ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
We are asked by the county court of increased jurisdiction of Walsh County to resolve the single question of law certified to this court under the provisions of Chapter 32-24, N.D.C.C.:
[880]*880“1. Is Ordinance No. 339 of the City of Grafton preempted by the North Dakota Obscenity Control Statute (Chapter 12.1 — 27.1, North Dakota Century Code) thus prohibiting the City of Grafton from enforcing Ordinance No. 339?”
The defendant, Four G’s, Inc., was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Grafton, North Dakota, of a violation of Ordinance No. 339 of the city of Grafton. The municipal court found that on March 22, 1976, the violation of the ordinance occurred as follows:
“That at the said time and place the said defendant did wilfully, wrongfully and unlawfully employ or use the services of a hostess or entertainer while such hostess or entertainer was unclothed or in such attire, costume or clothing as to expose to view a portion of the female breast below the top of the areola and a portion of the pubic hair, and the cleft of the buttocks . . .”
This language is from Ordinance No. 339, supra.1
The conviction was appealed to the Walsh county court of increased jurisdiction, which court asks us to determine whether this ordinance is invalid as having been preempted by the enactment in 1975 of [881]*881Chapter 12.1-27.1, N.D.C.C. A section of that chapter provides:
“This chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state, and no political subdivision shall enact new, or enforce existing, ordinances, or resolutions regulating or prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials, or controlling obscene performances.” (Emphasis by the Court.) § 12.1-27.1-12, N.D.C.C.
Chapter 5-02, N.D.C.C., dealing with the retail licensing of the sale of alcoholic beverages, specifically involves the local governing body in the licensing process, providing for both state and local licenses. Section 5-02-01, N.D.C.C. In conjunction with such licensing power, the local governing body is explicitly empowered to regulate the operation of its licensees:
“The local governing body by ordinance or resolution may regulate or restrict the operation of licensees including among other things determining the number of licenses to be granted, establishing health and safety standards for licensed premises, setting of hours and prohibition of dancing or various forms of entertainment on the premises.” (Emphasis by the Court.) § 5-02-09, N.D.C.C.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Midtown Palace, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 193 Neb. 785, 229 N.W.2d 56 (1975), held that an Omaha ordinance substantially similar to Ordinance No. 339 of the city of Grafton was not rendered void by the enactment of the State statute preempting the area of obscenity with specific reference to live performances. That court decided that the city ordinance in question there did not declare nudity to be obscene, but attempted to control nudity as a technique in selling liquor, finding the latter to be legitimate object. Id. at 229 N.W.2d 59.
Unlike the Nebraska statutory scheme relating to obscenity, the North Dakota Century Code chapter on obscenity control specifically relates to liquor establishments licensed by the local governing body:
“3. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he, as owner or manager of an establishment licensed under section 5-02-01, permits an obscene performance in his establishment. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he participates, whether or not for compensation, in an obscene performance in an establishment licensed under section 5— 02-01.” § 12.1-27.1-01(3), N.D.C.C.
Section 5-02-09, N.D.C.C., a special statute delegating the power to regulate or restrict the operation of liquor licensees would prevail over Section 12.1-27.1-12, N.D.C.C., which is a general preemption statute, if only these two statutes were involved. Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C. However, Section 12.1-27.1-12 must be read in conjunction with Section 12.1-27.1-01(3), quoted above.
Section 12.1-27.1-01(3) was enacted in 1975, eight years after the enactment of Section 5-02-09. In order to give full force to the later enacted provision, it appears that there must be an appropriation by the State of some regulatory power previously delegated to the local governing body through the earlier statute. This court is ill disposed to finding repeals by implication of one statute by another. E.g., Rodgers v. Freborg, 240 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1976); Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974). See 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.10 (4th ed. 1972).
“There must be a clear repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and the old statute to such an extent that a necessary implication arises that the legislature by enactment of the latter Act intended to repeal the former, and then only to the extent of its repugnancy.” First American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 98 (1972).
Accord, State v. Hagge, 224 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1974).
The fundamental test, however, in determining whether a statute has been repealed by implication through a later enactment, is the intent of the legislature. State v. Hagge, supra, at 564. In order to properly [882]*882develop the legislative history of Chapter 12.1-27.1, N.D.C.C., we must go back to its genesis, a 1973-1975 interim study by the Committee on Judiciary “A” of the North Dakota Legislative Council.
