2015 IL App (1st) 132228 No. 1-13-2228 Opinion filed January 14, 2015 Third Division
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
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DIANE CIPOLLA, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) No. 11 L 1673 v. ) ) The Honorable THE VILLAGE OF OAK LAWN, ) Thomas R. Mulroy, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellee. )
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JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Pucinski and Justice Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The village manager of Oak Lawn told Diane Cipolla, a 12-year employee just shy of her
sixtieth birthday, that her position was being terminated to help close a budget gap that exceeded
$1 million. But Cipolla believes the real reason was her age and claims her supervisor was heard
commenting on her age during a closed meeting of the village board of trustees only one day
before the termination. Cipolla sued the village alleging age discrimination in violation of the
Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-102(A) (West 2012)). After a four-day trial, the judge 1-13-2228
instructed the jurors and gave them two special interrogatories asking: (1) whether the non-
discriminatory reason the village gave for terminating Cipolla's employment (i.e., budget) was a
pretext, and (2) whether the village fired Cipolla because of her age. During deliberations, the
jury submitted a note to the judge asking whether the term "fired" includes laid off, terminated,
or eliminated. After conferring with counsel, the judge decided not to answer the question and
instead instructed the jurors to "resolve your question by continuing to review said facts and by
reference to the jury instructions." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the village. After the
trial court denied her motion for a new trial, Cipolla appealed.
¶2 Cipolla argues the jury's verdict should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial
because: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to clarify for the jury the meaning of
the word "fired"; (2) defense counsel made improper, prejudicial remarks during closing
argument; (3) the jury should have been given a "cat's paw" liability instruction; (4) the village
should not have been permitted to present witnesses who denied the comment about Cipolla's
age had been made during the closed board meeting while also maintaining executive privilege
over an audiotape of the meeting; (5) the trial court erred in permitting the village to present
irrelevant evidence about her husband's business; and (6) the jury's verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶3 We affirm. The jury's request for clarification on the meaning of the word "fired"
presented a factual issue, and the trial court did not err in refusing to answer it. Further, the
court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were not grounds for a new trial, defense
counsel's comments during closing arguments were not prejudicial, and the jury's verdict was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 Diane Cipolla began working as the business regulation officer in the Village of Oak
Lawn's finance department in 1996. On April 11, 2008, Cipolla met with village manager Larry
Deetjen, Brian Hanigan, the village's director of finance and Cipolla's supervisor, and Dan
Omiecinski, the village's human resource director. Deetjen told Cipolla that her job was being
eliminated or automated due to budget constraints. Cipolla was placed on administrative leave
and continued to receive full pay and benefits until April 23, 2008, when her employment was
officially terminated. On April 22, 2008, the village board of trustees approved amendments to
the village's 2008 budget, which included the elimination of Cipolla's position, as well as three
firefighter positions.
¶6 Cipolla contends that on April 10, 2008, the day before she was terminated, the village
board met in a closed executive session and, while discussing reorganization and staff cuts, her
supervisor, Brian Hanigan, commented that Cipolla was "older." Cipolla also asserts that
although she was told her position was being eliminated or automated, her job responsibilities
were transferred to Deanne Adasiak, another village employee who was 20 years her junior.
Cipolla contends that budget constraints were only a pretext for her termination, because not
long after, the village hired a budget director for a salary in excess of $80,000, gave many of its
finance department employees raises, and continued to hire new employees.
¶7 Cipolla filed a charge of age discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights, which dismissed the charge on November 10, 2010. Cipolla then filed a complaint in the
circuit court of Cook County on February 14, 2011 (which was amended on March 20, 2012),
alleging she was fired because of her age in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act)
(775 ILCS 5/1-102 et seq. (West 2012)). Section 1-102(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part,
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that "It is the public policy of this State *** [t]o secure for all individuals within Illinois the
freedom from discrimination against any individual because of his or her *** age ***." 775
ILCS 5/1-102(A) (West 2012). The village filed an answer denying all of Cipolla's allegations
and an affirmative defense asserting that Cipolla could not establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination because no other similarly situated younger employees were treated differently
and the village never sought a replacement for her position. The village contended Cipolla was
terminated for budgetary reasons, because it had a deficit of more than $1 million that it decided
to alleviate by cutting personnel costs.
