Christopher Mark Wall v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 8, 2024
Docket02-22-00173-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Christopher Mark Wall v. the State of Texas (Christopher Mark Wall v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Mark Wall v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-22-00173-CR ___________________________

CHRISTOPHER MARK WALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court Parker County, Texas Trial Court No. CR17-0896

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

In November 2017, Appellant Christopher Mark Wall killed two women—

Ashley Pohorence and Krista McClellan—by shooting them during the same criminal

transaction after they made him a victim of their “sextortion” scheme. 1 He pleaded

not guilty—relying on self-defense and defense of another (his then-fourteen-year-old

daughter K.W. 2) as justifications—but a jury found him guilty and convicted him of

capital murder,3 and the trial court sentenced him to confinement for life without

parole. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (stating that a person commits

capital murder if he murders more than one person during the same criminal

transaction); see also id. § 12.31(a)(2) (stating that an individual adjudged guilty of a

capital felony in a case in which the State does not seek the death penalty shall be

punished by imprisonment for life without parole if he committed the offense when

he was at least 18 years old). In five issues, Wall challenges the sufficiency of the

1 “Sextortion,” also known as “trick-rolling,” occurs when a perpetrator poses as a prostitute to extort money “out of [the trick] by telling [him] the horrible things that are going to happen if [he doesn’t] pay up in the form of telling [his] spouse[ or] telling [his] employer” about his attempt to hire a prostitute. 2 Because K.W. was a minor at the time of the offense, we refer to her by her initials. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3). 3 The three-count indictment alleged capital murder in the first count as to the shootings of Pohorence and McClellan in the same criminal transaction. The second count alleged Pohorence’s murder, and the third count alleged McClellan’s murder.

2 evidence to support his conviction and punishment, embedding two unpreserved

defensive jury-charge issues—mistake-of-fact and sudden passion—within his

evidentiary challenges.4 Because the evidence is sufficient to support Wall’s

conviction, and because he did not preserve his mistake-of-fact complaint and was

not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

II. Sufficiency

We combine our evidentiary review with our analysis to avoid repetition.

A. Standard of review and applicable law

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The factfinder

4 In his first and second issues, Wall contends that the evidence is insufficient because he had a reasonable but mistaken belief about matters of fact that negated his culpability. In his third and fourth issues, he asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense or in defense of K.W. And in his fifth issue, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support capital murder because he acted with sudden passion, which he asserts should have reduced the jury’s finding to that of second-degree murder.

3 alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We may not

re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the

factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. We must presume that the factfinder

resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that

resolution. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

To convict Wall of capital murder, the jury had to determine beyond a

reasonable doubt that—in the same criminal transaction—he had intentionally or

knowingly caused the deaths of Pohorence and McClellan by shooting them with a

firearm. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A). The jury also had to determine

that his actions were not in self-defense or in the defense of others. See Saxton v. State,

804 S.W.2d 910, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that self-defense is a fact

issue for the jury).

Under the Penal Code, a person is justified in using force against another

“when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately

necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful

force.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a). An actor’s belief is presumed to be reasonable

if the actor knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was

used: (A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and

with force, the actor’s occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or

employment; (B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove

4 unlawfully and with force, the actor from his habitation, vehicle, or place of business

or employment; or (C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated

kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated

robbery. Id. § 9.31(a)(1)(A)–(C). Otherwise, the Penal Code defines “reasonable

belief” as “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same

circumstances as the actor.” Id. § 1.07(a)(42).

To justify the use of deadly force, the actor not only must be justified in using

force against the other under Section 9.31 but also must reasonably believe that deadly

force is immediately necessary to protect the actor from another’s use or attempted

use of unlawful deadly force or to prevent the other’s imminent commission of

aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or

aggravated robbery. Id. § 9.32(a); Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). Like with the use of nondeadly force, the actor’s belief of immediate necessity

is presumed to be reasonable if the actor knew or had reason to believe that the

person against whom the deadly force was used had done one of the actions listed

above, did not provoke the person against whom the force was used, and was not

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Related

Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Valtierra v. State
310 S.W.3d 442 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Wesbrook v. State
29 S.W.3d 103 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Saxton v. State
804 S.W.2d 910 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Zuliani v. State
97 S.W.3d 589 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Mays v. State
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Posey v. State
966 S.W.2d 57 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Thomas Lester Harper v. State
508 S.W.3d 461 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2015)
Vega, Jose Luis Jr.
394 S.W.3d 514 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2013)
Braughton, Christopher Ernest
569 S.W.3d 592 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2018)
Francisco Flores v. State
573 S.W.3d 864 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2019)
Henley v. State
493 S.W.3d 77 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2016)
Gaona v. State
498 S.W.3d 706 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2016)
Queeman v. State
520 S.W.3d 616 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2017)
Rodriguez v. State
538 S.W.3d 623 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2018)

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