Christopher Poller v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 18, 1999
• Docket: 03-98-00180-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

---

NO. 03-98-00180-CR Christopher Poller, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. 497605, HONORABLE WILFRED AGUILAR, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury found appellant Christopher Poller guilty of driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 1999). The trial court sentenced appellant to 240 days in jail and suspended his driver's license for two years. In his first point of error, appellant complains that at the hearing on his motion to suppress, the trial court improperly admitted evidence showing there was probable cause appellant was intoxicated. Appellant asserts that the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the intoxication issue because in an earlier license-revocation proceeding, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") had found no probable cause for intoxication. In his second point, appellant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the police arrested him illegally and without probable cause. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1997, off-duty sheriff's deputy John Lacaria received a complaint from a neighbor that an Isuzu Trooper had been parked in the middle of the street for about an hour, headlights on and engine running. Lacaria drove to where the car was parked and blocked the roadway to prevent the driver from fleeing. When he approached the car, Lacaria found appellant unconscious in the driver's seat, his head hanging out of the window, drooling profusely.

Lacaria tried to wake appellant, but without success. He turned off the engine of appellant's car, removed the keys, and asked the Sheriff's Department to contact the Austin Police Department. Officer Noel Guerin arrived within five minutes, and Lacaria told him what had happened. Officer Guerin first tried to wake appellant by tapping him on the shoulder. When that did not work, Officer Guerin broke an ammonia capsule under appellant's nose. Appellant finally awoke after the officer used his knuckle to apply pressure to appellant's chest. Officer Guerin testified he noticed a "moderate" odor of alcohol coming from the car.

Once conscious, appellant become combative and tried to put the car in gear and drive away. Officer Guerin cuffed one of appellant's hands and pulled him out of the car. Appellant stumbled and tried to walk away as the officer cuffed the other hand. When the officer searched appellant's car, he found an open wine cooler bottle. Another witness testified he had seen appellant walk into a neighbor's house carrying a large case of beer. Officer Guerin did not conduct any field sobriety tests.

An administrative hearing pertaining to a revocation of appellant's driver's license was held on August 28, 1997. The ALJ who presided over that hearing found by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no probable cause to believe appellant was intoxicated and allowed appellant to keep his driver's license. Seven months later, in a criminal proceeding, a jury convicted appellant of driving while intoxicated. As punishment, the court suspended appellant's driver's license for two years and sentenced him to 240 days in jail.

Appellant complains on appeal that collateral estoppel prohibited the State from re-litigating the probable cause for intoxication issue at his criminal trial. He also contends the police lacked probable cause to arrest him for DWI and claims that the "fruits" of the illegal arrest should not have been allowed into evidence.

DISCUSSION

Appellant's points of error are not properly before this Court because they have not been preserved for appellate review. Although the reporter's record indicates appellant filed two motions to suppress, neither of these motions is in the appellate record. We therefore cannot determine what evidence appellant asked the trial court to suppress. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Moreover, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine requires appellant to identify what evidence was seized because of his illegal arrest and how that evidence was used at trial. See Gonzales v. State, 977 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. filed). Because appellant failed to identify the "fruits" of the alleged illegal arrest, we need not reach the merits of appellant's points of error. Id. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, we would still overrule both points of error for the reasons set forth below.

Appellant's first point of error argues that collateral estoppel prohibits the State from litigating probable cause for intoxication because an ALJ had previously found no probable cause to find appellant intoxicated. When reviewing the trial court's decision to apply collateral estoppel, the standard of review is de novo. See State v. Anderson, 974 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Appellant cites us to State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), where the court of criminal appeals held that the State is allowed to relitigate issues of probable cause for arrest in a criminal proceeding even though the same issue had been decided in a prior administrative hearing. Id. at 185. The court explained that when Brabson was arrested in 1992, former article 6701l-5 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes gave an ALJ authority to decide probable cause for intoxication but did not give the ALJ authority to decide issues of probable cause for arrest. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 184; Act of June 7, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 709, § 2, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 2340, 2342 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701l-5, § 2, since repealed and codified at Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048). Because the probable cause for arrest issue was not properly before the ALJ, the court held that collateral estoppel did not apply. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185.

To support his contention, appellant attempts to distinguish the facts in the instant case from those in Brabson. Here, appellant argues, the ALJ found there was no probable cause that appellant was intoxicated. Because the intoxication ruling falls under the ALJ's statutory authority, appellant reasons, collateral estoppel can be applied. See former Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701l-5, § 2.

Although appellant's logic may be sound, he overlooks the fact that article 6701l-5 was repealed in 1995 and was no longer in force when he was arrested in 1997. The legislature replaced article 6701l-5 with section 724.048 of the Transportation Code, which reads as follows:

(a) The determination of the department or administrative law judge:

(1) is a civil matter;

(2) is independent of and is not an estoppel as to any matter in issue in an adjudication of a criminal charge arising from the occurrence that is the basis for the suspension or denial; and

(3) does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.048 (West 1999). Section 724.048 clearly states that an ALJ ruling does not preclude subsequent criminal litigation of any issue determined in an administrative hearing. Because section 724.048 was in effect when appellant was arrested in 1997, that provision is controlling. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 185 n.6; Dodson v. State, 969 S.W.2d 117, 118-19 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). We therefore conclude the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress despite the ALJ's ruling of no probable cause for intoxication. ⁽¹⁾ Even if properly preserved, appellant's first point of error is overruled.

Appellant's second point of error contends his original motion to suppress should have been granted because the police arrested him illegally and without probable cause. The standard of review for a trial court's determination of probable cause is de novo. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We will therefore defer to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but decide anew whether probable cause existed, which requires that we focus on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87; Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

A police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant if he has trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999). The officer is not required to see every element of an offense before making an arrest. See Astran v. State, 799 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). He may rely on statements and observations from other people, including lay witnesses, to determine probable cause. Id.

