DLD-046 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2765 ___________
CHRISTOPHER YOUNGER, Appellant
v.
R. GROSS, Corrections Officer at ACJ; D. EDWARDS, Captain at ACJ; A. TUCKER, Sgt. at ACJ; J. HOLT, Corrections Officer at ACJ ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00878) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Patricia L. Dodge ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 4, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 19, 2025) __________
OPINION* __________ PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Christopher Younger, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s1 decision to dismiss his § 1983 action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. We will summarily affirm.
I.
In 2020, Christopher Younger filed a § 1983 complaint against several officials
employed at Allegheny County Jail, alleging that after he requested to go to the law
library, he was beaten by several officers and tackled to the ground despite offering no
resistance, was tased repeatedly by one of the officers, and was then placed in a restraint
chair for nine hours with no relief breaks. In March 2023, the defendants moved for
summary judgment, and the Court granted the motion as to the plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claims against two defendants, but denied the motion as to the
bulk of plaintiff’s excessive force claims.
Thereafter, no longer incarcerated, the plaintiff was invited to participate in the
Court’s Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program and was instructed to respond to the Court’s
order by April 14, 2023. On April 4, the mailed order was returned to the Court as
undeliverable, and the order was resent to the plaintiff’s address on file. On May 2, 2023,
the Court issued another order that instructed the plaintiff to respond regarding his
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge in this case.
2 participation in the mediation program, noted that the plaintiff had not communicated
with the Court at all since August 2022, and warned him that failure to respond by May
16, 2023, could result in a dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute.
On May 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed a notice of change of address along with a
motion to appoint counsel, and on May 30, the plaintiff was again directed to inform the
Court by June 14, 2023, whether he wished to participate in the mediation program. The
mailing that was sent to plaintiff’s updated address on May 30 was returned to the Court
as undeliverable on June 23, and on June 29, the Court issued an order administratively
closing the case. In its order, the Court announced that the case would be reopened no
later than August 1, 2023, and that the plaintiff had to provide a deliverable address as
well as a current phone number; the Court further warned that a failure to respond by
August 1 would result in a dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute. Younger did not
respond and the Court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute on
August 23, 2023.
In November 2023, the plaintiff obtained counsel and filed a motion to reopen the
case, which the Court granted several months later. After a telephone conference was
held in February 2024, a mediation date was set for April 3, 2024, but on March 28,
2024, Younger’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, so the mediation was postponed.
The Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and the plaintiff was asked to inform the
3 Court by April 22, 2024, whether he intended to retain new counsel or whether he wished
the Court to appoint him counsel for the purposes of mediation. The plaintiff failed to
respond by the deadline, and the Court extended the response deadline to June 7, 2024,
warning the plaintiff that if he again failed to respond, his case might be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
On May 9, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for a speedy trial, which the Court
denied and construed as an expression of the plaintiff’s intent to neither retain counsel
nor receive court-appointed counsel. In July 2024, the Court set the trial date for
December 9, 2024; however, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel in August
2024, and when the Court granted Younger’s motion, the Court also postponed the trial
and closed the case while it searched for a lawyer for Younger. In February 2025, court-
appointed counsel entered his appearance for the plaintiff, and on March 5, 2025, a
telephone conference was held, wherein counsel reported that he had been unable to
contact the plaintiff at the address or phone number of record. Thereafter plaintiff’s
counsel reported having been in contact with Younger, and a settlement conference was
scheduled for June 27, 2025.
On June 12, 2025, a new attorney entered a notice of appearance on behalf of
Younger, and Younger’s court-appointed attorney submitted an oral motion to withdraw
at a June 17 status conference with the Court. Further, at the June 17 conference, the
4 Court instructed the plaintiff to submit a written itemization and settlement demand to
defendants’ counsel by June 23, 2025. Three days after that deadline, on June 26, plaintiff
submitted a pro se stay motion, wherein he represented that the most recent counsel he
retained was “stand-by” counsel. The Court delayed the scheduled settlement conference
in order resolve the question of plaintiff’s representation, and instructed the plaintiff to
file either a status report regarding his representation or a motion to discharge his counsel
by July 11, 2025. After plaintiff missed that deadline, the Court reissued its order. On
July 15, 2025, the plaintiff filed a withdrawal motion, which the Court granted a day
later. A telephonic status conference was set for July 29, 2025.
