LSA-C.C. art. 482, at page 635 ruled in effect that regardless of the character of the acquisition, if the thing is never used, or ceases to be used, as a public thing, it takes on the character of alienability and becomes subject to prescription. Former LSA-C.C. art. 482 (now arts. 449, 450 and 455 provides, inter alia, that things naturally susceptible of ownership but applied to some public purpose, resume their original quality as soon as they cease to be applied to such public purpose; and gives as examples of such things highways, roads, streets and public places. The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, by whose decisions the undersigned is bound, quoted in Prothro the following language of the district court therein:
‘In the case of

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Bluebook (online)
391 So. 2d 548, 1980 La. App. LEXIS 4669, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-new-iberia-v-romero-lactapp-1980.