Cincinnati Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner
This text of 46 B.T.A. 453 (Cincinnati Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
This proceeding seeks redetermination of an income tax deficiency of $521.16 for the calendar year 1938.
The only issue is whether respondent erred in disallowing a claimed deduction of $2,742.93 representing the amount of unjust enrichment tax paid by petitioner during the taxable year 1938.
We find the facts as stipulated by the parties and such stipulated facts as are not set forth herein are incorporated by reference.
The petitioner, an Ohio corporation having its principal office at Norwood, Ohio, filed its Federal income tax return for the calendar year 1938 with the collector of internal revenue for the first district of Ohio.
Petitioner keeps its books and records and files its tax returns on the accrual basis of accounting. During 1938 it paid to the United States [454]*454Government certain unjust enrichment taxes described by Title III of the Revenue Act of 1936, in the amount of $2,742.93.
In its income tax return for 1938 petitioner deducted the amount of $2,742.93 from gross income as “taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year” under the provisions of section 23 (c) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1938.1 The respondent disallowed the claimed deduction on the ground that the unjust enrichment tax is an income tax which is not deductible from gross income under section 23 (c) (1), supra.
The petitioner contends that under the various provisions prescribing the levy, computation, etc., of the unjust enrichment tax as set forth in sections 501-506 of Title III of the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress intended to levy a special tax to accomplish certain purposes, i. e., the recapture of the Agricultural Adjustment Act excise taxes (which act had been held by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional) , the burden of which was shifted by the taxpayer to other persons ; that such unjust enrichment tax is not a true income tax, but is intended to be of a different character from the “Income Tax” imposed by Title I of that act, since if not so intended Congress would have merely amended Title I so as to embrace therein such unjust enrichment tax; and that Congress did not intend to include such unjust enrichment tax within the exception provided in section 23 (c) (1), supra.
Section 501 (a) of Title III of the Revenue Act of 19362 defines the tax on unjust enrichment as a tax “upon the net income of every person which arises from the sources specified” and as being “in addition to any other tax on net income” (italics supplied), and other subdivisions of section 501 set forth the various elements which enter [455]*455into and the method of computation of “gross income” and the “deductions” allowable in arriving at the “net income” subject to the tax. Section 502 3 provides for a credit against the unjust enrichment tax of an amount computed with reference to “other Federal income and excess-profits taxes” and, further, section 503 (a) 4 provides that all the provisions applicable to taxes imposed by Title I, in so far as not inconsistent with Title III, shall be applicable to the taxes imposed by Title III, with certain exceptions not material here. The prescribed method of computation to be made in order to reach the amount of net income derived from unjust enrichment, for the purpose of applying thereto a rate of taxation different from the rate applied to other net income, clearly demonstrates that Congress intended the tax imposed by section 501, supra, to be an income tax separate, distinct, and apart from and in addition to other income taxes, but nevertheless an income tax just as are the income taxes imposed by Title I.
In Steinhagen Rice Milling Co. v. Scofield, 87 Fed. (2d) 804; certiorari denied, 300 U. S. 663, where the contention was made by the taxpayer that the tax on unjust enrichment there involved was not an income tax within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, the court, in denying an injunction sought to stay the collection of such unjust enrichment tax, held, inter alia, that “the tax imposed * * * is an income tax, notwithstanding the rate of taxation is very much greater than that imposed on any other source of income.” See also Kingan & Co. v. Smith, 17 Fed. Supp. 217 (Dist. Ct. S. Dist. Ind.).
The unjust enrichment tax is, by the very terms of the statute imposing it, an income tax, and, in our opinion, it clearly falls within the specific exception of section 23 (c) (1), supra, which denies as a deduction from gross income all Federal income taxes other than certain enumerated excess profits taxes.
The respondent did not err in his determination that the amount of $2,742.93 unjust enrichment tax paid by petitioner during 1938 is not deductible from gross income for that year under section 23 (c), supra.
Decision will he entered for the respondent.
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46 B.T.A. 453, 1942 BTA LEXIS 870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-rubber-mfg-co-v-commissioner-bta-1942.