Cindy Edwards v. Wellstar Medical Group, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: July 29, 2022
• Docket: 20-13866
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 1 of 19

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13866 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

CINDY EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WELLSTAR MEDICAL GROUP, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-04492-MHC ____________________ USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 2 of 19

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Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Cindy Edwards appeals the district court’s summary judg- ment for WellStar Medical Group on her claim that the company failed to accommodate her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Edwards joined WellStar in 2013 as an “office supervisor.” Three years later, in 2016, Edwards applied for—and received—a promotion to be an “office manager” in WellStar’s Powder Springs office. As an office manager, Edwards was responsible for oversee- ing the office’s day-to-day operations. Edwards described the “es- sential functions” of her position as the “coordination of operations of the practice and staff meetings; supervision of patient schedul- ing, billing, [and] medical records; monthly financial reports; and managing staff performance.” As office manager, Edwards re- ported to Adewale Adebayo (her direct supervisor) and to Amber Thomas-Hutson (Adebayo’s supervisor). In 2015, Edwards began seeing a licensed clinical social worker, Robert Bryant, for “major depression recurrent with anx- ious stress.” In October 2017, Edwards took leave under the Fam- ily and Medical Leave Act for anxiety and stress. She returned to work about four months later in February 2018. USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 3 of 19

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WellStar required employees returning from a leave of ab- sence to be cleared to return. Edwards’s therapist only cleared her to return to work for four hours per day during her first thirty days back. So Edwards asked Joey Hunt—WellStar’s Vice President of Human Resources—for this work schedule as an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Hunt approved Ed- wards’s request. When Edwards returned to work, Adebayo—her direct su- pervisor—questioned her about her new schedule. After Edwards confirmed that she was limited to a four-hour workday, Adebayo asked her to email him the dates that she would be out of the office. He also asked her what type of illness she had. In response, Ed- wards filed a complaint about Adebayo and stated that she felt that “her safety [had been] compromised.” Because Edwards had re- ported that she did not feel safe in the workplace, Hunt placed her on paid administrative leave while he investigated her complaint. In March 2018, while Edwards was out on paid administra- tive leave, Thomas-Hutson decided to transfer Edwards to the “soon to be opening medical office on Prestley Mill Road,” where Edwards would have the same position with the same salary and benefits. Thomas-Hutson concluded that the transfer would “al- low Edwards a fresh start at another practice.” Because the Prest- ley Mill Road office wasn’t scheduled to open for a few months, Thomas-Hutson decided that, in the meantime, Edwards would “have some capacity and therefore would also be assisting [Thomas-Hutson] and Adebayo on the PCORI [Patient Centered USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 4 of 19

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Outcomes Research Institute] project.” PCORI is an entity that funds projects aimed at improving health care. On March 16, Edwards emailed Hunt, asking for an update on her complaint. She asked if she could return from paid admin- istrative leave to “rebuild trust with [her] team uninterrupted.” Hunt responded that Edwards would remain on paid administra- tive leave pending the investigation into her complaint. Weeks later, on April 9, Hunt met with Edwards to discuss the results of his investigation. He concluded that Adebayo hadn’t committed any wrongdoing and closed the investigation. Hunt also told Edwards about her temporary reassignment to the PCORI project—which was being run by Adebayo and Thomas-Hutson— and explained that she would then become the office manager of a new WellStar office when it opened. Edwards was unhappy with the transfer and told Hunt that she felt that the PCORI project “was an unsafe place to be for [her]” under Adebayo’s and Thomas-Hut- son’s management.1 Hunt did not provide any specifics about

1 On top of her complaint against Adebayo, Edwards also filed a complaint against Thomas-Hutson. The previous year, after a survey revealed that the Powder Springs Medical Center staff had much lower employee morale than other WellStar branches, Thomas-Hutson conducted a focus group with the staff to find out why. The employees complained about Edwards’s leadership style. Despite being barred from attending, Edwards allegedly questioned em- ployees about what they said at the focus group. After Thomas-Hutson con- fronted Edwards about her inquiries, Edwards filed a complaint about Thomas-Hutson’s “unprofessional behavior.” An investigation found no wrongdoing. USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 5 of 19

