NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-3115 __________
CHRYSSOULA ARSENIS, Appellant
v.
M&T BANK, s/b/m Hudson City Savings Bank ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-02601) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 24, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Appellant Chryssoula Arsenis, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
In May 2023, Arsenis filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of
New Jersey against M&T Bank s/b/m Hudson City Savings Bank (“M&T”) for violations
of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 9001-9141, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2617, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692p. The claims stem from a $795,000 mortgage loan that Arsenis obtained
from M&T. Arsenis argues that M&T violated all three Acts when it declared her in
default, declined to convert a loan modification Trial Period Plan (“TPP”) into a
permanent modification of the loan, and initiated foreclosure proceedings.
When this action was initiated, the property securing the loan was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings in New Jersey Superior Court. 1 M&T moved to dismiss the
complaint, and the District Court granted the motion pursuant to the Colorado River
abstention doctrine. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
1 Arsenis unsuccessfully attempted to remove the foreclosure proceedings to federal court multiple times. We affirmed the remands to state court. See M&T Bank v. Arsenis, No. 23-2324, 2024 WL 1171081 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (per curiam) (summarily affirming remand to state court); M&T Bank v. Arsenis, No. 24-1723, 2025 WL 1409479 (3d Cir. May 15, 2025) (per curiam) (same). 2 800, 817-18 (1976). Arsenis appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Superior Court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of M&T, and this Court ordered
supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue of claim preclusion. We ultimately
concluded that abstention was not warranted, vacated the District Court’s order of
dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. See Arsenis v. M&T Bank, No. 24-1151,
2025 WL 88838, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (per curiam). In remanding the matter, we
specifically declined to address in the first instance any preclusive effects from the state
court judgment. Instead, we left the issue “to the District Court to address on remand.”
Id., at *3.
Upon the reopening of proceedings after remand, the District Court granted
M&T’s motion to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of res judicata. M&T filed a
supplemental brief, to which Arsenis filed a response. 2 She also filed various motions.
After concluding that Arsenis’s claims were barred by res judicata, the District Court
granted the motion to dismiss and denied Arsenis’s pending motions as moot. Arsenis
timely appealed.
2 Arsenis filed a petition for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 requesting that this Court vacate the order granting supplemental briefing because of the “Third Circuit’s explicit holding that res judicata was not warranted.” In re Arsenis, No. 25-1365, 2025 WL 1166145, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (per curiam) (denying petition for writ of mandamus). Her appellate briefing argues the same. As noted above, we made no such holding. 3 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal. See Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v.
Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 67, 72 (3d Cir. 2024). Because Arsenis is proceeding pro se, we
construe her filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam).
We agree with the District Court that Arsenis’s claims are barred by res judicata.
“Both New Jersey and federal law apply res judicata or claim preclusion when three
circumstances are present: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2)
the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of
action.” In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation modified). In
determining whether two suits are based on the same cause of action, we take a “broad
view” and evaluate whether there is “essential similarity of the underlying events giving
rise to the various legal claims.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 261 (3d
Cir. 2010).
All three requirements of res judicata are satisfied here. First, the parties in this
case are the same as those in the foreclosure case. 3 Second, the Superior Court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of M&T is a final judgment on the merits. See Papera v. Pa.
Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2020). Third, Arsenis’s current suit
3 Arsenis appears to raise some form of a privity argument in her opening brief. However, this argument fails as the parties are the same. 4 arises from the same cause of action as the foreclosure case because both actions arise
from the same underlying series of events: the mortgage loan, the alleged default, the
TPP, the denial of a permanent loan modification, and the ensuing foreclosure
proceedings. See Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing
factors relevant to determining the same cause of action for res judicata purposes,
including “whether the acts complained of [are] the same”); see also McNeil v. Legis.
Apportionment Comm’n of State of N.J., 828 A.2d 840, 859 (N.J. 2003) (“Causes of
action are deemed part of a single claim if they arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence.” (citation modified)).
On appeal, Arsenis argues that the state court judgment cannot be preclusive
because the state and federal proceedings concern distinct claims. She is mistaken. To the
extent there is a difference between the claims in the two actions, Arsenis’s claims are
barred by the entire controversy doctrine—New Jersey’s “specific, and idiosyncratic,
application of traditional res judicata principles”—which “applies in federal courts when
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-3115 __________
CHRYSSOULA ARSENIS, Appellant
v.
M&T BANK, s/b/m Hudson City Savings Bank ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-02601) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 24, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Appellant Chryssoula Arsenis, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
In May 2023, Arsenis filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of
New Jersey against M&T Bank s/b/m Hudson City Savings Bank (“M&T”) for violations
of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 9001-9141, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2617, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692-1692p. The claims stem from a $795,000 mortgage loan that Arsenis obtained
from M&T. Arsenis argues that M&T violated all three Acts when it declared her in
default, declined to convert a loan modification Trial Period Plan (“TPP”) into a
permanent modification of the loan, and initiated foreclosure proceedings.
