CRAIG, Judge.
The Hazleton City Council appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County that declared null and void a city ordinance that would have amended the city’s Administrative Code to vest in the council, rather than in the mayor, the power to appoint members of municipal authorities.
The sole issue here is one of law: Do the relevant statutes permit the city council, in an Optional Plan B form of third class city government, to be the appointing power with respect to municipal authority members?
The facts are as follows. On November 5, 1985, the voters of Hazleton, a city of the third class, elected to change the city’s form of government from a commission type to an Optional Plan: Executive (Mayor) — Council Plan B under the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, Act of April 13, 1972, No. 62, §§ 101-1309, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 1-101 — 1-1309 (Optional Plans Law). On January [177]*17725, 1988, to implement the new government, the council passed Ordinance No. 88-1, known as the Administrative Code of the City of Hazleton.
Section 401 of that code, without the attempted amendment, states:
Article IV — Section 401. Appointment of Members to Authorities, Boards and Commissions. Where the appointment of members to authorities, boards, or commissions is vested in the city by statute or ordinance, such member or members shall be appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and approval of Council.
The council adopted Ordinance 88-56 on January 9, 1989, amending Section 401 to read as follows:
Article IV — Section 401. Appointments of Members to Authorities, Boards, and Commissions. Where the appointment of members to authorities is so stated in the Municipal Authorities Act (53 P.S., Section 309), said appointment is hereby granted by the Governing Body also known as the Council of the City of Hazleton. Whereby the appointment of boards or commissions is vested in the city by statute or Ordinance such member or members shall be appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and approval of Council.
Be it further resolved that any and all Ordinances or parts of Ordinances inconsistent with this Ordinance be and the same are hereby repealed.
Thus, Ordinance No. 88-56 would amend the original code by vesting in the council the power to appoint members to municipal authorities. The mayor would retain the power conferred under the original text of Section 401 to appoint members of “boards and commissions.”
The mayor vetoed the ordinance; however, the council unanimously overrode the veto. The council then appointed Hazleton residents to positions on various municipal authorities.
Section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law, as amended, 53 P.S. § 1-1221, reads as follows:
[178]*178The appointment power of the chief executive of the municipality under any of the plans authorized by this act shall include the appointment of members of boards and commissions authorized by this act, by general law now or hereafter enacted, or by action of municipal council. All such appointments shall be with the advice and consent of a majority of municipal council. (Emphasis added.)
The relevant provisions of the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945 (Authorities Act), Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382, as amended, §§ 1-19, 53 P.S. §§ 301-322, state:
§ 302. Definitions
The following terms whenever used or referred to in this act shall have the following meanings, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(b) The term “Board” shall mean the governing body of an Authority.
Section 2 of the Authorities Act, as amended, 53 P.S. § 302.
§ 309. Governing body
A. The Powers of each Authority shall be exercised by a governing body (Herein called the “Board”) composed as follows:
(a) If the Authority is incorporated by one municipality the board shall consist of such number of members not less than five as shall be set forth in the articles of incorporation or amendment thereto. The governing body of such municipality shall appoint the members of the board,
Section 7 of the Authorities Act, as amended, 53 P.S. § 309 A(a). (Emphasis added.)
The Optional Plans Law expressly defines “governing body” as:
____ [Bjoards of county commissioners, city councils, borough or incorporated town councils, commissioners of townships of the first class, and supervisors of townships [179]*179of the second class as their successor forms of government. (Emphasis added.)
Section 102 of the Law, 53 P.S. § 1-102.
The mayor contends that this court should interpret section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law as giving the mayor (the “chief executive”) power to appoint members of authorities, as being included within the power to appoint members of “boards and commissions” because the Authorities Act refers to the governing body of an authority (the appointed members) as a “Board”.
By that reading, the mayor assumes that the words “authorized ... by general law now ... enacted”, emphasized in our quotation of section 1221 above, refer to laws authorizing “boards and commissions.”
The mayor’s analysis also assumes that, when the legislature passed the Optional Plans Law, its section 1221 impliedly repealed contrary appointment provisions of acts which the general assembly had earlier adopted, such as the Authorities Act, expressly placing the appointment power in a governing body.
