City of Deridder, Louisiana v. Administrators of Vacant Succ. of Isaac J. Celestine, Etc.

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 4, 2014
• Docket: CA-0013-1453
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-1453

CITY OF DERIDDER, LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ADMINISTRATORS OF VACANT SUCC. OF ISAAC J. CELESTINE, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. 2012-0986 HONORABLE MARTHA ANN O’NEAL, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, James T. Genovese, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

David R. Lestage Hall, Lestage & Landreneau Post Office Box 880 DeRidder, Louisiana 70634 (337) 463-8692 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: City of DeRidder, Louisiana Harold Dewey Register, Jr. A Professional Law Corporation Post Office Box 80214 Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-0214 (337) 981-6644 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS: Administrators of Vacant Succ. of Isaac J. Celestine and Anna Thomas Celestine, Fredrick C. Celestine, Eva Celestine Gunter, and Marva Celestine Bluitt CONERY, Judge.

The City of DeRidder, Louisiana (“City”) instituted a combined petitory and

boundary action against the Vacant Successions of Isaac J. Celestine and Anna

Thomas Celestine and their surviving children, Fredrick C. Celestine, Eva

Celestine Gunter, and Marva Celestine Bluitt (“Celestines”) to determine the

ownership of approximately two acres of immovable property that the City claimed

was part of the Community Cemetery. After a bench trial on the merits, the trial

court ruled in favor of the City, finding it had record title to the property and that

La.R.S. 9:5804 precluded the running of acquisitive prescription against the City.

The trial court also fixed the boundary of the Community Cemetery in accordance

with record title as confirmed by the most recent survey of Registered Professional

Land Surveyor Stanley J. Vidrine. The court ordered the Celestines to remove the

existing fence which encroached on the City’s property at their cost and allow the

City to construct a new fence in accordance with the Vidrine survey, the new

boundary set by the trial court. The Celestines now appeal the September 18, 2013

judgment of the trial court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 14, 1942, the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation executed an Act

of Donation to the City of a 5.2 acre tract of immovable property for use as a

cemetery, the eastern two acres of which are the subject of this lawsuit. The City

designated the property as the Community Cemetery and accepted the donation in

a May 11, 1942 Resolution. Both the donation and acceptance were filed by the

Clerk of Court in Beauregard Parish under Instrument No. 68,733 and were

recorded in Conveyance Book 81 at Page 332. The City submitted into evidence at

trial a certified copy of the donation and acceptance, as well as the May 20, 1942 survey of R.A. Scalfi, the Parish Surveyor, which depicts the donated property

divided into lots and blocks for burial sites.

On February 2, 1949, the Long-Bell Lumber Company, which was a

company related to the donor of the Community Cemetery, sold approximately 3.5

acres of immovable property, a portion of which adjoins the eastern boundary of

the Community Cemetery, to Mrs. John B. Jones. On August 12, 1957, Mr. John

B. Jones subdivided Mrs. Jones’s property into the Jones Subdivision. On

September 30, 1957, Mr. Jones sold to Isaac and Anna Celestine by virtue of a

vendor’s lien deed all of Block One and Block Two of the Jones Subdivision. On

December 14, 1959, the heirs of Mrs. Jones executed a quit claim deed to Isaac and

Anna Celestine conveying their interest to that same land.

Sometime between the May 20, 1942 survey of the Community Cemetery

and the purchase of the property in the Jones Subdivision by Isaac and Anna

Celestine in 1957, someone erected a fence that runs north and south across the

eastern portion of approximately two acres of the originally donated cemetery

property. The Celestines contend that their parents maintained the property east of

the fence since 1957 and that upon their death, the Celestines have continued to

maintain the disputed two acres to the present. The Celestines claim ownership by

acquisitive prescription.

Sometime after taking office in July 2006, Mayor Ronald Roberts became

aware that the City owned additional property at the Community Cemetery that

had not been sold as burial sites. The City’s Director of Public Works

commissioned a survey by Stanley J. Vidrine, a registered professional land

surveyor, in order to determine the extent of the boundary of the City’s property.

Mr. Vidrine’s survey was completed on October 30, 2007. Mr. Vidrine included

2 the fence by partially drawing it in on the survey, as is the customary practice of

surveyors. The fenced-in portion claimed by the Celestines was an encroachment

on the City’s property as set forth in its title and confirmed by Mr. Vidrine’s

survey.

