T. M. Burns, J.
Defendant-appellant Gregory M. Pillon filed income tax returns with the city of Detroit pursuant to his obligation under § 21-8-5(a), Detroit city code, for the years 1963 and 1965 showing a total tax due for the two years of approxi
mately $65 but would not pay the taxes due. Defendant was found guilty in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit of wilful refusal to pay the taxes due which is a misdemeanor subject to a fine of $500 and imprisonment for a period not exceeding 90 days.
Defendant, an attorney, does not attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the tax nor does he deny his obligation to pay the tax.
He asserts that criminal sanctions may not be used to enforce payment of taxes. He also contends that although he refused to pay for the purpose of testing the legality of the penalty, his conduct cannot be termed “wilful” for penal purposes.
According to the defendant, “wilfulness” when used in a criminal statute requires some “evil intent” or “bad purpose.” He claims this intent was not evil because he had visions of poor persons unable to pay their taxes being imprisoned for failing to pay under the ordinance. We agree that some element of a “bad purpose” must be present to make the conduct subject to criminal sanctions. We conclude, however, that it is a sufficiently “bad purpose” that a taxpayer deliberately not pay the tax due when he knew he ought to pay. We are supported in our conclusion by the federal cases dealing with similar provisions in the federal income tax (Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §7203). We would call particular attention to
United States
v.
Litman
(CA 3, 1957), 246 F2d 206,
cert den
355 US 869 (78 S Ct 118, 2 L Ed 2d 75), where a jury instruction as to “bad purpose” quite similar to our standard was upheld, and also the case of
United States
v.
Murdock
(1933), 290 US 389 (54 S Ct 223, 78 L Ed 381), wherein the standard of wilfulness under the federal tax statutes was given full examination.
The United States Supreme Court said there, p 394, “The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act”. The conduct of the appellant in refusing to pay the tax which he admits is due certainly comes within the meaning of “bad purpose” in the concept of wilfulness under the ordinance even if his avowed purpose in challenging the constitutionality of the penalty might be considered by some to be laudable.
Defendant asserts that he refused to pay his tax and began his quixotic campaign to challenge the penalty section because he had visions of troops of poor people, who were unable to pay their taxes, being imprisoned for the failure to pay. In this, defendant has misconstrued the scope and coverage of the ordinance, for as the city-appellee asserts, mere nonpayment of a tax is not made a crime by the ordinance, particularly where inability is because of conditions beyond the taxpayer’s own control.
The nonpayment penalty provisions in the federal income tax code have consistently been interpreted that way and we certainly agree. See
United States
v.
Palermo,
(ED Pa, 1957) 152 F Supp 825, note 9. See also,
Spies
v.
United States
(1943), 317 US 492, (63 S Ct 364, 87 L Ed 418).
The appellant never asserted any inability to pay the approximately $65 due. He admitted his purpose in not paying was to be convicted so that he might challenge the penalty sections which he claims are in conflict with Const 1963, art 1, § 21.4
We do not find it so. Initially we would point out that Const 1908, art 2, § 20, which was in effect through 1963, did not forbid imprisonment for debt where the money was to be collected by public officers. The constitutional convention comments as found in 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3365 (1 MOLA p 752, 1 Stat Ann 1960 Rev p 427) indicate that although this specific language was dropped, it was considered excess verbiage and no change in prior law was intended.
Const 1963, art 1, § 21, adopted the prior law which was that such provisions prohibit imprisonment for a debt only where it arises from a contract.
People
v.
White
(1884), 53 Mich 537. See
Dallos
v.
Garras
(1943), 306 Mich 313. Imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes then is not prohibited by Const 1963, art 1, § 21, for as the Michigan Supreme Court said in
Thompson
v.
Auditor General
(1933), 261 Mich 624, 641: “Taxes are not contractual obligations of the taxpayer to the state. Taxation is a method of raising revenue to support the government.” We find, therefore, that Const 1963, art 1, § 21 has no application to the penalty sections of the uniform city income tax act as adopted by the city of Detroit in the ordinance before this Court.
