Christopher Thornton v. State of Rhode Island

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: 2022-0276-M.P.
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court

No. 2022-276-M.P. (WM 15-582)

Christopher Thornton :

v. :

State of Rhode Island. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This Court granted the state’s petition

for a writ of certiorari to review a Superior Court judgment partially granting

Christopher Thornton’s application for postconviction relief, thereby vacating his

convictions of felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury and witness

intimidation. The state submits that the hearing justice erred in granting Thornton

postconviction relief because Thornton’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing

the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in the state’s petition

should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral

submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown

and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the

reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the amended judgment of the Superior

-1- Court insofar as it vacated Thornton’s convictions for felony assault resulting in

serious bodily injury and witness intimidation.

I

Facts and Travel

In 1997, following a jury trial, Thornton was found guilty of (1) assault with

a dangerous weapon; (2) assault resulting in serious bodily injury; (3) violating a

no-contact order; (4) kidnapping; and (5) intimidating a witness. Thereafter,

Thornton was sentenced to serve (1) twenty years for assault with a dangerous

weapon; (2) twenty years for assault resulting in serious bodily injury; (3) ten years

for violating a no-contact order; (4) twenty years for kidnapping; and (5) five years

for intimidating a witness; all sentences to run consecutively. This Court upheld

these convictions in State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 2002). Thornton thrice

petitioned for, and was denied, postconviction relief. State v. Thornton, 68 A.3d 533,

536 (R.I. 2013).

On November 25, 2015, Thornton petitioned the Superior Court for

postconviction relief for the fourth time, raising numerous claims. On May 12, 2016,

the state was heard on its motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice indicated that she was concerned about

several issues that Thornton had raised. She appointed counsel for him and said she

-2- would defer on the state’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the state again filed a

motion to dismiss.

An evidentiary hearing eventually commenced in January 2020, at the

beginning of which the state renewed its motion to dismiss on the basis of res

judicata. The hearing justice granted the motion save for two issues—the failure to

instruct the jury regarding the definition of serious bodily injury and the alleged

failure of trial counsel to convey a plea offer. The hearing proceeded with respect

to those two issues. In December 2021 the hearing justice issued a bench decision.

She denied the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to convey a plea

offer, but she granted relief on Thornton’s claim that the trial justice failed to instruct

the jury on serious bodily injury.1 Consequently, she vacated his conviction on the

charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury.

After rendering her decision, the hearing justice indicated that she would

continue the matter for the parties to address additional issues. The state objected

and requested that the hearing justice “at some point issue a decision” on the issue

of res judicata.

1 For clarity, we use “hearing justice” to refer to the Superior Court justice who conducted hearings on Thornton’s applications for postconviction relief, and we use “trial justice” to refer to the Superior Court justice who presided over Thornton’s 1997 criminal trial.

-3- The matter next came before the Superior Court in July 2022, at which time

additional issues were addressed, including the alleged failure of the trial justice to

instruct the jury that felony assault should be considered a lesser-included offense

of assault with intent to murder, and the trial justice’s alleged deficient instructions

on witness intimidation. Ultimately, the hearing justice granted Thornton’s

application in part. She reprised her decision concerning the jury instructions on

serious bodily injury and found the instructions on witness intimidation to be

deficient. Consequently, she vacated Thornton’s convictions for assault resulting in

serious bodily injury and intimidating a witness. The hearing justice based her

decision to vacate these convictions on her finding that the trial justice had provided

the jury with inadequate instructions.

Before rendering her bench decision that vacated the conviction for assault

resulting in serious bodily injury, the hearing justice read aloud the trial justice’s

jury instructions. She subsequently held that:

“The trial justice completely omitted the statutory definition of serious bodily injury[.] * * * The omission of this mandatory definitional material, in said instructions, left the jurors to speculate and conjecture, in their own individual lay assessments, without any consistency or guide, as to what would constitute or could constitute serious bodily injury, which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the [c]ourt’s opinion, this omission is a fatal defect upon which the conviction cannot constitutionally rest; therefore, [Thornton]’s

-4- request for postconviction relief, as to Count [five], is granted.”