The contrary contention is that the words “authorized ... by general law now ... enacted,” section 1221, modify the preceding word “appointment,” so that the Optional Plans Law would have to be read as confirming a mayoral appointment power only when the other statute already authorizes appointment by the mayor.
Therefore, our decisive analysis here must first determine whether the Optional Plans Law, in defining the mayor’s appointment power, extends it to “boards and commissions” authorized by other laws, or extends it only to situations where the other law authorizes a mayoral appointment.
The conclusion must be that an ordinary, unstrained reading of the passage indicates that it refers to “boards and commissions” authorized by other laws, and therefore does not limit the mayor’s power to appoint members to boards or commissions only in those situations where the [180]*180other law expressly names the mayor as the appointing power.
Next, given that the Optional Plans Law extends the mayor’s appointive power to all boards and commissions authorized by law, the further question is whether the board or governing body of an authority comes within the concept of “boards and commissions” as used in the Optional Plans Law.
This court’s conclusion is that the concept of “boards and commissions” in section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law is limited to boards and commissions within the city government.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
CRAIG, Judge.
The Hazleton City Council appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County that declared null and void a city ordinance that would have amended the city’s Administrative Code to vest in the council, rather than in the mayor, the power to appoint members of municipal authorities.
The sole issue here is one of law: Do the relevant statutes permit the city council, in an Optional Plan B form of third class city government, to be the appointing power with respect to municipal authority members?
The facts are as follows. On November 5, 1985, the voters of Hazleton, a city of the third class, elected to change the city’s form of government from a commission type to an Optional Plan: Executive (Mayor) — Council Plan B under the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, Act of April 13, 1972, No. 62, §§ 101-1309, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 1-101 — 1-1309 (Optional Plans Law). On January [177]*17725, 1988, to implement the new government, the council passed Ordinance No. 88-1, known as the Administrative Code of the City of Hazleton.
Section 401 of that code, without the attempted amendment, states:
Article IV — Section 401. Appointment of Members to Authorities, Boards and Commissions. Where the appointment of members to authorities, boards, or commissions is vested in the city by statute or ordinance, such member or members shall be appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and approval of Council.
The council adopted Ordinance 88-56 on January 9, 1989, amending Section 401 to read as follows:
Article IV — Section 401. Appointments of Members to Authorities, Boards, and Commissions. Where the appointment of members to authorities is so stated in the Municipal Authorities Act (53 P.S., Section 309), said appointment is hereby granted by the Governing Body also known as the Council of the City of Hazleton. Whereby the appointment of boards or commissions is vested in the city by statute or Ordinance such member or members shall be appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and approval of Council.
Be it further resolved that any and all Ordinances or parts of Ordinances inconsistent with this Ordinance be and the same are hereby repealed.
Thus, Ordinance No. 88-56 would amend the original code by vesting in the council the power to appoint members to municipal authorities. The mayor would retain the power conferred under the original text of Section 401 to appoint members of “boards and commissions.”
The mayor vetoed the ordinance; however, the council unanimously overrode the veto. The council then appointed Hazleton residents to positions on various municipal authorities.
Section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law, as amended, 53 P.S. § 1-1221, reads as follows:
[178]*178The appointment power of the chief executive of the municipality under any of the plans authorized by this act shall include the appointment of members of boards and commissions authorized by this act, by general law now or hereafter enacted, or by action of municipal council. All such appointments shall be with the advice and consent of a majority of municipal council. (Emphasis added.)
The relevant provisions of the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945 (Authorities Act), Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382, as amended, §§ 1-19, 53 P.S. §§ 301-322, state:
§ 302. Definitions
The following terms whenever used or referred to in this act shall have the following meanings, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(b) The term “Board” shall mean the governing body of an Authority.
Section 2 of the Authorities Act, as amended, 53 P.S. § 302.