We are encouraged to make this finding by the fact that similar provisions in the constitutions of other states have consistently been interpreted in a like manner.
The rule is stated in 51 Am Jur, § 980, p 857.
“A tax is not a debt in the sense of an obligation incurred by contract, express or implied, and therefore is not within the meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions abolishing or prohibiting imprisonment for debt, and a statute or ordinance which punishes the nonpayment thereof by fine or imprisonment is not in conflict with that prohibition”.
This same rule has been upheld in the federal courts whether faced with state or federal matters. The district court in
United States
v.
Palermo, supra,
made this clear when it said (p 828), “it has been repeatedly held that neither the 13th Amendment nor any other Constitutional or statutory provision prevents imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes”.
As we have found that the trial court could properly have found that the defendant “wilfully refused” to pay the taxes due and that imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes does not violate the provision of the Michigan Constitution which prohibits imprisonment for debt, we are left with his vague assertions that the imposition of criminal as well as civil sanctions for nonpayment of a tax denies due process under both state and federal constitutions. The appellant would have us attempt to limit the
means of collection of the tax to the civil remedies and penalties provided. This we do not have power to do, for the power to devise means of enforcing collection and payment of taxes is vested in the legislative departments just as certainly as the power to impose the tax.
Thompson
v.
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T. M. Burns, J.
Defendant-appellant Gregory M. Pillon filed income tax returns with the city of Detroit pursuant to his obligation under § 21-8-5(a), Detroit city code, for the years 1963 and 1965 showing a total tax due for the two years of approxi
mately $65 but would not pay the taxes due. Defendant was found guilty in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit of wilful refusal to pay the taxes due which is a misdemeanor subject to a fine of $500 and imprisonment for a period not exceeding 90 days.
Defendant, an attorney, does not attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the tax nor does he deny his obligation to pay the tax.
He asserts that criminal sanctions may not be used to enforce payment of taxes. He also contends that although he refused to pay for the purpose of testing the legality of the penalty, his conduct cannot be termed “wilful” for penal purposes.
According to the defendant, “wilfulness” when used in a criminal statute requires some “evil intent” or “bad purpose.” He claims this intent was not evil because he had visions of poor persons unable to pay their taxes being imprisoned for failing to pay under the ordinance. We agree that some element of a “bad purpose” must be present to make the conduct subject to criminal sanctions. We conclude, however, that it is a sufficiently “bad purpose” that a taxpayer deliberately not pay the tax due when he knew he ought to pay. We are supported in our conclusion by the federal cases dealing with similar provisions in the federal income tax (Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §7203). We would call particular attention to
United States
v.
Litman
(CA 3, 1957), 246 F2d 206,
cert den
355 US 869 (78 S Ct 118, 2 L Ed 2d 75), where a jury instruction as to “bad purpose” quite similar to our standard was upheld, and also the case of
United States
v.
Murdock
(1933), 290 US 389 (54 S Ct 223, 78 L Ed 381), wherein the standard of wilfulness under the federal tax statutes was given full examination.
The United States Supreme Court said there, p 394, “The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act”. The conduct of the appellant in refusing to pay the tax which he admits is due certainly comes within the meaning of “bad purpose” in the concept of wilfulness under the ordinance even if his avowed purpose in challenging the constitutionality of the penalty might be considered by some to be laudable.
Defendant asserts that he refused to pay his tax and began his quixotic campaign to challenge the penalty section because he had visions of troops of poor people, who were unable to pay their taxes, being imprisoned for the failure to pay. In this, defendant has misconstrued the scope and coverage of the ordinance, for as the city-appellee asserts, mere nonpayment of a tax is not made a crime by the ordinance, particularly where inability is because of conditions beyond the taxpayer’s own control.
The nonpayment penalty provisions in the federal income tax code have consistently been interpreted that way and we certainly agree. See
United States
v.
Palermo,
(ED Pa, 1957) 152 F Supp 825, note 9. See also,
Spies
v.
