Ciana Evans v. School District of Philadelphia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 16, 2024
• Docket: 23-1086
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________

No. 23-1086 ______________

CIANA EVANS Appellant

v.

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA ______________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-22-cv-1410) District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney ______________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 25, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 16, 2024) ______________

OPINION* ______________

* This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Ciana Evans appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of appellee, her former employer, the School District of Philadelphia

(“District” or “School District”), on Evans’ race and sex discrimination claims and

retaliation claims for employment termination following alleged protected activity. 1 The

District Court concluded that Evans failed to adduce evidence of a prima facie case of

race or sex-based discrimination or retaliation, and that, in any event, Evans failed to

show the District’s articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action was a

pretext. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

The District hired Evans with an effective start date of August 24, 2020. Evans

did not have a teaching certification, and she was working on an emergency permit. An

emergency permit is issued when no certified applicant is available. Evans participated

in the Peer Assistance and Review Program, which was created under a collective

bargaining agreement by the School District and Evans’ Union, the Philadelphia

Federation of Teachers.

1 Evans brings her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The same analysis applies for claims under Title VII and § 1981. Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017). 2 Leslie Strothers was assigned to be Evans’ consulting teacher, and this role is

meant for observation, supervision, implementation of professional development, and

ultimately recommendation for retention or dismissal to the Peer Assistance Review

Panel. 2 Based on her observations, Strothers ultimately recommended to the Panel that

Evans be dismissed. Evans conceded that she did not think Strothers made that

recommendation because of race.

Throughout the school year, Evans also received multiple “Needs Improvement”

and “Unsatisfactory” ratings based on informal observations from two other evaluators:

Assistant Principal Sheree Howard and Principal Betsaida Ortiz. In Howard’s informal

observation, Evans received ratings of “Needs Improvement” and “Unsatisfactory” in

different domains, with an overall “Needs Improvement” rating. Evans conceded that she

did not believe Howard’s evaluation of Evans’ teaching performance was discriminatory

based on race or sex.

In Principal Ortiz’s informal observation, Evans also received ratings of “Needs

Improvement” and “Unsatisfactory” in different respective domains, with an overall

“Needs Improvement” rating. Following Principal Ortiz’s informal observation, Evans

2 The Panel is made up of four School District representatives and four Union representatives.

3 filed a grievance with the Union. However, Evans did not produce this document in

response to the School District’s discovery request.

Principal Ortiz conducted a formal observation of Evans’s performance on May

21, 2021, and performance ratings included “Needs Improvement” in seven areas.

Following the formal observation and subsequent “Needs Improvement” ratings,

Principal Ortiz recommended to the Peer Assistance and Review Panel that Evans be

dismissed from employment. While Principal Ortiz could recommend termination, she

did not have the authority to terminate Evans. The Panel, on which Principal Ortiz is not

a member, rated Evans’ performance as “Unsatisfactory” and unanimously recommended

that employment be terminated. On June 8, 2021, the Administration of the School

District notified Evans that it had recommended her for termination.

Following the Panel’s unanimous recommendation for termination, on or about

June 25, 2021, Evans filed a complaint of discrimination and harassment with the School

District’s Office of Employee and Labor Relations (“ELR”). In response to the

complaint, ELR conducted an investigation and report that detailed statements from other

employees related to the conduct of Principal Ortiz. The report found that “Ortiz created

an antagonistic environment for [the School] employees of various races and ethnicities

during the 2020-2021 school year.” Appx. 718. However, with regard to Evans’

allegations of discrimination against Ortiz, the report “did not find evidence of a pattern

and practice of Ortiz discriminating against women of color,” id., and further concluded 4 that there was “insufficient evidence to establish that Ortiz’s treatment of [the School’s]

employees was discriminatory based on race, sexual orientation, or any other protected

category,” id.

In the District Court, Evans alleged the School District illegally terminated her

because of her race, sex, and disability and in retaliation for complaints of discrimination

and harassment. 3 Evans appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in

the School District’s favor.

II. 4

We exercise plenary review of a grant or denial of summary judgment. Gardner v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is

required where there is “no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Evans, as the party opposing

summary judgment, must produce sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to

reasonably find in Evans’ favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252

(1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B).

