1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHRISTOPHER LEE WELCH, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02732-RBM-MSB
8 Plaintiff, ORDER: 9 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 10 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA COURT, et al., 11 PAUPERIS [Doc. 2] Defendants. 12 (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT 13 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 14 15 16 On October 15, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Lee Welch (“Plaintiff”) filed a 17 Complaint (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees 18 or Costs (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion 19 (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 A motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) presents two issues for the Court’s 22 consideration. First, the Court must determine whether an applicant properly shows an 23 inability to pay the $4051 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants typically must pay an additional 27 administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); United States Courts, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2023), 28 1 1915(a). An applicant must provide the Court with a signed affidavit “that includes a 2 statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or give security.” 3 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether 4 an applicant’s complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 5 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires 6 a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). The Court 7 addresses each issue in turn. 8 A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application 9 An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately 10 prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 11 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 12 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 13 Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 14 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (an adequate affidavit should state supporting facts “with some 15 particularity, definiteness and certainty”) (citation omitted). No exact formula is “set forth 16 by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP 17 status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on 18 a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of 19 “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 20 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based 21 upon available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 22 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 23 Here, Plaintiff represents that he is experiencing homelessness and “live[s] in a San 24 Diego shelter with no income.” (Doc. 2 at 5.) He represents in his IFP Motion that he 25 receives $294 a month in public assistance, but otherwise has no income or assets. (Id. at 26 27 However, the additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 1–4.) Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee and “still 2 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citation omitted). The Court 3 therefore exercises its discretion and GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. 4 B. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 5 Every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject 6 to mandatory screening by the Court under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 7 Under this provision, the Court must dismiss complaints that are (1) frivolous or malicious, 8 (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seek monetary relief from 9 defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 10 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 11 jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 12 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2). “The standard for determining whether a 13 plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 14 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 15 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 16 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 17 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 18 (quotation omitted). “[O]ur ‘obligation’ remains, ‘where the petitioner is pro se, . . . to 19 construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” 20 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 21 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, the Court may not “supply essential elements 22 of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 23 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 1. The Complaint 25 Plaintiff brings his Complaint against the United States Supreme Court, the State of 26 Texas, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of 27 Justice, and the State of Georgia. (See Doc. 1 at 1–3.) He alleges that “Federalism from 28 Texas-Georgia urged the capital to inadvertently allow small, steady growing extremist 1 factions to extort and exert their own agendas on the Native population, some of them 2 weaponized enough to extract natural resources such as oil, silver, copper, leather, tobacco, 3 gaming, gold, iron and more.” (Id. at 6.) He asks that the Court “investigate active counter 4 Constitution members enforcing open-air prison and cognitive prison operations on tribal 5 lands” and “prosecute members under Crimes Against the United States Constitution and 6 Conspiracy to Overthrow the United States Government impairing her Rights of Defense 7 against domestic terrorists and/or land piracy.” (Id.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHRISTOPHER LEE WELCH, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02732-RBM-MSB
8 Plaintiff, ORDER: 9 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 10 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA COURT, et al., 11 PAUPERIS [Doc. 2] Defendants. 12 (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT 13 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 14 15 16 On October 15, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Lee Welch (“Plaintiff”) filed a 17 Complaint (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees 18 or Costs (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion 19 (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 20 I. DISCUSSION 21 A motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) presents two issues for the Court’s 22 consideration. First, the Court must determine whether an applicant properly shows an 23 inability to pay the $4051 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants typically must pay an additional 27 administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); United States Courts, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2023), 28 1 1915(a). An applicant must provide the Court with a signed affidavit “that includes a 2 statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or give security.” 