Cid v. Erie Insurance Group

63 A.3d 787, 2013 Pa. Super. 22, 2013 WL 563328, 2013 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 15, 2013
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 63 A.3d 787 (Cid v. Erie Insurance Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cid v. Erie Insurance Group, 63 A.3d 787, 2013 Pa. Super. 22, 2013 WL 563328, 2013 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68 (Pa. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

Opinion by

BOWES, J.:

Hilda Cid filed the within appeal from the trial court’s February 22, 2012 order dismissing her petition seeking appointment of a neutral arbitrator in an underin-sured motorist arbitration (“UIM”). Dismissal was based upon improper venue and without prejudice to re-file in Montgomery County. Ms. Cid argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition on venue grounds because Erie Insurance Group (“Erie”) waived any objection to venue by failing to timely file preliminary objections to the petition. We find that under Philadelphia County Local Rule 206.1(a), Ms. Cid’s filing was a petition within the definition of Pa.R.C.P. 206.1 et seq., and preliminary objections are not contemplated within petition practice. Since Erie raised its opposition to venue in its initial answer to the petition, the objection was properly preserved, and we affirm.1

Hilda Cid, an Erie insured, sustained injuries in two automobile collisions in May 2005 and March 2006. On November 15, 2011, she filed a petition to appoint a third/neutral arbitrator and compel UIM arbitration in Philadelphia County. Erie filed an answer to the petition arguing, inter alia, that according to the insurance policy, proper venue lay in Montgomery County, the county of residence of the named insured at the time of the accident. On November 29, 2011, Ms. Cid inexplicably filed a second, identical petition to compel arbitration at the same number, together with an affidavit showing service upon Erie by certified mail. On December 8, 2011, Erie filed preliminary objections to this second petition challenging venue [789]*789and service of process. On January 3, 2012, the court ordered Erie to file a copy of the insurance policy and specifically reference the venue provision to enable the court to make a preliminary determination. Erie complied, and on January 18, 2012, the trial court sustained Erie’s preliminary objections to venue and dismissed the petition without prejudice for Ms. Cid to file a similar petition in the proper venue, Montgomery County.

On January 23, 2012, Ms. Cid filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. In response, the trial court vacated the January 18, 2012 order to enable Erie to respond to Ms. Cid’s contention that Erie waived any objection to venue when it filed an answer before filing preliminary objections. On February 22, 2012, after consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the petition to compel arbitration, the court again sustained Erie’s preliminary objections and dismissed Ms. Cid’s petition without prejudice. Ms. Cid filed the within appeal on March 14, 2012, and raised this issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its [discretion in] dismissing this matter on the basis of improper venue where defendant waived any venue objection by failing to timely file preliminary objections to plaintiff’s petition to compel arbitration?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Generally, a trial court’s ruling on venue will not be disturbed unless the trial court

abused its discretion. Schultz v. MMI Prods., 30 A.3d 1224,1227 (Pa.Super.2011). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment in a manifestly unreasonable manner, or renders a decision based on partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Sehl v. Neff, 26 A.3d 1130, 1131 (Pa.Super.2011).

This appeal presents the question of whether Erie, by initially filing an answer to Ms. Cid’s petition in which it objected to venue, rather than preliminary objections, waived the right to challenge venue in Philadelphia County.2 Also implicated is the larger question of whether the proper procedure in responding to a petition seeking court appointment of a neutral UIM arbitrator and/or to compel arbitration is governed by the procedural rules for petitions or complaints.

Ms. Cid contends that Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) governs the proper procedure herein. Rule 1006(e) provides that “[i]mproper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if not so raised shall be waived.” She relies upon this Court’s decision in Clark v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa.Super. 300, 599 A.2d 1001, 1006 (1991), for the proposition that a petition to compel arbitration is the functional equivalent of a complaint, and that the proper way to challenge venue in a civil action is through a preliminary objection. Pa.R.C.P. 1028(b)3, governing preliminary objec[790]*790tions, requires that all preliminary objections be raised at one time. Ms. Cid maintains that by filing an answer to her first petition in lieu of preliminary objections challenging venue, Erie waived any objection to venue and that Erie’s subsequent filing of preliminary objections was untimely. In Clark, as in the instant case, the insurance company proceeded directly to its responsive pleading instead of filing a preliminary objection to challenge venue. This Court relied upon McLain v. Arneytown Trucking Co., Inc., 370 Pa.Super. 520, 536 A.2d 1388, 1390 (1988), in holding that the failure to file appropriate preliminary objections to contest improper venue resulted in the waiver of the challenge. See also Boyce v. St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Co., 421 Pa.Super. 582, 618 A.2d 962 (1992).

Erie counters that the within petition to appoint an arbitrator and compel arbitration is not a pleading as defined in Pa. R.C.P. 10174, and that the proper procedure is controlled by Pa.R.C.P. 206.15 et seq. governing petitions, rather than the rules governing pleadings. Since Rule 206.26 provides for the filing of an answer that contains the material facts that constitute defenses to the petition and makes no provision for preliminary objections, Erie contends that the answer was the proper vehicle for raising its objection to venue. In support of its position, Erie directs our attention to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas decision in Figueroa v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2007 Phila. Ct. Com. PI. LEXIS 109 (April 11, 2007), holding that since Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a) only authorizes the filing of preliminary objections to a pleading, and since a petition is not a pleading under Pa.R.C.P. 1017, the answer is the proper place to assert improper venue in response to a petition. Pa.R.C.P. 206.2.

The trial court declined to find waiver, noting the “muddled procedural history that [Ms. Cid] helped create” by filing two identical petitions two weeks apart. Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/2012, at 3. Furthermore, after distinguishing Boyce and Clark on the facts, the trial court agreed with Erie that petitions are not pleadings under [791]*791Pa.R.C.P. 1017, and that Pa.R.C.P. 206.1, which governs petition practice, applied.7

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Bluebook (online)
63 A.3d 787, 2013 Pa. Super. 22, 2013 WL 563328, 2013 Pa. Super. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cid-v-erie-insurance-group-pasuperct-2013.