§ 309. Governing body
A. The Powers of each Authority shall be exercised by a governing body (Herein called the “Board”) composed as follows:
(a) If the Authority is incorporated by one municipality the board shall consist of such number of members not less than five as shall be set forth in the articles of incorporation or amendment thereto. The governing body of such municipality shall appoint the members of the board,
Section 7 of the Authorities Act, as amended, 53 P.S. § 309 A(a). (Emphasis added.)
The Optional Plans Law expressly defines “governing body” as:
____ [Bjoards of county commissioners, city councils, borough or incorporated town councils, commissioners of townships of the first class, and supervisors of townships [179]*179of the second class as their successor forms of government. (Emphasis added.)
Section 102 of the Law, 53 P.S. § 1-102.
The mayor contends that this court should interpret section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law as giving the mayor (the “chief executive”) power to appoint members of authorities, as being included within the power to appoint members of “boards and commissions” because the Authorities Act refers to the governing body of an authority (the appointed members) as a “Board”.
By that reading, the mayor assumes that the words “authorized ... by general law now ... enacted”, emphasized in our quotation of section 1221 above, refer to laws authorizing “boards and commissions.”
The mayor’s analysis also assumes that, when the legislature passed the Optional Plans Law, its section 1221 impliedly repealed contrary appointment provisions of acts which the general assembly had earlier adopted, such as the Authorities Act, expressly placing the appointment power in a governing body.
The contrary contention is that the words “authorized ... by general law now ... enacted,” section 1221, modify the preceding word “appointment,” so that the Optional Plans Law would have to be read as confirming a mayoral appointment power only when the other statute already authorizes appointment by the mayor.
Therefore, our decisive analysis here must first determine whether the Optional Plans Law, in defining the mayor’s appointment power, extends it to “boards and commissions” authorized by other laws, or extends it only to situations where the other law authorizes a mayoral appointment.
The conclusion must be that an ordinary, unstrained reading of the passage indicates that it refers to “boards and commissions” authorized by other laws, and therefore does not limit the mayor’s power to appoint members to boards or commissions only in those situations where the [180]*180other law expressly names the mayor as the appointing power.
Next, given that the Optional Plans Law extends the mayor’s appointive power to all boards and commissions authorized by law, the further question is whether the board or governing body of an authority comes within the concept of “boards and commissions” as used in the Optional Plans Law.
This court’s conclusion is that the concept of “boards and commissions” in section 1221 of the Optional Plans Law is limited to boards and commissions within the city government.
The unique nature of municipal authorities created under the Municipal Authorities Act supports the council’s position. As the council points out, authorities are “bodies politic and corporate”, independent agencies of the Commonwealth and part of the sovereignty of the State, Simon Appeal, 408 Pa. 464, 468-9, 184 A.2ds 695 (1962), and are not regarded as entities related to the general administration of a municipality.
The legislature’s label for an authority’s governing body, as a “board”, appears merely to provide a shorthand reference in the Authorities Act to the term “governing body”, as used in the Act, and cannot be regarded as an expression of legislative intent to equate the governing body of an authority with the boards and commissions common to the normal administration of a city or municipality.
Furthermore, as the council points out, in accordance with the rules of statutory construction, when the legislature includes specific designations in an act, omissions from the list of items or things mentioned should be regarded as exclusions. Samilo v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 98 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 232, 510 A.2d 412 (1986). The legislature’s omission of the word “authorities” in section 1221 should be regarded as an exclusion [181]*181from the list of entities (boards and commissions) included in that section.
The appointing power with respect to members of authorities therefore remains in the governing body, where the Authorities Act expressly puts it, and section 102 of the Optional Plans Law (quoted above) expressly states that the governing body in this third class city is the city council.
The mayor raises comparative arguments by pointing to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code and the effect that one interpretation or the other would have upon the powers of municipal executives or councils to define, and appoint the members of, planning commissions and zoning hearing boards. However, undertaking such a collateral interpretation cannot be determinative here, particularly because planning commissions and zoning hearing boards, unlike authorities, are agencies within the framework of municipal government itself, and therefore present distinguishable examples.
The decision of the trial court is reversed.
ORDER
Now, July 23, 1990, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, dated August 28, 1989, at No. 18E 1989, is reversed.