III.

3 Although Evans alleged discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., Evans withdrew that claim prior to the Court’s grant of summary judgment. 4 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over Evans’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 5 We analyze Evans’ employment discrimination and retaliation claims using the

framework applied in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). To survive summary

judgment in a discrimination case, a plaintiff must offer evidence to both shift the burden

to the employer and demonstrate that the employer’s reasons for the adverse employment

action were pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff can

establish prima facie evidence, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer “some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Jones, 198 F.3d at

410 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant meets this burden,

the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

reasons offered by the defendant were not true reasons, but a pretext for discrimination.

Id. Despite this burden-shifting methodology, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff “remains at all times with the

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

A prima facie case is established when a plaintiff shows: (1) plaintiff is a member

of a protected class; (2) plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) plaintiff suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under

circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

6 The School District concedes that each of the first three elements are met, but it

argues Evans is unable to satisfy the fourth element: that the employment termination

occurred under discriminatory circumstances. To determine whether discriminatory

circumstances are present, we have looked for comparisons to similarly-situated

employees. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2013).

When similarly-situated comparisons are not present, the employee must “establish some

causal nexus between [the plaintiff’s] membership in a protected class” and the adverse

employment action. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003).

Evans does not offer any evidence indicating that employees were in comparable

situations in terms of performance ratings, informal observations, or formal observations.

Further, the investigative report fails to link Principal Ortiz to a pattern or practice of

discrimination based on race, sexual orientation, or any other protected category. The

District Court correctly determined that Evans failed to identify facts sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of race or sex-based discrimination.

Even assuming that Evans could establish a prima facie case, her discrimination

claims are unable to survive summary judgment. The second prong of the test requires

“the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason of the adverse

employment action at issue.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 412. As Evans acknowledges, and we

agree, the School District has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Evans – unsatisfactory performance. 7 The third and final prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework focuses on

whether there is “sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the purported

reasons for defendant’s adverse employment actions were in actuality a pretext for

intentional . . . discrimination.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 412. A plaintiff “must convince the

finder of fact ‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real

reason.’” Id. at 412-13 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515). Under this part

of the analysis, Evans’ brief directs the Court to the evidence associated with the prima

facie part of the test.

If the evidence offered by the plaintiff as part of a prima facie case is sufficient “to

discredit the defendant’s proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff

need not also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her

prima facie case.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, however,

Evans has failed to show “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its

action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and

hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.”

Id. at 765 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Evans cannot survive

summary judgment based on the first and third prongs of the McDonnell Douglas

framework.

IV. 8 “Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee

‘because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice by this subchapter . . . .’” Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531, 536 (3d Cir. 2021)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). We apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to

Evans’ retaliation claims. Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir.

2015). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by

showing: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) adverse

action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and

the employer’s adverse action. Id. Once the introductory burden is met, the burden shifts

and the employer must “present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the

adverse action.” Id. Next, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

employer’s explanation was false and the real reason for the adverse employment action

was retaliation. Id.

The District Court correctly found that Evans did not establish the first and third

parts of the prima facie test due to Evans’ lack of evidence of engaging in a protected

activity and that a causal connection exists between any such activity (assuming it was

protected) and the termination of employment. We agree with the District Court that

there is a lack of evidence that protected activity occurred for purposes of Evans’

retaliation claim since the evidence offered by Evans was not sufficiently related to

complaints about the conduct that is protected. See Kengerski, 6 F.4th at 537. However, 9 assuming that Evans engaged in protected activity, we agree with the District Court that

she failed to establish a causal connection. Avenues to establish causation include: (1)

“unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the

allegedly retaliatory action”; (2) “a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing”; and (3)

implication by the record as a whole. Dondero v. Lower Milford Twp., 5 F.4th 355, 361-

62 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the timing, evidence offered

for a pattern of antagonism combined with the timing, and the entire record, cannot

support a finding by a reasonable factfinder that the necessary causal connection is

present between the alleged protected activity and the adverse employment action.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.