City of Chicago v. Farwell

103 N.E. 606, 260 Ill. 565
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 17, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 103 N.E. 606 (City of Chicago v. Farwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Chicago v. Farwell, 103 N.E. 606, 260 Ill. 565 (Ill. 1913).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

The city of Chicago filed a petition in the county court of Cook county praying that a special assessment might be levied upon property which would be benefited by the construction of a street improvement in accordance with the provisions of an ordinance therefor attached to the petition, and for the ascertainment of the just compensation to be made for private property to be taken or damaged for such improvement. The petition described certain parcels of land which it was averred would be taken or damaged for the improvement, and Arthur L. Farwell, who was the owner of a part of the land so described, entered a motion to dismiss the petition for the reason that the improvement described in the ordinance is not a local improvement; that it is not a single improvement; that the ordinance is void because it includes both the construction of the improvement and the condemnation of land therefor; and that the ordinance is void because it fails to describe and provide for the condemnation of land shown to be necessary for the making of the improvement and does describe and provide for the condemnation of land which is shown not to be necessary for or connected with the improvement. The court held the first three reasons insufficient but the fourth valid, and for that reason sustained the motion and dismissed the petition. The city appealed, and has assigned for error the dismissal of the petition for the reason of the defective descriptions. The appellee has assigned cross-errors on the overruling of the other three reasons.

The proposed improvement includes Michigan avenue from Randolph street north to the Chicago river and Pine street and Lincoln parkway from the southern terminus of Pine street north to Chicago avenue, and contemplates the extension of Pine street south to the river, a distance of about 120 feet, and the construction of a bridge over the river to connect Michigan avenue with this extension of Pine street. The distance from Randolph street to Chicago avenue is nearly a mile, and there are a great many tracts of land abutting on-or in the vicinity of the proposed improvement which may be liable to assessment in this proceeding. No assessment roll has yet been filed and no commissioners have been appointed upon the city’s petition.

W. F. McLaughlin & Co., a corporation, and Caroline Howe Packard and Mary Howe Straus, owner's of real estate abutting on the proposed improvement which may be assessed though no order has yet been made in regard thereto and though the petition is still pending in the county court as to their property, were granted leave to intervene and.file briefs in the cause. They have accordingly filed briefs, which are largely devoted to the proposition "that the appeal should be dismissed or at least the court should not pass upon the cross-errors. The grounds upon which it is urged that the appeal should be dismissed are, that the record does not present an agreed case within the meaning of rule 22 of the rules of this court or of sections 103, 104 and 103 of the Practice act, and that no commissioners’ report and assessment roll were on file when the motion was made and the court dismissed the petition. The case is not, and does not purport to be, an agreed case under the statute, and therefore the rule and the sections of .the statute cited have no application. In support of their contention that the commissioners’ report and assessment roll are necessary before the court can make an order dismissing the petition, counsel cite the case of Morrison v. City of Chicago, 142 Ill. 660. That case, however, decided only-that the court could not confirm an assessment until the assessment roll had been filed. In the case of Village of Hammond v. Leavitt, 181 Ill. 416, it was decided that a motion to dimiss the petition for want of jurisdiction in the court to take any action may be made at any time. Whenever it appears that the city council had no authority to pass the ordinance which is the foundation of the proceedings, whether from the face of the petition or otherwise, the county court is justified in dismissing the proceedings because, the ordinance being void, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Section 56 of the Local Improvement act declares that judgments of condemnation shall have the effect of several judgments as to each tract or parcel of land assessed, and that no appeal shall invalidate o’r delay the judgments except as to the property concerning which it is taken. Thus it appears that separate appeals are contemplated, and that the proceedings are not to be delayed because all persons who are or may be interested in the questions involved, though not in the property involved, are not in court to participate in the argument of the questions.

Errors may be assigned on the judgment of the court but not on the reasons for its judgment. The judgment of the court dismissed the petition on the appellee’s motion. The appellant assigned as error that the court erred in dismissing the petition. This raised the question of the validity of each of the reasons urged for the dismissal and no assignment of cross-errors was necessary. If any. of the four reasons assigned in the motion for the dismissal of the petition was sufficient that fact completely answered the assignment of error.

The motion was heard upon the petition, together with the recommendation of the board of local improvements, the engineer’s estimate, the ordinance, a stipulation of facts and the testimony of one witness, (a real estate expert,) who gave his opinion as to the effect of the improvement on the value of real estate abutting on and in the vicinity of the improvement, and of real estate, generally, in the city. The record shows that Michigan avenue is a north and south street extending south from the Chicago river to Sixty-third street, being under the jurisdiction of the city north of Randolph street and south of Garfield boulevard or Fifty-fifth street and of the South Park Commissioners between those streets. The avenue has a width of 66 feet north of Randolph street, 127^ feet from Randolph street to Madison, 130 feet from Madison street to Twelfth and 100 feet south of Twelfth street. North of Randolph street it has an old granite-block pavement re-surfaced with asphalt. From Randolph street to Garfield boulevard the pavement is asphaltic, and Michigan avenue, in connection with Garfield boulevard, forms the main thoroughfare for automobiles and pleasure vehicles between the central business district and the south side of the city. It is also intersected by other boulevards of the South Park system, and by means of Jackson boulevard is connected with the parks and boulevards under the control of the West Chicago Park Commissioners on the west side of the city.

Beginning at North Water street about 120 feet north of the Chicago river, with its center line about 200 feet east of Michigan avenue, a street runs north to Chicago avenue which is called Pine street south of Ohio street and Lincoln parkway north of Ohio street. This street extends still further north, and from Chicago avenue is a boulevard under the jurisdiction of the Lincoln Park Commissioners. At Oak street its name again changes to Lake Shore Drive, which, entering at North avenue, extends through Lincoln Park and joins Sheridan road, which extends north for many miles along Lake Michigan. The Lake Shore Drive south of North avenue is the main approach to the central district of the city for' pleasure and automobile traffic from the north.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Johnson
803 N.E.2d 442 (Illinois Supreme Court, 2003)
The People v. York
193 N.E.2d 773 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1963)
Mann v. Downers Grove Sanitary District
266 Ill. App. 526 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1932)
City of Kankakee v. Dunn
169 N.E. 251 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1929)
City of Springfield v. Springfield Consolidated Railway Co.
295 Ill. 234 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1920)
Village of Lovington v. Gregory
122 N.E. 504 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1919)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
103 N.E. 606, 260 Ill. 565, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-chicago-v-farwell-ill-1913.