HUGHES, Justice.
This suit was brought by the appellees, Continental Bus Systems, Inc., Union Bus Lines, Inc., and Greyhound Lines, Inc., Central Division, against the City of Corpus Christi, Texas, appellant, to permanently enjoin the City from conducting bus service outside its city limits and suburbs and for a money judgment. The Railroad Commission and other bus companies intervened aligning themselves with appel-lees. Appellee bus companies moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the injunction.1 The City, contesting Ap-[14]*14pellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, also moved for summary judgment. The trial court severed appellees’ action for injunction from the action for damages and entered judgment permanently enjoining the City2 from engaging in for-hire motor bus operations intercity intrastate transporting passengers over the highways of Texas outside the city limits of Corpus Christi and its suburbs.3 The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment was overruled.
In the early part of 1966, the City, a home-rule city, was forced into the bus business when Nueces Transportation Company, the bus company which had served the citizens of Corpus Christi for many years, was compelled for economic reasons to discontinue service. In addition to providing bus service inside the city limits, Nueces Transportation Company also served the City under two Railroad Commission certificates, one (No. 828) authorizing service to Rodd Field and Padre Island and the other (No. 2347-B) authorizing a charter service from the City to points outside the City.
When the City learned that Nueces Transportation Company was going to discontinue its bus operations, it attempted to interest other bus companies in taking over those operations. Those efforts were not successful, and in order to continue this essential public service, the City was compelled to take over. Pending final agree-merits and financial arrangements for the purchase of the system the City initially made a lease agreement by which it leased the Nueces Transportation Company’s facilities and equipment, including the two bus certificates, so that bus service could continue while more definitive arrangements were made.
The City applied to the Railroad Commission for approval to lease the two bus certificates and after notice and at an uncontested hearing this approval was granted by the Commission in May 1966. Thereafter, the City commenced to operate the bus certificates under Commission jurisdiction as a part of the transportation service for its citizens.
Arrangements were then made to finance the purchase of the bus system. The City entered into an agreement to purchase the system, conducted a bond election and issued $500,000 in bonds to finance the purchase and obtained a grant from the federal government for this purpose. The City then applied to the Railroad Commission for its approval of the purchase of the two bus certificates. At that point, appellee bus companies protested the application and filed motions to dismiss and exceptions to such application alleging that the City is not subject to the Motor Bus Act and not subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory powers of the Commission.
By order dated May 5, 1967, the Commission reversed its previous decision in [15]*15approving the lease and found that the City of Corpus Christi is not a “motor bus company” as that term is defined in the Motor Bus Act and that the City is not subject to the Commission regulation. The order dismissed the City’s application, can-celled the previous lease approval and can-celled the Commission’s approval as to certain rate matters relating to the City’s bus operations. Neither the City nor appel-lees appealed from that order.4
Following the issuance of that order by the Commission, the City has continued to provide bus service for its citizens including services to Padre Island, and school bus service for its school children and charter bus service for civic groups, schools and churches from the City of Corpus Christi to points outside the City. It has provided this service and spent substantial sums for bus equipment in order to do so in reliance upon the Commission’s determination that the City’s bus operations are not subject to Commission jurisdiction and regulation. The service provided has not been regulated by the Commission nor has the Commission asserted jurisdiction over the City’s bus operations.
The City has four points of error but our disposition of this case requires us to consider only the contention that the City is not subject to the jurisdiction of or regulation by the Railroad Commission and hence is not subject to be enjoined under the provisions of Art. 1690a, b, V.T.P.C.
We agree with the Commission, as shown by its order copied above, that the Commission is without jurisdiction of or authority to regulate the City of Corpus Christi insofar as the enjoined operations are concerned.
We quote from appellees’ brief their basic contentions:
“One of Appellant’s basic fallacies is its continued efforts to segregate consideration of its operations under the Motor Bus Act and the ‘Home Rule’ amendment to the Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution. Appellees believe the two aspects must necessarily be considered together and are not capable of independent evaluation.