Appellant argues that the circumstances in this case are insufficient to support probable cause for driving while intoxicated because Officer Guerin did not see him drive the car or ascertain that he had been drinking. This Court has rejected the contention that an officer must personally see a DWI suspect driving a vehicle to establish probable cause. See Elliott v. State, 908 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. ref'd); Pope v. State, 802 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no pet.). We must therefore decide whether the remaining circumstances support a finding of probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI. We conclude they do.

First, Officer Guerin had reliable information from Lacaria, the off-duty sheriff's deputy, that appellant had been operating a vehicle. Lacaria found appellant's car in the middle of a public street, with appellant passed out in the driver's seat and the engine running. Lacaria testified the engine was racing at times, which indicates appellant may have had his foot on the gas pedal. Lacaria, who had investigated DWIs "many times," blocked appellant's car with his own to prevent appellant from "running me down if it were a drunk driver." We are satisfied that, taken together, the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant was operating a motor vehicle. ⁽²⁾ See Pope, 802 S.W.2d at 420; State v. Savage, 905 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no pet.).

We are equally persuaded that probable cause for intoxication existed. When Lacaria found appellant, he was unconscious and drooling. Both Lacaria and Officer Guerin had trouble waking appellant, even after opening an ammonia capsule under his nose. There was a "moderate" odor of alcohol coming from the car. One witness testified he saw appellant carry a case of beer into a neighbor's house earlier that evening. It is clear that this circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable person to believe appellant was intoxicated. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413.

With respect to the legality of appellant's warrantless arrest, we note that when Officer Guerin finally woke appellant, appellant immediately tried to put the car in gear and drive away. This alone, under Elliott, indicates that appellant could have been a danger to himself or to others, which would justify a warrantless arrest for public intoxication. See Elliott, 908 S.W.2d at 592. We therefore conclude that appellant's arrest was not illegal. See id.; Porter v. State, 969 S.W.2d 60, 64-65 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. ref'd). Appellant's second point of error, even if properly preserved, is overruled.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant's two points of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

J. Woodfin Jones, Justice

Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel

Affirmed

Filed: March 18, 1999

Do Not Publish

1. Appellant also argues that the Department of Public Safety and the District Attorney's office are not in privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel and asks us to ignore Brabson in favor of older cases that support his position. Because we find section 724.048 controlling, we do not reach these issues.

2. We are mindful that other courts have sometimes held that finding a person unconscious in the driver's seat with the engine running is insufficient to prove he was operating the motor vehicle. See Ballard v. State, 757 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd); Reddie v. State, 736 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1987, pet. ref'd). In those cases, appellants complained there was insufficient evidence to support their DWI convictions because they were found asleep behind the wheel of their vehicles. Here, however, appellant is not complaining that there was insufficient evidence to support his DWI conviction; he is merely challenging the evidence that supports probable cause for his arrest. As we pointed out earlier, a police officer has probable cause if he can show he possessed knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to believe someone has committed or is committing a crime. We are satisfied this burden has been met.

.2d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). He may rely on statements and observations from other people, including lay witnesses, to determine probable cause. Id.

Appellant argues that the circumstances in this case are insufficient to support probable cause for driving while intoxicated because Officer Guerin did not see him drive the car or ascertain that he had been drinking. This Court has rejected the contention that an officer must personally see a DWI suspect driving a vehicle to establish probable cause. See Elliott v. State, 908 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. ref'd); Pope v. State, 802 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, no pet.). We must therefore decide whether the remaining circumstances support a finding of probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI. We conclude they do.

First, Officer Guerin had reliable information from Lacaria, the off-duty sheriff's deputy, that appellant had been operating a vehicle. Lacaria found appellant's car in the middle of a public street, with appellant passed out in the driver's seat and the engine running. Lacaria testified the engine was racing at times, which indicates appellant may have had his foot on the gas pedal. Lacaria, who had investigated DWIs "many times," blocked appellant's car with his own to prevent appellant from "running me down if it were a drunk driver." We are satisfied that, taken together, the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant was operating a motor vehicle. ⁽²⁾ See Pope, 802 S.W.2d at 420; State v. Savage, 905 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, no pet.).

We are equally persuaded that probable cause for intoxication existed. When Lacaria found appellant, he was unconscious and drooling. Both Lacaria and Officer Guerin had trouble waking appellant, even after opening an ammonia capsule under his nose. There was a "moderate" odor of alcohol coming from the car. One witness testified he saw appellant carry a case of beer into a neighbor's house earlier that evening. It is clear that this circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable person to believe appellant was intoxicated. See Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413.

With respect to the legality of appellant's warrantless arrest, we note that when Officer Guerin finally woke appellant, appellant immediately tried to put the car in gear and drive away. This alone, under Elliott, indicates that appellant could have been a danger to himself or to others, which would justify a warrantless arrest for public intoxication. See Elliott, 908 S.W.2d at 592. We therefore conclude that appellant's arrest was not illegal. See id.; Porter v. State, 969 S.W.2d 60, 64-65 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. ref'd). Appellant's second point of error, even if properly preserved, is overruled.

We overrule appellant's two points of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1. Appellant also argues that the Department of Public Safety and the District Attorney's office are not in privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel and asks us to ignore Brabson in favor of older cases that support his position. Because we find section 724.048 controlling, we do not reach these issues.

2. We are mindful that other courts have sometimes held that finding a person unconscious in the driver's seat with the engine running is insufficient to prove he was operating the motor