The plaintiff failed to appear for the July 29 status conference, at which point the
Court issued a show cause order, directing that the plaintiff show cause by August 6,
2025, as to why his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. On August 7,
2025, plaintiff’s third counsel re-filed a notice of appearance as well as a response to the
Court’s show cause order and a motion for an extension of time to respond to the show
cause order. In his response to the show cause order, Younger indicated that “he was not
aware of said conference” and that he “has been mourning his mother’s death.” The
District Court was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s assertions and dismissed the case with
prejudice, emphasizing that the scheduling conference order had been mailed to the
address of record without being returned, and that in his stay petition the plaintiff
5 indicated he had “criminal cases that need to be first on the list” for his time, which
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DLD-046 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 25-2765 ___________
CHRISTOPHER YOUNGER, Appellant
v.
R. GROSS, Corrections Officer at ACJ; D. EDWARDS, Captain at ACJ; A. TUCKER, Sgt. at ACJ; J. HOLT, Corrections Officer at ACJ ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00878) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Patricia L. Dodge ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 4, 2025
Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 19, 2025) __________
OPINION* __________ PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Christopher Younger, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s1 decision to dismiss his § 1983 action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. We will summarily affirm.
I.
In 2020, Christopher Younger filed a § 1983 complaint against several officials
employed at Allegheny County Jail, alleging that after he requested to go to the law
library, he was beaten by several officers and tackled to the ground despite offering no
resistance, was tased repeatedly by one of the officers, and was then placed in a restraint
chair for nine hours with no relief breaks. In March 2023, the defendants moved for
summary judgment, and the Court granted the motion as to the plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claims against two defendants, but denied the motion as to the
bulk of plaintiff’s excessive force claims.
Thereafter, no longer incarcerated, the plaintiff was invited to participate in the
Court’s Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program and was instructed to respond to the Court’s
order by April 14, 2023. On April 4, the mailed order was returned to the Court as
undeliverable, and the order was resent to the plaintiff’s address on file. On May 2, 2023,
the Court issued another order that instructed the plaintiff to respond regarding his
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge in this case.
2 participation in the mediation program, noted that the plaintiff had not communicated
with the Court at all since August 2022, and warned him that failure to respond by May
16, 2023, could result in a dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute.
On May 24, 2023, the plaintiff filed a notice of change of address along with a
motion to appoint counsel, and on May 30, the plaintiff was again directed to inform the
Court by June 14, 2023, whether he wished to participate in the mediation program. The
mailing that was sent to plaintiff’s updated address on May 30 was returned to the Court
as undeliverable on June 23, and on June 29, the Court issued an order administratively
closing the case. In its order, the Court announced that the case would be reopened no
later than August 1, 2023, and that the plaintiff had to provide a deliverable address as
well as a current phone number; the Court further warned that a failure to respond by
August 1 would result in a dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute. Younger did not
respond and the Court dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute on
August 23, 2023.
In November 2023, the plaintiff obtained counsel and filed a motion to reopen the
case, which the Court granted several months later. After a telephone conference was
held in February 2024, a mediation date was set for April 3, 2024, but on March 28,
2024, Younger’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, so the mediation was postponed.
The Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and the plaintiff was asked to inform the
3 Court by April 22, 2024, whether he intended to retain new counsel or whether he wished
the Court to appoint him counsel for the purposes of mediation. The plaintiff failed to
respond by the deadline, and the Court extended the response deadline to June 7, 2024,
warning the plaintiff that if he again failed to respond, his case might be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
On May 9, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for a speedy trial, which the Court
denied and construed as an expression of the plaintiff’s intent to neither retain counsel
nor receive court-appointed counsel. In July 2024, the Court set the trial date for
December 9, 2024; however, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel in August
2024, and when the Court granted Younger’s motion, the Court also postponed the trial
and closed the case while it searched for a lawyer for Younger. In February 2025, court-
appointed counsel entered his appearance for the plaintiff, and on March 5, 2025, a
telephone conference was held, wherein counsel reported that he had been unable to
contact the plaintiff at the address or phone number of record. Thereafter plaintiff’s
counsel reported having been in contact with Younger, and a settlement conference was
scheduled for June 27, 2025.
On June 12, 2025, a new attorney entered a notice of appearance on behalf of
Younger, and Younger’s court-appointed attorney submitted an oral motion to withdraw
at a June 17 status conference with the Court. Further, at the June 17 conference, the
4 Court instructed the plaintiff to submit a written itemization and settlement demand to
defendants’ counsel by June 23, 2025. Three days after that deadline, on June 26, plaintiff
submitted a pro se stay motion, wherein he represented that the most recent counsel he
retained was “stand-by” counsel. The Court delayed the scheduled settlement conference
in order resolve the question of plaintiff’s representation, and instructed the plaintiff to
file either a status report regarding his representation or a motion to discharge his counsel
by July 11, 2025. After plaintiff missed that deadline, the Court reissued its order. On
July 15, 2025, the plaintiff filed a withdrawal motion, which the Court granted a day
later. A telephonic status conference was set for July 29, 2025.
The plaintiff failed to appear for the July 29 status conference, at which point the
Court issued a show cause order, directing that the plaintiff show cause by August 6,
2025, as to why his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. On August 7,
2025, plaintiff’s third counsel re-filed a notice of appearance as well as a response to the
Court’s show cause order and a motion for an extension of time to respond to the show
cause order. In his response to the show cause order, Younger indicated that “he was not
aware of said conference” and that he “has been mourning his mother’s death.” The
District Court was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s assertions and dismissed the case with
prejudice, emphasizing that the scheduling conference order had been mailed to the
address of record without being returned, and that in his stay petition the plaintiff
5 indicated he had “criminal cases that need to be first on the list” for his time, which
undermined the plaintiff’s claims that his failure to prosecute was not willful.
Younger’s timely appeal followed. He filed a motion for appointment of counsel,
and the appellees have filed a motion for summary affirmance. Younger has not
responded to the appellees’ motion.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review a dismissal
for failure to prosecute for abuse of discretion. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257
(3d Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the final order being appealed is a dismissal for failure to
prosecute, we do not review the District Court’s earlier orders dismissing or granting
summary judgment as to several of plaintiff’s claims. See R & C Oilfield Servs. LLC v.
Am. Wind Transp. Grp. LLC, 45 F.4th 655, 660-61 (3d Cir. 2022). We may summarily
affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6.
III.
Under Rule 41(b), a District Court may sua sponte dismiss an action if the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or otherwise comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). We
have held that, prior to doing so, the District Court should weigh six factors set forth in
6 Poulis: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary . . .; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or
defense.” Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)
(emphasis omitted). While our Court has held that dismissal with prejudice is a drastic
measure, see Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258, we have also held that no single Poulis factor is
determinative, and not all factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal for dismissal to be
proper. See id. at 263.
Here, the District Court thoroughly assessed each Poulis factor. The District Court
determined that although the plaintiff’s claim had sufficient merit to survive summary
judgment, the remaining five Poulis factors weighed against the plaintiff in favor of
dismissal. The Court found that Younger was personally responsible for his conduct and
that it was willful, noting that Younger had repeatedly missed deadlines set by the Court
and that Younger had explicitly stated that he had other legal matters that were “first on
the list” above this case. The Court also found that this case has been pending for over
five years, and further delay would prejudice the defendants.
7 The District Court was well within its discretion to dismiss Younger’s case for
failure to prosecute. Therefore, we grant the appellees’ motion and will summarily affirm
the District Court’s judgment. Younger’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.