Clark, C. J.
It appears from the will of A. A. Shuford that the only specific, unconditional bequests made by him, to become effective at the time of his death, were:
1. The allowance of $2,000 per year to his widow for each and every year that she should survive him.
2. The allowance of $1,000 per year to each of the 7 children, naming them, “during the term of the natural life” of his widow.
3. Two hundred dollars a year to the pastor of the Corinth Reformed Church of Hickory during the life of his widow.
4. An allowance of $200 a year to Julius H. Shuford, and $100 a year to Mrs. Laura Ramseur, to be paid to each during the remainder of his or her life, with definite directions, (4)0 and (6), as to the manner and means of providing these sums after the death of the testator’s widow in the event they or either of them survived her.
5. He expressly directs his executors “as long as his said wife shall live” to keep his estate undivided, managing and handling it according to their best business judgment, and (9) vests in his executors full power and authority to change any investment and to sell, convey, and convert any real estate, exercising that care which they would use in the management of their own business.
In item (7) he says: “I direct my executors, or the survivors of them, after the death of my wife, to distribute and divide my estate among all of my children, share and share alike, the children of any deceased child of mine taking his or her share: Provided, that if any of
my children are dead without lineal descendants, the share of such child or children shall go to my other children equally.”
He further declares in this item that he does not mean that his estate shall be converted into cash, but that the surviving executors shall value and apportion it, and, in item (8), he makes provision for “meeting certain contingencies in the general division.”
The closing language of the will is as follows: “In the event the said Geitner or Menzies should die, leaving the other and my wife surviving, then I direct them to agree upon and nominate an executor as a substitute for the deceased. The person so nominated to have all power and authority as an executor as though he were specifically herein named as such, and in case of the death of any executors during the lifetime of my said wife, I direct the vacancy to be filled in the same way in order that there may be two executors to survive my wife and cooperate with each other in valuing and distributing my estate under the provisions of this will.”
It seems clear that the question as to what individuals would become the recipients of the bulk of the estate and its surplus earnings was not to be determined, and could not be, until the death of his widow, at which time the property should be divided by the two executors among the children of the testator living at that time, and the' children of such who should be dead leaving children, in which event the children of such deceased child taking his or her share, with a provision that when any child has died without lineal descendants, the share of such child or children should go to the other children of the testator equally.
The provisions of item 7, as above set out, are clear and unequivocal. Under the terms thereof the property devised has been properly divided into 7 equal shares, which it is admitted has been equitably and fairly done. Of these 7 shares each of the 6 living children is entitled to one share, and the other share is to go to the two children of his deceased daughter, Maude E. Oilley. There is no contingency under which the son-in-law, the petitioner, Gordon II. Oilley, is entitled to receive any' part of the estate. The two infant children of the deceased daughter take, not as the heirs of the mother, but directly from the testator under item 7 of the will. And,, therefore, their father, Gordon H. Oilley, has no interest as representative of his wife. Nor could he derive any by any agreement made with the guardian of said infants, nor can the court authorize said guardian to disburse or administer the one-seventh share accruing to said infants, according to his own judgment, nor under the laws of this State could said fund accruing to his said children be turned over to a guardian appointed by the courts of another State. It would be necessary that a guardian should qualify in this State. If it is desired to remove the fund to another State, proper proceedings must
be taken in accordance witb our statute, C. S., 2195, by petition filed before tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court, and judgment rendered thereon in tbe manner provided in C. S., 2196.
Tbe terms of item 7 of tbe will are clear and explicit, and capable of but one construction, wbicb is as above stated. In
Anderson v. Felton, 36
N. C., 55, where tbe provision of tbe will was for a division “at tbe time my daughter Sarah arrives to 15,”
Ruffin, C. J.,
held that only those children would take who were living when Sarah arrived at 15, saying that until tbe time appointed for tbe division tbe legacies did not vest. To tbe same effect,
Threadgill v. Ingram,
23 N. C., 577;
Skinner v. Lamb,
25 N. C., 157;
Gregory v. Beasley,
36 N. C., 25;
Nelson v. Moore, ib.,
31.
“Where a legacy is given
'at
21, or
in case
or
provided’
tbe legatee attain such age, these words annex tbe time to tbe substance of legacy, and tbe legatee’s right to it will depend on bis being alive at tbe time fixed for payment.”
