ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Cindylou Yardas, a judgment creditor of Paul L. Wilson, served a statutory notice of garnishment, which had been issued by a state court, upon the Clerk of the United States District Court. The notice advised the clerk that the state court had reason to believe that the district court had “in your hands or under your control” personal property belonging to Wilson which was subject to garnishment or execution to satisfy Yardas’ judgment. The property sought by Yardas had been seized by the F.B.I. pursuant to a search warrant issued by the district court. By the time the notice was served, the property had come into the possession of the United States Marshals Service in that district.
The question raised by the appeal is whether Yardas’ notice was effective to establish a claim superior to a subsequently perfected lien of the Internal Revenue Service. In granting the government’s motion for summary judgment the district court concluded that, although the property was seized pursuant to the authority of the district court, notice to the court was ineffective since the Marshal had actual custody and control of the property. For reasons which follow, we reverse.
I.
In May 1985, pursuant to a search warrant, F.B.I. agents seized personal property Wilson had used in an illegal gambling business. The property was later transferred from the F.B.I. field office to the Marshal. In December, the government brought a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d). The seized property at issue in this case — a 1984 Jeep, a 1983 Mercedes Benz, a 1978 Mercedes Benz, miscellaneous jewelry and coins, and two prints — was not the subject of the forfeiture action.
On May 16, Yardas obtained a civil judgment against Wilson in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in the amount of $99,740. On May 20, she filed an affidavit with that court, seeking property of Wilson held by a third party, the “United States District Court,” to satisfy her judgment. The state court issued a “Court Order and Notice Of Garnishment,” pursuant to Ohio’s garnishment statute, and it was served on the Clerk of the United States District Court. The district court, as garnishee, was directed to report to the court of common pleas any personal property of Wilson in its possession or under its control. The clerk’s response listed the property sought in the forfeiture action, but not the other property seized pursuant to the search warrant and then held by the Marshals Service.
In September, the government initiated a second action, this time seeking forfeiture of the remaining property. The district court granted Yardas’ motion to intervene, in order that she might assert an interest in the personal property. On June 9, 1987, the district court granted the government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the forfeiture action.
[552]*552On May 15, the Marshals Service was served by the I.R.S. with a notice of levy. That notice asserted a tax lien in the amount of $554,324.85 on all property of Wilson being held by the Marshal. The Marshal turned the property over to the I.R.S. and it was sold.
Yardas initiated this action for a declaratory judgment, contending that the notice served on the clerk was effective to establish a right to the property which was superior to that of the I.R.S., since it was seized under the authority of a warrant issued by the district court and was being held by the Marshal as an agent of the district court. The district court, however, concluded that the Marshals Service is an executive branch agency, independent of the district court, and that the court cannot be charged with having control of all property seized pursuant to a warrant.
II.
Federal law determines the priority between a federal tax lien and a judgment creditor’s lien. See United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361, 363, 73 S.Ct. 701, 703, 97 L.Ed. 1071 (1953); 26 U.S.C. § 6323. Generally, a federal tax lien arises against property belonging to a delinquent taxpayer from the time he refuses or neglects to heed a lawful demand to pay. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321. Congress, however, has chosen to extend special protection to holders of judgment liens whose interests are perfected before they have constructive notice of an outstanding federal tax lien. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85, 74 S.Ct. 367, 370, 98 L.Ed. 520 (1954); 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a). Accordingly, a judgment lien will have priority over a federal tax lien if the judgment lien is perfected before the government gives constructive notice of its lien to the public by filing written notice with the appropriate state or county agency. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g). Courts must look to state law to determine whether a competing judgment lien is perfected. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 1279-80, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960).
In Ohio, one method by which a judgment creditor can obtain a lien upon his judgment debtor’s personal property is by serving a notice of garnishment on a “garnishee,” a person who is in possession or control of the judgment debtor’s property. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2716.13(B), (D). Ohio law provides that
[a] garnishee is liable to the judgment creditor for all money, property, and credits, other than personal earnings, of the judgment debtor in his possession or under his control or for all personal earnings due from the garnishee to the judgment debtor, whichever is applicable, from the time the garnishee is served with the written notice required in section 2716.05 or 2716.13 of the Revised Code.