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what Edwards would be doing at the PCORI project. Instead, Hunt said that he would set up a meeting between Edwards, Adebayo, Thomas-Hutson, and himself to discuss next steps. The next day, Edwards followed up with Hunt, emailing him that she couldn’t meet with Adebayo or Thomas-Hutson be- cause of her health condition.2 At this point, Edwards retained an attorney and told WellStar to direct all future communications to her counsel. At some point in mid-May, Edwards called Hunt to ask for an accommodation—specifically, to transfer supervisors. She sub- mitted a letter from her therapist stating that “[s]he would benefit from being reassigned to a similar position on another team.” On May 21, Edwards met with Hunt and representatives from human resources to discuss Edwards’s request to be assigned to a new team. At the meeting, they “discussed the PCORI project, [with Edwards] still asking for the job description and what [she’d] be doing. [They] also discussed a transfer to anywhere other than the PCORI project.” Edwards offered to take a pay cut to transfer but she never applied to transfer to another location. Other than transferring supervisors, Edwards didn’t ask for any other accom- modations. She again told Hunt that she could not work with Thomas-Hutson or Adebayo because of their unprofessional be- havior. That same day, Edwards tried to go back to the office to

2 She also filed a complaint against Hunt for his “improper investigation.” USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 6 of 19

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work—because her paid leave had ended—but Hunt sent her home. Days later, on May 25, Hunt told Edwards that transferring supervisors was not a reasonable accommodation and that, “[i]f there [was] a different accommodation [she] would like to re- quest,” then Edwards should submit it “by June 1” or else WellStar would “make a decision” about her employment based on the in- formation she had previously provided. Edwards replied later that day, telling Hunt that, “[i]f [she was] to remain under the management/supervision of [her super- visors], [she] respectfully ma[de] the following reasonable accom- modation request.” Edwards then listed eighteen accommoda- tions (which we’ve reproduced below): • [1] Telecommuting and/or working from home.(On an as needed basis only due to medication side effects) • [2] Part-time work hours, job sharing, adjustments in the start or end of work hours(as needed to due to medication side effects ) • [3] Sick leave for reasons related to mental health, flexible use of vacation time, additional unpaid or administrative leave for treatment of recovery, leaves of absence and/or use of occasional leave (a few hours at a time) for therapy and other related appointments. • [4] Breaks according to individual needs rather than a fixed schedule, more frequent breaks and/or greater flexibility in USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 7 of 19

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scheduling breaks, provision of backup coverage during breaks, and telephone breaks during work hours to call pro- fessionals and others needed for support. • [5] Reduction and/or removal of distractions in the work area. • [6] Tape recorders for recording/reviewing meetings and training sessions.(due to medication side effects and symp- toms of my health condition) • [7] Modification or removal of non-essential job duties or restricting of the job to include only the essential job func- tions. • [8] Division of large assignments into smaller tasks and goals. • [9] Additional assistance and/or time for orientation activi- ties, training and learning job tasks and new responsibili- ties.(based on my individual needs) • [10] Additional training or modified training materi- als.(based on my individual needs) • [11] Implementation of flexible and supportive supervision style; POSITIVE reinforcement and feedback; adjustments in the level of supervision or structure, such as more fre- quent meetings to help prioritize my daily tasks; and open communication DIRECTLY with supervisors regarding performance and work expectations. • [12] Additional forms of communication and/or written and visual tools, including communication of assignments USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 8 of 19