United States
(1943), 317 US 492, (63 S Ct 364, 87 L Ed 418).
The appellant never asserted any inability to pay the approximately $65 due. He admitted his purpose in not paying was to be convicted so that he might challenge the penalty sections which he claims are in conflict with Const 1963, art 1, § 21.4
We do not find it so. Initially we would point out that Const 1908, art 2, § 20, which was in effect through 1963, did not forbid imprisonment for debt where the money was to be collected by public officers. The constitutional convention comments as found in 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3365 (1 MOLA p 752, 1 Stat Ann 1960 Rev p 427) indicate that although this specific language was dropped, it was considered excess verbiage and no change in prior law was intended.
Const 1963, art 1, § 21, adopted the prior law which was that such provisions prohibit imprisonment for a debt only where it arises from a contract.
People
v.
White
(1884), 53 Mich 537. See
Dallos
v.
Garras
(1943), 306 Mich 313. Imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes then is not prohibited by Const 1963, art 1, § 21, for as the Michigan Supreme Court said in
Thompson
v.
Auditor General
(1933), 261 Mich 624, 641: “Taxes are not contractual obligations of the taxpayer to the state. Taxation is a method of raising revenue to support the government.” We find, therefore, that Const 1963, art 1, § 21 has no application to the penalty sections of the uniform city income tax act as adopted by the city of Detroit in the ordinance before this Court.
We are encouraged to make this finding by the fact that similar provisions in the constitutions of other states have consistently been interpreted in a like manner.
The rule is stated in 51 Am Jur, § 980, p 857.
“A tax is not a debt in the sense of an obligation incurred by contract, express or implied, and therefore is not within the meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions abolishing or prohibiting imprisonment for debt, and a statute or ordinance which punishes the nonpayment thereof by fine or imprisonment is not in conflict with that prohibition”.
This same rule has been upheld in the federal courts whether faced with state or federal matters. The district court in
United States
v.
Palermo, supra,
made this clear when it said (p 828), “it has been repeatedly held that neither the 13th Amendment nor any other Constitutional or statutory provision prevents imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes”.
As we have found that the trial court could properly have found that the defendant “wilfully refused” to pay the taxes due and that imprisonment for nonpayment of taxes does not violate the provision of the Michigan Constitution which prohibits imprisonment for debt, we are left with his vague assertions that the imposition of criminal as well as civil sanctions for nonpayment of a tax denies due process under both state and federal constitutions. The appellant would have us attempt to limit the
means of collection of the tax to the civil remedies and penalties provided. This we do not have power to do, for the power to devise means of enforcing collection and payment of taxes is vested in the legislative departments just as certainly as the power to impose the tax.
Thompson
v.
Auditor General, supra; Spies
v.
United States, supra.
The state legislature of Michigan by PA 1964, No 284, MCLA §§ 141.501-141.699 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp §§ 5-.3194[1]-5.3194[109]) unequivocally authorized both civil and criminal enforcement of the collection of city income tax. The defendant contends that because a recalcitrant “taxpayer” might be subjected to both the civil and criminal penalties, the ordinance somehow denies him due process. The principle that criminal sanctions may be had in addition to all other sanctions, in an accumulation of collection enforcement weapons, has been approved by the United States Supreme Court,
Helvering
v.
Mitchell
(1937), 303 US 391 (58 S Ct 630, 82 L Ed 917);
Spies
v.
United States, supra,
and we approve of it here. The determination whether or not to have criminal sanctions for nonpayment and whether they should be accumulative or not is entirely within legislative discretionary power.
The legislature of this State has made a decision to allow the imposition of the penalties and the city of Detroit has adopted the criminal sanctions by ordinance. As they have acted within their proper scope of their discretionary pow
ers, this Court has uo power to intervene. The defendant was found by the trial court to have wilfully not paid Detroit city income taxes for the years 1963 and 1965 on his own admissions. We find no merit in defendant’s contentions regarding the constitutionality of any of the ordinances mentioned. Therefore, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
All concurred.