Upon completion of the Vidrine survey, the City began communicating with

the Celestines concerning the City’s claim of ownership of the property east of the

fence and its desire to begin to prepare the property to be sold as burial sites.

When the Celestines refused to remove the fence and relinquish the disputed

property to the City, the City filed this combined petitory and boundary action.

After the death of their parents, the Celestines contacted an attorney to prepare the

successions of their parents. Those successions were never opened. The City

requested that the district court appoint administrators for those vacant successions

and named the vacant successions and the three sole heirs in this combined action.

A bench trial on the merits was held on August 7, 2013, after which the

parties were allowed to file post-trial memoranda. The trial court promptly issued

its written reasons for ruling and judgment on September 18, 2013. The trial court

found that although the Celestines were in possession of the approximately two

acres of the disputed immovable property, they had no proof of valid title to the

disputed acreage. The City had proved record ownership and just title by virtue of

the 1942 recordation of both the donation and acceptance. Thus, the Celestines’

only other method of proving ownership was by way of thirty years acquisitive

prescription pursuant to La.Civ.Code arts. 3446 and 3486.1

1 Louisiana Civil Code Article 3446 provides, “Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.” La.Civ.Code art. 3486 provides, “Ownership and other real rights in immovables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or possession in good faith.”

3 In addition to the finding that the Celestines had no proof of valid title to the

disputed acreage, the trial court also found that La.R.S. 9:5804 precluded the

running of acquisitive prescription against the City. The trial court fixed the

boundary of the Community Cemetery based on the 2007 survey of Mr. Vidrine.

The trial court then ordered the Celestines to remove the fence partially enclosing

the approximately two acres in dispute as depicted on the Vidrine survey at their

own cost and allow the City to erect a new fence to mark the boundaries set by the

trial court. The Celestines timely appealed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Celestines assert as their sole assignment of error on appeal that “The

trial court erred in ruling that the disputed portion of land is not susceptible to

acquisitive prescription because the City never exercised dominion or control over

the disputed portion of property.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“[A]ppellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts.”

La.Const. art. 5, § 10(B). The appellate court must determine whether the trial

court committed an error of law or made a factual finding that was manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Gibson v. State, 99-1730 (La. 4/11/00), 758 So.2d 782,

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 656 (2000). The reviewing court must

review the record in its entirety to make this determination. Stobart v. State, Dep’t

of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

However, statutory interpretations are questions of law. Shell v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 00-997 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/21/01), 782 So.2d 1155, writ denied, 01-

1149 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1244. Although a reviewing court defers to a trial

4 court’s reasonable decision on a question or matter properly within the trial court’s

discretion, if the trial court’s decision is based on an erroneous interpretation or

application of the law, such an incorrect decision is not entitled to deference. Kem

Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067 (La.1983).

In essence, the only issue before this court is the application by the trial

court of La.R.S. 9:5804. The trial court found that despite the failure of the City to

recognize that their record title to the contested two acres of immovable property

had been partially fenced-in and clearly possessed by the Celestines in excess of

the thirty year acquisitive prescriptive period, La.R.S. 9:5804 was controlling and

suspended the running of acquisitive prescription against the city. The statute

provides:

Any municipal corporation owning alienable immovable property may prevent the running of prescription acquirendi causa against it in favor of any third possessor, by recording a notice with the clerk of court of the parish where the property is situated, or with the register of conveyances in the Parish of Orleans insofar as property in that parish is concerned. This notice shall contain a description of the property and a declaration that it is public property belonging to the municipality and the recording shall suspend the running of prescription during the time the ownership of the property shall remain vested in the name of the municipality.

The recordation of the written act by which a municipal corporation shall acquire alienable immovable property likewise shall be deemed sufficient notice in order to suspend the term of prescription.

At the trial on the merits, the City properly entered into evidence both the

Act of Donation and the May 11, 1942 Resolution whereby the City accepted the

donation of the 5.2 acres of immovable property designated as the Community

Cemetery, as well as the May 20, 1942 R.A. Scalfi survey which depicts the

donated property divided into lots and blocks for burial sites.

5 Mr. Vidrine, who prepared the 2007 survey for the City, testified at trial that

he was familiar with the work of Mr. Scalfi, the former Parish Surveyor. Mr.