¶8 During pretrial discovery, Cipolla asked the village to produce the audiotape from the
executive session of the village board, but the village refused, arguing it was privileged under the
Illinois Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2012)). Cipolla then filed a motion to
compel the village to produce the audiotape, or alternatively, to bar the village from denying that
Hanigan made statements about Cipolla's age during that meeting. In support of her motion,
Cipolla contended that because budgetary decisions were purportedly made during the executive
session, it was not a properly closed meeting and thus the exception to disclosure under the Open
Meetings Act was inapplicable. Cipolla also argued she had a particularized need for the
audiotape because board members who were at the meeting presented conflicting deposition
testimony as to whether Hanigan commented about her age and discovery of the truth weighed in
favor of compelling the village to produce the audiotape. Cipolla alternatively asked the trial
court to inspect the audiotape in camera to determine whether anything related to her age was
said during the executive session.
¶9 After argument, the trial court ordered the village to submit the audiotape and a verified
transcript for in camera review. After reviewing the tape and the transcript, the trial court denied
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Cipolla's motion. The trial judge said that the transcript indicated that a male speaker mentioned
Cipolla's name twice during the executive session and that after listening to the tape, which was
difficult to understand, he was able to determine that nothing was said regarding Cipolla's
termination, her age, or anything else relevant to the case. The court also denied Cipolla's later
motion to have the audiotape inspected by a forensics recording expert to determine if it had
been edited, altered, or otherwise not properly preserved, because the court found no evidence
that the recording's integrity had been compromised.
¶ 10 Before trial, Cipolla filed a motion in limine to bar the village from presenting testimony
denying that Hanigan made statements about her age during the executive session or, in the
alternative, to bar testimony relating to the tape. The trial court's ruling on that motion is not in
the record, but it appears from the trial transcript that the motion was denied, at least in part,
because the village presented several witnesses at trial who testified that Hanigan did not make
any comments about Cipolla's age during the executive session.
¶ 11 The evidence at trial showed that on April 10, 2008, the day before Cipolla was
terminated, the village's board of trustees met in executive session to discuss budget
amendments. The village had a budget deficit of about $1.4 million and the board was
discussing, among other things, the elimination of some vacant positions and the dismissal of
some village employees. Village board member Jerry Hurckes testified that while discussing
Cipolla's termination, finance director Hanigan said, "Well, she [Cipolla] is older." Hurckes said
he admonished Hanigan saying, "those kinds of words can't be used because that's what gets us
in trouble." Hurckes said trustee Alex Olejniczak also similarly admonished Hanigan.
Olejniczak, however, testified he never heard Jerry Hurckes scold Brian Hanigan for making
comments about Cipolla's age and said that if Hanigan had made that type of comment he would
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have objected but denied having done so. Several other witnesses at the executive session,
including village trustees Thomas Phelan and Carol Quinlan and village mayor David Heilmann,
also testified that they did not hear Hanigan make any comments about Cipolla's age.
¶ 12 Village manager Deetjen testified that Hanigan recommended eliminating Cipolla's
position and giving her job responsibilities to Deanne Adasiak, a village employee who worked
on special events. Deetjen said that the decision to terminate Cipolla was not performance-based
but was an effort to address the village's budget problems. Deetjen testified that in addition to
Cipolla's position, the budget amendment eliminated several vacant positions and resulted in the
layoff of three firefighters. Hanigan acknowledged that during the executive session meeting he
recommended that the village's finance department be restructured by consolidating Cipolla's and
Adasiak's positions to help close the village's budget gap but denied making any statements
about Cipolla's age during that meeting.
¶ 13 On April 22, 2008, the village board held a public meeting and approved the budget
amendments, which included the elimination of Cipolla's position and three firefighter positions.
Trustee Hurckes voted against the amendments. Trustees Olejniczak, Phelan and Quinlan voted
for the budget amendment, but testified their votes were not motivated by Cipolla's age. Later,
Cipolla saw Hurckes at a political fundraiser, and he told her about Hanigan's comments
regarding her age. At about the same time, Cipolla saw a job posting on the village website for a
budget director with a salary that exceeded the salary she had been earning in the business
regulation officer position. Deetjen confirmed that a few months after Cipolla left the village
hired a budget director, whose salary exceeded Cipolla's. Cipolla acknowledged she was not
qualified for that job because she did not have an accounting degree.