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and instructions in my preferred learning style (written, or e-mail demonstration)creation and implementation of writ- ten tools such as daily ‘to-do’ lists, step-by-step checklists, written (in addition to typed minutes of meetings). • [13] Regularly scheduled meetings (weekly) to discuss workplace issues and productivity, including annual discus- sions as part of performance appraisals to assess abilities and discuss promotional opportunities/performance deficien- cies. • [14] Development of strategies to deal with problems BEFORE they arise. • [15] Written work agreements that include any agreed upon accommodations, long-term and short-term goals, expecta- tions of responsibilities and performance standards. • [16] ALL meetings must be scheduled with at least a week prior notice. The meeting agenda and attendees must be disclosed at the time the meeting is scheduled. • [17] Any cancellation, rescheduling or postponing of meet- ings will need to be done so in writing with explanation at least 24hrs in advance. • [18] There will be no behavior or violation of the code of conduct of any kind that will exacerbate my mental health condition. Edwards listed eighteen accommodations because she didn’t know what her new job responsibilities at the PCORI project would be and wanted to let WellStar “pick the ones that wouldn’t USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 9 of 19

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be a hardship.” Edwards admitted, though, that she copied the eighteen accommodations from “the ADA website,” even though her therapist had only ever recommended that she change supervi- sors. On June 5, Hunt responded that he didn’t understand whether Edwards was requesting all of the accommodations or whether some subset of them would be sufficient. He also said it was unclear how the accommodations would help her mental health condition. He further noted that “many of her requests [were] non-specific.” To that end, Hunt asked Edwards to identify which accommodations she was requesting and to explain how those accommodations would allow her to perform in light of her health condition. Hunt asked Edwards to respond by the next day. Edwards replied a few hours later, explaining that she was requesting accommodations “to allow [her] to maximize [her] productivity.” She explained that she had recently been diagnosed with “major depressive disorder w[ith] anxious stress,” which was causing her to experience sadness, sleep disturbances, and related symptoms. She said she was also taking medication that caused her to feel groggy. Edwards listed the same accommodations from her May 25 email almost verbatim, adding that she wasn’t certain whether she would remain as an office manager at the Powder Springs office or whether she would move to the PCORI project. Edwards asked for more time to re-acclimate if she was going to stay at the Powder Springs office or for more time to orient to a new position at the PCORI project. USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 10 of 19

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In her email, Edwards also linked some of her requested ac- commodations to her depression and anxiety. She noted, for ex- ample, that: (1) due to her anxiety, she wanted meetings to be scheduled with a week’s notice; (2) due to her depression and anx- iety, she wanted 24 hours’ notice of any meeting’s cancellation, re- scheduling, or postponement; and (3) due to her depression, she wanted there to be “no code of conduct violations of any kind that w[ould] exacerbate [her] mental health condition.” Edwards con- cluded by asking Hunt to let her know if he needed medical docu- mentation of her disability or need for accommodations and that she “looked forward to meeting with [him] to discuss options for accommodating [her] disability.” On June 8, a few days later, Hunt responded that Edwards’s requests were “unduly burdensome, impractical, [and] disruptive.” He noted, for instance, that it wasn’t feasible to schedule all meet- ings a week in advance. More than that, he continued, “many of the requested accommodations are too general to implement in any meaningful way.” So, Hunt concluded, he couldn’t grant her request. And because Edwards had multiple opportunities to iden- tify a set of reasonable accommodations and had not done so, Hunt “concluded that no such accommodation exists.” He terminated her employment. PROCEDURAL HISTORY After her termination, Edwards sued WellStar for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act because WellStar committed “[a]ctual [d]iscrimination and [f]ailure to [a]ccommodate in USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 11 of 19

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[v]iolation of the [Americans with Disabilities Act].” 3 In her com- plaint, Edwards alleged that, although she asked for accommoda- tions (in her May 25 and June 5 emails), WellStar refused to meet with her, hid the essential functions of her new position, and de- nied her accommodations. Edwards also claimed that WellStar re- fused to engage in the “interactive process” required by the Amer- icans with Disabilities Act. WellStar moved for summary judgment. WellStar con- strued Edwards’s complaint as asserting two claims—one for fail- ing to accommodate her disability and one for failing to engage in the Act’s “interactive process.” As to Edwards’s failure to accommodate claim, WellStar contended that transferring supervisors was not a reasonable ac- commodation. And her other proposed accommodations were ei- ther non-specific, not reasonable, or would require changing the essential functions of the office manager position. As to Edwards’s interactive process claim, WellStar con- tended that it was not an independent claim and that, even if it was, it failed because there was no genuine dispute that WellStar had worked with her in good faith and provided multiple opportunities to identify a reasonable accommodation.

