City of Lewiston v. Knieriem

685 P.2d 821, 107 Idaho 80, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 500

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 28, 1984
• Docket: 13792
• Status: Published

Opinions

BAKES, Justice.

Appeal is taken from a district court judgment denying a mandatory injunction which would have required the removal of a mobile home from a parcel of real property. On the basis of the record before us, we reverse.

The parties filed a stipulation of facts prior to trial which establishes that on or about April 1, 1977, defendant respondents, Walter and Beverly Knieriem, placed a mobile home to be used as their permanent residence on a parcel of property owned by them and located within the City of Lewiston. The parcel is located in an area zoned F-l, a farm zone in which single family dwellings are a permitted use, but mobile homes that are not a pre-existing or conditional use are prohibited. The parcel had an existing residence on the premises, which the Knieriems had lived in prior to moving the mobile home onto the premises. After the mobile home was moved on, the Knieriems moved into it and rented the existing residence. The City of Lewiston notified the respondents that the placement of their mobile home was contrary to the provisions of Lewiston’s zoning and mobile home ordinances and requested them to remove their mobile home. When respondents failed and refused to remove the mobile home, plaintiff appellant City of Lewiston sought an injunction to enforce the ordinances which restrict the location of the mobile home from the area in question.

The district court, sitting without a jury, heard testimony and arguments and, after the conclusion of trial, having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court entered its judgment in which it concluded that “the banning of mobile homes from all residential districts without regard to their effect on property values is not a constitutionally acceptable means to preserve property values because it is totally arbitrary and unreasonably sweeping.” The court also concluded that “[t]he zoning ordinances at bar unconstitutionally ban Defendant’s mobile home from the neighborhood and lot in question both by taking property rights without due process and by denying equal protection.” The court denied plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction to perpetually enjoin defendants from violating the zoning ordinance and mobile home ordinance of the City of Lewiston, which injunction would have required removal of the mobile home from the property in question.

On appeal, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance in question. According to the Lewiston City Code, mobile home developments are an allowed use in both R-l and R-2 residential areas. The ordinance allows mobile homes to be placed in mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions, or mobile home planned unit developments.¹ The zoning map of the City of Lewiston indicates that approximately 50% of the zoned area of the city is zoned either R-l or R-2.

It is unclear whether the district court decided this question on the basis that the ordinance is an unconstitutional exercise of the municipality’s police power, or on the basis that the ordinance in question denies rights of equal protection and due process. Although the arguments in the briefs on appeal do not plainly distinguish between the two theories, the appellant raises the issues separately, as distinct reasons for overturning the decision of the district court. Therefore, we will examine the reasonableness of the mobile home ordinance as an exercise of police power and also analyze the ordinance under standards of equal protection and due process.

I

Local legislative bodies are authorized to enact zoning ordinances restricting use of property within the corporate limits. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 511, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (1977); White v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 176, 183, 338 P.2d 778, 782 (1959). The zoning power is not unlimited; the power to zone derives from the police power of the state, and zoning ordinances must therefore bear a reasonable relation to goals properly pursued by the state through its police power. Idaho Const. Art. 12, § 2; Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra: see Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 562, 468 P.2d 290, 294 (1970). A strong presumption exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra, 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. The burden of proving that the ordinance is invalid rests upon the party challenging its validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome only by a clear showing that the ordinance as applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. Wyckoff v. Board of County Comm’rs, 101 Idaho 12, 14, 607 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1980). Where there is a basis for a reasonable difference of opinion, or if the validity of legislative classification for zoning purposes is debatable, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local zoning authority. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, supra, 98 Idaho at 512, 567 P.2d at 1263.

It is generally recognized that mobile homes

“are residential uses which possess special characteristics which warrant their separate regulation. Thus, they may be confined to mobile home parks, or may be excluded from residential districts.

... Absent exceptional circumstances, the exclusion of this use from a residential district is not regarded as unreasonable.” State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 851 [92 S.Ct. 87, 30 L.Ed.2d 90] (1971), citing Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Vol. 2, § 11.52, p. 372.

See Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978); see also Wyckoff v. Board of County Comm’rs of Ada County, supra.

The purposes sought to be advanced by the City of Lewiston’s limitation on the placement of mobile homes are, as stated in the restricting ordinance, to “protect residential property values, to preserve the intent of the city’s comprehensive plan, and to promote the general safety and welfare of the City of Lewiston” and its residents. These are legitimate bases for regulation and the trial court properly found that these purposes are constitutional.² In determining whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power, the question then becomes whether the ordinance bears a reasonable relationship to the advancement of those established purposes. The indiscriminate placement of mobile homes within a municipality may undermine conservation of property values and stifle the development of a potential residential neighborhood. See Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959). The intent of comprehensive zoning is to provide for orderly growth and development, conserve and stabilize property values, promote the best use of land, and to promote the general health, safety and welfare. See I.C. § 67-6502; § 37-2, Zoning Ordinances of the City of Lewiston. Preserving and promoting general health and welfare includes providing necessary services such as water and sewage, schools, and police and fire protection. Cities have found it easier to provide and regulate necessary services by limiting mobile homes to mobile home parks or other designated areas. State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972).

