City of East Peoria v. Colianni & Dire Co.

78 N.E.2d 806, 334 Ill. App. 108, 1948 Ill. App. LEXIS 297
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 8, 1948
DocketGen. No. 9,523
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 78 N.E.2d 806 (City of East Peoria v. Colianni & Dire Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of East Peoria v. Colianni & Dire Co., 78 N.E.2d 806, 334 Ill. App. 108, 1948 Ill. App. LEXIS 297 (Ill. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinion

Mb. Pbesidihg Justice Wheat

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case involves an action by the city of Bast Peoria, appellant, against Colianni & Dire Co., a contractor, and its surety Continental Casualty Co., appellees, for damages for breach of a contract to build a sanitary sewer system. This suit was consolidated with a subsequent action brought by the contractor against the City for damages and extras. The master in chancery recommended judgment for the City in the sum of $122,637.33. The City appeals from a decree of the circuit court sustaining exceptions to the master’s report and entering judgment against the City in the sum of $52,459.82.

The complaint of the City, filed August 31, 1939, alleges that on October 24, 1938, the City entered into a contract with the defendant contractor for the construction of a sewer system; that the defendant Continental Casualty Co. was surety upon the performance bond; that the contractor started work, but on July 24, 1939, wilfully stopped work and refused to perform its contract; that by virtue of certain provisions of the contract, the City served notice of intention to terminate such contract for breach, and upon further refusal of the contractor to perform, did effect such termination; that the surety elected not to take over the contract; that time is of the essence of the contract and that construction was to have been completed by October 24,1939; that such work should be finished to avoid unfavorable working conditions and to avoid danger of loss of a P.W.A. grant; that a new contract must be let for the completion of -the work; that the letting thereof, performance thereunder, and the fixing of damages on account of breach by defendant should be under the supervision of a court of equity. The complaint prayed, among other things, for an accounting to fix damages. The answer of the contractor admitted the execution of thé contract and bond and that it began performance; denied that it refused to complete the contract; charged that the City wilfully hampered and obstructed the defendant in its work; that despite such hindrance it continued working until October 28, 1939, at which time the City compelled it to stop work; and denied that the contractor had defaulted. As an alternative defense the answer denied that the contract was valid and enforceable. The answer of the Continental Casualty Co. adopted, in general, the position taken by the contractor.

The complaint of the contractor charged that the City, its officers, and its engineers, conspired to conceal subsurface conditions, as a result of which no meeting of the minds occurred and no valid contract existed. It prayed that it be compensated for work done, for damages suffered, and for loss of profits. The City filed an answer generally denying these allegations.

The general picture of the situation may be completed with the following statements, based on the evidence. On October 24,1938, a contract was entered into by the City and the contractor for the construction of a sanitary sewer system. The contract provided for payment on the basis of “unit prices” rather than a lump sum for the entire work. The quantities were estimated for the purpose of comparison of bids and for fixing the amount of the performance bond. Such total estimate, by defendant contractor’s bid, totaled $309,990.50, and a bond for such amount was furnished by the contractor, with Continental Casualty Co. as surety. • The contractor completed about 42 per cent of the work under contract. Thereafter, the City advertised for bids to complete the work and on October 31, 1939, awarded a contract to H. C. Willadsen Construction Co., at substantially higher unit prices than those in the Colianni contract. Willadsen'performed about 52 per cent of his contract and work was stopped because the City’s funds were exhausted. This percentage of 52 per cent amounted to about 30 per cent of the. work covered by the Colianni contract. About 28 per cent of the work contracted for by Colianni has never been built. The work performed by Willadsen had a value of $166,281.53, but would have had a value of only $94,123.25 if it had been performed by Colianni under its contract with lower unit prices, so that the additional cost to the City for work done by Willadsen was $72,158.28. The work uncompleted by both contractors, if performed by the unit prices under the Willadsen contract would have cost $146,117.17, and under the Colianni contract unit prices would have cost $86,375.10, a difference amounting to $59,742.07.

One of the contentions made by defendant contractor is that the contract was not breached by it but by the City. It is urged that any delay was occasioned by the insufficiency of the plans and specifications, by reason of which the City’s engineer frequently made substantial changes in them, redesigning the sewer system piecemeal in advance of operation by the contractor. The case of Sperry v. Fanning, 80 Ill. 371, is cited in support of this contention. In cited case, however, the issue concerned certain buildings and changes to be made therein, without any responsibility on the contractor to previously appraise the job to determine conditions for himself. The facts in the instant case are different. The contractor argues that the plans and specifications should have indicated the underground obstructions and underground conditions to be encountered, including water and gas mains, storm sewers, culverts, tunnels, telephone conduits, public and private utilities, and that borings should have been made to indicate the type of subsoil material, including quicksand. The fact that these were not shown but were in fact encountered forms the basis for many of the contractor’s claims for extra compensation, and is directly involved in the termination of the contract. In this latter connection, the contractor, after encountering certain wet and soft underground-conditions, refused to proceed with performance unless compensated on a cost plus basis rather than on his unit price bid. It is noted that these plans and specifications had the prior approval of the P.W.A. and the Illinois Department of Public Health. In addition to this, the instructions to bidders (made a part of the contract) provide as follows:

“(9) unusual conditions: The contractor shall examine the location of the work and determine for himself the nature of any unusual conditions affecting the cost of the work to be performed, and shall include in his bid the cost thereof, it being understood that no additional payment is to made therefor. . . .
(11) bidder’s responsibility for conditions of work and site. Each bidder shall examine the plans and contract documents, visit the location of the work, examine the ground and site of the work and fully inform himself of all natural and legal conditions affecting the cost of the work to be performed including all subsurface or underground conditions that may be encountered, and shall make his own estimate of such costs and include .same in his bid. It is understood that the bidder has taken all probable costs into consideration in the preparation of his bid and no additional compensation is to be paid him therefor.”

Responsive to these instructions the defendant’s proposal (a part of the contract) commences with this language:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

R & R Construction Co. v. Junior College District No. 529
370 N.E.2d 599 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1977)
De Vito v. Village of Elburn
184 N.E.2d 890 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1962)
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. State
170 A.2d 274 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
78 N.E.2d 806, 334 Ill. App. 108, 1948 Ill. App. LEXIS 297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-east-peoria-v-colianni-dire-co-illappct-1948.