The previous North Dakota obscenity control statutes were held unconstitutional by the Federal District Court in McCright v. Olson, 367 F.Supp. 937 (D.N.D.1973). This may have precipitated the legislation under consideration today.
Several alternative drafts of obscenity legislation were before the committee. After a review of the alternatives, it was suggested that, since live pornographic entertainment presented different problems than other types of pornography, different methodologies should be used to handle each situation, particularly with reference to live performances. Minutes of the Committee on Judiciary “A”, North Dakota Legislative Council, September 5-6,1974, at 5. It was also suggested that the committee staff draft a separate bill dealing with performances in liquor establishments and reference was made to a California statute which rested on the fact that the State licensed liquor establishments. Id. at 7. The staff prepared a composite draft at the direction of the committee which included the following provision:
“3.
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ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
We are asked by the county court of increased jurisdiction of Walsh County to resolve the single question of law certified to this court under the provisions of Chapter 32-24, N.D.C.C.:
[880]*880“1. Is Ordinance No. 339 of the City of Grafton preempted by the North Dakota Obscenity Control Statute (Chapter 12.1 — 27.1, North Dakota Century Code) thus prohibiting the City of Grafton from enforcing Ordinance No. 339?”
The defendant, Four G’s, Inc., was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Grafton, North Dakota, of a violation of Ordinance No. 339 of the city of Grafton. The municipal court found that on March 22, 1976, the violation of the ordinance occurred as follows:
“That at the said time and place the said defendant did wilfully, wrongfully and unlawfully employ or use the services of a hostess or entertainer while such hostess or entertainer was unclothed or in such attire, costume or clothing as to expose to view a portion of the female breast below the top of the areola and a portion of the pubic hair, and the cleft of the buttocks . . .”
This language is from Ordinance No. 339, supra.1
The conviction was appealed to the Walsh county court of increased jurisdiction, which court asks us to determine whether this ordinance is invalid as having been preempted by the enactment in 1975 of [881]*881Chapter 12.1-27.1, N.D.C.C. A section of that chapter provides:
“This chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state, and no political subdivision shall enact new, or enforce existing, ordinances, or resolutions regulating or prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials, or controlling obscene performances.” (Emphasis by the Court.) § 12.1-27.1-12, N.D.C.C.
Chapter 5-02, N.D.C.C., dealing with the retail licensing of the sale of alcoholic beverages, specifically involves the local governing body in the licensing process, providing for both state and local licenses. Section 5-02-01, N.D.C.C. In conjunction with such licensing power, the local governing body is explicitly empowered to regulate the operation of its licensees:
“The local governing body by ordinance or resolution may regulate or restrict the operation of licensees including among other things determining the number of licenses to be granted, establishing health and safety standards for licensed premises, setting of hours and prohibition of dancing or various forms of entertainment on the premises.” (Emphasis by the Court.) § 5-02-09, N.D.C.C.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Midtown Palace, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 193 Neb. 785, 229 N.W.2d 56 (1975), held that an Omaha ordinance substantially similar to Ordinance No. 339 of the city of Grafton was not rendered void by the enactment of the State statute preempting the area of obscenity with specific reference to live performances. That court decided that the city ordinance in question there did not declare nudity to be obscene, but attempted to control nudity as a technique in selling liquor, finding the latter to be legitimate object. Id. at 229 N.W.2d 59.
Unlike the Nebraska statutory scheme relating to obscenity, the North Dakota Century Code chapter on obscenity control specifically relates to liquor establishments licensed by the local governing body:
“3. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he, as owner or manager of an establishment licensed under section 5-02-01, permits an obscene performance in his establishment. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he participates, whether or not for compensation, in an obscene performance in an establishment licensed under section 5— 02-01.” § 12.1-27.1-01(3), N.D.C.C.
Section 5-02-09, N.D.C.C., a special statute delegating the power to regulate or restrict the operation of liquor licensees would prevail over Section 12.1-27.1-12, N.D.C.C., which is a general preemption statute, if only these two statutes were involved. Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C. However, Section 12.1-27.1-12 must be read in conjunction with Section 12.1-27.1-01(3), quoted above.
Section 12.1-27.1-01(3) was enacted in 1975, eight years after the enactment of Section 5-02-09. In order to give full force to the later enacted provision, it appears that there must be an appropriation by the State of some regulatory power previously delegated to the local governing body through the earlier statute. This court is ill disposed to finding repeals by implication of one statute by another. E.g., Rodgers v. Freborg, 240 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1976); Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974). See 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.10 (4th ed. 1972).
