Cipollone v. Yale Industrial

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 30, 2000
• Docket: 99-1494
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit


No. 99-1494



                        ROBERT CIPOLLONE,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



 YALE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC.; DAVCO CORPORATION OF TENNESSEE,



                      Defendants, Appellees.


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



         [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]


Before



                      Stahl, Circuit Judge,

                   Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

                   and Lipez, Circuit Judge.


Charles E. Berg, with whom Office of Albert E. Grady was on

brief for appellant.

     Joel F. Pierce, with whom Michael S. Bonner and Pierce, Davis,

Fahey & Perritano, LLP, were on brief for appellee Davco

Corporation of Tennessee.

     David R. Schmahmann, with whom Thomas O. Bean and Nutter,

McClennen & Fish, LLP, were on brief for appellee Yale Industrial

Products, Inc.


January 28, 2000


STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff-appellant Robert

Cipollone appeals a judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Yale

Industrial Products, Inc. ("Yale") and Davco Corporation of

Tennessee ("Davco").  Cipollone injured his hand while working on

a loading dock manufactured by Yale and installed by Davco at a

Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") facility in Franklin,

Massachusetts.  Basing jurisdiction on diversity, he sued

defendants in the District of Massachusetts for breach of warranty,

negligence, and violations of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A. 

Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment.  Cipollone

appeals, and we affirm.

                               I.

  FedEx, working with an outside consultant, designed a

material-handling system for its Franklin facility.  It then hired

Yale to manufacture a customized dock lift, which was to become a

component part of its material-handling system.  Yale constructed

the lift to FedEx's specifications and delivered it to FedEx.  The

lift, like many of its type, had a removable handrail.  Upon

receipt of the dock lift, another FedEx contractor, Davco,

integrated the lift into the overall material-handling system. 

FedEx's drawings directed Davco to install the lift adjacent to a

catwalk, which had no handrail.  While inspecting the project,

FedEx's engineers determined that a fixed handrail should be

installed on the catwalk to obviate what it perceived as a

potential fall hazard when the lift was in its lowered position. 

Both the lift and the catwalk had two horizontal rails with a

vertical rail on both ends.  There was no posted warning of the

potential for a person or object to get caught between the catwalk

and the lift.

  Cipollone worked as a truck driver for FedEx.  He was

loading packages onto a truck at the Franklin facility on June 5,

1996, after the handling system had come into use.  While the exact

circumstances of the accident are not entirely clear, we present

them to the best of our understanding.  Cipollone and others loaded

cans onto the lift.  Before the lift was moved, Cipollone attempted

to slide onto the catwalk a tool called a J-bar by pushing it

between the rails of the lift and the stationary rails of the

catwalk.  As Cipollone was moving the J-bar, the lift operator

began to move the lift, and Cipollone tried to pull his arms from

between the bars.  Cipollone's hand was caught between the bars,

and his left thumb was severed.  Cipollone contends he was not

holding anything at the instant his hand was injured.

  Cipollone brought suit against Yale and Davco for breach

of warranty, negligence, and unfair trade practices.  After

discovery, Yale and Davco each moved for summary judgment on all

counts.  In his opposition, Cipollone argued that the potential

testimony of his expert witness, Bradford Schofield, would create

a question of fact as to whether the proximity of the rails on the

moving lift and the stationary rails on the catwalk should have put

the defendants on notice of the shearing hazard described in note

2, supra.  Schofield was prepared to testify that the narrow

spacing of the two handrails created a shearing hazard for persons

grasping objects within that space.  The district court concluded

that Schofield's opinion was "sheer ipse dixit" and ruled that the

court would exclude it at trial.  Because no other evidence

supported Cipollone's claims, the court granted summary judgment to

both defendants. 

                              II.

  We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, see EEOC

v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 141 (1st Cir. 1997), and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, see Champagne v.

Servistar Corp., 138 F.3d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 1998).  Because this case

is before us on diversity jurisdiction, and all events took place

in Massachusetts, we apply Massachusetts law.  See Ticketmaster-New

York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[A]

federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is the functional

equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.").

                              III.

  Cipollone contends that Yale negligently designed and

manufactured the lift, negligently failed to warn him of the

shearing hazard, and breached its warranty of merchantability.  He

contends that Davco negligently installed the lift and negligently

failed to warn him of the hazard.  We address in turn the claims

against each party.

                               A.

  We begin with Cipollone's claims against Yale.  When

addressing a claimed breach of warranty of merchantability, we

focus on the product itself rather than on the conduct of the user. 

See Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1313 (Mass.

