Chung-Ping Li v. Attorney General of the United States

392 F. App'x 950
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedAugust 27, 2010
Docket19-1081
StatusUnpublished

This text of 392 F. App'x 950 (Chung-Ping Li v. Attorney General of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chung-Ping Li v. Attorney General of the United States, 392 F. App'x 950 (3d Cir. 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Chung-Ping Li, a/k/a Zhen Bin Li, a native of China, entered the United States in 1991. He was later charged as removable as an alien without a valid entry document and was ordered deported in absen-tia. In 2007, an Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Li’s motion to reopen his proceedings. Li conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He argued that he would be persecuted in China pursuant to the family planning policy because he and his-wife had two children in the United States. He also asked for a continuance on the grounds that he had a pending labor certification application.

The IJ denied Li’s motion for a continuance because Li did not have an approved labor certification. The IJ determined that Li’s asylum application was untimely and that he was not entitled to withholding of removal or CAT relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. It concluded that Li had not shown sufficient evidence that he had a labor certification petition pending. The BIA determined that even if Li’s asylum application had been timely filed, he could not show a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA concluded that some of the evidence Li submitted did not reflect the family planning policy in Li’s locality of the Fuji-an province and that economic fines were commonly used to achieve compliance in Fujian. The BIA gave little weight to Li’s personal evidence that he would be sterilized if returned to China. Li filed a timely petition for review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

*953 Denial of a continuance

We review the deniál of a continuance for abuse of discretion. Khan v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir.2006). We resolve this question on a case by case basis according to the facts of each case. Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir.2003). The denial of a continuance may only be reversed if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Khan, 448 F.3d at 233. In Khan, the alien challenged the denial of a continuance while his wife’s labor certification application was pending. We concluded that the IJ’s refusal to grant a continuance was within the.IJ’s discretion because the alien had failed to submit a visa petition. We rejected Khan’s argument that the government’s delay in processing the application constituted extraordinary circumstances that justified an indefinite continuance. Id. at 235.

Here, Li’s removal proceedings were started in 1991 and reopened in 2007. Li asserts that his labor certification application was filed in October 2008 and should have been adjudicated within ninety days but is still pending. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of the continuance on the ground that Li had not shown his eligibility for adjustment: he had not provided sufficient evidence that he had a petition for labor certification pending or that a petition for alien worker had been filed on his behalf such that he would be eligible for adjustment under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). We agree and conclude that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Li’s request for a continuance. See Khan, 448 F.3d at 233-35. While Li argues that the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding, he does not argue that his labor certification application has been approved such that he was eligible to adjust his status.

Asylum, Withholding of Removal and CAT relief 1

To establish eligibility for asylum, Li needed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (which includes persecution related to an oppressive family planning policy). See Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 138 (3d Cir.2005). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, he needed to demonstrate that it was more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened in China on account of the family planning policy. Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir.2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To be eligible for withholding' of removal under the Convention Against Torture, he needed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to China. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

We review the BIA’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc). The BIA’s findings are considered conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We exercise de novo review over the BIA’s legal decisions. Tous-saint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir.2006).

The BIA stated that much of Li’s evidence was general and cumulative of evidence addressed in their published opinions: Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (BIA 2007); Matter of S-Y-G- 24 I. & *954 N. Dec. 247 (BIA 2007); Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007); and Matter of C-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 899 (BIA 2006). 2 Li argues that he submitted evidence not considered in those cases: localized evidence of the implementation of the family planning policy in his hometown. However, the BIA addressed this evidence and did not give it much weight. The BIA noted that Li did not provide original statements from the two women from his town whom his father stated had been forcibly sterilized. The BIA also observed that the evidence indicated that economic fines, fees, and incentives were commonly used to ensure compliance with the family planning policy and that Li had not shown an inability to pay such a fine.

Li also contends that the BIA did not defer to the IJ’s findings and appears to have reviewed his evidence de novo.

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Related

Feng Gui Lin v. Holder
588 F.3d 981 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
J-W-S
24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)
J-H-S
24 I. & N. Dec. 196 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)
C-C
23 I. & N. Dec. 899 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
392 F. App'x 950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chung-ping-li-v-attorney-general-of-the-united-states-ca3-2010.