Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This lawsuit attacks the constitutionality of a wrecker or towing service ordinance passed by the City of Chattanooga. The Ordinance No. 4072 is copied in full in the footnote.
The trial judge held the Ordinance void as
being obnoxious to Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits the passage of “any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land”, etc.; and as prohibited by Section 8 of Article I, as not being “due process of law”, or “the law of
the land.” And likewise as offensive to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The city .has seasonably perfected an appeal. We now have the matter for determination.
The ease was tried on agreed stipulation of facts wherein it was agreed that the Ordinance in question was in full force and effect and that the defendant violated Sections 2 and 13 of said Ordinance in that he did not apply for and obtain a license or permit as required hy the provi
sions of the Ordinance and that he did, on or about September 18, 1952, take his wrecker or towing car from his place of business on McAllie Avenne along' and over the streets of the City of Chattanooga to a wreck on Riverside Drive without having been called by the owner or the owner’s agent or the police dispatcher.
The Charter of the City of Chattanooga is found in Chapter 536 of the Private Acts of 1949- and under Subsection 16 thereof it is provided that:
“To license, tax and regulate taxicabs, automobiles for hire, trucks and buses; to fix a rate to be charged for the carriage of persons and property by any vehicle held out to the public use for hire within the City; to require indemnity bonds, issued by surety companies or indemnity insurance policies to be filed with the City by the owner or operator of any such vehicle * *
This authority is given to the Board of Commissioners of Chattanooga. Pursuant to that authority the Ordinance quoted below was passed. "We think there can be no question but that under this provision of the Charter of the City of Chattanooga the City Commission had the authority and power if they deemed it necessary for such an Ordinance to be passed to regulate these vehicles, that is wreckers or towing vehicles on the streets of the City of Chattanooga.
Spoone
v.
Mayor & Aldermen of Town of Morristown,
185 Tenn. 454, 206 S. W. (2d) 422;
City of Chattanooga
v.
Jackson,
172 Tenn. 264, 111 S. W. 1026. It seems to us clear under many authorities that the business of carrying or transporting property for hire is a privilege, the licensing, regulation and control’of which is a legislative prerogative. This power to regulate the roads and streets is likewise a legislative prerogative ,and may be delegated by the Legislature of the State to the cities who in turn may by ordinance regulate control of the use and operation of wreckers or towing cars on its streets.
City Transportation Co.
v.
Pharr,
186 Tenn. 217, 200 S. W. (2d) 15;
Large
v.
City of Elizabethton,
185 Tenn. 156, 203 S. W. (2d) 907;
Tennessee Coach Co.
v.
Lenoir City,
179 Tenn. 453, 167 S. W.
(2d) 335, 337, 144 A. L. R. 1116, and other eases that might be cited.
It is obvious from a consideration of the Ordinance as a whole that it was enacted by the City Fathers in the furtherance of public safety and public welfare. The provisions of the Ordinance apply to all wrecker or towing operators engaged in removing wrecks or disabled vehicles from the streets of the City of Chattanooga. It seems therefore clear that this classification is reasonable and was enacted pursuant to express legislative authority as above indicated and clearly is not violative of the constitutional sections invoked or any other sections of the Constitution that we know anything about. This power of the city exists not alone through its licensing’ power but also “in the exercise of police powers, to prevent traffic congestion and the dangers incident thereto.”
Tennessee Coach Co.
v.
Lenoir City,
supra.
In
Stephenson
v.
Binford,
287 U. S. 251, 256, 53 S. Ct. 181, 184, 77 L. Ed. 288, 87 A. L. R. 721, a truck line challenged an Act of the Legislature regulating the business of transporting freight by motor lines over the highways. The Act was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, saying:
“It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.” (Citing authorities.)
The City Fathers of Chattanooga who enacted the Ordinance are presumed to be familiar with the local conditions and the necessity for the regulation of wreck
ers and towing cars. These legislative and administrative officials of the city are the ones who receive complaints abont such things and they are the ones who are in a position to know what should be done to protect the public safety. We as a Court therefore do not ordinarily, unless the Statute is plainly obnoxious to some constitutional provision, substitute our judgment for the legislative branch of the government.
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.
v.
White,
158 Tenn. 407, 413, 15 S. W. (2d) 1, affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, 278 U. S. 456, 49 S. Ct. 189, 73 L. Ed. 452.
