City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg

265 S.W.2d 15, 196 Tenn. 226, 32 Beeler 226, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1200, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 367
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 11, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 265 S.W.2d 15 (City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Chattanooga v. Fanburg, 265 S.W.2d 15, 196 Tenn. 226, 32 Beeler 226, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1200, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. 1954).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Burnett

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This lawsuit attacks the constitutionality of a wrecker or towing service ordinance passed by the City of Chattanooga. The Ordinance No. 4072 is copied in full in the footnote. 1 The trial judge held the Ordinance void as *229 being obnoxious to Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits the passage of “any law for the benefit of individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land”, etc.; and as prohibited by Section 8 of Article I, as not being “due process of law”, or “the law of *230 the land.” And likewise as offensive to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The city .has seasonably perfected an appeal. We now have the matter for determination.

*231 The ease was tried on agreed stipulation of facts wherein it was agreed that the Ordinance in question was in full force and effect and that the defendant violated Sections 2 and 13 of said Ordinance in that he did not apply for and obtain a license or permit as required hy the provi *232 sions of the Ordinance and that he did, on or about September 18, 1952, take his wrecker or towing car from his place of business on McAllie Avenne along' and over the streets of the City of Chattanooga to a wreck on Riverside Drive without having been called by the owner or the owner’s agent or the police dispatcher.

*233 The Charter of the City of Chattanooga is found in Chapter 536 of the Private Acts of 1949- and under Subsection 16 thereof it is provided that:

“To license, tax and regulate taxicabs, automobiles for hire, trucks and buses; to fix a rate to be charged for the carriage of persons and property by any vehicle held out to the public use for hire within the City; to require indemnity bonds, issued by surety companies or indemnity insurance policies to be filed with the City by the owner or operator of any such vehicle * *

This authority is given to the Board of Commissioners of Chattanooga. Pursuant to that authority the Ordinance quoted below was passed. "We think there can be no question but that under this provision of the Charter of the City of Chattanooga the City Commission had the authority and power if they deemed it necessary for such an Ordinance to be passed to regulate these vehicles, that is wreckers or towing vehicles on the streets of the City of Chattanooga. Spoone v. Mayor & Aldermen of Town of Morristown, 185 Tenn. 454, 206 S. W. (2d) 422; City of Chattanooga v. Jackson, 172 Tenn. 264, 111 S. W. 1026. It seems to us clear under many authorities that the business of carrying or transporting property for hire is a privilege, the licensing, regulation and control’of which is a legislative prerogative. This power to regulate the roads and streets is likewise a legislative prerogative ,and may be delegated by the Legislature of the State to the cities who in turn may by ordinance regulate control of the use and operation of wreckers or towing cars on its streets. City Transportation Co. v. Pharr, 186 Tenn. 217, 200 S. W. (2d) 15; Large v. City of Elizabethton, 185 Tenn. 156, 203 S. W. (2d) 907; Tennessee Coach Co. v. Lenoir City, 179 Tenn. 453, 167 S. W. *234 (2d) 335, 337, 144 A. L. R. 1116, and other eases that might be cited.

It is obvious from a consideration of the Ordinance as a whole that it was enacted by the City Fathers in the furtherance of public safety and public welfare. The provisions of the Ordinance apply to all wrecker or towing operators engaged in removing wrecks or disabled vehicles from the streets of the City of Chattanooga. It seems therefore clear that this classification is reasonable and was enacted pursuant to express legislative authority as above indicated and clearly is not violative of the constitutional sections invoked or any other sections of the Constitution that we know anything about. This power of the city exists not alone through its licensing’ power but also “in the exercise of police powers, to prevent traffic congestion and the dangers incident thereto.” Tennessee Coach Co. v. Lenoir City, supra.

In Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 256, 53 S. Ct. 181, 184, 77 L. Ed. 288, 87 A. L. R. 721, a truck line challenged an Act of the Legislature regulating the business of transporting freight by motor lines over the highways. The Act was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, saying:

“It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit.” (Citing authorities.)

The City Fathers of Chattanooga who enacted the Ordinance are presumed to be familiar with the local conditions and the necessity for the regulation of wreck *235 ers and towing cars. These legislative and administrative officials of the city are the ones who receive complaints abont such things and they are the ones who are in a position to know what should be done to protect the public safety. We as a Court therefore do not ordinarily, unless the Statute is plainly obnoxious to some constitutional provision, substitute our judgment for the legislative branch of the government. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. White, 158 Tenn. 407, 413, 15 S. W. (2d) 1, affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, 278 U. S. 456, 49 S. Ct. 189, 73 L. Ed. 452.

It seems to us upon a consideration of the Ordinance in its entirety that it manifestly seeks to regulate, on the streets, traffic of the nature involved, for the convenience, necessity and protection of the public. The Ordinance is, in all its provisions, wholly regulatory, and, to effectuate its intent .and purposes, must be given reasonable construction. We think that many of the things that the Ordinance regulates that the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that most cities the size of Chattanooga have police or shortwave radios over which reports are made and that wrecker operators and others have receiving sets or something of the kind in their cars where they obtain information about these wrecks and immediately rush to the scene of the accident which of course in many instances might create a hazard on the public streets. This though is a matter for consideration of the City Fathers in enacting an ordinance of the kind.

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Bluebook (online)
265 S.W.2d 15, 196 Tenn. 226, 32 Beeler 226, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1200, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-chattanooga-v-fanburg-tenn-1954.