City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions

373 N.W.2d 219, 143 Mich. App. 808
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1985
DocketDocket 67664
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 373 N.W.2d 219 (City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Detroit v. Michael's Prescriptions, 373 N.W.2d 219, 143 Mich. App. 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

*810 M. J. Kelly, J.

The City of Detroit appeals as of right from a jury verdict of $275,000 in this condemnation action arising out of the Central Industrial Park Project, more commonly known as the "Poletown Project”. See generally, Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit, 410 Mich 616; 304 NW2d 455 (1981). The condemned property in this case was a neighborhood pharmacy known for over 40 years as "Michael’s Prescriptions”, a sole proprietorship owned and operated since 1971 by pharmacist Harry Kablak and located on East Grand Boulevard in Detroit. The issue on appeal is whether respondent may be compensated for the going concern value of the business. 1

We are presented in this case with an issue that is common to several other Poletown cases presently before this Court. After the Supreme Court expeditiously decided, in Poletown Neighborhood Council, supra, that the condemnation of Poletown was for a public purpose, the city pursued a plethora of condemnation petitions in circuit court in which the sole issue was valuation of the property taken. Apparently, these cases were heard by two specially assigned judges who diverged on allowing recovery for the going concern value of businesses. Because of this "split” at the trial level a careful review of this issue is in order.

The law of eminent domain is governed in Michigan by the Constitution and by statute. Const 1963, art 10, §2 obligates the condemnor of private property to render just compensation to the property owner:

"Private property shall not be taken for public use *811 without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record.”

The Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act, MCL 213.51 et seq.; MSA 8.265(1) et seq., sets forth the procedures and remedies applicable to the Pole-town project. While intangible property interests are compensable, MCL 213.51(h); MSA 8.265(l)(h), no formula or artificial measure of damages will apply in all cases and the amount to be recovered by the owner of the condemned property will generally be left to the discretion of the trier of fact based on the evidence presented. Just compensation should, however, place the owner of the property in as good a position as was occupied before the taking. In re Widening of Bagley Avenue, 248 Mich 1, 5; 226 NW 688 (1929); In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20, 28; 97 NW2d 748 (1959); State Highway Comm’r v Eilender, 362 Mich 697, 699; 108 NW2d 755 (1961).

This Court’s review of condemnation awards is limited. Absent an abuse of discretion with regard to evidentiary matters, we will generally affirm the award if it is within the range of the valuation testimony produced at trial. State Highway Comm’r v Schultz, 370 Mich 78, 84-85; 120 NW2d 733 (1963); Fenton v Lutz, 73 Mich App 117, 124; 250 NW2d 579 (1977). A controversy over the going concern value of a business will usually be presented on appeal as an evidentiary issue with this Court deciding whether evidence of the going concern value of a business was properly admitted or excluded at trial. In this case, the city argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence.

The general rule of law is that, unless a business *812 is taken for use as a going concern, the owner of the business located on a condemned parcel of realty will not be compensated for the good will or going concern value of the business. In re Jeffries Homes Housing Project, 306 Mich 638, 651; 11 NW2d 272 (1943); In re Lansing Urban Renewal (Lansing v Wery), 68 Mich App 158, 163; 242 NW2d 51 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 828 (1976). See also 58 ALR3d 566, § 2, p 568; 81 ALR3d 198, § 2, p 202 and 17 ALR4th 337, §17, p 437 if. The justification for this general rule is that the owner of a successful business may generally transfer that business to another location. Where the government does not appropriate the business for its value as a going concern, the owner of that interest need not be compensated since nothing is taken. See Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles v Abrams, 15 Cal 3d 813; 126 Cal Rptr 473; 543 P2d 905; 81 ALR3d 174 (1975), cert den 429 US 869; 97 S Ct 180; 50 L Ed 2d 149 (1976).

As with most general principles of law, however, the rule prohibiting recovery is not without exception. As far back as 1888, in Grand Rapids & Indiana R Co v Weiden, 70 Mich 390; 38 NW 294 (1888), the Michigan Supreme Court considered with favor the claims of two business owners seeking compensation for businesses located on condemned parcels of realty. The Court held:

"Both of the appellants were using their property in lucrative business, in which the locality and its surroundings had some bearing on its value. Apart from the money value of the property itself, they were entitled to be compensated so as to lose nothing by the interruption of their business and its damage by the change. A business stand is of some value to the owner of the business, whether he owns the fee of the land or not, and a diminution of business facilities may lead to *813 serious results. There may be cases when the loss of a particular location may destroy business altogether, for want of access to any other that is suitable for it. Whatever damage is suffered, must be compensated. Appellants are not legally bound to suffer for petitioner’s benefit. Petitioner can only be authorized to oust them from their possessions by making up to them the whole of their losses.” 70 Mich 395. (Emphasis added.)

In In re Widening of Michigan Avenue, Rossevelt to Livernois (Ansonia Company v Detroit), 280 Mich 539, 550; 273 NW 798 (1937), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage from Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 1089-1090; 198 NW 486; 34 ALR 1517 (1924):

" 'Ordinarily, market value is the criterion, but in certain cases it is not the true standard by which to determine the value. It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a rule of universal application as to what may be considered as elements of damage, as the equities of the parties must more or less depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. * * * This is particularly true as applied to a leasehold. Value must be determined by a consideration of the uses to which the property is adapted. All circumstances naturally affecting this value are open to consideration. * * *’
" 'An established trade or business connected with a location clearly enhances the value of a leasehold interest, and just compensation contemplates this fact.’” (Emphasis added.)

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Bluebook (online)
373 N.W.2d 219, 143 Mich. App. 808, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-detroit-v-michaels-prescriptions-michctapp-1985.