Vidrine purchased Mr. Scalfi’s field notes and also worked with his plats and

surveys on occasion. Mr. Vidrine further opined that if the fence in question was

in existence when Mr. Scalfi performed his survey in 1942, it would have been so

noted on his plat. It was not. He further testified that the disputed two-acre tract

on the eastern boundary claimed by the Celestines was part of the original donation

to the City and that the existing fence encroached on the City’s property.

Able counsel for the Celestines cited several cases in brief and at oral

argument which they urge support their position that the trial court erred in holding

that La.R.S. 9:5804 suspended the running of acquisitive prescription against the

City. Louisiana Highway Comm’n v. Raxdale, 12 So.2d 631 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1943);

Prothro v. City of Natchitoches, 265 So.2d 242 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1972); City of New

Iberia v. Romero, 391 So.2d 548 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1980). The properties at issue in

Raxdale, Prothro, and Romero were acquired by the public entities prior to the

enactment of La.R.S. 9:5804 in 1926. The holdings in those cases do not apply to

cases such as this arising subsequent to the statute’s enactment.

The trial court correctly held that by filing and recording the donation,

acceptance, and the parish surveyor’s plat in this case, the City proved it had

complied with the statute and suspended the running of acquisitive prescription

pursuant to La.R.S. 9:5804:

City presented evidence that it met the requirements of this statute, preventing the running of acquisitive prescription against it from November 14, 1942, thus, defendants cannot claim ownership[.] Defendants have not proved that they gained ownership through acquisitive prescription from ancestors in title of the property before City suspended the running of prescription against it.

6 The Celestines nevertheless argued to the trial court that acquisitive

prescription had run against the City “because the tract of land in dispute has never

been used or owned by the municipality as a public thing[.]” The trial court also

ruled against the Celestines on this issue, citing La.Civ.Code art. 450 and Locke v.

Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1955) for the proposition that prescription is

suspended for an entire tract of land accepted and recorded pursuant to La.R.S.

9:5804. The trial court stated, “The court finds the Acceptance by the City of the

donated land that designates the immovable property as a Community Cemetery

establishes the property as a public thing.”

The trial court further found that even if the immovable property at issue

was deemed to be a “private thing,” it also would not be susceptible to acquisitive

prescription based on the provisions of La.Civ.Code art. 3485, which provides,

“All private things are susceptible of prescription unless prescription is excluded

by legislation.” The trial court correctly found that Comment (c) of La.Civ.Code

art. 3485 specifically lists La.R.S. 9:5804 as a legislative provision which excludes

the running of acquisitive prescription against a “private thing” when that thing is

owned by a political subdivision of the State, such as the City. Thus, the City’s

compliance with the provisions of La.R.S. 9:5804 would also have suspended the

running of acquisitive prescription even if the property in question had been a

private thing.

We find no legal error in the trial court’s ruling and find that there is ample

evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual findings. We find no

manifest error and affirm its decision on this issue.

The trial court then addressed the City’s boundary action pursuant to

La.Civ.Code art. 792, which states, “The court shall fix the boundary according to

7 the ownership of the parties; if neither party proves ownership, the boundary shall

be fixed according to the limits established by possession.” Additionally, La.Code

Civ.P. art. 3693 instructs, “After considering the evidence, including the testimony

and exhibits of a surveyor or other expert appointed by the court or by a party, the

court shall render judgment fixing the boundary between the contiguous lands in

accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties.”

The trial court ultimately found that the City had proved ownership of the

disputed property, had complied with the notice requirements of the statute, and in

its judgment, the court fixed the boundaries of the Community Cemetery in

accordance with the 2007 Certificate of Survey by Mr. Vidrine. The trial court

ordered the Celestines to remove the fence enclosing the approximately two acres

at their own cost and allow the City to erect a new fence to mark the boundaries set

by the trial court.2 We agree and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

CONCLUSION

Finding that the trial court did not commit an error of law in its application

of La.R.S. 9:5804 and did not make a factual finding that was manifestly erroneous

or clearly wrong, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City of

DeRidder, Louisiana. We assess all costs of this appeal to the appellants, the

Vacant Successions of Isaac J. Celestine and Anna Thomas Celestine and their

surviving children, Fredrick C. Celestine, Eva Celestine Gunter, and Marva

Celestine Bluitt.

2 See Seminary v. DuPont, 09-1082 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/11/10), 41 So.3d 1182, writ denied, 10-1336 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So. 3d. 1077, wherein a mandatory injunction was affirmed by the fifth circuit, ordering a neighbor to remove a fence that encroached on the neighboring homeowner’s property.