The Motor Bus Act, Art. 911a, V.A. C.S., prohibits the operations of Appellant, enjoined by the trial court, in two respects. The statute specifically defines the areas of mutually exclusive jurisdiction as between cities and the Railroad Commission. Violations on either side of the coin may be redressed through remedies incorporated in the Act and established by court decisions. In addition, were the Motor Bus Act completely silent in all respects concerning motor bus operations of cities, ‘Home Rule’ or otherwise, the jurisprudence of this state establishes the Act as a limitation on the operations of Appellant. When Appellant or any other ‘Home Rule’ city seeks to conduct motor bus operations [16]*16which are inconsistent with a general law of this state (Art. 911a, V.A.C.S.) their operations are illegal to the extent they conflict with the provisions and intent of the Legislature embodied in the statute.”
Before considering these contentions, we must bear in mind two important principles: (1) The Railroad Commission has only such jurisdiction and authority as may be conferred upon it by the Legislature. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 96 S.W.2d 735, Tex.Civ.App., Austin, writ ref. (1936).5 (2) Home Rule Cities have full power of self-government, that is, full authority to do anything the Legislature could theretofore have authorized them to do, the result being that Home Rule Cities look to the acts of the Legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 214 S.W.2d 282 (1948); State of Texas ex rel. Rose v. City of La Porte, 386 S.W.2d 782, Tex.Sup. (1965), Art. 11, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution.
The Motor Bus Act, Art.
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HUGHES, Justice.
This suit was brought by the appellees, Continental Bus Systems, Inc., Union Bus Lines, Inc., and Greyhound Lines, Inc., Central Division, against the City of Corpus Christi, Texas, appellant, to permanently enjoin the City from conducting bus service outside its city limits and suburbs and for a money judgment. The Railroad Commission and other bus companies intervened aligning themselves with appel-lees. Appellee bus companies moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the injunction.1 The City, contesting Ap-[14]*14pellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, also moved for summary judgment. The trial court severed appellees’ action for injunction from the action for damages and entered judgment permanently enjoining the City2 from engaging in for-hire motor bus operations intercity intrastate transporting passengers over the highways of Texas outside the city limits of Corpus Christi and its suburbs.3 The City’s Motion for Summary Judgment was overruled.
In the early part of 1966, the City, a home-rule city, was forced into the bus business when Nueces Transportation Company, the bus company which had served the citizens of Corpus Christi for many years, was compelled for economic reasons to discontinue service. In addition to providing bus service inside the city limits, Nueces Transportation Company also served the City under two Railroad Commission certificates, one (No. 828) authorizing service to Rodd Field and Padre Island and the other (No. 2347-B) authorizing a charter service from the City to points outside the City.
When the City learned that Nueces Transportation Company was going to discontinue its bus operations, it attempted to interest other bus companies in taking over those operations. Those efforts were not successful, and in order to continue this essential public service, the City was compelled to take over. Pending final agree-merits and financial arrangements for the purchase of the system the City initially made a lease agreement by which it leased the Nueces Transportation Company’s facilities and equipment, including the two bus certificates, so that bus service could continue while more definitive arrangements were made.
The City applied to the Railroad Commission for approval to lease the two bus certificates and after notice and at an uncontested hearing this approval was granted by the Commission in May 1966. Thereafter, the City commenced to operate the bus certificates under Commission jurisdiction as a part of the transportation service for its citizens.
Arrangements were then made to finance the purchase of the bus system. The City entered into an agreement to purchase the system, conducted a bond election and issued $500,000 in bonds to finance the purchase and obtained a grant from the federal government for this purpose. The City then applied to the Railroad Commission for its approval of the purchase of the two bus certificates. At that point, appellee bus companies protested the application and filed motions to dismiss and exceptions to such application alleging that the City is not subject to the Motor Bus Act and not subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory powers of the Commission.
