Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims

211 B.R. 813, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11668
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 7, 1997
DocketCivil Action Nos. 95-1872, 95-1886; Bankruptcy No. 91-20903; Adversary No. 91-2642
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 211 B.R. 813 (Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 211 B.R. 813, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11668 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CINDRICH, District Judge.

This action arises from an October 12,1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order (collectively referred as the “October 12 Order”) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (the “Bankruptcy Court”), Bankruptcy Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald presiding. In re Papercraft Corp., 187 B.R. 486 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1995). Pending before the Court is an appeal and cross-appeal of the October 12 Order by Appellant and Cross-Appellee Citicorp Venture [816]*816Capital, Ltd. (“CVC”) and Appellee and Cross-Appellant Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims and Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims as Estate Representative of Papereraft Corporation (the “Committee”).1 This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(1) and in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 8001 as the appeal and cross-appeal arise out of a final judgment entered by the Bankruptcy Court.

I. Facts

We begin by reciting the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact.

The following facts were established by stipulation of the parties or from the evidentiary record:
1. In 1985, Debtor, [Papereraft Corporation], completed a leveraged buyout (LBO) with the assistance of an affiliate of CVC.
2. The LBO transformed Debtor from a publicly traded company into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Amalgamated Investment Corporation (hereafter “Amalgamated”).
3. CVC acquired a 28% equity position in Amalgamated as a result of the LBO. It wrote off the equity position in 1987 because it expected no return on its investment.
4. At all relevant times, a representative of CVC sat on the boards of directors of Amalgamated, Debtor, Barth & Dreyfuss and Knomark, subsidiaries of Debtor. After 1989, that representative was CVC’s Vice President, M. Saleem Muqaddam, who served- on the boards of those companies.
5. Barth & Dreyfuss and Knomark were subsidiaries of Debtor at all relevant times.
6. In April of 1989, Debtor completed a restructuring of its debt which resulted in an exchange of approximately 98% of Debtor’s debentures for unsecured First Priority and Second Priority notes.
7. The First Priority Notes were issued under an Indenture dated May 15, 1989, and were to mature on October 1, 1994. An aggregate amount of $90,717,398 (principal plus accrued interest) was outstanding on the date Debtor’s chapter 11 case was filed.
8. The Second Priority Notes were issued under a separate Indenture, also dated May 15,1989, and were to mature on April 1, 1995. An aggregate amount of $56,318,-767 (principal plus accrued interest) was outstanding on the date the chapter 11 case was filed.2
9. Debtor was unable to meet the terms of the notes. Therefore, in the fall of 1990, Debtor sought another restructuring of its unsecured debt and began pre-bankruptcy negotiations with creditors who were part [817]*817of what has been termed in this case the “Informal Committee”.3
10. After several months of prepetition negotiations, Debtor and the Informal Committee reached an agreement on what is called herein the BDK Plan of Reorganization which was to be filed in conjunction with a chapter 11 ease.
11. The BDK Plan would effect a reorganized enterprise and was unanimously approved by Debtor’s board, including CVC through Muqaddam, in March of 1991.
12. Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition on March 22,1991.
13. At that time, CVC held none of Debt- or’s First or Second Priority Notes and was not a creditor of Debtor.
14. Debtor was insolvent on the filing date and all relevant times thereafter.
15. On March 25, 1991, three days after this bankruptcy began, Debtor filed the BDK Plan, without a disclosure statement. A disclosure statement was not filed until October 15,1991.
16. In March of 1991, Muqaddam sought the approval of CVC’s Investment Committee for CVC to purchase Papercraft notes.
17. On April 1, 1991, CVC’s Investment Committee granted approval for CVC to purchase up to $10 million of Papercraft notes.
18. In early May, 1991, Muqaddam prepared a review of CVC’s investment in Amalgamated.
19. CVC purchased $60,849,575.72 face value of the Papercraft notes for $10,553,-541.88 between April and August of 1991. Approximately $7.4 million (more than 70%) of CVC’s purchases of Papercraft notes were made on or after August 19, 1991.
20. CVC acquired 38.3% of Debtor’s First Priority Notes, 46.4% of Debtor’s Second Priority Notes, and 40.8% of Debtor’s total unsecured claims.
21. CVC neither requested nor obtained the approval of Debtor’s board, the [C]ommittee4, or the court to buy the notes. [FN1]
FN1. On or about May 23, 1991, while it was a member of the [Cjommittee, Magten purchased, on behalf of clients, approximately $3.8 million in Second Priority Notes from Oppenheimer & Co. for approximately $879,000. Oppenheimer was a member of the Informal Committee and acknowledged in writing that it knew Mag-ten was the purchaser. Magten also made other offers to purchase Papercraft notes, again on behalf of clients. In January, 1991, Magten entered into a settlement agreement by which it agreed to receive no more than its cost of these claims at the time of distribution under the plan. Mag-ten disclosed to those entities from which it purchased notes its position with the committee and the bankruptcy. Unlike CVC, Magten had disclosed its identity and connection with Debtor. Furthermore, Magten was not buying notes for its own account, as was CVC, but for accounts of its customers.
22. Debtor learned of CVC’s initial purchases of notes by May, 1991, that is, after CVC made the purchases. Its counsel became aware that CVC had purchased some claims by June of that year. Debtor and its counsel also learned of CVC’s later purchases.
23. In April of 1991, the committee heard a rumor that CVC was purchasing claims. [818]*818The committee heal'd no more about it until CVC made its asset purchase offer in September of 1991. Neither CVC nor Debtor communicated to the committee the status or extent of CVC’s purchases.
24. CVC acquired the RTC’s First Priority and Second Priority Notes for 25 cents and 12 cents on the dollar, respectively. Magten unsuccessfully bid for the notes at 20.5 cents and 10.5 cents. When CVC bought the RTC’s notes, Muqaddam estimated that the RTC controlled approximately 20% of Debtor’s total unsecured claims.
25.

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211 B.R. 813, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11668, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citicorp-venture-capital-ltd-v-committee-of-creditors-holding-unsecured-pawd-1997.