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¶ 14 Cipolla also acknowledged that on the day she was terminated, Deetjen told her about a
potential opening in the village's 911 telecommunications center, but said no formal job offer
was made, and she believed she would need to pass a civil service test before she could be
offered that position. On cross-examination, Cipolla conceded that she was not interested in the
telecommunications position because she had small children and did not want to work evening
and weekend hours and also did not think she could handle the pressure of the job. Cipolla said
the village offered no other alternatives to termination, such as taking a lower salary or assuming
the job duties of another village employee with less tenure.
¶ 15 After Cipolla was terminated, she submitted paperwork with the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund (IMRF) and has been receiving pension payments since April 2008. Cipolla
testified that she filed the IMRF papers so that she and her husband could continue to get health
insurance through the village's insurance plan rather than buying health insurance from a private
insurer. She said that the village continues to pay part of her health insurance premium, but at a
lower rate than when she was a village employee.
¶ 16 After she was terminated, Cipolla searched for other job opportunities, without success.
In June 2008, she took a part-time, unpaid position at her husband's snack food business. In
2010, she began receiving salary for her work at the company, and at the time of trial, was
earning $12,000 a year. Cipolla testified that her duties involve sales and marketing, attending
trade shows, and sending samples and product pricing information to distributors. She said she
has business cards with the title of sales director, but said she uses them primarily to provide
potential customers her contact information. Cipolla described the company as a small, three-
employee business and her job as a "lesser position" than the one she held at the village.
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¶ 17 On cross-examination, Cipolla acknowledged that her husband's business partner was
Fred Plochman, one of the owners of Plochman's Mustard Company, that Fred Plochman died
and her husband is now the sole owner of the business. She also acknowledged that the
company's products are sold in Whole Foods stores, as well as in China and Dubai. Over
objection, defense counsel asked Cipolla about a report showing the company had annual
revenues exceeding $2 million. Cipolla denied knowledge about the company's finances but
disputed that figure.
¶ 18 Plaintiff's husband, Paul Cipolla, testified that his company is a small snack food business
with three employees. He said he hired his wife as a part-time sales director because she was
unable to find other employment and he thought it would help alleviate the depression she felt
after losing her job with the village. On cross-examination and over objection from plaintiff's
attorney, Paul Cipolla testified that his company's 2012 annual revenues were between $500,000
and $1 million. On redirect, he said that the $500,000 to $1 million figure was not income to him
because it did not include deductions for expenses paid to distributors and contractors.
¶ 19 During the jury instruction conference, Cipolla tendered a non-Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction (plaintiff's instruction No. 10), which read as follows:
"The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits 'unlawful discrimination.' Unlawful
discrimination is discrimination against a person on the basis of his or her race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status or handicap.
The Act specifically defines the following conduct as a civil rights violation in the
employment context: For any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with
respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for
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training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or
conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination."
¶ 20 The village objected, arguing that the first paragraph alone would sufficiently and
accurately state Illinois law and noting that plaintiff's instruction No. 11 (see Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil, No. 250.02 (2011) (hereinafter, IPI Civil (2011)) already addressed the
elements Cipolla was required to prove to prevail on her age discrimination claim. Plaintiff's
instruction No. 11 stated:
"The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
First, that the Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendant;
Second, that the Plaintiff was fired from her employment with the Defendant;
Third, that the Plaintiff was fired because of her age;
Fourth, that the Plaintiff sustained damages as a result of her firing.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proven, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. On the
other hand, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for the Defendant."
¶ 21 The trial court gave plaintiff's instruction No. 11 and over Cipolla's objection, only gave
the jury the first paragraph of plaintiff's instruction No. 10.
¶ 22 Two other proposed jury instructions on which the parties disagreed were plaintiff's
instructions Nos. 17 (a modified IPI) and 18 (a non-IPI). Plaintiff's instruction No. 17 modified
IPI Civil (2011), No. 50.02 agency instruction as follows: "Brian Hanigan and Larry Deetjen
were agents of the Defendant Village of Oak Lawn at the time of Plaintiff's termination.
Therefore, any act or omission of the agents at that time was in law the act of omission of the
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Defendant Village of Oak Lawn." The village objected, arguing that agency was not a contested
issue and the instruction would confuse the jury. The village also objected to Cipolla's proposed
non-IPI instruction No. 18, seeking to hold the village liable for Hanigan's discriminatory intent,
also referred to as "cat's paw liability." Plaintiff's instruction No. 18 read: "The Defendant
Village of Oak Lawn may be held liable for employment discrimination based on the
discriminatory animus of a supervisor who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate
employment decision, if that supervisor performs an act motivated by discriminatory animus that
is intended by the supervisor to cause the termination, and does cause the termination."