By order dated May 5, 1967, the Commission reversed its previous decision in [15]*15approving the lease and found that the City of Corpus Christi is not a “motor bus company” as that term is defined in the Motor Bus Act and that the City is not subject to the Commission regulation. The order dismissed the City’s application, can-celled the previous lease approval and can-celled the Commission’s approval as to certain rate matters relating to the City’s bus operations. Neither the City nor appel-lees appealed from that order.4
Following the issuance of that order by the Commission, the City has continued to provide bus service for its citizens including services to Padre Island, and school bus service for its school children and charter bus service for civic groups, schools and churches from the City of Corpus Christi to points outside the City. It has provided this service and spent substantial sums for bus equipment in order to do so in reliance upon the Commission’s determination that the City’s bus operations are not subject to Commission jurisdiction and regulation. The service provided has not been regulated by the Commission nor has the Commission asserted jurisdiction over the City’s bus operations.
The City has four points of error but our disposition of this case requires us to consider only the contention that the City is not subject to the jurisdiction of or regulation by the Railroad Commission and hence is not subject to be enjoined under the provisions of Art. 1690a, b, V.T.P.C.
We agree with the Commission, as shown by its order copied above, that the Commission is without jurisdiction of or authority to regulate the City of Corpus Christi insofar as the enjoined operations are concerned.
We quote from appellees’ brief their basic contentions:
“One of Appellant’s basic fallacies is its continued efforts to segregate consideration of its operations under the Motor Bus Act and the ‘Home Rule’ amendment to the Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution. Appellees believe the two aspects must necessarily be considered together and are not capable of independent evaluation.
The Motor Bus Act, Art. 911a, V.A. C.S., prohibits the operations of Appellant, enjoined by the trial court, in two respects. The statute specifically defines the areas of mutually exclusive jurisdiction as between cities and the Railroad Commission. Violations on either side of the coin may be redressed through remedies incorporated in the Act and established by court decisions. In addition, were the Motor Bus Act completely silent in all respects concerning motor bus operations of cities, ‘Home Rule’ or otherwise, the jurisprudence of this state establishes the Act as a limitation on the operations of Appellant. When Appellant or any other ‘Home Rule’ city seeks to conduct motor bus operations [16]*16which are inconsistent with a general law of this state (Art. 911a, V.A.C.S.) their operations are illegal to the extent they conflict with the provisions and intent of the Legislature embodied in the statute.”
Before considering these contentions, we must bear in mind two important principles: (1) The Railroad Commission has only such jurisdiction and authority as may be conferred upon it by the Legislature. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 96 S.W.2d 735, Tex.Civ.App., Austin, writ ref. (1936).5 (2) Home Rule Cities have full power of self-government, that is, full authority to do anything the Legislature could theretofore have authorized them to do, the result being that Home Rule Cities look to the acts of the Legislature not for grants of power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 214 S.W.2d 282 (1948); State of Texas ex rel. Rose v. City of La Porte, 386 S.W.2d 782, Tex.Sup. (1965), Art. 11, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution.
The Motor Bus Act, Art. 911a, V.T.C.S., referred to and relied upon by appellees as prohibiting the operations of the City which were enjoined defines in Sec. 1(a) the term “corporation” as meaning “a corporation, company, association, or joint stock association.” This definition does not include a municipal corporation. The decisions on this point are clear, authoritative and recent. In The State of Texas v. Central Power and Light Company, 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W.2d 766 (1942), it is stated, “While there are exceptions, depending on the peculiar wording of the statute under consideration, as a general rule the word ‘corporation’ is construed to apply only to private corporations and does not include municipal corporations, unless the statute expressly so provides.” This case on this point has been followed without question and was last cited and followed by our Supreme Court in City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (1968).
Sec. 1(c) of Art. 911a defines “Motor Bus Company” as meaning “ * * * every corporation * * * as herein defined * * * ”
It follows, in our opinion, that the Motor Bus Act does not purport to regulate municipal corporations.
