Churchill Meat Co. v. Brodsky

160 F. Supp. 241, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2478
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMarch 17, 1958
DocketCiv. A. No. 411-56
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 160 F. Supp. 241 (Churchill Meat Co. v. Brodsky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Churchill Meat Co. v. Brodsky, 160 F. Supp. 241, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2478 (D.N.J. 1958).

Opinion

WORTENDYKE, District Judge.

This case involves the validity and alleged infringement of United States Patent No. 2,565,245, issued on August 21, 1951 to Morris Lebovitz and assigned to plaintiff. It is described in the specification as a “Method And Means For Shaping Meats” and consists of two claims.1

The case was tried with a jury which, in response to specific questions put to it pursuant to Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 49(a), 28 U.S.C.A., found the patent valid and infringed. At the close of all of the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict in accordance with Rule 50 (b). This motion was denied, and by virtue of the reservation implicit in such denial, defendant has duly moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The issue of damages was eliminated from the case by direction of the Court for failure of supporting proof. The motion n. o. v. was submitted on briefs and orally argued. This opinion embodies the Court’s decision which was reserved at the conclusion of the argument.

The Patent in Suit

The device covered by the patent (Lebo) is essentially a two-way hydraulic press by means of which a piece of frozen meat is conformed by the application of vertical and horizontal pressures into a cylindrical shape of maximum density. To achieve this conformation, the piece of meat is placed in a stationary, longitudinally-divided, horizontal half-cylinder, closed at one end. Thereupon the movable, complementary upper half of the cylinder is hydraulically pressed downward to confine the meat within the concavity of the cylinder thereby ultimately formed, and this vertical pressure is thereupon supplemented by horizontally applied hydraulic pressure against a plunger moving against the meat through the cylinder thus formed, and successively applied thereto by a reciprocating motion until the maximum compression into the desired conformation of the meat is achieved.

The advantages afforded by the method and results which the inventor claims for the patent over prior meat handling processes are stated in the second paragraph of column one of the patent specifications. The principle object sought to be achieved by the invention is stated in [243]*243column two of the specifications to be that of providing “a novel method for shaping meat into cylindrical form or other desired shape, which method eliminates loss of blood as well as flavor and discoloration normally accompanying commonly used meat shaping operations, also which is speedier than presently known methods, and which provides a uniformly .shaped solid piece of meat retaining all the blood content and flavor as well as the original appearance of fresh meat.” Another claimed advantage is the achievement of a uniform cross-section of the meat so that upon slicing the pieces will be “uniformly sized discs.”

In support of his contention that Lebo is invalid for lack of invention, defendant relies not only upon the referenced prior art patents, but also upon that of Marshall, No. 43,516, issued July 12, 1864, entitled “Improved Process For Preserving Meats”, which involves a similar molding of meat by vertical and horizontal pressures manually applied, and which was not cited. Both parties to the present suit concede that the substitution of hydraulic pressure for manually applied screw pressure is old in the art.

Claim 2.

The duty of this Court, confronted with the pending motion, has been expressed by Judge Hastie, speaking for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 1952, 195 F.2d 971, 973, certiorari denied 344 U.S. 844, 73 S.Ct. 61, 97 L.Ed. 657, rehearing denied 344 U.S. 882, 73 S.Ct. 174, 97 L.Ed. 683. After stating that the jury’s finding of invention and validity of the patent in suit was very grossly wrong, Judge Hastie says:

“A jury in a patent case is not free to treat invention as a concept broad enough to include whatever discovery or novelty may impress the jurors favorably. Over the years the courts of the United States, and particularly the Supreme Court, have found meaning implicit in the scheme and purpose of the patent laws which aids in the construction of their general language. In this process, rules and standards have been developed for use as guides to the systematic and orderly definition and application of such a conception as invention in accordance with what the courts understand to be the true meaning of the Constitution and the patent laws. Once such standards and rules are authoritatively announced any finding of ‘invention’ whether by a court or a jury must be consistent with them. * * * This authority and responsibility to keep jury findings within reasoned rules and standards is an essential function of United States judges today as it long has been of common law judges. * * * It stands as a great safeguard against gross mistake or caprice in fact finding.”

Adherence to this judicial obligation was exemplified by Judge Willson in Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., D.C.W.D.Pa.1955, 134 F.Supp. 392, 395, affirmed 3 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 211. He reminds me that, while I am “ ‘not free to reweigh the evidence or set aside the verdict because the jury might have drawn different inferences or conclusions or the court might have thought another result more reasonable, but must take the view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. * * * ’ Magee v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cir., 213 F.2d 899, 900”, I must, nevertheless, review the evidence. In such a review, however, the sufficiency of the evidence must be appraised in the light of the general principles referred to in Pack-wood, supra.

Lebo is measured and limited by its claims, which are two in number. Claim 1 relates to the press or apparatus. Claim 2 relates to the process of treating and reshaping an irregular piece of solid fresh meat, which has been brought to about 30° F., by means of the apparatus described in Claim 1. In the language of Judge Smith of this Court, in Ludlow Manufacturing & Sales Co. v. Dolphin [244]*244Jute Mills, D.C.D.N.J.1943, 50 F.Supp. 395, 398, affirmed per curiam, 3 Cir., 145 F.2d 471, the so-called process claims of the Lebo patent does not:

“ * * * [D]efine a patentable method but define(s) the peculiar and characteristic functions of the elements of the apparatus recommended for its practice, and appropriately illustrated and described in the specifications of the patent. * * * The successive operations of the purported method, as herein-above stated, are inherent in the elements of the apparatus as the peculiar and characteristic functions thereof.”

A reading of Claim 2 of Lebo indicates that the method referred to therein is nothing other than the functioning of the apparatus described in Claim 1 when applied to a piece of solid fresh meat previously brought to a temperature of approximately 30° F. Because, therefore, the method therein described was not patentable, Claim 2 of the Lebo patent is invalid as a matter of law, and the jury’s finding of validity and infringement respecting this claim must be set aside and judgment must be entered for the defendant declaring that claim invalid.

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160 F. Supp. 241, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 571, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2478, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/churchill-meat-co-v-brodsky-njd-1958.