Citizens Coal Council v. Norton

193 F. Supp. 2d 159, 151 Oil & Gas Rep. 357, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20570, 54 ERC (BNA) 1348, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5799, 2002 WL 501111
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 28, 2002
DocketCIV.A. 00-0274JR
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 193 F. Supp. 2d 159 (Citizens Coal Council v. Norton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 159, 151 Oil & Gas Rep. 357, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20570, 54 ERC (BNA) 1348, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5799, 2002 WL 501111 (D.D.C. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ROBERTSON, District Judge.

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq., prohibits “surface coal mining operations” in national parks and other protected areas. Id. § 1272(e). This case, the latest chapter in fifteen years of litigation over the definition of “surface coal mining operations,” presents the question whether § 1272(e) also prohibits subsidence and underground mining activities that may cause subsidence in *161 those same parks and protected areas. The plaintiff organizations, whose members use parks and other protected areas, challenge the Secretary of the Interior’s decision that § 1272(e) does not prohibit such activities. The National Mining Association, whose members mine or wish to mine coal beneath national parks and other protected areas, have intervened to defend the Secretary’s decision. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will be granted. The defendants’ motion will be denied.

Background

SMCRA established a comprehensive scheme for regulating strip mining and other surface mining techniques that disturb lands used for commercial, residential, recreational, and agricultural purposes. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202. One of its goals was to encourage the development and application of underground mining technologies. Id. § 1202(k). Congress was nevertheless concerned enough about the surface effects of underground coal mining, including subsidence and water pollution, that it wrote provisions into SMCRA requiring that subsidence from underground mining be prevented to the extent technologically and economically feasible, id. § 1266(b)(1), and (as of 1992) that operators repair or compensate the owners of surface rights for certain subsidence damage to homes and water sources, id. § 1309a.

SMCRA § 1272(e) bans “surface coal mining operations” outright in certain areas. 1 The question in this case is whether § 1272(e) also prohibits subsidence in those protected areas and underground mining activities that might lead to subsidence in those areas. The word “subsidence” does not appear in § 1272, but plaintiffs maintain — defendants disagree— that subsidence and activities leading to subsidence are included in the term “surface coal mining operations” as that term is used in § 1272(e) and defined in § 1291(28). The issue has been raised in previous litigation but never resolved on the merits. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 835 F.Supp. 654, 658-60, 668 (D.D.C.1993) (Flannery, J.); In re Perma *162 nent Surface Min. Regulation Litigation, 620 F.Supp. 1519, 1552-54 (D.D.C.1985), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C.Cir. 1988). The Department of Interior has sent “conflicting signals” in various administrative actions. Babbitt, 835 F.Supp. at 658-60 (tracing the history in detail).

After Judge Flannery concluded in the Babbitt case that the issue needed to be resolved pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking, id. at 668, the Secretary initiated a formal rulemaking proceeding. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a final rule that subsidence, and underground activities that may lead to subsidence, are outside the term “surface coal mining operations” as used in § 1272(e) and defined in § 1291(28). 30 C.F.R. § 761.200(a); 64 Fed.Reg. 70,838, 70,843 (Dec. 17, 1999). Underground mining is thus not banned in the areas protected by § 1272(e), the Secretary concluded, although such mines must comply with § 1266(b) and § 1309a by adopting measures to prevent subsidence to the extent technologically and economically feasible and by repairing or compensating for damages to homes and water sources. 64 Fed. Reg. at 70,843.

Plaintiffs filed this suit in February 2000, seeking a declaratory judgment that 30 C.F.R. § 761.200 and the Secretary’s underlying statutory interpretation violate SMCRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise inconsistent with law. See 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).

Analysis

A rule issued after notice-and-eomment rulemaking interpreting a statute that the Secretary administers is subject to the familiar two-step analysis outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). If the underlying statute speaks directly to the precise question at issue, the agency and the Court must give effect to Congress’ unambiguously expressed intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 (D.C.Cir.2001). If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference if it is a reasonable construction, even if there may be other reasonable, or more reasonable, views. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778; National Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 132 (D.C.Cir.2000).

The regulation at issue states that “[s]ubsidence due to underground coal mining is not included in the definition of surface coal mining operations under section 701(28) of the Act ... and therefore is not prohibited in areas protected under section 522(e) of the Act.” 30 C.F.R. § 761.200(a). The statutory definition on which this conclusion rests states:

“[S]urface coal mining operations” means—
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal mine or subject to the requirements of section 1266 of this title surface operations and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine ....

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Bluebook (online)
193 F. Supp. 2d 159, 151 Oil & Gas Rep. 357, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20570, 54 ERC (BNA) 1348, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5799, 2002 WL 501111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citizens-coal-council-v-norton-dcd-2002.