¶ 23 Cipolla's attorney contended cat's paw liability was an issue because evidence showed
that Hanigan recommended to Deetjen that Cipolla be terminated. The trial court declined to give
instruction No. 18, finding it would confuse the jury, but instead gave the modified agency
instruction, plaintiff's instruction No. 17.
¶ 24 While the jurors were deliberating, they sent a note to the judge, stating, "Judge, Please
define fire. Does it include, a) laid off; b) terminated; c) eliminated." Cipolla's counsel argued the
trial judge should answer in the affirmative and suggested that the jury's confusion could have
been avoided if the trial judge had given plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 10 in full. The trial
judge decided the question was a factual one and answered it by telling the jurors "You should
resolve your questions by continuing to review said facts and by reference to the jury
instructions." Cipolla's attorney did not object to this response.
¶ 25 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the village. In addition, the jury answered two
special interrogatories in the negative, finding that the nondiscriminatory reason the village gave
for terminating Cipolla's employment (i.e., budget) was not a pretext and that the village did not
fire Cipolla because of her age. On January 31, 2013, the trial court entered judgment against
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Cipolla and in favor of the village. Cipolla filed a motion for a new trial arguing, in part, that the
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial judge erred in refusing to
answer the jury's question regarding the definition of "fired," and that several of the trial judge's
rulings on evidence and jury instructions were erroneous. The trial court denied the motion for a
new trial and Cipolla filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 26 ANALYSIS
¶ 27 Jurors' Question
¶ 28 Cipolla first contends the trial court abused its discretion by not answering the jury's
question whether "fired" includes laid off, terminated, or eliminated. She asserts the judge's
failure to provide an answer led to jury confusion and warrants reversal and a new trial.
¶ 29 As a preliminary matter, we address defendant's assertion that Cipolla waived the issue
by assenting to the trial court's decision to tell the jury to continue to deliberate. Generally, when
a party consents to a trial court's answer to a jury question, that party cannot later argue that the
trial court's answer was an abuse of discretion. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2010). The
record shows that after receiving the jury's question, the trial judge asked the attorneys for input
on a response. When defense counsel suggested the judge tell the jury that "fired" does not
include eliminated, plaintiff's attorney objected and asked to "make a record" that the trial court
should have given the jury plaintiff's instruction No. 10. Although the judge ultimately rejected
plaintiff's request, stating that he could not give the jury additional instructions, and told the jury
to continue to review the facts, plaintiff's counsel did present an objection, which she again
raised in her motion for a new trial. Thus, plaintiff preserved the issue.
¶ 30 Generally, the trial court has “a duty to provide instruction to the jury where it has posed
an explicit question or requested clarification on a point of law arising from facts about which
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there is doubt or confusion.” People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 228-29 (1994). The duty to
answer the jury's question applies even if the jury was properly instructed. Id. at 229; see also
People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). Therefore, “[t]he failure to answer or the giving of a
response which provides no answer to the particular question of law posed has been held to be
prejudicial error.” Childs, 159 Ill. 2d at 229. But the trial court has the discretion to “decline to
answer a jury's inquiries where the instructions are readily understandable and sufficiently
explain the relevant law, where further instructions would serve no useful purpose or would
potentially mislead the jury, when the jury's inquiry involves a question of fact, or if the giving
of an answer would cause the court to express an opinion which would likely direct a verdict one
way or another.” Id. at 228. A trial court's decision on how to respond to jury questions during
deliberations is “ordinarily left to the discretion of the trial court, so that the trial court's decision
will be disturbed on appeal only if that decision constituted an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Nash, 2012 IL (1st) 093233, ¶ 39.
¶ 31 Cipolla relies on Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 291 Ill. App. 3d 165
(1997), to support her argument that the trial judge's decision not to answer the jury's question
was an abuse of discretion. In Van Winkle, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant conspired with
others to suppress the health hazards of asbestos exposure. Van Winkle, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 167.
