City of Lackawanna v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment

42 Misc. 2d 58, 247 N.Y.S.2d 585, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1763
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 26, 1963
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 42 Misc. 2d 58 (City of Lackawanna v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Lackawanna v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 42 Misc. 2d 58, 247 N.Y.S.2d 585, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1763 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1963).

Opinion

Ellis J. Staley, Jr., J.

This is a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act and section 760 of the Real Property Tax Law to review a determination of the State Board of Equalization and Assessment of the State of New York which established an equalization rate of 25 on September 1, I960 for the City of Lackawanna, New York, based upon the 1959 assessment roll.

In establishing this equalization rate the respondent appraised the steel plant of Bethlehem Steel Company located at the westerly side of Hamburg Turnpike in the City of Lackawanna, [60]*60New York. The assessed valuation of this plant constitutes approximately 60% of the total assessed valuation of the real property on the 1959 assessment roll of the City of Lackawanna, New York. The parties have stipulated that if the respondent’s appraisal of this plant is substantially in error, then the equalization rate is substantially in error.

The main question in this proceeding is whether the structures located at the steel plant of the Bethlehem Steel Company in the City of Lackawanna described by the parties as consisting of: the blast furnace group; the open hearth furnace group; the coke oven group; the soaking pit group; the by-products group; the electrical and steam property and the ore bridges and unloaders were properly included as real property in the appraisal of the plant made by the respondent.

The petitioner contends that these items of property were not properly included in the respondent’s appraisal as real property and that they are exempt from real property taxation under the provisions of section 102 (subd. 12, par. [f]) of the Beal Property Tax Law as enacted by chapter 959 of the Laws of 1958.

This section provides as follows: “ 12. ‘ Beal property ’, property ’ or land ’ mean and include; * * * (f) Boilers, ventilating apparatus, elevators, plumbing, heating, lighting and power generating apparatus, shafting other than counter-shafting and equipment for the distribution of heat, light, power, gases and liquids, but shall not include movable machinery or equipment consisting of structures or erections to the operation of which machinery is essential, owned by a corporation taxable under article nine-a of the tax law, used for trade or manufacture and not essential for the support of the building, structure or superstructure, and removable without material injury thereto ”.

The respondent’s answer admits that the items of property in dispute are owned by Bethlehem Steel Company, a corporation taxable under article 9-a of the Tax Law and that these items are used by said company in the manufacture of steel and steel products.

Section 102 (subd. 12, par. [f]) of the Beal Property Tax Law is derived from former section 3 of the Tax Law and is a restatement of that prior section without any substantive change intended. The Beal Property Tax Law expressly provides in subdivision 5 of section 1602 that the new section is 1 ‘ intended to effectuate a continuation and restatement, without change in substance or effect, of the provisions of such laws and the classification of any property as real property or personal property, as the case may be, shall not be broadened, increased, dis[61]*61continued, diminished, affected or impaired by reason of such re-enactment.” Therefore, the interpretation of the prior law relative to the classification of property as either real or personal is pertinent to the issues raised herein.

The petitioner contends that the blast furnace group, the open hearth furnace group, the coke oven group, the soaking pit furnace group, the by-products group, the electrical equipment and blowing engines and the ore bridges and Hulett unloaders are machines or equipment consisting of a structure or erection to the operation of which machinery is essential, that they are not essential for the support of any building and that they are all movable without material injury or change to any building.

Item 1. Blast furnace group (7 blast furnaces, assessment $53,000,000) — In considering the application of section 102 (subd. 12, par. [f]) to the blast furnace group to determine its character as real or personal property, it appears to be a structure which requires machinery in its operation and, since it is a structure separate and distinct in itself, it is not essential to the support of any building, and if dismantled and moved, would not cause injury to any other building although it could cause material injury to the structure itself.

The basic issue is whether or not a blast furnace can be construed to be a “ movable machine or equipment ’ ’ within the meaning of the statute.

The petitioner has presented evidence to prove that blast furnaces have been moved from one site to another and from time to time they are offered for sale on the open market for dismantling and moving. The question is whether the fact that such a structure is capable of being dismantled, moved and reassembled meets the requirement of movability with the result that such a blast furnace should be included in the tax exemption provided by section 102 (subd. 12, par. [f]) of the Beal Property Tax Law.

In my opinion the section contemplates the inclusion of that type of machinery and equipment which in its use is auxiliary to the carrying on of the trade and manufacture of the taxpayer and which was contemplated by the taxpayer as capable of being removed as a separate entity from another immovable structure for further use at some other trade or manufacturing site. Therefore, if the original installation of the structure itself was with the intent of permanent annexation to the real property and continuous use at such site indefinitely in the course of trade and manufacture of the taxpayer, the item does not fall within the phrase “ movable machinery or equipment ” as provided by the statute.

[62]*62Blast furnaces qre generally immovable by intent and destined to remain attached to the realty for use during their usable period of existence. They do not possess the essential element of movability which includes the intent of their owner to transfer them from place to place if and when the original site is sold or abandoned. :

The petitioner relies mainly on the following cases: People ex rel. Ruppert Realty Corp. v. Cantor (115 Misc. 519, affd. 204 App. Div. 863); Matter of Leonhard Michel Brewing Co. v. Cantor (119 Misc: 854); People ex rel. International Salt Co. v. Matthews (Referee’s report unreported but attached to petitioner’s brief); Matter of Tri-County Asphalt & Stone Co. v. Town of Kingsbury (17 Misc 2d 437).

In the Ruppert case (supra)

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Bluebook (online)
42 Misc. 2d 58, 247 N.Y.S.2d 585, 1963 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1763, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-lackawanna-v-state-board-of-equalization-assessment-nysupct-1963.