3 Edwards also asserted claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act and for “regarded as” discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because Edwards does not appeal the summary judg- ment for WellStar on those claims, we don’t discuss them further. USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 12 of 19

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Edwards responded in several ways. As to the failure to ac- commodate claim, Edwards argued that she satisfied all elements of the cause of action. As relevant here, Edwards argued that there was a factual dispute over whether her requested accommodations were reasonable because Hunt, at his deposition, admitted that ten of the eighteen requests could be implemented. Edwards also claimed that she didn’t intend for WellStar to grant every request, which is why she had told Hunt that she looked forward to meeting with him to discuss “options.” As to her interactive process claim, Edwards conceded that it was not an independent claim. Still, she argued that several facts showed that WellStar had failed to accommodate her and was re- sponsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. For exam- ple, she pointed to: WellStar’s failure to identify the essential func- tions of the PCORI position, its refusal to identify any possible po- sitions to transfer to, its decision to impose short deadlines on her to respond, and its refusal to meet with her in response to her June 5 email. The district court entered summary judgment for WellStar. As to the failure to accommodate claim, the district court con- cluded that “[b]ecause [Edwards] has failed to clarify what accom- modation(s) she needed to address her disability, she has failed to show that her requested accommodations were reasonable[.]” The district court rejected Edwards’s argument that some of her accom- modations were reasonable, explaining that she hadn’t “identified USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 13 of 19

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which accommodations she needed to appropriately address her disability and that would permit her to do her job.” As to the “failure to engage in the interactive process” claim, the district court concluded: It is clear from a de novo review of the record that there was a long history of [WellStar] considering and granting many of [Edwards’s] ADA work accommo- dation requests. It is also clear from the record that [WellStar] specifically considered [Edwards’s] May 21, 2018, request for different supervisors, rejected it, but invited [Edwards] to propose an alternative ac- commodation. [Edwards] responded on May 25 with a voluminous list of generic requests that were cut and pasted from a website and did not appear to be related to her health condition or tailored to her job function. Nevertheless, [WellStar] asked [Edwards] for clarification as to which requests she needed to ac- commodate her health condition and requested an explanation as to how the requested accommoda- tions would allow her to perform her work consider- ing the health condition. Instead of clarifying her re- quest, [Edwards] sent another, largely repetitive, laundry list of cut-and-pasted requests without any explanation. Based on this record, no reasonable ju- ror could conclude that [WellStar] cut off the USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 14 of 19

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interactive process regarding the reasonable accom- modation of [Edwards’s] disability. Edwards appeals the summary judgment for WellStar on her Americans with Disabilities Act claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg- ment, “viewing all evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). A party is entitled to sum- mary judgment if she can show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [she] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

DISCUSSION On appeal, Edwards argues that a reasonable jury could find for her on her failure to accommodate claim and her interactive process claim.4 We take each in turn.

4 Edwards also argues that we should revive her “actual discrimination” claim—that is, her claim that WellStar violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by firing her because of her disability. But neither side addressed this claim before the district court. The claim is therefore forfeited. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (explain- ing that, when a party “move[s] for final summary judgment,” the non-mov- ing party must “rais[e] in their opposition papers any and all arguments or de- fenses they felt precluded judgment in [the moving party’s] favor”). USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 15 of 19