During deliberations, the jury asked a question about the underlying charge of a civil conspiracy,
namely expressing " 'confus[ion] about the meaning of "one or more parties" in a conspiracy' "
and whether it could mean defendant alone or had to be defendant and another company. Id. at
171. After conferring with counsel for both parties, the trial court referred the jury to the written
jury instructions. Id. at 172. The appellate court found this response to be an abuse of discretion
warranting reversal. The appellate court first noted that the jury asked a specific question that
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manifested their confusion on a substantive legal issue—who could enter into a conspiracy—
which was critical to deciding the merits of the defense. The court further noted that although the
jury instructions may have been proper, that "is not the determinative inquiry. The issue is
whether the instructions were clearly understandable to the jury.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at 173. Concluding that the trial court's failure to answer the question substantially
prejudiced the defendant, the court stated: “[I]n the midst of jury deliberations after a vigorously
contested trial, a question from the jury deserves as much—if not more—thoughtful
consideration as did the original instructions.” Id. at 174.
¶ 32 The Van Winkle court relied heavily on the reasoning of Childs. In Childs, the jury
requested clarification of jury instructions on an “intricate” and “difficult” point of law—whether
a guilty verdict on armed robbery mandated a guilty verdict of murder or still allowed for the
jury to find defendant guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. In response, the trial court
briefly attempted to answer the question through an ex parte communication, but this response
did not clarify the legal issues raised in the jury's question. While the trial court admitted that it
did not understand the question, it made no effort to clarify the jury's question. The supreme
court found that the question reflected juror confusion over a substantive legal issue and the trial
court had a duty to answer it. Therefore, the trial court's failure to address the problem that
triggered the question substantially prejudiced the defendant. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d at 234. The
supreme court in reversing the judgment concluded, “It is not apparent to us that the manner in
which the court dealt with the jury's inquiry was not a factor in the rendering of that verdict.” Id.
at 234-35.
¶ 33 Cipolla contends that as in Van Winkle and Childs, the jury's question expressed
confusion about a specific substantive legal issue and the trial judge's refusal to answer it left the
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jury confused as to a fundamental element of employment discrimination, requiring reversal and
a new trial. We disagree. The jury's question, whether "fired" included laid off, terminated, or
elimination of Cipolla's position, was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The jury heard
several witnesses, including village manager Deetjen, testify about the distinction between an
employee being fired and a position elimination, suggesting that Cipolla was not fired because
the decision not "performance based." Village trustee Olejniczak also testified about a factual
distinction between firing, terminating, and eliminating an employee's position, in that firing is
performance-based while a position elimination involves budgetary factors. The jury question in
this case, unlike the jury questions in Van Winkle and Childs, involves a question of fact, not a
question of law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not answering the jury's
question.
¶ 34 We also disagree with Cipolla's contention that the jury's question would have been
avoided if the trial court had given her proposed jury instruction No. 10, rather than only the first
paragraph. The remainder of that proposed jury instruction does not mention layoffs or
elimination of positions or define what those terms mean in relation to the word "fired." The
decision to provide a particular jury instruction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d
1007, 1020-21 (2006). Cipolla has failed to show that if the trial judge had given her proposed
instruction, the jury would have not submitted the question or that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to do so.
¶ 35 Finally, we note that Cipolla's claim of error is based on the trial court's decision to
refrain from answering a question related to an instruction she tendered. If the jury was confused
about the meaning of the word "fired," it was because Cipolla used that word in a jury instruction
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she tendered (plaintiff's instruction No. 10). By tendering the instruction, Cipolla took the
position that it was an accurate statement of the law, and she cannot now argue error related to
the trial court's decision not to clarify that instruction. Further IPI Civil (2011) No. 250.02, on
which plaintiff's instruction No. 10 was based, gives a party the option of using "discharged"
instead of "fired," which would have been a more accurate description of the village's action—it
discharged her due to the elimination of her position for budgetary reasons. Because Cipolla did
not use the more accurate term when requesting the jury instruction, she cannot now complain.
¶ 36 Defense Counsel's Closing Argument
¶ 37 Cipolla next contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a new
trial based on defense counsel's comments during closing arguments. The village's attorney
asserted that Cipolla "[was not] fired, at all" because "[t]he Village of Oak Lawn is still
subsidizing her health insurance. They don't do that for fir[ed] employees." Cipolla contends the
statement was false because her contributions to IMRF while she was a village employee entitled
her to health insurance regardless of how her employment was terminated. Cipolla asserts that
defense counsel attempted to confuse the jury by implying that Cipolla's receipt of health
insurance through IMRF necessarily means she was not fired.