Green v. Green,
86 N. C., 546;
Giles v. Franks,
17 N. C., 521. There are numerous other cases to tbe same effect.
In
Blake v. Blake,
118 N. C., 575, it is said: “Under tbe devise in tbe will, wbicb is appended to tbe complaint, tbe property was left in trust to be 'divided when tbe youngest child should arrive at age.’ Tbe contingency not yet 'having happened, a division cannot be ordered.
Green v. Green,
86 N. C., 546. Tbe complaint fails to state.a cause of action.”
Bowen v. Hackney,
136 N. C., 187, and
ib.,
200, are directly in point, and are decisive of tbe construction to be placed upon item 7 of this will. In tbe first of these cases it is said, “Under a devise providing that at tbe expiration of tbe estate of a life tenant, tbe property given to him shall be equally divided between tbe children of tbe testator, tbe representatives of such children as may have died to stand in tbe place of their ancestors, tbe husband of one of tbe children who died without issue and before tbe life tenant does not take under tbe will, though be be tbe sole devisee of tbe wife.” Tbe point is elaborately discussed there, and is restated tbe second time that case was before tbe Court, 36 N. C., 200. And tbe decision has .been repeated, in
Clark v. Wimberly,
171 N. C., 48;
Jenkins v. Lambeth,
172 N. C., 466, and
Grantham v. Jinnette,
177 N. C., 229.
In
Clark v. Wimberly, supra,
tbe Court says: “By tbe terms of tbe will tbe children of Martha L.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Clark, C. J.
It appears from the will of A. A. Shuford that the only specific, unconditional bequests made by him, to become effective at the time of his death, were:
1. The allowance of $2,000 per year to his widow for each and every year that she should survive him.
2. The allowance of $1,000 per year to each of the 7 children, naming them, “during the term of the natural life” of his widow.
3. Two hundred dollars a year to the pastor of the Corinth Reformed Church of Hickory during the life of his widow.
4. An allowance of $200 a year to Julius H. Shuford, and $100 a year to Mrs. Laura Ramseur, to be paid to each during the remainder of his or her life, with definite directions, (4)0 and (6), as to the manner and means of providing these sums after the death of the testator’s widow in the event they or either of them survived her.
5. He expressly directs his executors “as long as his said wife shall live” to keep his estate undivided, managing and handling it according to their best business judgment, and (9) vests in his executors full power and authority to change any investment and to sell, convey, and convert any real estate, exercising that care which they would use in the management of their own business.
In item (7) he says: “I direct my executors, or the survivors of them, after the death of my wife, to distribute and divide my estate among all of my children, share and share alike, the children of any deceased child of mine taking his or her share: Provided, that if any of
my children are dead without lineal descendants, the share of such child or children shall go to my other children equally.”
He further declares in this item that he does not mean that his estate shall be converted into cash, but that the surviving executors shall value and apportion it, and, in item (8), he makes provision for “meeting certain contingencies in the general division.”
The closing language of the will is as follows: “In the event the said Geitner or Menzies should die, leaving the other and my wife surviving, then I direct them to agree upon and nominate an executor as a substitute for the deceased. The person so nominated to have all power and authority as an executor as though he were specifically herein named as such, and in case of the death of any executors during the lifetime of my said wife, I direct the vacancy to be filled in the same way in order that there may be two executors to survive my wife and cooperate with each other in valuing and distributing my estate under the provisions of this will.”
It seems clear that the question as to what individuals would become the recipients of the bulk of the estate and its surplus earnings was not to be determined, and could not be, until the death of his widow, at which time the property should be divided by the two executors among the children of the testator living at that time, and the' children of such who should be dead leaving children, in which event the children of such deceased child taking his or her share, with a provision that when any child has died without lineal descendants, the share of such child or children should go to the other children of the testator equally.
The provisions of item 7, as above set out, are clear and unequivocal. Under the terms thereof the property devised has been properly divided into 7 equal shares, which it is admitted has been equitably and fairly done. Of these 7 shares each of the 6 living children is entitled to one share, and the other share is to go to the two children of his deceased daughter, Maude E. Oilley. There is no contingency under which the son-in-law, the petitioner, Gordon II. Oilley, is entitled to receive any' part of the estate. The two infant children of the deceased daughter take, not as the heirs of the mother, but directly from the testator under item 7 of the will. And,, therefore, their father, Gordon H. Oilley, has no interest as representative of his wife. Nor could he derive any by any agreement made with the guardian of said infants, nor can the court authorize said guardian to disburse or administer the one-seventh share accruing to said infants, according to his own judgment, nor under the laws of this State could said fund accruing to his said children be turned over to a guardian appointed by the courts of another State. It would be necessary that a guardian should qualify in this State. If it is desired to remove the fund to another State, proper proceedings must
be taken in accordance witb our statute, C. S., 2195, by petition filed before tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court, and judgment rendered thereon in tbe manner provided in C. S., 2196.
