CITY OF COLLEGE PARK v. MARTIN

304 Ga. 488

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: August 27, 2018
• Docket: S17G2008
• Status: Published

Opinion

304 Ga. 488 FINAL COPY

S17G2008. CITY OF COLLEGE PARK et al v. MARTIN.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

After she was terminated from her employment as a firefighter with the

City, Appellee Chawanda Martin sued the City of College Park, the city council,

and various interim officials, including the two individuals responsible for her

dismissal (Interim Fire Chief Wade Elmore and Interim City Manager Richard

Chess), alleging that the interim appointments were made in violation of the

Open Meetings Act, OCGA § 50-14-1 et seq., and, thus, that the interim officials

lacked the authority to take adverse employment action against her. The trial

court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that

Martin’s claims were untimely and lacked evidentiary support.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part, determining that

Martin’s challenge to Chess’ appointment was timely and, further, that the

undisputed evidence demonstrated that the mayor made the challenged appointment in “consensus” with the city council without ever having taken a

vote. Martin v. City of College Park, 342 Ga. App. 289 (802 SE2d 292) (2017).

The appellate court then reasoned that, because the Open Meetings Act requires

a public vote on the appointment of a public officer or employee, see OCGA §

50-14-3 (b) (2), Martin had “demonstrated a legal and evidentiary basis to

survive summary judgment as to an [Open Meetings Act] violation with respect

to the appointment of interim City Manager Chess.” Id. at 293. We granted

certiorari review to consider the Court of Appeals’ application of the Open

Meetings Act. We conclude that the Court of Appeals should have first

determined whether the charter for the City of College Park actually requires a

vote to effectuate such an interim appointment before considering the

applicability of the public-vote requirement of the Open Meetings Act.

Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals in part and remand this case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

As we delve into the text of the Open Meetings Act, we are mindful that

“we must afford the statutory text its ‘plain and ordinary meaning,’ we must

view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the

statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of

2 the English language would.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v.

Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). We “look to the text

of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to

discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568,

571 (788 SE2d 468) (2016). See also OCGA § 1-3-1 (a), (b). Where the

statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,” we attribute to the statute its plain

meaning, and our search for statutory meaning generally ends. See Deal, 294

Ga. at 173. The issue before us is purely legal and, thus, is reviewed de novo.

See Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 285 Ga. 684 (4) (681 SE2d 122) (2009).

“The Open Meetings Act requires all meetings, as that term is defined in

the Act, of certain public agencies to be open to the public.” Lue v. Eady, 297

Ga. 321, 324 (773 SE2d 679) (2015). As we have explained, the Act “was

enacted in the public interest to protect the public — both individuals and the

public generally — from ‘closed door’ politics and the potential abuse of

individuals and the misuse of power such policies entail.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County, 281 Ga. 396,

399 (3) (638 SE2d 325) (2006). The Open Meetings Act is not without

exceptions and exemptions. Relevant here, OCGA § 50-14-3 (b) (2) permits the

3 relevant agency1 to conduct executive sessions2

when discussing or deliberating upon the appointment, employment, compensation, hiring, disciplinary action or dismissal, or periodic evaluation or rating of a public officer or employee or interviewing applicants for the position of the executive head of an agency. . . . The vote on any matter covered by this paragraph shall be taken in public and minutes of the meeting as provided in this chapter shall be made available.

(Emphasis supplied.) Id. The Court of Appeals determined, without discussion,

that the public vote language in subsection (b) (2) requires the city council to

have voted on Chess’ interim appointment as city manager (and presumably any

1 The term “agency,” as it is used in the Open Meetings Act, is defined in relevant part as follows: (A) Every state department, agency, board, bureau, office, commission, public corporation, and authority; (B) Every county, municipal corporation, school district, or other political subdivision of this state; (C) Every department, agency, board, bureau, office, commission, authority, or similar body of each such county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of the state; (D) Every city, county, regional, or other authority established pursuant to the laws of this state. . . .

OCGA § 50-14-1 (a) (1) (A)-(D). 2 “‘Executive session’ means a portion of a meeting lawfully closed to the public.” OCGA § 50-14-1 (a) (2).

4 future interim appointments).3 The Court of Appeals has plainly misapplied this

subsection.

The phrase “the vote . . . shall be taken in public” employs the use of a

definite article (“the”) and is therefore referential, presupposing a required

action. Simply put, the language does not mandate a vote on a relevant

employment decision, it simply references such vote and requires that any such

vote be taken in public. Thus, consistent with the design of the Open Meetings

Act, the plain language of (b) (2) requires that when a vote on a relevant

employment matter is taken, it must be taken in public. To the extent that the

Court of Appeals’ opinion conflicts with this holding, it is reversed.

The key issue here then — which was neither articulated by the parties

below nor considered by the lower courts — is whether a vote is required for the

appointment of an interim city manager. The scant record before us reflects that

Martin has consistently averred that the city charter does not permit such an

appointment without a vote by the city council (which must be in public), while

the City maintains that the mayor is authorized to make such an appointment

3 There is no argument that the city council is not an “agency” as defined in the Open Meetings Act.

5 independently. The mayor and city council are bound by the charter, see Sadler

v. Nijem, 251 Ga. 375, 377 (2) (306 SE2d 257) (1983), and, thus, the resolution

of this matter calls for a review and interpretation of the city charter. However,

because this issue was not addressed by the trial court and because the parties

have not briefed us on this dispositive issue, we must remand this case for

further proceedings.

Judgment reversed and case remanded. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J.,

Benham, Nahmias, Blackwell, and Peterson, JJ., concur. Boggs, J., disqualified.

6 Decided August 27, 2018 — Reconsideration denied October 9, 2018.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 342 Ga. App. 289.

Fincher Denmark, Steven M. Fincher, Winston A. Denmark, Emilia C.

Walker, for appellants.

Christopher D. Balch; Orr, Brown & Billips, Matthew C. Billips, for

appellee.