¶ 38 The purpose of closing argument is to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and
assist the jury in fairly arriving at a verdict based on the law and evidence. Copeland v. Stebco
Products Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 932, 948 (2000) As a result, counsel is afforded wide latitude
during closing argument and may comment and argue on the evidence and any reasonable
inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence. Clarke v. Medley Moving & Storage, Inc.,
381 Ill. App. 3d 82, 95 (2008). “The scope of closing argument is within the sound discretion of
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the trial court and the reviewing court will reverse only if the argument is prejudicial.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O'Neil v. Continental Bank, N.A., 278 Ill. App. 3d 327, 340 (1996).
¶ 39 First, we note that defense counsel's assertion that Cipolla was not fired was appropriate
as that was the basis of the village's affirmative defense, namely that her position was eliminated
as part of an overall restructuring of the finance department. Several witnesses at trial provided
testimony to support this defense and witnesses stated that Cipolla was not "fired" for
performance reasons, but rather budget cuts lead to the elimination of her position. Thus,
defense counsel's comments were reasonably drawn from the evidence.
¶ 40 Furthermore, although Cipolla contends defense counsel made a false statement by
stating that Cipolla must not have been fired because fired employees are not entitled to
healthcare benefits, the record does not indicate that defense counsel knew this assertion was
false. Plaintiff's attorney did not object to the statement during the trial and thus, nothing in the
record sheds light on whether the statement was knowingly false. But, even if defense counsel
knew that this assertion regarding Cipolla's entitlement to village subsidized healthcare benefits
was false, Cipolla is unable to show that she was prejudiced by it. The central issue in the case
was whether the village terminated Cipolla because of her age and only used the budget as a
pretext. Answers to the two special interrogatories establish that the jury found the village acted
appropriately. Thus, because defense counsel's comments did not go to the central question—the
reason for Cipolla's termination—Cipolla is unable to show that she was prejudiced by defense
counsel's closing argument, and they do not constitute grounds for a new trial.
¶ 41 Cat's Paw Liability Instruction
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¶ 42 Cipolla next argues the trial court erred in refusing her request to give a cat's paw liability
jury instruction to permit the jury to determine whether the village could be found liable for
Hanigan's discriminatory motive in recommending her termination.
¶ 43 Whether to provide a particular jury instruction lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb that determination absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1020-21 (2006). It is for the trial court
to evaluate if a jury instruction is “ 'applicable, supported by evidence in the record, and an
accurate statement of the law.' ” Id. at 1021 (quoting Luye v. Schopper, 348 Ill. App. 3d 767, 773
(2004)). Litigants are entitled to have the jury instructed as to their theory of the case, but the
instructions they propose “must accurately state applicable law” for them to be given at trial.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Ultimately, no abuse of discretion can be established as
long as “taken as a whole, the instructions fairly, fully, and comprehensively apprise[ ] the jury
of the relevant legal principles” of the case. Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter
R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 273-74 (2002). A new trial will be granted based on the court's
refusal to give a proposed instruction only when that refusal has caused serious prejudice to a
litigant's right to a fair trial. See Stift v. Lizzadro, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1026 (2005).
¶ 44 The cat's paw theory of liability seeks to hold an employer liable when a supervisory
employee acts with discriminatory intent to cause a higher-up employee to take adverse action
against the plaintiff. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190 (2011).
The employee with a discriminatory intent does not make the firing decision but influences
another person who unwittingly fires the employee. To succeed under this theory, a plaintiff
must show the nondecisionmaker exercised such “ ‘singular influence’ ” over the decisionmaker
that the decision to terminate was the product of “blind reliance.” Id. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1190.
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(The term “cat's paw” comes from a fable by Aesop and is cited in the employment
discrimination context in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). In the fable, a
monkey induces a cat by flattery to extract roasting chestnuts from the fire. After the cat does so,
burning its paws in the process, the monkey makes off with the chestnuts and leaves the cat with
nothing. A coda to the fable observes that the cat is similar to princes who, flattered by the king,
perform services on the king's behalf and receive no reward. Staub, 562 U.S. at ___, n.1, 131 S.
Ct. at 1190, n.1.)