Tbe terms of item 7 of tbe will are clear and explicit, and capable of but one construction, wbicb is as above stated. In
Anderson v. Felton, 36
N. C., 55, where tbe provision of tbe will was for a division “at tbe time my daughter Sarah arrives to 15,”
Ruffin, C. J.,
held that only those children would take who were living when Sarah arrived at 15, saying that until tbe time appointed for tbe division tbe legacies did not vest. To tbe same effect,
Threadgill v. Ingram,
23 N. C., 577;
Skinner v. Lamb,
25 N. C., 157;
Gregory v. Beasley,
36 N. C., 25;
Nelson v. Moore, ib.,
31.
“Where a legacy is given
'at
21, or
in case
or
provided’
tbe legatee attain such age, these words annex tbe time to tbe substance of legacy, and tbe legatee’s right to it will depend on bis being alive at tbe time fixed for payment.”
Green v. Green,
86 N. C., 546;
Giles v. Franks,
17 N. C., 521. There are numerous other cases to tbe same effect.
In
Blake v. Blake,
118 N. C., 575, it is said: “Under tbe devise in tbe will, wbicb is appended to tbe complaint, tbe property was left in trust to be 'divided when tbe youngest child should arrive at age.’ Tbe contingency not yet 'having happened, a division cannot be ordered.
Green v. Green,
86 N. C., 546. Tbe complaint fails to state.a cause of action.”
Bowen v. Hackney,
136 N. C., 187, and
ib.,
200, are directly in point, and are decisive of tbe construction to be placed upon item 7 of this will. In tbe first of these cases it is said, “Under a devise providing that at tbe expiration of tbe estate of a life tenant, tbe property given to him shall be equally divided between tbe children of tbe testator, tbe representatives of such children as may have died to stand in tbe place of their ancestors, tbe husband of one of tbe children who died without issue and before tbe life tenant does not take under tbe will, though be be tbe sole devisee of tbe wife.” Tbe point is elaborately discussed there, and is restated tbe second time that case was before tbe Court, 36 N. C., 200. And tbe decision has .been repeated, in
Clark v. Wimberly,
171 N. C., 48;
Jenkins v. Lambeth,
172 N. C., 466, and
Grantham v. Jinnette,
177 N. C., 229.
In
Clark v. Wimberly, supra,
tbe Court says: “By tbe terms of tbe will tbe children of Martha L. Wimberly held an estate dependent upon their being alive and filling tbe description at tbe death of their mother, tbe life tenant. ' If they died before that time, without issue, their interest became extinct, and if they so died, leaving issue, these last became tbe owners of tbe interest of their deceased parent, but bolding
direct from the
testatorIn
Whitesides v. Cooper,
115 N. C., 573, tbe
devise was almost
in totidem verbis,
as in tbis case, and received tbe same construction, wbicb bas been followed since in
Hutchinson v. Lucas,
181 N. C., 56.
It is perfectly clear tbat tbe children of Maude E. Gilley are entitled to tbe interest in tbis estate wbicb sbe would bave taken if sbe bad survived ber mother — -not as her heirs or next of kin, but as devisees and legatees of A. A. Shuford.
In
Thompson v. Humphrey,
179 N. C., 44, tbe Court says: “Tbe construction of tbe will makes tbe estate of tbe children a defeasible fee for they may never take, as tbe mother may survive all of them, in wbicb event their children would take in their places, and then, not by descent from them, but directly from tbe devisor under tbe will as purchasers.” To same purport,
Smith v. Lumber Co.,
155 N. C., 389.
Tbe will must be construed and tbe distribution of tbe estate made according to tbe laws of North Carolina.
Leake v. Gilchrist,
13 N. C., 77;
Hartness v. Pharr,
133 N. C., 566;
Hall v. R. R.,
146 N. C., 345.
Maude E. Gilley having predeceased ber mother, Gordon H. Oilley, ber surviving husband, would bave no right of curtesy in any property.
Hoke, J.,
in
Jones v. Whichard,
163 N. C., 241.
The case must be remanded tbat judgment may be entered in tbe court below, and further proceedings bad, in' conformity to tbis opinion.
Reversed.
Hoke, J., dissenting.