No. 3-96-0187
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
CITY OF MARSEILLES, an Illinois ) Appeal from the Circuit
Municipal Corporation, ) Court of the 14th
) Judicial Circuit, LaSalle
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) County, Illinois
)
v. ) Nos. 95-ED-2
ROSS BLAKE RADKE, ) Honorable
) Cynthia Raccuglia,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:
Defendant, Ross Radke (Radke), appeals from an order of the
circuit court of LaSalle County denying his motion to vacate a
consent decree judgment entered in an eminent domain action in
which the City of Marseilles (City) sought to acquire a railroad
easement from Radke. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the
order of the circuit court and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
FACTS
The City adopted ordinances creating a real property tax
increment financing district (TIF district) and an attendant
redevelopment plan and project pursuant to the Tax Increment
Allocation Redevelopment Act (the Act). 65 ILCS 5/11--74.4--1 et
seq. (Michie 1994). Pursuant to the authority granted to it under
the Act (65 ILCS 5/11--74.4--4), the City brought condemnation
proceedings against Radke, seeking to acquire a single railroad
easement across his property. The rail easement would be used by
the Independent Tube Corporation to provide rail access to a
factory it would build within the TIF district.
Radke filed a motion to traverse and dismiss, alleging several
grounds, including: (1) the City had failed to pass a proper
authorizing ordinance; (2) the property sought to be condemned was
not blighted within the meaning of the Act; (3) the condemnation
was not for a valid public use; and (4) the City had failed to make
a good faith offer for the purchase of the property.
Prior to the hearing on the traverse action, negotiations were
held which resulted in an agreement between the parties. A
"Consent Judgment" was entered that required Radke to convey the
subject easement as well as another railroad easement. The City
was ordered to pay Radke $30,000 for both easements, and to make
good faith efforts to obtain for Radke better access to his
property.
The consent judgment noted, inter alia, that: (1) Radke's
property was "located wholly within the boundaries of the
redevelopment project area" created by ordinance; (2) the court had
jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter; and (3) the
parties had reached a settlement of all issues and ratified their
agreement by presenting it to the court for entry as a consent
judgment.
Within 30 days of entry of the consent judgment, Radke filed
a motion to vacate the judgment. He maintained that after the
consent judgment was entered, he discovered that the easement the
City had sought through condemnation was not within the legal
description of the project redevelopment area contained in the
ordinance and notices published pursuant to the Act. The motion to
vacate alleged that the City had no authority to acquire the
easement by condemnation, and thus the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the consent judgment.
Radke subsequently amended his motion to vacate adding as
additional grounds to vacate allegations that the consent order
violated public policy and that it was entered into by the parties
as the result of a mutual mistake of fact.
At the hearing on Radke's motion to vacate, the attorney for
each party indicated to the trial court that they had brought
expert witnesses to court to testify as to whether the condemned
easement was or was not within the TIF district. Radke's attorney
indicated to the court that his expert would testify that the
condemned easement was not within the territory encompassed by the
legal description given in the public notice required by the Act.
The attorney for the City indicated to the court that its expert
would testify that the subject easement was within the TIF district
"when you look at both the legal description, the metes and bounds
description, and the accompanying map, which [was] an exhibit to
the same ordinance." The trial court took no testimony from either
expert on whether the subject easement was within the TIF district,
nor did either party make an offer of proof for the record on
appeal.
Radke argued to the trial court that, because the subject
easement was outside the legal boundaries of the TIF district, a
statutory prerequisite necessary for the trial court to exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction was not present. Thus, the consent
judgment was void and should be vacated. The City argued that: (1)
the subject easement was within the boundaries of the TIF district,
thus any statutory jurisdictional requirements were satisfied; (2)
the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter by
virtue of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Illinois
constitution to hear eminent domain matter; and/or (3) the consent
judgment, being a private agreement of the parties, could not be
subject to an attack based upon subject-matter jurisdiction.
The trial court denied all relief requested by Radke, who now
appeals.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the City maintains that the consent
judgment entered in this matter is not subject to appellate review
and this appeal should therefore be dismissed for lack of appellate
court jurisdiction.
A consent decree is based upon the agreement of the parties,
and may supersede both the pleadings and the evidence. Filosa v.
Pecora, 18 Ill. App. 3d 123 (1974). A consent decree is conclusive
upon the parties and cannot be amended or vacated without the
consent of both parties. People ex rel. Stead v. Spring Lake
Drainage and Levee District, 253 Ill. 479 (1912); Thompson v. IFA,
Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 293 (1989). Ordinarily, a consent decree
may not be appealed because it constitutes no more than the court's
recording of a settlement agreement reached by the parties and is
not a judicial determination of their rights. People ex rel.
Fahner v. Colorado City Lot Owners & Taxpayers Association, 106
Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1985); Sementa v. Tylman, 230 Ill. App. 3d 701
(1992).
Certain exceptions to the general rule are recognized,
however. A court will vacate a consent decree on the motion of
only one party upon a showing of fraudulent misrepresentation or
coercion in the making of the agreement, the incompetence of one of
the parties, gross disparity in the position or capacity of the
parties, errors of law apparent on the face of the record, or newly
discovered evidence. Thompson, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 296-97; In re
Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309; Lubowsky v. Skokie Valley
Community Hospital, 79 Ill. App. 3d 909, 913-15; Filosa, 18 Ill.
App. 3d at 127; City of Des Plaines v. Scientific Machinery Movers,
Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3d 438, 443.
In this matter, Radke maintains on appeal that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction necessary to enter the consent
judgment. The question before us, which appears to be one of first
impression, is whether lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a
sufficient basis upon which to appeal a consent judgment. We
believe that it is, and we reverse and remand on that basis.