During the same hearing, the hearing justice granted Thornton’s application

for postconviction relief related to his conviction for witness intimidation, ruling:

“The trial justice completely omitted the definition of * * * criminal proceeding as provided in * * * Rhode Island General Laws 11-32-5 * * *. Once again, the jurors were left to determine, in their own individual mind, what might constitute a criminal proceeding. This omission and failure to instruct properly * * * is, likewise, in this [c]ourt’s estimation, a fatal error and cannot constitutionally support the conviction on Count [nine].”

An order entered on July 26, 2022, granting Thornton’s petition to vacate his

conviction as to assault resulting in serious bodily injury and witness intimidation.

His petition was denied as to assault with a dangerous weapon and ineffective

assistance of counsel. An amended judgment to that effect entered the same day.

Both parties petitioned for writs of certiorari. We denied Thornton’s petition on

October 13, 2023, and granted the state’s petition on October 16, 2023.

II

Standard of Review

“A party aggrieved by a final judgment entered in response to a

postconviction-relief application may seek review by filing a petition for writ of

certiorari.” LeFebvre v. State, 313 A.3d 1156, 1162 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Atryzek v.

State, 268 A.3d 37, 41 (R.I. 2022)). This Court’s “review of a case on certiorari is

-5- limited to an examination of the record to determine if an error of law has been

committed.” Id. (quoting Atryzek, 268 A.3d at 41). “In addition to examining the

record for judicial error,” this Court inspects “the record to discern if there is any

legally competent evidence to support the findings of the hearing justice below.” Id.

(quoting Atryzek, 268 A.3d at 41). “This Court will not disturb a trial justice’s

factual findings made on an application for post-conviction relief absent clear error

or a showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in

arriving at those findings.” Id. (quoting Atryzek, 268 A.3d at 41).

III

Discussion

Before this Court, the state argues that Thornton was precluded from bringing

his postconviction-relief claims before the Superior Court pursuant to the doctrine

of res judicata. The state submits that the hearing justice “should have summarily

denied each claim based on the doctrine of res judicata codified in [G.L. 1956]

§ 10-9.1-8.”

Section 10-9.1-8 provides:

“All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he or she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised in his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken

-6- to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of justice the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground for relief.”

This Court has previously held that Ҥ 10-9.1-8 codifies the doctrine of res judicata

for postconviction-relief applications.” Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110, 1112 (R.I.

2007). Furthermore, “[§] 10-9.1-8 provides a procedural bar not only to issues that

have been raised and decided in a previous postconviction-relief proceeding, but also

to ‘the []litigation of any issue that could have been litigated in a prior proceeding,

even if the particular issue was not raised.’” Ferrell v. Wall, 971 A.2d 615, 620 (R.I.

2009) (quoting Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1138 (R.I. 2001)). This Court has

further recognized that “any claim barred by res judicata is subject to summary

dismissal, ‘unless the court finds that in the interest of justice the applicant should

be permitted’ to pursue it.” Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 457 (R.I. 2012) (quoting

§ 10-9.1-8).

In the case at bar, the state argues that the interest-of-justice exception to our

well-settled postconviction-relief res judicata doctrine does not apply to Thornton.

Specifically, the state suggests that both claims granted by the Superior Court do not

“involve newly discovered evidence or actual innocence.” The state correctly points

out that this Court has “applied the doctrine of res judicata to bar postconviction

relief arguments regarding faulty or otherwise improper jury instructions.” (Citing

-7- Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 672 (R.I. 2010); Perez v. State, 57 A.3d 677, 682 (R.I.

2013).)

In response, Thornton contends that the interest-of-justice exception applies

to his claims because he is a pro se litigant, and his previous appointed counsel did

not raise the issue of faulty jury instructions for the counts at issue in this case and,

instead, submitted Shatney2 memoranda to highlight the weakness in his pro se

claims. Thornton observes that Shatney memoranda are no longer permitted in

Rhode Island criminal proceedings, as this Court abrogated Shatney in Motyka v.