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2716.21(D) (emphasis added). Under the Ohio statute, then, Yardas could establish her claim to the property by serving the notice of garnishment on the person or entity having Wilson’s property “in his possession or under his control.”
Because Yardas’ notice of garnishment was served on the clerk approximately a year before the I.R.S. served its notice of levy, the government concedes that the garnishment notice was effective to establish a perfected interest in any of Wilson's property which was in the possession of the district court. It contends, however, that the notice was ineffective to establish an interest in the property in question because the Marshal had custody and control of the property; garnishment efforts should have been directed at the Marshal. We disagree.
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ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Cindylou Yardas, a judgment creditor of Paul L. Wilson, served a statutory notice of garnishment, which had been issued by a state court, upon the Clerk of the United States District Court. The notice advised the clerk that the state court had reason to believe that the district court had “in your hands or under your control” personal property belonging to Wilson which was subject to garnishment or execution to satisfy Yardas’ judgment. The property sought by Yardas had been seized by the F.B.I. pursuant to a search warrant issued by the district court. By the time the notice was served, the property had come into the possession of the United States Marshals Service in that district.
The question raised by the appeal is whether Yardas’ notice was effective to establish a claim superior to a subsequently perfected lien of the Internal Revenue Service. In granting the government’s motion for summary judgment the district court concluded that, although the property was seized pursuant to the authority of the district court, notice to the court was ineffective since the Marshal had actual custody and control of the property. For reasons which follow, we reverse.
I.
In May 1985, pursuant to a search warrant, F.B.I. agents seized personal property Wilson had used in an illegal gambling business. The property was later transferred from the F.B.I. field office to the Marshal. In December, the government brought a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d). The seized property at issue in this case — a 1984 Jeep, a 1983 Mercedes Benz, a 1978 Mercedes Benz, miscellaneous jewelry and coins, and two prints — was not the subject of the forfeiture action.
On May 16, Yardas obtained a civil judgment against Wilson in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in the amount of $99,740. On May 20, she filed an affidavit with that court, seeking property of Wilson held by a third party, the “United States District Court,” to satisfy her judgment. The state court issued a “Court Order and Notice Of Garnishment,” pursuant to Ohio’s garnishment statute, and it was served on the Clerk of the United States District Court. The district court, as garnishee, was directed to report to the court of common pleas any personal property of Wilson in its possession or under its control. The clerk’s response listed the property sought in the forfeiture action, but not the other property seized pursuant to the search warrant and then held by the Marshals Service.
In September, the government initiated a second action, this time seeking forfeiture of the remaining property. The district court granted Yardas’ motion to intervene, in order that she might assert an interest in the personal property. On June 9, 1987, the district court granted the government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss the forfeiture action.
[552]*552On May 15, the Marshals Service was served by the I.R.S. with a notice of levy. That notice asserted a tax lien in the amount of $554,324.85 on all property of Wilson being held by the Marshal. The Marshal turned the property over to the I.R.S. and it was sold.
Yardas initiated this action for a declaratory judgment, contending that the notice served on the clerk was effective to establish a right to the property which was superior to that of the I.R.S., since it was seized under the authority of a warrant issued by the district court and was being held by the Marshal as an agent of the district court. The district court, however, concluded that the Marshals Service is an executive branch agency, independent of the district court, and that the court cannot be charged with having control of all property seized pursuant to a warrant.
II.
