Christy v. Leong Don

5 F.2d 135, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2616

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: March 24, 1925
• Docket: 4448
• Status: Published

Opinions

BRYAN, Circuit. Judge.

Leong Don, a Chinese person, applied at the port of New Orleans for entry to the United States. His application was denied by the Commissioner of Immigration, whose action was affirmed on appeal by the Secretary of Labor. Leong Don then filed a petition in the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration, by whom he was .held for deportation, alleging that he is the son of Leong Goon, a citizen of the United States, and in the most general terms that he was not given a fair hearing upon his application for admission. The answer of the Commissioner admits that Leong Goon was bom in California and is a citizen of the United States, but denies that Leong Don is his son, and also denies that the hearing, complained of was unfair.

It appears from the proceedings before a board of special inquiry that Leong Don was examined on two occasions. On the first he testified that he was bom in China, was 26 years old, and that he had no recollection of his paternal grandfather, grandmother, or of that grandfather’s brother. The hearing was continued for the purpose of examining the alleged father, Leong Gpon, who testified, in Detroit, among other things, that his father had been dead 12 years, and his mother about 8 years, and that his father’s brother was living as late as 1912 in the same village in which his father, mother, and Leong Don lived. This witness testified also that Leong Don was his son and was 26 years old. Leong Don’s alleged brother was also examined in Detroit, and contradicted him in several matters relating to family history. Shortly after this testimony was taken, Leong Don was again examined, and then testified that he remembered his grandfather and grandmother, but did not remember his great-uncle. The only explanation he offered of his previous testimony was that it was a mistake. He admitted that he had communicated with Leong Goon after his first hearing. Leong Don and Leong Goon both testified before the District Judge in the ha-beas corpus proceeding, but nothing was added to the testimony already giyen, and no explanation was given of the inconsistencies in their previous testimony. The District Judge expressed the opinion that Leong Don was Leong Goon’s son, and was therefore entitled to admission to this country as a, citizen. Accordingly an order was entered discharging Leong Don from custody. The Commissioner of Immigration appeals.

The Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. 390 [Comp. St. § 4325]),- provides that the decision of appropriate immigration officials adverse to the admission of an alien into the United States shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. This provision was amended in 1903, transferring jurisdiction to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. 32 Stat. 828 (Comp. St. § 858). Section 17 of the Act of February 5, 1917 (39 Stat. 887 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289:)4ii]), provides for the appointment of boards of special inquiry, and for an appeal through the Commissioner of Immigration at the port of arrival to the Secretary of Labor, and that the decision of a board of special inquiry adverse to the admission of an alien shall be final unless reversed on appeal. It thus appears that it has been the policy of the Congress since 1894 to make final a decision of the appropriate department. Under the law as amended from time to time, it is settled by the decisions that one applying for admission to the United States is in legal contemplation without its borders, but is entitled to a fair hearing before the executive officers of the government. If fhe hearing be fair, though summary, it .is conclusive, and is not to be set aside by the courts, even though it be considered that the decision arrived at by the appropriate department was wrong. It is only where the court finds that the hearing conducted by the department was unfair that it is authorized to hear the ease on its merits. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 S. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938; United States v. Ruiz, 203 F. 441, 121 C. C. A. 551.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus signally fails to allege wherein the hearings held by the board of special inquiry were unfair. Notwithstanding this, we have examined the entire record, and are unable to find that there was any unfairness in the hearings conducted by the immigration1 officials. Of course, if there were no evidence to sustain the order of deportation, the conclusion that the hearing was unfair because arbitrary would be justifiable. The burden was upon appellee to show that he was the son of an American citizen, and therefore entitled to admission under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 3947). If appellee were the son of Leong Goon, he was old enough to remember his grandfather, grandmother and his grandfather’s brother. But he was unable to do this until after he had communicated with his alleged farther. There was substantial evidence upon which the conclusion might well be reached that appellee’s claim of relationship to a native-born Chinaman was unfounded in fact. It is not indicative of unfairness that the immigration officials inquired into the family relationship of one who used that as the basis of his claim of citizenship. The hearing having been fair, and there being substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by the immigration officials, in our opinion, it was error for the District Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Department of Labor upon-the weight of the evidence.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.