City of Houston v. Melton

354 S.W.2d 387, 163 Tex. 294, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 230, 1962 Tex. LEXIS 722

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: January 31, 1962
• Docket: A-8538
• Status: Published

Opinions

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MEADE F. GRIFFIN

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Foy D. Melton, an inspector of police in the City of Houston, Texas, on October 20, 1959, was indefinitely suspended by the Chief of Police of said City. The Chief of Police in all things complied with the provisions of Art. 1269m, Sec. 16, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, known as the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Act. Melton appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and that body, after hearing all parties and their witnesses, upheld the suspension. Melton then appealed to a district court of Harris County, Texas, and that court, after a hearing, held that the order of the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called Commission) was not supported by substantial evidence and set the order aside for its failure to contain specific findings that Melton was guilty of each of the charges contained in the letter of the Chief of Police suspending Melton. The City and others appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court and reinstated Melton and ordered the City to pay to Melton his accumulated salary. The Court of Civil Appeals disagreed with the holding of the trial court that the charges on which Melton was tried before the Commission were not supported by substantial evidence, and held that five out of the six charges were supported by substantial evidence, but that charge No. 2 — or specification as it was designated by the Commission — was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the order of the Commislsion did not comply with the latter part of Art. 1269m, Sec. 16, providing that “no employee shall be suspended or dismissed by the Commission except for violation of the civil service rules, and except upon a finding by the Commission of the truth of the specific charges against such employee.” (Emphasis by Court of Civil Appeals), 347 S.W. 2d 643.

The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals contains a full, complete and clear statement of the facts and we shall set out only such facts herein as are necessary to properly understand our opinion.

The City complains of the action of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals by seven points of error. In our opinion, the point upon which this cause must be decided is whether or not the order of the Commission upholding the indefinite suspension of Melton is a finding of the truth of the six charges, or specifications, contained in the letter of the Chief of Police dismissing Melton. It was upon these charges that the Commission tried Melton, and on which the Commission heard evidence. The Court of Civil Appeals said that “while we do not mean to hold that the Commission must necessarily make separate findings on each charge, at least it is required that it make some type of finding that will inform us what charges it found to be true. If here the Commission had made a general finding that all charges were true, this would suffice, or if it had found all to be true except certain specified charges, it would suffice.” We agree with this statement of the law as applicable in this case, and we hold the Commission did find all charges to be true. Eddings v. Bichsel, Texas Civ. App., 1957, 320 S.W. 2d 197, no writ history. We agree also with the Court of Civil Appeals that there is in the record substantial evidence to support all of the six remaining specifications except Specification, or Charge No. 2. Any one of the five remaining specifications, if found to be true, would support the action of the Chief of Police and the Commission in indefinitely suspending Melton.

Let us now examine the order of the Commission in its entirety to determine whether or not it contains findings of the truth of the charges. The order begins by referring to the letter of the Chief of Police suspending Melton; it states that a copy of the letter is attached to the order and that the Commission had numbered the specifications for convenience in referring and identifying the specifications. After reciting certain preliminary steps taken to fix the date of hearing, and that all parties appeared in person and by attorney, the order sustains Melton’s motion to dismiss Specification No. 9. The order further recites that Specifications Nos. 7 and 8 were dismissed and not considered further; that the hearing proceeded on the remaining six specifications until both sides rested their respective cases. The order recites further that after both sides had closed, the Commission and its members considered and discussed among and between themselves all of the testimony adduced upon said hearing and conferred among themselves with respect thereto. This particular paragraph of the order concludes with the. following language: “* * * and the evidence as a whole leaves no doubt in our minds as to the substance (Commission’s emphasis) of the issues. Based on such evidence, as well as upon the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, we have no doubt that the said Foy D. Melton was guilty of improper and wrongful conduct, well unthin said Specifications remaining before us,” (emphasis ours) — those “specifications remaining” meaning only the six remaining specifications considered by the Commission.

This is a finding by the Commission that all the remaining six charges are true. The Commission’s underscoring and emphasis of the word “substance” precludes any question that it found the specifications to be true. Webster’s Third New Unabridged International Dictionary, 1961, defines “substance” as follows: “a fundamental part, quality or aspect: essential quality or import; the characteristic and essential part.” The order then continues with the following language, “based on such evidence * * * we have no doubt that the said Foy D. Melton was guilty of improper and wrongful conduct, well within said Specifications remaining before us.” (Emphasis ours.) The language “well within” was here used in the sense of “as alleged”, or “as contained”. This is a specific finding of guilt of wrongful and improper conduct charged in each and all six specifications on which Melton was tried. The fact that Specification No. 2 is not supported by substantial evidence does not set aside the Commission’s finding of guilt as to the other five.

Respondent Melton relies on Thompson v. Railroad Commission, 150 Texas 307, 240 S.W. 2d 759 (1951) as authority for his position that the order of the Civil Service Commission in our case is not sufficient compliance with the requirements of Art. 1269m, Sec. 16, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes. The statute in the Thompson case provided that the order of the Railroad Commission should be void unless the Railroad Commission “shall set forth in its order full and complete findings of fact pointing out in detail the inadequacies of the services and facilities of the existing carriers, and the public need for the proposed service”. We find no language of like or similar import in Art. 1269m, Sec. 16. There is no requirement that failure to set out detailed findings shall make void the order of the Commission. The requirement is that the Commission must make a finding of the truth of the specific charges against such employee, and a careful analysis points up the fact that the order is based upon such findings. The order permanently dismissed Melton from the police force of the City of Houston as is required by the provisions of Art. 1269m, Sec. 16.

Melton also relies on the case of United States of America v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, 294 U.S. 499, 79 L. Ed. 1023 (1935), to support his position. We have examined that case and it is not in point. No requisite findings were made in that case, whereas in the case at bar the necessary findings were made.

The order of the Commission set out the facts and expressly made findings showing the jurisdiction of that body to conduct the hearing. There is no complaint in the instant case attacking the jurisdiction of the Commission to act.

The judgment of the trial court setting aside the order of the Civil Service Commission and reinstating Melton and ordering the City to pay him his accrued salary, and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirming the judgment of the trial court, is hereby reversed and judgment is rendered that Foy D. Melton take nothing.

Opinion delivered January 31, 1962.