Christopher Tyrone Mason v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 20, 2004
• Docket: 06-03-00199-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-03-00199-CR

CHRISTOPHER TYRONE MASON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 6th Judicial District Court

Lamar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 19179

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Christopher Tyrone Mason was indicted for attempted murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A jury found him guilty of the aggravated assault charge. The trial court imposed punishment consistent with the jury's recommendation of thirty years' imprisonment. Mason now appeals, complaining his trial counsel's failure to object to certain testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we determine trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, we affirm Mason's conviction.

          The series of events leading to Mason's conviction began in Paris, Texas, when Steven Hall, convicted felon and complainant in this case, left work April 25, 2002, and went to a local apartment complex in search of someone who would sell him crack cocaine. He met with an acquaintance named Terry Mackey, who introduced Hall to Mason. Mason used Hall's fifty dollars to buy crack cocaine for Hall. Hall consumed this supply of drugs and returned to the apartment complex in search of more drugs. Hall testified his memory became blurry at this point but, somehow, he managed to meet again with Mason and Mason's girlfriend, Kamesha Gill. Hall persuaded Mason to find more drugs for him.

          Mackey loaned Mason a car while the three (Hall, Mason, and Gill) drove around town searching for more crack cocaine. Finally, the trio found a place to purchase more cocaine. Hall's and Mason's respective versions of the events that followed are varied and conflicting.

          Hall testified the three occupants smoked the recently purchased cocaine at several secluded areas. After some time driving around, the two men got out of the car to urinate on the side of the road. Hall testified he turned around after urinating, and Mason cut his throat for no apparent reason. Mason then chased Hall down the road. Hall eluded Mason by hiding in some bushes and then sought medical help from a nearby house. Hall testified Mason's motivation in the attack was probably not robbery because Mason knew that Hall had no money.

          Mason testified that only Hall smoked the cocaine. According to Mason's version of events, after the drug purchase, Hall asked to be dropped off on Fourth Street and, on their way, smoked cocaine in the car despite Gill's several requests that he not. Mason maintains that, because Hall insisted on smoking in the car, while the two of them were outside the car urinating, he told Hall not to get back into the car. Angered by this, Hall pulled something from his pocket and swung at Mason. Mason began to swing his knife at Hall in self-defense. Hall suddenly started running, and Mason gave chase for a few feet. Mason then got back into the car with Gill. He further testified that, since it was dark outside, he was not aware he had cut Hall until the next day during the police interview.

          At trial, the jury heard the testimony of investigating officer Tim Moree, Gill, Hall, and Mason. At several points in his testimony, Moree testified regarding out-of-court statements by Hall and Gill. Trial counsel did not object to this testimony. On appeal, Mason contends this failure was a violation of his constitutional right to reasonable representation and, thus, seeks reversal of his conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial.

I.        Analysis

          A.       Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

          Federal and state constitutions guarantee the right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel in a state criminal proceeding. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ the two-pronged test as set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 54–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

          Under the Strickland-Hernandez standard, first, we must determine whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Judicial review of a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance must be highly deferential to trial counsel. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. We employ a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

          Under the second prong of the Strickland-Hernandez test, on a finding of deficient performance of trial counsel, we must assess whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. An appellant must prove both deficiency and harm by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We will apply these standards to each instance of trial counsel's failure to object to Moree's testimony.

          B.       The Rule Excluding Hearsay

          Mason relies on Rule 801 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which defines hearsay as a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Mason contends that the officer's testimony qualified as hearsay and, as such, was inadmissible. Thus, he argues, he received ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel's failure to object to this testimony.

          C.       Admissible Testimony: Present Sense Impression Exception

          After Hall was released from the hospital, Moree proceeded to investigate the incident. As part of his investigation, Moree accompanied Hall to the location of the attack, where Hall recounted the event. Moree testified that, while he and Hall were at the location, Hall alerted him that Mason had just driven by them:

While we were discussing where he had ran [sic] to, a small white car passed by and drove right beside us. The roadway is very narrow so he drove right beside us and Mr. Hall made the statement that that's the same guy in the car that had cut him and that he was in the night before.

          This portion of Moree's testimony falls squarely into the present sense impression exception to the rule excluding hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(1). A statement regarding the declarant's present sense impression, though it may fall within the definition of hearsay, represents an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. Id. The rules define a present sense impression as a "statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." Id. The record shows that approximately thirty seconds to one minute after seeing the car Mason was driving go by, while Moree and Hall still stood at the location, Hall made the statement at issue identifying the person driving by as the man who had attacked him the night before.

          That being the case, Moree's testimony concerning Hall's statements is within the present sense impression exception and, thus, is not inadmissible hearsay. Failure to object to admissible evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Lee v. State, 29 S.W.3d 570, 579–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.). Counsel's failure to object to this admissible testimony did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id.

          D.       Cumulative Testimony

          At trial, Moree also testified regarding what Hall said at the location of the crime:

I asked Steven to show me -- Mr. Hall to show me exactly where he was standing at or what had taken place. I stopped my car in the same location he said the suspect had stopped his car. They had gotten out to use the bathroom on the side of the road. Both of them got out of the driver's side, and the suspect cut his throat and he took off running.

Moree further testified regarding Hall's description of the interior of the vehicle driven by Mason before the attack:

He said that he had left a pair of sunglasses inside the car by the console, somewhere around the console area, a pair of gray sunglasses. There were [sic] no door, inside door panels on the door, and that the front windshield would be cracked.

          Moree testified as to Gill's out-of-court statements as well. Specifically, he testified concerning what she stated she saw on the night in question:

She did not see the cutting, no. All she saw was Hall running from the vehicle down the roadway, with Mr. Mason chasing him.

                     . . . .

That she saw Mr. Mason chasing Mr. Hall down the roadway while she was still sitting in the vehicle.

          The admission of improper evidence does not constitute reversible error when the same evidence is admitted through another without objection. See Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); East v. State, 702 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Even if evidence constitutes hearsay, the failure to object to its admission does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, if the testimony is cumulative in nature. See Darby v. State, 922 S.W.2d 614, 624 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd); Marlow v. State, 886 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd).

          These portions of Moree's testimony, as well as the previously discussed testimony concerning Hall's statement when Mason drove by, are cumulative of other admissible evidence. Specifically, evidence similar to Moree's testimony regarding Gill's description of the incident was later received through Gill's own testimony, a nonhearsay source. Additionally, Hall's testimony provided evidence consistent with Moree's testimony concerning Hall's description of the vehicle's interior. The allegedly inadmissible evidence was simply cumulative of admissible evidence and, as such, we are unable to conclude that, had trial counsel objected, the outcome of the trial would have differed. See In re AWT, 61 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.).

          Since most of Moree's testimony at issue concerns statements which are merely cumulative of other admissible evidence, trial counsel's failure to object to its admission, regardless of whether it was hearsay, did not render his performance below an objective standard of reasonableness.

II.       Conclusion

          Mason fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his trial counsel's performance was deficient. Trial counsel's failure to object to admissible evidence and to evidence properly admitted without objection does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

          We overrule Mason's sole point of error and affirm the judgment.

                                                                           Donald R. Ross

                                                                           Justice

Date Submitted:      June 10, 2004

Date Decided:         July 20, 2004

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