¶ 45 The evidence at trial did not warrant a cat's paw liability instruction, and thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give it. Several witnesses, including Deetjen,
Hurckes and Olejniczak, testified that Oak Lawn employed a village manager form of
government and that Deetjen, as village manager, had the authority to make all personnel
decisions. It is undisputed that department directors could make recommendations to Deetjen
regarding hiring and firing of employees and that Hanigan, the finance department director,
recommended that the finance department be reorganized by eliminating Cipolla's position and
transferring her job responsibilities to another village employee. But there was no testimony or
evidence indicating that Deetjen blindly relied on Hanigan when he decided to terminate Cipolla.
¶ 46 Moreover, for Cipolla's termination to become final, the budget amendments that
proposed the elimination of the business licensing officer position, as well as three firefighter
positions, had to be approved by a majority of the village board. Board members who voted in
favor of the budget amendment testified their votes were in no way motivated by Cipolla's age.
Thus, in the absence of clear evidence that Hanigan had a discriminatory intent and was a
"singular influence" on Deetjen, a cat's paw liability instruction was not warranted.
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¶ 47 Further, the trial judge did give plaintiff's jury instruction No. 18, which permitted the
jury to find the village liable under an agency theory, namely, that because Hanigan, the village's
agent, improperly discriminated against Cipolla, the principal, the village is liable. An additional
cat's paw liability instruction was not necessary to permit the jury to find the village liable based
on Hanigan's alleged discriminatory comments. Thus, Cipolla was not prejudiced by the trial
court's decision not to give the cat's paw liability instruction.
¶ 48 Denial of Motion in Limine
¶ 49 Cipolla contends she was denied a fair trial when the trial court allowed the village to
present witnesses to deny that Hanigan made statements about Cipolla's age during the April 10,
2008 executive session, while simultaneously permitting the village to claim privilege under the
Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2012)) as a basis for not turning over the
audiotape.
¶ 50 As noted above, Cipolla filed a motion asking the trial court to either compel the village
to turn over a copy of the audiotape from the executive session or to bar the village from denying
that Hanigan made a statement about Cipolla's age during the session. In her motion, Cipolla
asked in the alternative that the trial court conduct an in camera inspection of the audiotape. The
court granted the alternative relief requested and, after carefully reviewing the transcript and
listening to the audiotape in camera, determined that no mention was made of Cipolla's age and
that nothing of relevance to this case was said in the executive session. Thus, Cipolla was
granted the relief she requested in her motion to compel or bar, and cannot argue that the trial
court erred in denying her motion to compel.
¶ 51 We also do not find that the trial court erred in permitting the village to present witnesses
who testified that Hanigan said nothing regarding Cipolla's age during the executive session. As
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Cipolla notes, before trial she filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to bar the village
from presenting testimony denying that Hanigan made statements about Cipolla's age during the
executive session or in the alternative to bar evidence and testimony relating to the tape of the
April 10, 2008 executive session. Although the trial court's ruling on that motion is not evident
from the record, given that several witnesses testified that Hanigan did not comment on Cipolla's
age during the executive session and no witnesses testified about the tape, it appears the trial
court granted the alternative relief Cipolla requested i.e., by barring any evidence or testimony
relating to the audiotape. Thus, once again, Cipolla cannot be heard to complain that the
alternative relief requested was granted.
¶ 52 Further, as the appellant, it is Cipolla's burden to present a sufficiently adequate record to
support her claim of error. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). In the absence an
adequate record, it is presumed the trial court's order was in conformance with Illinois law. Id.
Any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record are resolved against appellant. Id. As
noted, nothing in the record indicates how the trial court ruled on the motion in limine or the
reasoning behind its ruling. Hence we presume the trial court's ruling was in compliance with
Illinois law.
¶ 53 Evidence Regarding Husband's Business
¶ 54 Cipolla next contends that evidence elicited by the village about the value of her
husband's snack company was more prejudicial than probative and warrants a new trial.
Specifically, plaintiff points to questions from defense counsel, over objection, regarding the
revenue generated by her husband's company, the financial status of her husband's deceased
former business partner, and where the company's products are sold and for how much. Plaintiff
argues that none of this evidence was relevant to her claim of age discrimination and was
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intended to prejudice her by suggesting that her husband's business made so much money that
plaintiff did not need her job at the village. She also contends the trial court erred in permitting
the jury to take documents regarding her husband's business into the jury room, specifically the
corporation's annual report filed with the Illinois Secretary of State, when that document was
only used for impeachment purposes.
¶ 55 Evidence must be relevant to be admissible at a trial. Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill.
