Chrysler Group LLC v. Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc.

776 F.3d 411, 2015 WL 221056
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 16, 2015
Docket13-2117, 13-2118, 13-2119
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 776 F.3d 411 (Chrysler Group LLC v. Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chrysler Group LLC v. Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc., 776 F.3d 411, 2015 WL 221056 (6th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

Congress — in Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 — created an arbitration procedure for automobile dealerships to seek continuation or reinstatement of franchise agreements that had been terminated by Chrysler during its bankruptcy proceedings, with the approval of the bankruptcy court. This case involves what happens when the dealerships prevail, as some did, in their statutorily-provided arbitrations.

The lawsuit below involved numerous claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims by Chrysler and various dealers. Among other things, the parties dispute the scope of relief provided for successful dealers under § 747, and whether such dealers are subject to state dealer protest laws that permit existing dealerships to protest the addition of a new dealer. The district court correctly held that § 747 does not constitute an unconstitutional legislative reversal of a federal court judgment, and that the only relief provided to successful dealers under § 747 is the issuance of a “customary and usual” letter of intent. The district court also properly found that the letters of intent at issue in this case were “customary and usual,” with the exception of one contractual provision that requires reversal. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, however, application of the state dealer acts of the two states in question (Michigan and Nevada) is preempted by § 747, because the state acts provide for redetermination of factors directly addressed in federally-mandated arbitrations closely related to a major federal government bailout.

I.

This case involves the post-bankruptcy corporate identity of Chrysler, the American automobile manufacturer. The bankruptcy transferred almost all of the business from “Old Chrysler” to “New Chrysler,” an entirely new corporate entity. 1 Facing declining sales and an overextended network of dealerships, Old Chrysler arrived at the brink of insolvency after the global financial crisis and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2009. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87-88, 90 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009). Prior to the bankruptcy petition, Old Chrysler applied to and received from the federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) a $4 billion loan, which was given in exchange for a security interest in all of Old Chrysler’s assets, to be held by the U.S. Treasury. Id. at 89-90; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq.) (establishing TARP). After this loan, the federal government assumed a central role in Chrysler’s restructuring. Beyond the Treasury’s floating of considerable capital aid through TARP, the President of the *416 United States instituted an Auto Task Force, whose goal was to negotiate a comprehensive restructuring among Chrysler and other' affected parties. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 91. Eventually, the parties negotiated a plan with Fiat,, the Italian automaker, which was willing and able to take up primary ownership of Chrysler’s automobile empire. See id. at 91-92.

As part of the final sale order of the bankruptcy court, Old Chrysler sold, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, nearly all of its assets to New Chrysler, which was owned predominantly by a voluntary employees’ beneficiary association and partially by Fiat and various entities of the federal government, with Fiat maintaining the possibility of acquiring a majority ownership in the future. Id. at 92, 118. This asset transfer was conducted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), which creates a mechanism for a bankruptcy trustee to sell certain property of the debtor “free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.”

In addition to transferring substantially all of Old Chrysler’s assets to the new entity, the restructuring plan included some procedures designed to consolidate and streamline Old Chrysler’s business operations. At the time of the bankruptcy petition, Old Chrysler had 32 manufacturing and assembly facilities and a network of 3,200 independent dealerships in the United States. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 88. Early in the bankruptcy proceedings, Old Chrysler filed a motion seeking to “reject executory contracts and unexpired leases affecting 789 domestic car dealerships,” that is, requesting permission to terminate its sales and service agreements with 789 dealers. See id. That request represented the elimination of nearly a quarter of Chrysler’s dealerships in the United States.

In response to the upheaval in the American automobile industry — which was said to threaten almost 2,000 dealerships nationwide and put nearly 100,000 jobs at risk — the United States Senate held a special hearing on June 3, 2009, to address the issue of dealership closures. GM and Chrysler Dealership Closures: Protecting Dealers and Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm, on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 111th. Cong. (2009) (“Senate Hearing”). One senator at the hearing expressed concern that “[w]e committed an awful lot of taxpayer money to try to save all those jobs that are now being cut,” while the cause of the problem was that the automobile manufacturers were stubbornly refusing to innovate in the marketplace. See id. at 85 (statement of Sen. Bill Nelson). One senator stated that “because of this financial investment, we have an obligation to ensure Federal resources are being used wisely and fairly and in the best interests of the taxpayers.” Id. at 20 (statement of Sen. John Thune). 2

During the hearing, James Press, the Vice Chairman and President of Old Chrysler, responded that the dealership terminations were necessary for the survival of New Chrysler. He pointed out *417 that the average Chrysler dealer lost over $8,000 annually and that the existence of “a legacy of dealers that sell only one or two of the company’s three brands— Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge — ... led to redundancies and inefficiencies in product development and marketing costs.” Id. at 28-29. Press outlined Chrysler’s plan to streamline their dealership network:

Chrysler has consistently communicated the need for a consolidation of dealers to our network. Our most recent restructuring effort, Project Genesis, is aimed at bringing all three brands under one roof to go along with our plan to produce fewer products that overlap. Genesis was launched in 2008 with an extensive communication plan including a series of meetings across the United States with our dealers and presentations at the National Auto Dealers Association annual conference. In each market, we identified the optimal number of dealers and locations and we began working collaboratively to build a healthy and profitable network.

Id. at 30; see also In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 193-95 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009) (describing Project Genesis).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
776 F.3d 411, 2015 WL 221056, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chrysler-group-llc-v-fox-hills-motor-sales-inc-ca6-2015.