1988).  In addition, "a defendant may be liable on a theory of

breach of warranty of merchantability even though he or she

properly designed, manufactured, and sold his or her product."  Id. 

To win a breach of warranty claim, plaintiff must "prove a defect

in the product or an unreasonably dangerous condition which existed

at the time the product left the defendant's control."  Enrich v.

Windmere Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Mass. 1993).

  When a component of an integrated product is not itself

defective, the maker of the component is not liable for injury that

results from a defect in the integrated product.  See Mitchell v.

Sky Climber, Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1986) ("[A]

supplier of a component part containing no latent defect has no

duty to warn the subsequent assembler or its customers of any

danger that may arise after the components are assembled."); see

also Freitas v. Emhart Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (D. Mass.

1989) (discussing Massachusetts law); Murray v. Goodrich Eng'g

Corp., 566 N.E.2d 631,  632 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing that

a component part manufacturer is not liable for defects in the

assembled product);  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products

Liability  5 (1998).  "If the component is not itself defective,

it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on

the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product utilizes

the component in a manner that renders the integrated product

defective."  Id. cmt. a.  Therefore, the manufacturer of a

component is liable only if the defect existed in the

manufacturer's component itself.

  In this case, Yale designed to FedEx's specifications a

lift, which FedEx later integrated into a larger package-handling

system.  The Restatement contemplates components that "function on

their own but still may be utilized in a variety of ways by

assemblers of other products."  Id.  Such components would include

a dock lift that is integrated into a package-handling system.  Cf.

Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 717 (R.I. 1999)

(adopting section 5 and approving its application to major

components of a large conveyor belt system).  Because there is no

evidence that Yale's lift itself was defective when Yale delivered

it to FedEx and because Yale's product is merely a component of

FedEx's larger package-handling system, summary judgment for Yale

was proper.

                               B.

  Next, we turn to whether summary judgment was proper for

Davco.  Cipollone claims Davco negligently installed the Yale lift. 

As a general matter, negligence requires a duty, breach of that

duty, "but for" and proximate causation of harm, and damages.  See

Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1038

(Mass. 1983).  To prove Davco's negligence in this case, Cipollone

proffered Schofield's expert testimony.  As we have stated, the

district court determined that Schofield's "opinion [was] sheer

ipse dixit" -- and therefore would be inadmissible at trial --

because his references to various standards either were not on

point or did not support the plaintiff's claims.  For us to

determine whether Davco acted negligently, we first must review

whether the district court's decision to exclude Schofield's

testimony was proper.

  The Supreme Court has observed that Federal Rule of

Evidence 702 "assign[s] to the trial judge the task of ensuring

that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and

is relevant to the task at hand."  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).  The Court also has made clear that

a trial judge must make these determinations whenever scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge is at issue.  See Kumho

Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999) (applying

Daubert to the testimony of "an expert in tire failure analysis"). 

The ultimate purpose of the Daubert inquiry is to determine whether

the testimony of the expert would be helpful to the jury in

resolving a fact in issue. 

  According broad deference to the district court's

determination, see General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,

143 (1997) ("[T]he question of admissibility of expert testimony

is . . . reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard."), we

turn to the proffered expert testimony in this case.  In a written

report and at his deposition, Schofield explained that the gap

between the fixed and the moving handrail measured between 3.25 and

3.50 inches and that, based on anthropomorphic data, a male hand

grasping an object could measure 4.50 inches in width.  While

conceding that "[i]t is probably unrealistic to expect a

manufacturer of such lifts to know of all these arrangements and

configurations and the specific hazards that may be created in

combination with their product," Schofield nonetheless concluded

that this particular lift as installed was too dangerous and that

Yale and Davco had a duty to warn its users about its inherent

risks.

  The district court found that this proposed testimony

failed to satisfy Daubert because it "did not meet that threshold

necessary to assist the jury."  We agree.  To be admissible,

Schofield's testimony must have "a valid . . . connection to the

pertinent inquiry."  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.  It does not. 

Schofield testified that the 3.50 inch pinch point created a

shearing hazard because if a man were holding something 2.10 inches

in diameter, his hand might measure 4.50 inches from the

metacarpal-phalangial joint of the middle finger to the proximal

interphalangial joint of the thumb.  But Cipollone never contended

he was holding anything during the accident; indeed, he testified

he was holding nothing when the accident occurred.  Because

Schofield described a shearing hazard that did not cause

Cipollone's injury, and Cipollone described an injury that did not

result from the shearing hazard Schofield described, Schofield's

testimony is irrelevant and properly was excluded under Daubert.

                              IV.

  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's

grant of summary judgment.