The consent judgment specifically stated that the court had
subject-matter jurisdiction. This provision can only be viewed as
an attempt by the parties to confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon the trial court. It is well-settled that where a court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be conferred by stipulation,
consent or waiver (Hill v. Daley, 28 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1975)); and
where subject-matter jurisdiction is absent, the court should
decline to proceed further in the cause. Toman v. Park Castles
Apartment Building Corp., 375 Ill. 293 (1941).
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time,
even on appeal. Hill, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 204; Toman, 375 Ill. at
302. We therefore find that we have jurisdiction to review the
trial court's determination that it had subject-matter jurisdiction
necessary to enter the consent judgment.
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Radke first maintains
that the trial court erred in not vacating the consent judgment
based upon its lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review a
trial court's decision that it has subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo. Griffin v. Universal Casualty Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 1056
(1995).
The basis of Radke argument to the trial court in support of
his motion to vacate the consent judgment was that the easement
sought in the City's condemnation complaint was not within the
legal description of the TIF district contained in the notice
published by the City prior to adoption of the ordinance
establishing the TIF district. The notice, which is a prerequisite
to the ordinance, is required to include "[t]he boundaries
redevelopment project area by legal description and by street
location where possible." 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-6(b)(2)(Michie 1994).
Radke notes that the statute does not provide for a map of the
proposed TIF district, as satisfying the notice requirement.
Radke alleged that the easement sought in the City's
condemnation complaint was not within the boundaries of the legal
description and therefore the City lacked the statutory authority
to bring the condemnation action before the trial court. No
evidence was presented to the trial court to support this
allegation, although the record indicates that Radke was prepared
to present such evidence to the trial court. The trial court,
however, did not permit the evidence to be presented.
The City argued, and the trial court apparently agreed, that
such evidence was not necessary in order for the trial court to
determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction. The City
maintains that the trial court's jurisdiction emanates exclusively
from Article VI, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,
which provides that "(c)ircuit courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters except where the Supreme
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction."
According to the City, the test for subject-matter
jurisdiction is simply whether the court has the power to enter
into the inquiry before it. The City maintains that the trial
court had the authority to adjudicate an eminent domain action over
property located within LaSalle County, and that alone is
sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
The City's argument has been considered and rejected by other
courts. See, People ex rel. Brzica v. Lake Barrington, 268 Ill.
App. 3d 429 (1994)(and cases cited therein). It is well-settled
that, even though circuit courts derive their plenary power to
adjudicate "justiciable matters" solely from the Article VI of the
constitution, and the legislature has no power to limit a court's
constitutional jurisdiction to hear a matter, the legislature may
define the "justiciable matters" when it creates a statutory right
having no counterpart in common law or equity. Brzica, 268 Ill.
App. 3d at 422. In such cases, certain statutory prerequisites
must exist before a court can exercise its power to hear the case
and grant the relief requested. People ex rel. Illinois Department
of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp., 122 Ill. App.
3d 517, 521 (1984); Skilling v. Skilling, 104 Ill. App. 3d 213, 219
(1982).
One court has explained that, "when a court is acting pursuant
to present-day statutory subject-matter jurisdiction," it does so
because the legislature may impose by statute certain conditions
precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by that court and these
conditions precedent cannot be waived." Brzica, 268 Ill. App. 3d
at 423 (quoting In re Estate of Mears, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1137-
38 (1982).
The right of eminent domain by a municipality did not exist at
common law; a municipality can only exercise the power of eminent
domain when it has been specifically conferred by legislative
enactment. City of Oakbrook Terrace v. LaSalle National Bank, 186
Ill. App. 3d 343, 348 (1989). A statutory grant of eminent domain
power can only be exercised in the manner authorized by statute.
Village of Skokie v. Gianoulis, 260 Ill. App. 3d 287, 295 (1994).
Under the TIF Act, the City can only bring an eminent domain
action against property located within the TIF district. 65 ILCS
5/11--74.4-4(c). Therefore, the location of the condemned easement
within the TIF district was a statutory prerequisite to the trial
court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the condemned
easement was outside the TIF district, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to enter any order, even a consent judgment, and it
should have dismissed the complaint. As subject-matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time in the proceeding, the trial
court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on this issue,
even in response to Radke's motion to vacate the consent judgment.
The City maintains that the trial court determined that the
condemned easement was within the TIF district, and that
determination is entitled to some deference by this court. We have
reviewed the record and can find no evidence upon which the trial
court could have reached that conclusion. It appears the trial
court may have assumed that the evidence would have shown that the
condemned easement was within the TIF district. However, on
review, we cannot defer to that assumption.
Alternatively, the City invites this court to determine that
the condemned easement was within the boundaries of the TIF
district as those boundaries were described in a map published with
the notice of proposed ordinance establishing the TIF district. We
cannot accept the City's invitation to make such a finding of fact.
There is simply no evidence in the record to establish whether the
condemned easement was located within the TIF district. We
therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand this
matter for an evidentiary hearing for the parties to present
evidence and the trial court to make a determination, based upon
the evidence presented, as to whether the condemned easement was
within the boundaries of the TIF district. Such a hearing is
necessary in order for the trial court to properly determine
whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction necessary to enter any
order.
Radke also asks this court to find that the consent judgment
is void as against public policy, or as having been entered based
upon a mutual mistake of fact. Neither of these arguments provides
a basis for appellate review of consent decrees, and therefore we
will not consider these issues. In re Haber, 99 Ill. App. 3d 306
(1981).
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the circuit
court of LaSalle County is reversed, and the cause remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
LYTTON, P.J., and BRESLIN, J., concurred.