2d 49, 57 (2000). Evidence is only relevant if it proves a fact in controversy or renders a matter
at issue more or less probable. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 241, 256 (2008).
¶ 56 We agree with plaintiff that evidence regarding the size and revenue of her husband's
business was not directly relevant to her claim of age discrimination. But Cipolla had a duty to
mitigate her damages by seeking employment. ISS International Service System, Inc. v. Human
Rights Comm'n, 272 Ill. App. 3d 969 (1995) (party alleging employment discrimination required
to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages by seeking new employment). Cipolla testified
that she was unable to find a position similar to the one she held at the village and became a paid
employee at her husband's company in 2010. Cipolla described her husband's company as a
small business and her position as "lesser" than the one she held at the village. To rebut the
argument that Cipolla's damages may be greater based on her inability to find satisfying
employment, it was proper for the village to question Cipolla about her current position with her
husband's company, including the company's revenues and sales to determine, for damages
purposes, whether her job likely was less fulfilling than her prior position.
¶ 57 Thus, because the questions regarding Cipolla's husband's business were relevant to
damages and plaintiff's efforts in mitigating them, the trial court did not err in permitting the
village to elicit the evidence.
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¶ 58 We also find that the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to take into the jury
room the annual report for Cipolla's husband company, which listed Cipolla as
secretary/treasurer. Relying on Esderts v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 76 Ill. App.
2d 210, 229 (1966), Cipolla contends that documents used only for impeachment purposes may
not go to the jury room. In admitting that document into evidence, the trial judge noted that it
could be used substantively and not just for impeachment because Cipolla denied she was the
corporation's secretary/treasurer. Thus, since the document was admitted into evidence, the trial
court did not err in permitting the jury to take it into the jury room. But even if, as Cipolla
contends, she never denied that she had a title with the company but simply stated that she had
never seen the annual report before, the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to take the
document to the jury room. A trial court has great discretion in deciding what documents to send
to the jury room. Brdar v. Cottrell, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 690 (2007). The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting into the jury room a document that, as noted above, was
relevant to the issue of mitigation of damages.
¶ 59 Verdict Was Not Against Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 60 Lastly, Cipolla contends the trial court's judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial because the verdict in the village's favor was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. “A court of review is empowered to reverse a jury verdict only if it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Ford v. City of Chicago, 132 Ill. App. 3d 408, 412
(1985). Typically, a verdict will be viewed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence
“where it is palpably erroneous and wholly unwarranted [citation], is clearly the result of passion
or prejudice [citation], or appears to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based upon the evidence
[citation].” Id. In other words, “[w]hen considering whether a verdict was contrary to the
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manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the appellee.” Id.
¶ 61 Cipolla argues the evidence at trial did not support a finding that the village terminated
her employment due to budget considerations. She contends the budget was not on the agenda
for the April 10, 2008 executive session meeting and, moreover, could only have been discussed
in a public meeting. She also asserts that Hanigan's comment that that she was "older" and the
village's decision to hire a budget director and give finance department employees raises in 2008
after she was terminated, shows that the budget was only a pretext and that the real reason she
was let go was her age.
¶ 62 Cipolla's arguments fail for a number of reasons. First, numerous witnesses testified that
the village was having financial issues and needed to cut about $1.4 million from its budget,
which supports a finding that the budget was not a pretext for terminating Cipolla. In addition,
the primary evidence that the village terminated Cipolla because of her age were alleged
statements by Hanigan that she was an "older" employee. But the testimony at trial as to whether
Hanigan made that statement during the executive session was conflicting. Hurckes testified he
heard Hanigan say that Cipolla was older and that he and Olejniczak admonished Hanigan for
the comment. Hanigan denied making any statement about Cipolla's age and Olejniczak denied
hearing it or admonishing Hanigan. Several other Board members also denied hearing the alleged
comment and testified that they voted for the budget amendment for financial reasons and not
because of Cipolla's age. These statements were further supported by the fact that Cipolla was
not the only person to lose her job as a result of the budget cuts—three firefighter positions were
eliminated too. The evidence was conflicting, without a doubt, but when viewed in a light most
favorable to the appellee, the jury's finding that the village did not terminate Cipolla because of
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her age and only used the budget as a pretext was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 63 CONCLUSION
¶ 64 We affirm the trial court orders entering judgment in favor of the village and denying
Cipolla's motion for a new trial.
¶ 65 Affirmed.