We conclude that under the aforementioned rules of construction the ordinance in question bears a reasonable relation to the protection of property values, the general health and welfare and the intent of comprehensive zoning, that it was not shown to be clearly arbitrary or unreasonable and hence represents a valid exercise of the City of Lewiston’s police power. Our conclusion is supported by the great majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624 (Me.1981); Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v. Hamilton County, 552 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn.App.1976), cert. den. 431 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 2678, 53 L.Ed.2d 273 (1977); City of Brookside Village v. Co-mean, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1982) cert. den. 459 U.S. 1087,103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 932 (1982); Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W.Va.1980); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978): accord, County of Ada v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 533 P.2d 1199 (1975). Contra Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).³ See generally, Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 598 (1972); Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 232, § 5 (1964). It seems that the trial judge placed undue emphasis, as do respondents here, upon testimony that only one lot in a mobile home subdivision was available for sale at the time of trial. This fact does not support the trial judge’s conclusion that:

“[T]he zoning scheme in Lewiston has created a situation in which the placement of mobile homes is presently banned for all practical purposes. It is unconstitutional for Lewiston in the name of comprehensive planning to create ordinances, the practical effect of which, is to completely bar a type of home which is safe, healthful, and is presently being purchased by a substantial percentage (about one-third) of all home buyers in the country.”

The record clearly shows that mobile home parks, subdivisions, and planned unit developments are allowed, under Lewiston’s zoning scheme, in approximately 50% of the city. While there may have been only one lot available for sale, the record does reflect that there were other mobile home parks which rented space. Merely because these particular parties could not locate a lot to purchase that met their criteria does not invalidate the ordinance. A city need not provide the lots or finance construction of subdivisions to assure that any particular person can buy one; the city merely has to provide the mechanism, which Lewiston has done by zoning approximately 50% of the city R-l and R-2 where mobile home subdivisions and parks are allowable uses. Where the purpose of the ordinance is constitutional, and a total ban has not been imposed, the ordinance will be upheld as a valid exercise of the city’s police power.

II

The district court also stated that the ordinance regulating the location of mobile homes within the City of Lewiston was unconstitutional in “taking property rights without due process and by denying equal protection.”⁴ We turn first to the equal protection arguments.

A threshold inquiry in determining whether an ordinance works a denial of equal protection is what level of scrutiny is to be applied. There is no claim that this action involves a suspect class, requiring strict scrutiny. See Idaho Quarterhorse Breeders Ass’n, Inc. v. Ada County Fair Board, 101 Idaho 339, 612 P.2d 1186 (1980). Nor does the ordinance obviously discriminate on its face or patently lack relationship to its declared purpose, triggering the means-focus analysis expressly adopted by this Court in Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976), cert. den. 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 55 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977). Therefore, we hold that the traditional level of restrained review, i.e., whether the distinctions drawn bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective, is appropriate. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 24, 644 P.2d 341, 346 (1982). Under the “rational basis” test, equal protection is offended only if the classifications “are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.” Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957,102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101,1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); see Jones v. State Board of Medicine, supra; Evans v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 95 Idaho 54, 501 P.2d 1054 (1972).

The stated purposes of the ordinance restricting the location of mobile homes within the City of Lewiston are to “protect residential property values within the city, to preserve the intent of the city’s comprehensive plan, and to promote the general safety and welfare of the City of Lewiston and the residents thereof.” These are legitimate legislative purposes and, as set forth in Part I, the restrictions on the placement of mobile homes are rationally related to these ends. When the ordinance is considered in this light, it is apparent that the trial court erred in determining that the restrictions on the placement of mobile homes within the City of Lewiston is a denial of equal protection.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in determining that the ordinance constitutes a taking of property in violation of rights of due process. As this Court recently stated in Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 601, 635 P.2d 962, 965 (1981), “The standard applicable in due process cases is whether the challenged law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.” See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, supra. For the reasons stated above, the ordinance in question survives the due process challenge as well.

We reverse and remand to the trial court with directions to issue a mandatory injunction requiring respondents to remove the mobile home from the property in question. We also reverse the award of attorney fees. Costs to appellants.

DONALDSON, C.J., HUNTLEY, J., and TOWLES, J. Pro Tern., concur.

1 . Section 23-01 of Chapter 23 of the Municipal Code of the City of Lewiston provides:

"The city council of the City of Lewiston, Idaho, hereby finds and declares that the indiscriminate placement of mobile homes and trailers on individual building lots in the residential zones of the city threatens irreparable damage to residential property values within the city. The city council further finds and declares that, in order to protect residential property values, to preserve the intent of the city’s comprehensive plan, and to promote the general safety and welfare of the City of Lewiston and the residents thereof, mobile homes shall be located only within mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions, and mobile home planned unit developments, except in emergency situations, as hereinafter provided.”

Although this particular provision was enacted as part of Chapter 23, Mobile Homes and Tourist Facilities, it is cross-referenced to in Chapter 37, Zoning, and, like zoning, is a restriction on the use of land resulting from a municipality’s exercise of its police power. Therefore, this ordinance will be construed as an exercise of the city’s zoning authority.

2 . As stated by the trial court:

“The purpose of the ordinance concerning mobile homes in Lewiston has been stated in the ordinance and shown by testimony to be the preservation of property values and the preservation of the health, safety and welfare of the community. These purposes are constitutional.”

3 . We are not unmindful of the general improvements in the quality and appearance of mobile homes. These changes may indeed persuade municipalities to amend ordinances similar to the ordinance in question. Such changes, however, are properly left for the legislative, not the judicial process.

4 . The district court did not differentiate between the rights of equal protection and due process afforded by the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, nor did the parties specifically rely on the federal or state Constitution in their briefs on appeal. Our analysis, however, applies equally to either clause.