City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System v. Holley Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedMarch 20, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-00148
StatusUnknown

This text of City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System v. Holley Inc. (City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System v. Holley Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System v. Holley Inc., (W.D. Ky. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00148-GNS

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE GENERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated PLAINTIFF

v.

HOLLEY INC. f/k/a EMPOWER LTD. et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DN 41, 42) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemented Amended Complaint (DN 55). The motions are ripe for adjudication. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees’ Retirement System (“Retirement System”) filed this putative class action, as Lead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) against Defendants Holley Inc. f/k/a Empower Ltd. (“Holley”), Tom Tomlinson, and Dominic Bardos (collectively, “Defendants”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 22-29, DN 36). Because Defendants allegedly engaged in wrongful acts and omissions that resulted in the decline in the value of Holley’s securities, the Retirement System claims that it and other class members suffered losses and damages. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-105). Defendants allegedly made materially false statements about Holley’s growth, business, and future prospects regarding its “minimum advertised pricing” (“MAP”) and reseller relationship leverage strategies when growth was, in fact, “unsustainable.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, 32-105). These alleged false or misleading statements later came to light when the quarterly report showed a drop in valuation and financial results, a decline in sales, and multiple members of Holley leadership left the company. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-16, 32-105). The Retirement System filed its Amended Complaint after this Court granted the parties’ joint stipulation, and Defendants moved to dismiss the claims for failing to state a claim under various federal securities laws including various sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

(“Exchange Act”). (Order 1-2, DN 31; Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl., DN 42; see generally Am. Compl.). The Retirement System has moved to file a Proposed Supplemented Amended Complaint to add additional allegations from statements made by Holley’s leadership. (Pl.’s Mot. Leave Suppl. Am. Compl., DN 55). II. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction of this matter based upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemented Amended Complaint

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) provides in pertinent part: “On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Supreme Court has ruled that “Rule 15(d) . . . plainly permits supplemental amendments to cover events happening after suit . . . .” Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964) (internal footnote omitted). The standard for granting leave to supplement under Rule 15(d) is the same as the standard governing leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2). Spies v. Voinovich, 48 F. App’x 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2002). The granting of a motion to file a supplemental pleading is within the discretion of the trial court, and courts typically grant such applications. Martinez v. Hiland, No. 5:13-CV-P182-GNS, 2017 WL 939009, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2017) (citations omitted); Vaughan v. Erwin, No. 1:18- CV-P17-GNS, 2019 WL 2011053, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 7, 2019) (citation omitted). A court may deny a motion to supplement where it contains “a new legal theory, not just events that occurred

after the complaint.” Koukios v. Ganson, 229 F.3d 1152, 2000 WL 1175499, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (citations omitted). Additionally, “leave to supplement may be denied if it would be fairer and more orderly to let the plaintiff raise the new claim(s) in another lawsuit.” Martinez, 2017 WL 939009, at *2 (citation omitted). A supplemental pleading may include new facts, new claims, new defenses, and new parties. Vaughan, 2019 WL 2011053, at *1 (citation omitted). The events do not need to arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim but must have some relationship to the original pleading. Id. (citing Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Kimbell, 250 F.R.D. 397, 402 (E.D. Wis. 2008)). In considering whether to allow a plaintiff to supplement his complaint, a court

should consider: (1) undue delay in filing the motion; (2) lack of notice to adverse parties; (3) whether the movant is acting in bad faith or with a dilatory motive; (4) failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (5) the possibility of undue prejudice to adverse parties; and (6) whether amendment is futile. Bromley v. Mich. Educ. Ass’n-NEA, 178 F.R.D. 148, 154 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (citations omitted). When “the original pleading placed the defendant on notice that the disputed conduct was of a continuing nature, the supplemental complaint should be allowed.” Id. (citation omitted). 1. Proposed Revisions The Proposed Supplemented Amended Complaint clarifies or rewords previous allegations in the Amended Complaint and adds allegations regarding statements by current Holley CEO, Matthew Stevenson (“Stevenson”), about Holley’s lack of adherence to pricing discipline that harmed reseller relationships and its MAP plan. (Pl.’s Mot. Leave Suppl. Am. Compl. Ex. A, at

¶¶ 5-6, 16, 37, 39, 42-45, 54, 89, 108-112, 123, 134, 145, 152, 160, 174, 191, 194, 204, 220-233, 238, 253, 278, 284, DN 55-1 [hereinafter Proposed Suppl. Am. Compl.]). Defendants only oppose this amended pleading on the basis of futility. (Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Leave Suppl. Am. Compl. 1-3, DN 56); Degolia v. Kenton Cnty., 381 F. Supp. 3d 740, 759-60 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (“As a practical matter, ‘it is well understood . . . that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.’”). As a preliminary matter, Defendants cite Kuyat v. BioMimetic Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2014), and Miller v. Champion Enterprises Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 692 (6th Cir. 2003),

for the proposition that the “usual liberal standards under Rule 15 do not apply to cases governed by the PSLRA.” (Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Leave Suppl. Am. Compl. 1-3, 9-14). In Kuyat, the Sixth Circuit did not discourage amendments but cautioned courts not to ignore a party’s potential motives, noting “Rule 15’s permissive amendment policy should not permit plaintiffs to ‘use the court as a sounding board to discover holes in their arguments, then reopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court’s decision.’” Kuyat, 747 F.3d at 445 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit also warned that “the purpose of the PSLRA would be frustrated if district courts were required to allow repeated amendments to complaints filed under the PSLRA.” Miller, 346 F.3d at 692.

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City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System v. Holley Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-fort-lauderdale-general-employees-retirement-system-v-holley-inc-kywd-2025.