Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate v. NEWREZ LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedApril 10, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-00553
StatusUnknown

This text of Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate v. NEWREZ LLC (Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate v. NEWREZ LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate v. NEWREZ LLC, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate, et al., No. CV-24-00553-TUC-JCH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 NEWREZ LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff's Notice of Removal for Pima County Superior Court 16 Case No. C-20244301. Doc. 1. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny the 17 request for a Temporary Restraining Order, deny the request for Waiver of Fees, deny as 18 moot Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4), remand this action to Pima County Superior 19 Court, and issue a warning to Plaintiff. 20 I. Temporary Restraining Order 21 Plaintiff requests an "immediate Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 22 enjoining the defendants from engaging in any further unlawful practices as described in 23 the complaint." Doc. 1 at 5. To qualify for a temporary restraining order, the moving party 24 must demonstrate either (1) a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of 25 irreparable harm, or (2) that the lawsuit raises serious questions and the balance of hardship 26 tips sharply in the movant's favor. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1102 27 (9th Cir. 1986). Neither factor is met here. The entirety of the allegations against the 28 defendants are that they "engaged in actions that constitute violations of federal law," 1 including "fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contracts." Doc. 1 at 3. Such vague 2 and conclusory legal statements fall far short of the specificity required for a TRO. See 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)–(d). Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's request for a TRO. 4 II. Request for Waiver of Fees 5 Plaintiff requests that no court fees or costs be imposed on him in connection with 6 this action because he is "a Private Attorney General pursuing a case in the public interest." 7 Doc. 1 at 4. It is not apparent from Plaintiff's filings that this action is brought for public 8 good rather than Plaintiff's personal benefit. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 9 390 U.S. 400, 405 (1968). Neither did Plaintiff submit "an affidavit that includes a 10 statement of all assets" to support an application to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(a). Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff's request for Waiver of Fees. 12 III. Remand 13 A civil action originally brought in state court, but over which a federal court would 14 have original jurisdiction, "may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 15 district court . . . for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 16 pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). As the Court previously1 informed 17 Plaintiff, only a defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court. The reason 18 for this is simple: it is entirely within a plaintiff's control where he chooses to file a lawsuit. 19 If a plaintiff intends for his case to be heard in federal court, he should file it in federal 20 court at the outset. Plaintiff's ill-advised attempts to work around this simple procedural 21 rule are needlessly plugging up the dockets in state and federal court. Because a plaintiff 22 cannot remove his own case, the Court will remand this matter to the Pima County Superior 23 Court. 24 Prior to the Court screening Plaintiff's Complaint and request to proceed in forma 25 pauperis, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4). Because this case will be 26 remanded, the Court will deny as moot the Motion to Dismiss. 27

28 1 See Dismissal Order, Doc. 6 at 1, Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate et al v. Sharpe Opportunity Intermediate Trust et al., No. 4:24-CV-00543 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2025). 1 IV. Warning to Plaintiff 2 The right to access the courts is a cornerstone of the legal system and individuals 3 must be allowed a fair opportunity to present legitimate claims, regardless of how often 4 they litigate. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982). Additionally, the in forma 5 pauperis statute was designed to ensure indigent individuals have equal access to the 6 federal courts. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915). However, this access is not without limits: 7 regardless of financial status, no one has the right to misuse or exploit the judicial 8 system. Id. 9 A district court is empowered to enjoin litigants who have a history of abusive 10 litigation or who file frivolous lawsuits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). "A District Court not 11 only may, but should, protect its ability to carry out its constitutional functions against the 12 threat of onerous, multiplicitous, and baseless litigation." Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 13 729 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). Federal courts possess the inherent power "to regulate the 14 activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the 15 appropriate circumstances." Delong v. Hennesey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (e.g., 16 enjoining litigants from filing new actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). Such restrictions 17 are appropriate to further important judicial interests such as preserving the finality of 18 judgments, protecting defendants from unwarranted harassment, or maintaining order on 19 the Court's docket. See Oliver, 682 F.2d at 445 (3d Cir. 1982), (citing Clinton v. United 20 States, 297 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1961)). A persistent pattern of baseless and harassing 21 litigation may warrant an order restricting a litigant from filing additional complaints 22 without prior court approval. Id. at 446. 23 Before imposing such an order, the Court must (1) give the litigant notice and an 24 opportunity to be heard; (2) compile an adequate record; (3) make substantive findings of 25 frivolousness or harassment; and (4) narrowly tailor the order to the specific conduct at 26 issue. Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). 27 /// 28 /// 1 Plaintiff is familiar to this Court. Between 2014 and 2023, Plaintiff filed five 2 complaints, which were each dismissed for jurisdictional defects or for failure to state a 3 claim.2 Since September 27, 2024, Plaintiff has filed at least seven new complaints before 4 this Court.3 Including this matter, five have now been dismissed. The sixth and seventh 5 cases appear similarly fated. In addition to the complaints in these seven cases, Plaintiff 6 has also filed temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and various motions, 7 2 Nero v. USA, No. 4:14-CV-02169 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2014) (Court summarily dismissed 8 Plaintiff’s 85-page § 2255 motion to collaterally attack restitution order as plainly meritless); Nero et al. v. Seifert, No. 4:16-CV-00684 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2016) (Court 9 summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint attacking the government’s legitimate tax collection activity); Nero et al. v.

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Related

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.
390 U.S. 400 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Richard H. Clinton v. United States
297 F.2d 899 (Ninth Circuit, 1961)
In Re Lonzy Oliver. Appeal of Lonzy Oliver
682 F.2d 443 (Third Circuit, 1982)
The Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Joe Christie
812 F.2d 1097 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Justin Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles
761 F.3d 1057 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)

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Christopher Karls Sisneros Estate v. NEWREZ LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christopher-karls-sisneros-estate-v-newrez-llc-azd-2025.