3 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether 4 an applicant’s complaint sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 5 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires 6 a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). The Court 7 addresses each issue in turn. 8 A. Plaintiff’s IFP Application 9 An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately 10 prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 11 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 12 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 13 Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see also United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 14 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (an adequate affidavit should state supporting facts “with some 15 particularity, definiteness and certainty”) (citation omitted). No exact formula is “set forth 16 by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP 17 status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on 18 a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of 19 “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 20 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based 21 upon available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 22 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 23 Here, Plaintiff represents that he is experiencing homelessness and “live[s] in a San 24 Diego shelter with no income.” (Doc. 2 at 5.) He represents in his IFP Motion that he 25 receives $294 a month in public assistance, but otherwise has no income or assets. (Id. at 26 27 However, the additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 1 1–4.) Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee and “still 2 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citation omitted). The Court 3 therefore exercises its discretion and GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. 4 B. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 5 Every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject 6 to mandatory screening by the Court under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 7 Under this provision, the Court must dismiss complaints that are (1) frivolous or malicious, 8 (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seek monetary relief from 9 defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 10 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 11 jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 12 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2). “The standard for determining whether a 13 plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 14 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for 15 failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 16 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 17 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 18 (quotation omitted). “[O]ur ‘obligation’ remains, ‘where the petitioner is pro se, . . . to 19 construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” 20 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 21 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, the Court may not “supply essential elements 22 of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 23 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 1. The Complaint 25 Plaintiff brings his Complaint against the United States Supreme Court, the State of 26 Texas, the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of 27 Justice, and the State of Georgia. (See Doc. 1 at 1–3.) He alleges that “Federalism from 28 Texas-Georgia urged the capital to inadvertently allow small, steady growing extremist 1 factions to extort and exert their own agendas on the Native population, some of them 2 weaponized enough to extract natural resources such as oil, silver, copper, leather, tobacco, 3 gaming, gold, iron and more.” (Id. at 6.) He asks that the Court “investigate active counter 4 Constitution members enforcing open-air prison and cognitive prison operations on tribal 5 lands” and “prosecute members under Crimes Against the United States Constitution and 6 Conspiracy to Overthrow the United States Government impairing her Rights of Defense 7 against domestic terrorists and/or land piracy.” (Id. at 9.) He also requests that the Court 8 “persecute Project 2025 to the full extent of Universal Law by barring access to powers, 9 freezing assets and holding its authors and enforcers in universal containment,” and “order 10 Native Reservations be incorporated municipalities with federally subsidized start-up 11 funding of $30m–$3.9B per Incorporation.” (Id.) 12 2. Failure to State a Claim 13 “By any measure, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain ‘a short and plain statement’ 14 of either the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction or Plaintiff’s claim for relief. Plaintiff’s 15 [Complaint] is rambling, disjointed, nearly impossible to follow, and rife with legal 16 conclusions.” De La Hoz v. Gov’t of the United States, CASE NO. C18-1370JLR, 2018 17 WL 4773407, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2018). The Court cannot infer the nature of the 18 dispute or any specific claim against any of the Defendants. (See Doc. 1 at 9 (alleging only 19 that the Court “prosecute members under Crimes Against the United States Constitution”).) 20 Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” against any 21 of the Defendants. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 22 3. Defendants Immune from Suit 23 The Court also has concerns regarding Defendants’ immunities from suit. First, the 24 states of Texas and Georgia may be immune from suit. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. 25 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 833 F.2d 200, 203–04 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that, with limited 26 exceptions, “[t]he eleventh amendment, by its terms, prohibits suits brought against a state 27 by a citizen of another state,” and that the “Supreme Cout has held that the amendment also 28 prohibits suits against a state by citizens of the state sued”) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 1 1, 10 (1890)). Second, the federal government may be immune from suit. See FDIC 2 ||v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the 3 || Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”) Third, the United States Supreme Court 4 ||may be immune from suit. See Christ v. Hixson, Case No. 3:22-cv-02401-LB, Case No. 5 ||3:22-cv-02404-LB, Case No. 3:22-cv-02407-LB, 2022 WL 21768595, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 6 29, 2022) (“the claims against the Supreme Court are barred by absolute judicial 7 ||immunity”). If he chooses to file an amended Complaint, Plaintiff must either sue 8 Defendants not immune from suit or demonstrate why the Defendants at issue are not 9 ||immune from suit. See Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 10 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit because 11 of the defendants enjoy immunity from this suit’). 12 I. CONCLUSION 13 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and 14 || Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an 15 ||amended Complaint that addresses the deficiencies above on or before July 10, 2026. If 16 || Plaintiff declines to file an amended Complaint, his case may be closed. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || DATE: June 3, 2026 ee Racial, Martins □ 0 ON. RUTH BERM@BDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28