State, 172 A.3d 1203 (R.I. 2017). Thornton further argues that the hearing justice

did not err in vacating the two convictions at issue in this case because “it is the

hearing justice that is best situated to identify when a prior injustice rises to the level

of good cause to invoke the exception of the res judicata doctrine, and nothing about

this case suggests that she failed to fully consider all relevant factors.”

In her bench decision, the hearing justice granted part of Thornton’s

application for postconviction relief without addressing the res judicata arguments

presented by the state. The hearing justice, therefore, did not address whether

Thornton’s claims fit within the interest-of-justice exception to the general res

judicata rule that would render Thornton’s claims barred.

2 Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).

-8- Our review of the record reveals that Thornton’s claims were statutorily

barred by the doctrine of res judicata as set forth in § 10-9.1-8. Indeed, “[t]his Court

repeatedly has said that the doctrine of res judicata ‘provides a procedural bar not

only to issues that have been raised and decided in a previous postconviction-relief

proceeding, but also to the []litigation of any issue that could have been litigated in

a prior proceeding, even if the particular issue was not raised.’” Mattatall v. State,

126 A.3d 480, 481 (R.I. 2015) (mem.) (quoting Ferrell, 971 A.2d at 620). The

language of § 10-9.1-8 is clear. In a postconviction-relief context, “[a]ll grounds for

relief * * * must be raised in [an] original, or a supplemental or amended,

application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised * * * may not be the

basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of justice

the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground for relief.” Section

10-9.1-8.

Therefore, in order to survive preclusion by res judicata, Thornton’s claims

must fall within the interest-of-justice exception. Based upon our review of the

hearing justice’s decision, it does not appear that she addressed the doctrine of res

judicata, or whether Thornton’s claims may be excused therefrom in the interest of

justice. This Court has held:

“Under § 10-9.1-8, an applicant is permitted to assert an otherwise estopped ground for relief only if it is in the ‘interest of justice.’ Although the term ‘interest of justice’

-9- can be defined only upon a review of the facts in a particular case, there nevertheless must be some sufficient finding, articulation, or explanation by the motion justice that an issue barred by the doctrine of res judicata merits consideration in the interest of justice.” Ferrell, 971 A.2d at 621.

Consequently, without explanation of why Thornton’s claims may survive res

judicata in the interest of justice, we hold that the hearing justice erred in granting

postconviction relief on the counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and

witness intimidation. Furthermore, we glean nothing in the record to support

Thornton’s argument that, pursuant to the interest of justice, his claims should not

be barred by res judicata.

Although “[t]his Court never has definitively construed the phrase ‘interest of

justice’ as it is used in § 10-9.1-8 * * * it is apparent that applicant has not

demonstrated that the interest of justice requires this Court to revisit an issue that

applicant could have raised in his first application for postconviction relief.” Ferrell,

971 A.2d at 621. Here, “[w]e are not confronted with a case of actual innocence or

newly discovered evidence.” Miguel v. State, 924 A.2d 3, 5 (R.I. 2007) (mem.). Nor

do we accept Thornton’s proffered reason that the failure to raise the issue in

previous postconviction-relief petitions was the fault “of the no-merit Shatney

memos.” In this case, no compelling reason is found to except Thornton’s claims

from the doctrine of res judicata in the interest of justice. See Ramirez, 933 A.2d at

- 10 - 1112 (“[The applicant] raised claims for the first time in his third

postconviction-relief application, yet he provided scant reason why such arguments

could not have been raised in either his first or second application. * * * We are

satisfied * * * that § 10-9.1-8 bars consideration of his new claims.”). As such,

because the interest-of-justice exception does not save Thornton’s claims, they

should have been precluded from the proceeding before the Superior Court.

IV

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we quash the portions of the Superior Court

amended judgment that vacated Thornton’s convictions for felony assault resulting

in serious bodily injury and witness intimidation. The papers in this case may be

remanded to that tribunal.

- 11 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Christopher Thornton v. State of Rhode Island.

No. 2022-276-M.P. Case Number (WM 15-582)

Date Opinion Filed April 1, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melanie Wilk Thunberg

For State:

Judy Davis Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General For Respondent:

Kara Hoopis Manosh, Esq.