Christopher King, J.d., V. Black Excellence In Cannabis
This text of Christopher King, J.d., V. Black Excellence In Cannabis (Christopher King, J.d., V. Black Excellence In Cannabis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D. A/K/A KINGCAST, No. 85326-1-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION BLACK EXCELLENCE IN CANNABIS, PETER MANNING, and MIKE ASAI,
Respondents.
MANN, J. — Christopher King appeals the superior court’s order dismissing his
complaint against Peter Manning, Mike Asai, and Black Excellence in Cannabis. We
affirm.
I
In 2022, King filed an amended complaint in King County Superior Court against
Manning, Asai, and Black Excellence in Cannabis, for “unlawful filing and use of a
nonprofit corporation” and defamation. King alleged that Manning and Asai licensed
Black Excellence in Cannabis with the Washington Secretary of State in summer 2022, No. 85326-1-I/2
without the knowledge or permission of Black Excellence in Cannabis’s original founder
Aaron Barfield. 1
King first moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Manning from
misappropriating the good will of Black Excellence in Cannabis. The superior court
denied King’s motion because King failed to establish standing to seek the requested
injunction and failed to show that he personally had a legal or equitable right in the
organization.
Manning then moved to dismiss the complaint under CR 12(b)(6) asserting that
King did not possess standing either as an individual or as a derivative action on behalf
of the nonprofit entity because King sought to protect the alleged property of a third
party, not his own. In response, King asserted that he had standing as a taxpayer and
as a member of Black Excellence in Cannabis.
The superior court agreed with Manning and granted the motion to dismiss. The
superior court also denied King’s oral request for leave to amend the complaint because
the “new claims are markedly different than those asserted herein.” However, the
superior court wrote on the order that King “may pursue new litigation/legal causes of
action as warranted.”
King appeals. 2
1 King only provided this court with his first amended complaint filed November 8, 2022. 2 Respondents filed a declaration in lieu of a response brief opting to stand on the existing record
and asserting “[i]n the absence of clear error on the part of the trial court, there is no justifiable cause to remand this case for further proceedings.” We accepted the declaration as the respondents’ brief in this matter.
-2- No. 85326-1-I/3
II
King asserts that the superior court erred by failing to allow him to amend his
complaint for the second time.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to amend pleadings for an abuse of
discretion. Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Glob. Nw. Ltd., 105 Wn.2d 878, 888, 719 P.2d 120
(1986). CR 15(a) provides that “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” See Caruso v. Loc. Union No. 690 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 100
Wn.2d 343, 349, 670 P.2d 240 (1983) (leave to amend should be freely given “‘except
where prejudice to the opposing party would result’” (quoting United States v. Hougham,
364 U.S. 310, 316, 81 S. Ct. 13, 5 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1960))). The court may consider such
factors as delay. Caruso, 100 Wn.2d at 349.
However, “[i]f a party moves to amend a pleading, a copy of the proposed
amended pleading, denominated ‘proposed’ and unsigned, shall be attached to the
motion.” CR 15(a). The word “shall” is presumptively imperative and operates to create
a duty. Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O’Neal, 100 Wn.2d 256, 261, 668 P.2d 585 (1983).
“Both the opposing party and the court have a legitimate need to see the proposed
amended pleading in order to address and assess relevant issues of prejudice and
futility.” Hook v. Lincoln County Noxious Weed Control Bd., 166 Wn. App. 145, 159,
269 P.3d 1056 (2012).
-3- No. 85326-1-I/4
King neither filed a motion for leave to amend nor provided a proposed amended
complaint as required by CR 15(a). Instead, he orally requested to amend his complaint
at the hearing to dismiss his complaint. 3,4
King’s failure to provide the amended complaint required by CR 15(a) alone was
a sufficient basis for denying the motion. The superior court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
3 King did not provide a verbatim report of this hearing for our review. The superior court’s written order incorporated “reasons stated on the record.” 4 In King’s response to the respondents’ motion to dismiss, King stated, “[i]f necessary Plaintiff
will Amend the Complaint to properly Summons the Secretary of State.” While this may have notified Respondents that King might seek leave to amend the complaint, it was not a motion, nor did it provide the court and respondents an opportunity to “address and assess relevant issues of prejudice and futility.” Hook, 166 Wn. App. at 159. Further, it is not the same argument that King asserts on appeal: that King should have been allowed to amend the complaint “to place him as [a Black Excellence in Cannabis] member plaintiff as opposed to a taxpayer Plaintiff.”
-4-
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