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Reasonable Accommodation The Americans with Disabilities Act provides that “[n]o cov- ered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in any terms, conditions, or privileges of employ- ment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prevail on a disability discrimina- tion claim, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is disabled, (2) she was a qualified individual when she was terminated, and (3) she was discriminated against on account of her disability.” Frazier- White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016). We’ll focus our attention to the third element: discrimination. “An employer unlawfully discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability when the employer fails to provide rea- sonable accommodations for the disability—unless doing so would impose undue hardship on the employer.” Lucas v. W.W. Grain- ger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing that discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations . . . , unless . . . the ac- commodation would impose an undue hardship” on the business). “The burden of identifying an accommodation that would allow a qualified employee to perform the essential functions of her job rests with that employee, as does the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to showing that such accommodation is reasonable.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). But what is a reasonable accommodation? For one thing, we’ve said that “[a]n ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’—and, there- fore, required under the ADA—only if it enables the employee to USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 16 of 19

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perform the essential functions of the job.” LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining a reasonable accommodation partly as an action that “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position”). To “[e]nable” means “to make someone able to do something” or “to make something possible.” Enable, Cam- bridge English Dictionary Online (2022). In other words, a plaintiff must show that the accommodation is necessary—in that the ac- commodation “make[s] [it] possible” for her to do her job. Id. The corollary is that, “[i]f an employee does not require an accommo- dation to perform her essential job functions, then the employer is under no obligation to make an accommodation, even if the em- ployee requests an accommodation that is reasonable and could be easily provided.” D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Edwards hasn’t shown that she needed an accommodation. Viewed in the light most favorable to Edwards, the office man- ager’s essential functions were: “coordination of operations of the practice and staff meetings; supervision of patient scheduling, bill- ing, [and] medical records; monthly financial reports; and manag- ing staff performance.” 5 But Edwards admits that she could do all of these things without accommodations. In her final

5 The parties agree that the relevant position is the office manager position, not the PCORI project position. USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 17 of 19

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accommodations request, for example, Edwards said she was ask- ing for her long list of accommodations—not because she needed them—but because they would “maximize [her] productivity.” Consistent with that, Edwards performed the essential functions of the office manager role for two years without accommodations, even after she began treatment with Dr. Bryant in 2015. Even Ed- wards concedes that she “had been performing in the position and a similar position for five years before she was terminated and still could perform the essential functions of her position.” Consistent with this admission, Edwards tried to come back to work, in May 2018, without any accommodations. Although Edwards listed eighteen accommodations in her letter to Hunt—some of which WellStar admitted it could reason- ably provide—she didn’t identify any specific accommodations and explain how those accommodation would “enable” her to perform the essential functions of her job. See Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] plaintiff does not satisfy her initial burden by simply naming a preferred accommodation—even one mention in the statute or regulations; she must show that the ac- commodation is ‘reasonable’ given her situation.”); cf. Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir. 2008) (hold- ing, in the housing context, that a city “cannot be liable for refusing to grant a reasonable and necessary accommodation if the city never knew the accommodation was in fact necessary” (cleaned up)). For an accommodation to be reasonable, it must “enable” Edwards to perform her job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). Even on USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 18 of 19

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appeal, though, Edwards hasn’t explained which accommodations she needs—not merely wants. And it’s “incumbent on the plain- tiff[], not the defendant[] or the court, to identify where [she] wanted partial relief, if full relief [was] not possible.” Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999). In the end, this is fatal to Edwards’s claim. In sum: a reasonable accommodation is one that “enable[s] an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the es- sential functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1(ii). Be- cause Edwards was able to perform the essential functions of her job without any accommodation, she didn’t need an accommoda- tion to “make [it] possible” or “enable” her to perform them. Put another way, because she was already capable of doing the job, she did “not require an accommodation to perform her essential job functions” and Wellstar was thus “under no obligation to make an accommodation.” D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022. For this reason, WellStar didn’t violate the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying Edwards’s accommodations requests. Interactive Process Edwards’s interactive process claim also fails. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations provide that, “[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interac- tive process with the individual with a disability in need of the ac- commodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). But we’ve held that, “where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate ‘reasonable USCA11 Case: 20-13866 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 19 of 19

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accommodation,’ the employer’s lack of investigation into reason- able accommodation is unimportant.” Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997). Edwards failed to show that she re- quested any reasonable accommodation. As a result, WellStar had no obligation to initiate an interactive process. AFFIRMED.