When this action was initiated, the property securing the loan was the subject of
foreclosure proceedings in New Jersey Superior Court. 1 M&T moved to dismiss the
complaint, and the District Court granted the motion pursuant to the Colorado River
abstention doctrine. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
1 Arsenis unsuccessfully attempted to remove the foreclosure proceedings to federal court multiple times. We affirmed the remands to state court. See M&T Bank v. Arsenis, No. 23-2324, 2024 WL 1171081 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (per curiam) (summarily affirming remand to state court); M&T Bank v. Arsenis, No. 24-1723, 2025 WL 1409479 (3d Cir. May 15, 2025) (per curiam) (same). 2 800, 817-18 (1976). Arsenis appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Superior Court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of M&T, and this Court ordered
supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue of claim preclusion. We ultimately
concluded that abstention was not warranted, vacated the District Court’s order of
dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. See Arsenis v. M&T Bank, No. 24-1151,
2025 WL 88838, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (per curiam). In remanding the matter, we
specifically declined to address in the first instance any preclusive effects from the state
court judgment. Instead, we left the issue “to the District Court to address on remand.”
Id., at *3.
Upon the reopening of proceedings after remand, the District Court granted
M&T’s motion to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of res judicata. M&T filed a
supplemental brief, to which Arsenis filed a response. 2 She also filed various motions.
After concluding that Arsenis’s claims were barred by res judicata, the District Court
granted the motion to dismiss and denied Arsenis’s pending motions as moot. Arsenis
timely appealed.
2 Arsenis filed a petition for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 requesting that this Court vacate the order granting supplemental briefing because of the “Third Circuit’s explicit holding that res judicata was not warranted.” In re Arsenis, No. 25-1365, 2025 WL 1166145, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (per curiam) (denying petition for writ of mandamus). Her appellate briefing argues the same. As noted above, we made no such holding. 3 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal. See Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v.
Att’y Gen., 105 F.4th 67, 72 (3d Cir. 2024). Because Arsenis is proceeding pro se, we
construe her filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam).
We agree with the District Court that Arsenis’s claims are barred by res judicata.
“Both New Jersey and federal law apply res judicata or claim preclusion when three
circumstances are present: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2)
the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of
action.” In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation modified). In
determining whether two suits are based on the same cause of action, we take a “broad
view” and evaluate whether there is “essential similarity of the underlying events giving
rise to the various legal claims.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 261 (3d
Cir. 2010).
All three requirements of res judicata are satisfied here. First, the parties in this
case are the same as those in the foreclosure case. 3 Second, the Superior Court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of M&T is a final judgment on the merits. See Papera v. Pa.
Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2020). Third, Arsenis’s current suit
3 Arsenis appears to raise some form of a privity argument in her opening brief. However, this argument fails as the parties are the same. 4 arises from the same cause of action as the foreclosure case because both actions arise
from the same underlying series of events: the mortgage loan, the alleged default, the
TPP, the denial of a permanent loan modification, and the ensuing foreclosure
proceedings. See Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing
factors relevant to determining the same cause of action for res judicata purposes,
including “whether the acts complained of [are] the same”); see also McNeil v. Legis.
Apportionment Comm’n of State of N.J., 828 A.2d 840, 859 (N.J. 2003) (“Causes of
action are deemed part of a single claim if they arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence.” (citation modified)).
On appeal, Arsenis argues that the state court judgment cannot be preclusive
because the state and federal proceedings concern distinct claims. She is mistaken. To the
extent there is a difference between the claims in the two actions, Arsenis’s claims are
barred by the entire controversy doctrine—New Jersey’s “specific, and idiosyncratic,
application of traditional res judicata principles”—which “applies in federal courts when
there was a previous state-court action involving the same transaction.” Ricketti v. Barry,
775 F.3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Under that doctrine, claims
“germane” to a foreclosure action must be raised in the foreclosure proceeding itself. See
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 229 (explaining “germane” claims “aris[e] out of the mortgage
transaction”).
5 Here, Arsenis’s claims are plainly germane to the foreclosure action. They are
premised on the argument that M&T wrongfully denied a loan modification and violated
the CARES Act, and she challenges M&T’s conduct during the foreclosure process. She
even seeks, in part, a declaration from the District Court that M&T “breached” the
alleged loan modification plan. See ECF 1 at 11. These claims ultimately “[go] to the
validity of the mortgage, the amount due, or the right of [the mortgagee] to foreclose[,]”
and thus “had to be raised in the foreclosure proceeding.” Delacruz v. Alfieri, 145 A.3d
695, 708 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). Indeed, in the foreclosure case, Arsenis
asserted defenses and counterclaims for violations of the CARES Act, and challenged,
inter alia, M&T’s conduct and the allegedly wrongful denial of a loan modification.
Moreover, she “reserve[d] the right to assert other claims, including” claims that may
arise under RESPA or FDCPA. See ECF 12-6 at 14. 4 Contrary to Arsenis’s belief, it is
“not dispositive” whether she “asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different
relief in the two actions.” See Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261. Because she did not pursue
these available claims in state court, they are barred.
Arsenis argues that the District Court erred in determining that she “could have
raised” her claims in state court because her claims are “grounded in a materially
4 Arsenis contends that she “expressly reserved the right to pursue federal statutory claims . . . in a separate action.” She is incorrect. These claims were not reserved for a subsequent action, but for later filings in the foreclosure action, such as in response to M&T Bank’s motion for summary judgment. 6 different and later-developed nucleus of facts, including post-judgment events arising
from the bankruptcy process.” C.A. Doc. 13 at 29. Not so. The claims raised in Arsenis’s
complaint are entirely based on the alleged forbearance, TPP, denial of a loan
modification, and default. In fact, Arsenis did not discuss the bankruptcy proceedings at
all in her filings in the District Court.
Given the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err in concluding that
granting Arsenis leave to amend would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). And, because dismissal was appropriate under the
circumstances, Arsenis’s other challenges to the District Court’s rulings on her
miscellaneous motions are unavailing.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.