It seems to us upon a consideration of the Ordinance in its entirety that it manifestly seeks to regulate, on the streets, traffic of the nature involved, for the convenience, necessity and protection of the public. The Ordinance is, in all its provisions, wholly regulatory, and, to effectuate its intent .and purposes, must be given reasonable construction. We think that many of the things that the Ordinance regulates that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that most cities the size of Chattanooga have police or shortwave radios over which reports are made and that wrecker operators and others have receiving sets or something of the kind in their cars where they obtain information about these wrecks and immediately rush to the scene of the accident which of course in many instances might create a hazard on the public streets. This though is a matter for consideration of the City Fathers in enacting an ordinance of the kind.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This lawsuit attacks the constitutionality of a wrecker or towing service ordinance passed by the City of Chattanooga. The Ordinance No. 4072 is copied in full in the footnote.
The trial judge held the Ordinance void as
being obnoxious to Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits the passage of “any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land”, etc.; and as prohibited by Section 8 of Article I, as not being “due process of law”, or “the law of
the land.” And likewise as offensive to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The city .has seasonably perfected an appeal. We now have the matter for determination.
The ease was tried on agreed stipulation of facts wherein it was agreed that the Ordinance in question was in full force and effect and that the defendant violated Sections 2 and 13 of said Ordinance in that he did not apply for and obtain a license or permit as required hy the provi
sions of the Ordinance and that he did, on or about September 18, 1952, take his wrecker or towing car from his place of business on McAllie Avenne along' and over the streets of the City of Chattanooga to a wreck on Riverside Drive without having been called by the owner or the owner’s agent or the police dispatcher.
The Charter of the City of Chattanooga is found in Chapter 536 of the Private Acts of 1949- and under Subsection 16 thereof it is provided that:
“To license, tax and regulate taxicabs, automobiles for hire, trucks and buses; to fix a rate to be charged for the carriage of persons and property by any vehicle held out to the public use for hire within the City; to require indemnity bonds, issued by surety companies or indemnity insurance policies to be filed with the City by the owner or operator of any such vehicle * *
This authority is given to the Board of Commissioners of Chattanooga. Pursuant to that authority the Ordinance quoted below was passed. "We think there can be no question but that under this provision of the Charter of the City of Chattanooga the City Commission had the authority and power if they deemed it necessary for such an Ordinance to be passed to regulate these vehicles, that is wreckers or towing vehicles on the streets of the City of Chattanooga.
Spoone
v.
Mayor & Aldermen of Town of Morristown,
185 Tenn. 454, 206 S. W. (2d) 422;
City of Chattanooga
v.
Jackson,
172 Tenn. 264, 111 S. W. 1026. It seems to us clear under many authorities that the business of carrying or transporting property for hire is a privilege, the licensing, regulation and control’of which is a legislative prerogative. This power to regulate the roads and streets is likewise a legislative prerogative ,and may be delegated by the Legislature of the State to the cities who in turn may by ordinance regulate control of the use and operation of wreckers or towing cars on its streets.
City Transportation Co.
v.
Pharr,
186 Tenn. 217, 200 S. W. (2d) 15;
Large
v.
City of Elizabethton,
185 Tenn. 156, 203 S. W. (2d) 907;
Tennessee Coach Co.
v.
Lenoir City,
179 Tenn. 453, 167 S. W.
(2d) 335, 337, 144 A. L. R. 1116, and other eases that might be cited.
It is obvious from a consideration of the Ordinance as a whole that it was enacted by the City Fathers in the furtherance of public safety and public welfare. The provisions of the Ordinance apply to all wrecker or towing operators engaged in removing wrecks or disabled vehicles from the streets of the City of Chattanooga. It seems therefore clear that this classification is reasonable and was enacted pursuant to express legislative authority as above indicated and clearly is not violative of the constitutional sections invoked or any other sections of the Constitution that we know anything about. This power of the city exists not alone through its licensing’ power but also “in the exercise of police powers, to prevent traffic congestion and the dangers incident thereto.”
Tennessee Coach Co.
v.
Lenoir City,
supra.
In
Stephenson
v.
Binford,
287 U. S. 251, 256, 53 S. Ct. 181, 184, 77 L. Ed. 288, 87 A. L. R. 721, a truck line challenged an Act of the Legislature regulating the business of transporting freight by motor lines over the highways. The Act was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, saying:
“It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.” (Citing authorities.)
