City of Charleston v. Public Service Commission

120 S.E. 398, 95 W. Va. 91, 1923 W. Va. LEXIS 224
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 27, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 120 S.E. 398 (City of Charleston v. Public Service Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Charleston v. Public Service Commission, 120 S.E. 398, 95 W. Va. 91, 1923 W. Va. LEXIS 224 (W. Va. 1923).

Opinion

MeRedith, Judge:

This is an appeal of the cities of Charleston, Williamson, Kenova, Spencer and Logan; the towns of Ceredo, Barbours-ville, Ripley and Ravenswood; Jobbers and Manufacturers Bureau of Huntington; Manufacturers Club of Huntington; Huntington Chamber of Commerce; The Warner-Klipstein Chemical Company, and others, from an order of the Public Service Commission entered August 9, 1923, upon the application of the United Fuel Gas Company for authority to increase its rates for furnishing natural gas to all its consumers, *94 both domestic and industrial, in the several conmmnities above named and elsewhere in the State of West Virginia.

.The order complained of grants the applicant an increase of five cents per thousand cubic feet on each of its rates then in effect, except as to gas supplied by it in Nitro, West Virginia, the rates at that point being then under consideration by the commission in a separate proceeding, the increased rate to go into effect as to domestic consumers after the meter readings in June, 1923, and as to industrial consumers on and after August 15, 1923, and to continue in effect until March 1, 1924, and until the further order of the commission. It also requires the applicant to file with the commission, on or before March 20, 1924, a statement setting forth its revenue, operating expenses and taxes for the period from September 1, 1923, to March 1, 1924, the revenue derived from gasoline and what changes, if any, the applicant shall have made in any of its rates to other consumers.

Upon filing the petition of appellants an order was entered by one of the judges of this Court on their motion fixing a day for hearing their application for suspension of the aforesaid order. On the.... day of September, 1923, a hearing was had thereon and the order allowing the rate increase was suspended. At a later day in the present term, upon extended oral argument and voluminous briefs, the case was submitted for final decision. Some of the questions presented are novel; many are of such vital importance both to the applicant and to the public as to merit the fullest consideration. In reaching a conclusion we have been required to consider a great variety of data comprising the financial history of applicant for its twenty years existence; reports of expert accountants compiled from its books; the oral testimony and opinions of various witnesses; the orders and opinions of the commission on former applications of the utility for increase in rates; and many other matters bearing on the questions at issue. The utility and the public are entitled to know the facts we have considered as well as the reasons for our de- *95 cisión; for, however sound the legal principles announced in an opinion may be, the opinion itself is of little value unless the vital facts on which the opinion is based are clearly set forth in proper order. For these reasons it is necessary to carry this opinion to greater length than would ordinarily be advisable.

This proceeding was begun June 29, 1921, by the company filing its application for an increase in rates and in effect asking for a rehearing of practically the same questions that were involved in its two former applications, reported as Case No. 585, 1 W. Va. P. S. C. 504, P. U. R. 1918-C, p. 193; and Case No. 845, decided December 19, 1919, 1 W. Va. P. S. C. 561, P. U. R. 1920-C, p. 583. On April 28, 1922, an order was entered granting a substantial increase for certain blocks of its industrial gas and allowing the company to charge schools, hotels, churches and other public institutions the regular domestic rates instead of the preferential rates they had formerly enjoyed.

The Commission in an opinion then filed reiterated its former holdings denying the company’s claim for appreciation in its leaseholds, and restricted the leasehold value to investment cost. In case No. 845 it had fixed1 the rate base at $30,-000,000, and found the company was entitled to earn thereon annually $5,000,000, after paying operating expenses, to provide a return upon the investment, calculated at 8%, a depreciation reserve fund, and a fund for the amortization of its leaseholds, the allowance for the last named fund being calculated at $500,000. This amounted to 16 2/3% of the rate base. In its opinion, it found that since December 19, 1919, the company had invested in additions to its property in round figures $3,000,000 and that during this period it had apparently earned in excess of its operating expenses, taxes and return upon its investment, revenues applicable to depletion and depreciation amounting to $2,500,000, so that the net additions to the fair value- of the company’s property was about $500,000. It therefore found the fair value of the company’s property as of April 28, 1922, for the “purpose *96 of return upon the investment” to be $30,500,000. It further said:

“The sum upon which depreciation and depletion must be calculated should be increased to the extent the applicant has added to its depreciable property since the decision in Case No. 845, but when depreciation and depletion have been earned and set aside for the amortization of applicant’s investment, the applicant is no longer entitled; to earn a return upon the sum so earned .and set aside, upon the theory that this fund will be either paid out to the stockholders in the nature of liquidating dividends or reinvested in other property. ’ ’

It further found that the company’s operating experience, (considering the amount of depreciation accruing), for the year 1921 showed an apparent deficit of about $1,700,000; that of this sum $1,000,000 should be nfade up by charging-it as having received higher rates from its parent companies; that the remaining deficit was in part due to inadequate rates, but largely due to a falling off in the volume of its business, which would correct itself by probable increase in gas sales; but that it was entitled to an increase in net earnings of $200,000 and for this purpose it was allowed to increase the rates on certain blocks of its industrial gas and to place schools and other public institutions on the domestic rate basis. These increases were to become effective as of' May 1, 1922; the company was directed to keep and report an account of its income and operating expenses arising from its gas and gasoline business, as well as additions to capital for the succeeding six months; the case was retired from the-active calendar to be reinstated thereon for further investigation and orders upon the filing of the report. On January 11, 1923, the report was filed, and on February 20th, on applicant’s motion, the case was set down for further investigation and hearing, which finally resulted in the order complained of here.

The questions with which we are concerned upon this appeal are:

(1) What is a proper rate base, involving (a) whether *97 appreciation in the value of the company’s leaseholds should be considered in arriving at a fair value of the company’s property for rate-making purposes; and (b) whether in ascertaining the rate base, deduction should be made for depreciation and depletion.

(2) What income, if any, from the company’s gasoline business should be credited to .its gas business.

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Bluebook (online)
120 S.E. 398, 95 W. Va. 91, 1923 W. Va. LEXIS 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-charleston-v-public-service-commission-wva-1923.