The only mention in the Motor Bus Act of the authority of cities and towns in relation to the Act is that they are unaffected by it. This is found in Sec. 2 which provides, in part: “ * * * provided, however, that nothing in this Act or any provision thereof shall be construed or held to in any manner affect, limit, or deprive cities and towns from exercising any of the powers granted them by Chapter 147, Pages 307 to 318 inclusive, of the General Laws of the State of Texas, passed by the 33rd Legislature, or any amendments thereto.”
The laws referred to are now codified as Arts. 1175-6, V.T.C.S.
In our judgment, the quoted language from Sec. 2 of Art. 911a is purely exclusionary as to cities and towns and does not constitute any limitation upon their powers. However, if reference should be made to Arts. 1175-6 for restrictions or limitations on the authority of cities and towns, we fail to find any applicable restrictions.
Sec. 16 of Art. 1175 gives to Home Rule Cities “exclusive” dominion, control and jurisdiction over and under the public streets, avenues, alleys and highways of the City.
Sec. 13 of Art. 1175 provides that such cities have the power, “To buy, own, construct within or without the city limits and to maintain and operate a system or sys-[17]*17terns, of gas, or electric lighting plant, telephone, street railways, sewerage plants, fertilizing plants, abattoir, municipal railway terminals, docks, wharfs, ferries, ferry landings, loading and unloading devices and shipping facilities, or any other public service or public utility, and to demand and receive compensation for service furnished for private purpose or otherwise.” (Italics ours.)
Art. 1176 provides:
“Further powers
The enumeration of powers herein-above made shall never be construed to preclude, by implication or otherwise, any such city from, exercising the powers incident to the enjoyment of local self-government, provided that such powers shall not be inhibited by the State Constitution.” (Italics ours.)
The City Charter of the City of Corpus Christi contains these provisions:
“The City may take, hold and use property, within or without the corporate limits, needed for a public purpose.
The enumeration of particular powers in this Charter shall not be deemed exclusive, but in addition to the powers enumerated the City shall have power to do all things necessary to efficient management and control of municipal property and to promote the general welfare, not forbidden by this Charter, the general laws or the Constitution of the State of Texas. In addition to the powers herein otherwise granted, the City shall have all powers enumerated in Article 1175, Revised Statutes of Texas, 1925, as heretofore amended, as though such statute were set forth herein.”
The rule governing this Court in this case is stated in City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550, Tex.Sup. (1964) as follows:
“Although the broad powers granted to home rule cities by the Constitution, Ar-tide XI, Section 5, Vernon’s Ann.St., may be limited by acts of the Legislature, it seems that should the Legislature decide to exercise that authority, its intention to do so should appear with unmistakable clarity.”
Appellees lay great stress on Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Tuck, 115 S.W.2d 455, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, writ ref. (1938); Villalobos v. Holguin, 146 Tex. 474, 208 S.W.2d 871 (1948) and City of Wichita Falls, Tex. v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d 695, 154 A.L.R. 1434 (1944). These cases simply hold that Home Rule Cities have exclusive jurisdiction over streets and highways within their cities as is specifically provided in Art. 1175, supra. That the cities have this exclusive jurisdiction does not militate against their authority to share with others the use of streets and highways outside their limits.
We are unable to find that the Legislature with “unmistakable clarity” has denied to Home Rule Cities the right to do what the trial court enjoined the City of Corpus Christi from doing.
The briefs in this case contain much that pertains to the public policy which should prevail. This is not a proper forum for such discussion, the proper forum being the Texas Legislature.
Under our view of the law as expressed herein none of appellees has the right to sue for injunctive relief under the provisions of Art. 1690a, b, V.T.P.C. for the reason that no order, rule or regulation of the Railroad Commission is shown to have been violated by the City of Corpus Christi.
It is our opinion that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in issuing a permanent injunction against the City of Corpus Christi under the authority of Art. 1690a, b, V.T.P.C. It is, therefore, ordered that such partial summary judgment be vacated, the injunction dissolved, and [18]*18that this cause he reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
PHILLIPS, C. J., dissenting.