Federal law determines the priority between a federal tax lien and a judgment creditor’s lien. See United States v. Gilbert Assocs., 345 U.S. 361, 363, 73 S.Ct. 701, 703, 97 L.Ed. 1071 (1953); 26 U.S.C. § 6323. Generally, a federal tax lien arises against property belonging to a delinquent taxpayer from the time he refuses or neglects to heed a lawful demand to pay. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321. Congress, however, has chosen to extend special protection to holders of judgment liens whose interests are perfected before they have constructive notice of an outstanding federal tax lien. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85, 74 S.Ct. 367, 370, 98 L.Ed. 520 (1954); 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a). Accordingly, a judgment lien will have priority over a federal tax lien if the judgment lien is perfected before the government gives constructive notice of its lien to the public by filing written notice with the appropriate state or county agency. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g). Courts must look to state law to determine whether a competing judgment lien is perfected. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 1279-80, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960).
In Ohio, one method by which a judgment creditor can obtain a lien upon his judgment debtor’s personal property is by serving a notice of garnishment on a “garnishee,” a person who is in possession or control of the judgment debtor’s property. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2716.13(B), (D). Ohio law provides that
[a] garnishee is liable to the judgment creditor for all money, property, and credits, other than personal earnings, of the judgment debtor in his possession or under his control or for all personal earnings due from the garnishee to the judgment debtor, whichever is applicable, from the time the garnishee is served with the written notice required in section 2716.05 or 2716.13 of the Revised Code.
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2716.21(D) (emphasis added). Under the Ohio statute, then, Yardas could establish her claim to the property by serving the notice of garnishment on the person or entity having Wilson’s property “in his possession or under his control.”
Because Yardas’ notice of garnishment was served on the clerk approximately a year before the I.R.S. served its notice of levy, the government concedes that the garnishment notice was effective to establish a perfected interest in any of Wilson's property which was in the possession of the district court. It contends, however, that the notice was ineffective to establish an interest in the property in question because the Marshal had custody and control of the property; garnishment efforts should have been directed at the Marshal. We disagree.
Under the circumstances of this case, it appears that Yardas did give to a third party in possession or control of her judgment debtor’s property the notice contemplated by the Ohio statute. In the context of this case, the key words in the statute are “under his control.” The property was seized at the direction of and under the authority of the district court. In executing the warrant, the F.B.I. was acting under the direction of the court, was restricted to seizing only what the warrant [553]*553permitted, and was subject to any conditions of custody specified in the warrant. For a time, the property was in the possession of the F.B.I.; later, it was held by the Marshal. Obviously, while in possession of the property, those agencies exerted a degree of control over it. However, for purposes of the garnishment statute, the property was under the control of the district court. That is because, when one views the property in the context of its seizure, retention, and disposition and of any question of entitlement as between Wilson and the federal government, the district court’s control over the property was superior to that of the F.B.I. or the Marshal. As among the F.B.I., the Marshal, and the district court, primary and ultimate control over disposition of the property rested with the court.
Under these circumstances, Yardas, upon learning that her judgment debtor’s property had been seized pursuant to the district court’s search warrant, was warranted in assuming that the district court exercised ultimate control over the property. Difficulties encountered in determining the government agency in actual possession of seized property are more formidable than the government acknowledges. Although the government does not contend that the transfer of the property to the Marshal was readily discernible from court records, nevertheless, under the government’s theory, had Yardas served the F.B.I., as the agency seeking the warrant and seizing the property, she would have served the wrong party.
Under somewhat analogous circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the government’s argument that, because money was held by local police officials, the district court lacked jurisdiction to return property taken from the accused, after the indictment against her had been dismissed.
[Wjhoever holds the money does so as agent for, and subject to the ultimate direction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, under the authority of whose process the money was seized.
... [I]t is the United States District Court that has primary jurisdiction over the money and property seized pursuant to its warrant and upon which it issued its indictment because pursuant to law it issued its warrant authorizing and directing the search and seizure and requiring the seizing officer to “prepare a written inventory ... and bring the property before me as required by law.” If the District of Columbia or the property clerk have somehow come into the possession of such money or property they hold it as agents subject to the order of the United States Courts.
United States v. Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 938-39 (D.C.Cir.1979) (emphasis deleted). Wilson’s property was also seized pursuant to district court authority and, once seized, was no less subject to court order than the property at issue in Wright.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this opinion.