The City Fathers of Chattanooga who enacted the Ordinance are presumed to be familiar with the local conditions and the necessity for the regulation of wreck
ers and towing cars. These legislative and administrative officials of the city are the ones who receive complaints abont such things and they are the ones who are in a position to know what should be done to protect the public safety. We as a Court therefore do not ordinarily, unless the Statute is plainly obnoxious to some constitutional provision, substitute our judgment for the legislative branch of the government.
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.
v.
White,
158 Tenn. 407, 413, 15 S. W. (2d) 1, affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, 278 U. S. 456, 49 S. Ct. 189, 73 L. Ed. 452.
It seems to us upon a consideration of the Ordinance in its entirety that it manifestly seeks to regulate, on the streets, traffic of the nature involved, for the convenience, necessity and protection of the public. The Ordinance is, in all its provisions, wholly regulatory, and, to effectuate its intent .and purposes, must be given reasonable construction. We think that many of the things that the Ordinance regulates that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that most cities the size of Chattanooga have police or shortwave radios over which reports are made and that wrecker operators and others have receiving sets or something of the kind in their cars where they obtain information about these wrecks and immediately rush to the scene of the accident which of course in many instances might create a hazard on the public streets. This though is a matter for consideration of the City Fathers in enacting an ordinance of the kind. The Ordinance (Subsection 13) does not prohibit the operator of a wrecker or towing car from being at the scene of a wreck under any conditions. By reading the Ordinance as a whole it simply prohibits the operator of a wrecker or towing car from taking- his wrecker or tow
ing car to the scene of the wreck without being called by the owner or the owner’s agent or police dispatcher. It prohibits him from going to the wreck and soliciting wrecker business. It does not prohibit the operator from going to the scene of the accident without his equipment provided he does not solicit wrecker business or interfere with the police officers in making their investigation. The contention which was made below that we have answered to our satisfaction above was likewise made in the case of
Tennessee Coach Co.
v.
Lenoir City,
supra. This Court in answer to the contention there made said:
“Considering, first, the second of the grounds relied on for the Coach Company, we do not find the ordinance to be prohibitory in the sense asserted, but regulatory only. It is true that the language is somewhat broad, in that it purports to prohibit the Coach Company, and its servants, .and other motor carriers of its class, ‘from loading and/or unloading passengers on or upon any of the public thoroughfares within the corporate limits, ’ etc., but when the object set forth in the ordinance, .as being the prevention of, ‘congestion of traffic and dangerous, unsafe and hazardous conditions, endangering the lives and property of other users, ’ of the City streets, is considered, it is apparent that it is not the purpose of the Act to prohibit altogether the taking on or off of one or more passengers, at reasonable points within the City limits. We think the language of the ordinance may and should be construed as intended to accomplish the purposes of its enactment as set forth therein. The principle of the maxim ejusdem generis, which requires that general terms be related to specific enumerations, has application. ’ ’
This Court in
Large
v.
Elizabethton,
supra, held that
a municipality bad the right to fix rates to be charged by taxicab operators. In
Spoone
v.
Mayor
&
Aldermen of Town of Morristown,
supra, we held that the city had the right to regulate the taxicabs on the street, where they should park, etc. Similar ordinances have been passed on by the courts of other jurisdictions. The author of McQuillin on Municipal Corporations in Section 24.628 3rd Edition, Vol. 7, said:
“An ordinance prohibiting private garage owners and towing agents from using the streets to solicit business and to tow and clear away wrecked automobiles, and delegating such service to a City police garage, may be held valid. Leastwise, such an ordinance is valid where it appears that private garage owners have committed many abuses detrimental to public safety with respect to the matter. A provision regulating towing cars and making it unlawful to refuse towing service is in the interest of the car owner so that he may have prompt and reasonable towing service at proper prices. However, such provision does not confer a right on the tow truck owner or operator to go where he is lawfully forbidden to enter. ’ ’
Under the first sentence of the above quotation we find cited two cases from Texas,
City of Dallas
v.
Harris,
Tex. Civ. App., 157 S. W. (2d) 710, and
Liegl
v.
City of San Antonio,
Tex. Civ. App., 207 S. W. (2d) 441, upholding ordinances very similar to that involved in the instant litigation.
We have given this matter considerable thought and are constrained to uphold the validity of the ordinance as a whole and reverse the judgment below. The case will be reversed and remanded to the Criminal Court for hearing.