“There must be a clear repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and the old statute to such an extent that a necessary implication arises that the legislature by enactment of the latter Act intended to repeal the former, and then only to the extent of its repugnancy.” First American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84, 98 (1972).
Accord, State v. Hagge, 224 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1974).
The fundamental test, however, in determining whether a statute has been repealed by implication through a later enactment, is the intent of the legislature. State v. Hagge, supra, at 564. In order to properly [882]*882develop the legislative history of Chapter 12.1-27.1, N.D.C.C., we must go back to its genesis, a 1973-1975 interim study by the Committee on Judiciary “A” of the North Dakota Legislative Council.
The previous North Dakota obscenity control statutes were held unconstitutional by the Federal District Court in McCright v. Olson, 367 F.Supp. 937 (D.N.D.1973). This may have precipitated the legislation under consideration today.
Several alternative drafts of obscenity legislation were before the committee. After a review of the alternatives, it was suggested that, since live pornographic entertainment presented different problems than other types of pornography, different methodologies should be used to handle each situation, particularly with reference to live performances. Minutes of the Committee on Judiciary “A”, North Dakota Legislative Council, September 5-6,1974, at 5. It was also suggested that the committee staff draft a separate bill dealing with performances in liquor establishments and reference was made to a California statute which rested on the fact that the State licensed liquor establishments. Id. at 7. The staff prepared a composite draft at the direction of the committee which included the following provision:
“3. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he, as owner or manager of an establishment licensed under section 5-02-01, permits, an obscene performance in his establishment. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he participates, whether or not for compensation, in an obscene performance in an establishment licensed under section 5-02-01.” Appendix “C”, Minutes of the Committee on Judiciary “A”, North Dakota Legislative Council, September 30-0ctober 1, 1974 at 1.
This comment followed the above provision as set forth in Appendix “C”:
“STAFF COMMENT: This subsection is in accordance with Chief Anderson’s suggestions at the last meeting, and is an attempt to take advantage of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 [93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342] (1972), wherein the Court upheld California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control regulations prohibiting explicitly sexual live entertainment or films in bars, basing its decision on the States’ power to control the manner in which liquor is dispensed under the Twenty-first Amendment.” Id. at 2.
The section relating to obscene performances in licensed liquor establishments as set forth in the above draft is identical to Section 12.1-27.1-01(3), N.D.C.C., supra.
In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), the United States Supreme Court case mentioned in the staff comment quoted above, it was held that certain rules adopted by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control were not limited by the Supreme Court’s decisions as to obscenity, and were not violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court held that the State regulatory authority was not limited by the constitutional guidelines in obscenity cases, as the States have authority somewhat broader than police power alone in regulating intoxicating liquors under the Twenty-first Amendment. While LaRue conceivably gives the State of North Dakota wider latitude than it chose to exercise under Section 12.1-27.1-01(3), as the legislature chose to apply the obscenity standard to performances in liquor establishments licensed under Section 5-02-01, N.D.C.C., the breadth of LaRue under different statutory provisions is not before us and thus cannot be decided in this case.
When we consider Section 12.1-27.1-12, N.D.C.C., which prohibits political subdivisions from enacting or enforcing existing ordinances regulating or prohibiting the dissemination of obscene material or controlling obscene performances in light of Section 12.1-27.1-01(3) which declares that a person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he, as owner or manager of an establishment licensed under Section 5-02-01, N.D. [883]*883C.C. (relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages at retail), permits an obscene performance in his establishment, we must conclude that the legislature intended to prohibit municipalities from attempting to control obscenity not only generally, but also specifically in establishments licensed under Chapter 5-02, N.D.C.C. It is significant also that much of the rest of Section 12.1-27.1-01, N.D.C.C., relates to the same conduct prohibited by the ordinance here under attack.2
Our decision today should not delay the prosecution of obscene performances by the State, as Section 12.1-27.1-05, which requires a civil determination prior to a criminal prosecution, does not relate to obscene performances but relates to the dissemination or production of material.3
For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the answer to the certified question is yes, and that Ordinance No. 339 is preempted by the North Dakota Obscenity Control statute, Chapter 12.1-27.1, N.D.C.C.
SAND, PAULSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur.