Christopher Johnson v. Roger Goodell, Mark Davis, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01906
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 Case No.: 2:25-cv-01906-JAD-EJY 3 CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT 4 Plaintiff, AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE 5 v. 6 ROGER GOODELL, MARK DAVIS, et al., ECF No. 16 7 Defendants. 8 On 2/5/26, the magistrate judge entered this report and recommendation [ECF No. 16]: 9 The Court has before it Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”).1 ECF No. 15. 10 Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 11 York. ECF No. 1-1. The matter was transferred to the District of Nevada (ECF No. 3) before that 12 Complaint was screened. Plaintiff then filed his First Amended Complaint, which the Court 13 dismissed without prejudice, but with leave to amend on November 6, 2025. ECF No. 14. At the 14 same time the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was screened, Plaintiff’s application to proceed 15 in forma pauperis was granted. Id. This is Plaintiff’s third time attempting to plead a claim. The 16 Court screens the SAC below. 17 I. Screening Standard 18 Upon granting Plaintiff’s IFP application the Court must screen his SAC under 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915(e)(2). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that 20 are frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary 21 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 22 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 23 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court must dismiss a claim if the action “is frivolous or 24 malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against 25 a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing 26 a complaint for failure to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 27 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 1 the complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 2 that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 3 Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the Court treats all allegations of material fact stated in 4 the complaint as true, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 5 Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted 7 by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does 8 not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. 9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a 10 cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying 11 pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 12 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 13 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 14 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 15 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 16 states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 17 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 18 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 19 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 20 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 21 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 22 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 23 McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 II. Discussion 25 The SAC tells a story regarding Plaintiff’s pursuit of sponsoring and promoting a Las Vegas, 26 Nevada football bowl game that would highlight historically black colleges and universities 27 (“HBCU”). ECF No. 15. Plaintiff alleges that he first spoke to the president of the Las Vegas 1 sponsor and promote The Las Vegas HBCU.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff states he next spoke to Burke 2 Mangus (who is also not named as a Defendant and whose position is undefined) and “pitched … a 3 rematch of the ESPN [C]elebration Bowl.” Id. at 2. Thereafter, Plaintiff says he spoke with a variety 4 of individuals (one of whom is identified only by first name and others whose specific roles in 5 Plaintiff’s story are unclear) at unspecified times.2 Id. at 2-3. After speaking to and reaching out to 6 these various individuals, Plaintiff says “Steve Hill and The Raiders” stole his game and are 7 sponsoring the “Las Vegas HBCU Classic.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff says he tried to work out a marketing 8 deal with the Raiders (through Steve Hill and Justin Carley), but no deal was made and it may be no 9 responses to his communications were received. Id. Plaintiff makes vague reference to race and 10 “rogue owner[s] stealing intellectual property.” Id. Plaintiff attaches a cease and desist letter he 11 says was sent to Steve Hill at the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (the “LVCVA”), but 12 there is no evidence supporting this fact and the letter is unsigned. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also attaches 13 what may be emails and other electronic communications he sent to various individuals (id. at 6-13), 14 a newspaper article (id. at 15-16), and a document downloaded from the Nevada Secretary of State 15 business portal (id. at 17-18). 16 On the first page of the Plaintiff’s SAC he lists the National Football League (“NFL”), Roger 17 Goodell, the Las Vegas Raiders, Mark Davis, LVCVA, and Steve Hill as Defendants. Id. at 1. 18 Plaintiff identifies theft, copyright infringement, conspiracy, business sabotage, unethical behavior, 19 fraud, and wire fraud as his “Charges.” Id. Plaintiff mentions trademark infringement in his cease 20 and desist letter to Steve Hill. Id. at 5. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s SAC does he identify or tie the 21 elements of any cause of action to a specific Defendant. Id. at 1-19. There are no allegations 22 regarding the NFL, LVCVA, or Roger Goodell engaging in any specific wrongdoing. Id. 23 24 25 26 2 ECF No. 15 at 2 references Dan, Burke Magnus, Chris Wright, and Bill Hornbuckle who is the CEO of MGM 27 Resorts International. Plaintiff also states he sent a letter to the owner of the Las Vegas Raiders, Mark Davis. Id. On 1 a. Claims Against the NFL, LVCVA, and Roger Goodell Should Be Dismissed with Prejudice. 2 3 This is Plaintiff third attempt to plead a claim. Labeling or merely identifying causes of 4 action do not support a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Rule 8 of the 5 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to plead sufficient facts to give a defendant 6 fair notice of the claims against him and the grounds upon which it rests. Yamaguchi v. United States 7 Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). “[A] pleading 8 may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief.” Sherrell v. Bank of Am., 9 N.A., Case No. CV F 11-1785-LJO (JLT), 2011 WL 6749765, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011). While 10 a pro se plaintiff’s allegations are liberally construed, the plaintiff must still state sufficient facts to 11 establish a plausible claim. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, when 12 Plaintiff’s claims fail to put Defendants on notice of the wrongdoing in which they allegedly 13 engaged, Defendants are deprived of a meaningful ability to defend against the claims made. Benitez 14 v.Schumacher, Case No. 2:20-CV-00396-FMO-SHK, 2020 WL 6526352, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 15 2020). 16 A review of Plaintiff’s SAC demonstrates there are no factual allegations regarding the NFL, 17 LVCVA, or Roger Goodell; nor are there references that would allow the Court to reasonably infer 18 wrongdoing by these named Defendants. In fact, there is no mention of Mr. Goodell in Plaintiff’s 19 SAC at all. The NFL is only alleged to have received emails from Plaintiff. The LVCVA is 20 mentioned only as an entity with whom Steve Hill is associated. Plaintiff’s brief references to these 21 Defendants are not sufficient to state claims against any of these Defendants. 22 Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities and ample time to develop and allege facts in support 23 of his claims. Plaintiff states he was a Nevada business owner and was “doing a celebrity dating 24 show and comedy” at the time he was speaking to individuals about the Las Vegas HBCU Classic. 25 ECF No. 15 at 2. Thus, Plaintiff is not an unsophisticated individual. The Court must reasonably 26 presume that if there were facts to support claims against Mr. Goodall, the NFL, or the LVCVA 27 Plaintiff would have alleged them in the SAC if not before. The Court finds that granting Plaintiff 1 warranted. See Isbelle v. Denney, Case No. 1:19-cv-00093-DCN, 2020 WL 2841886, at *5 n.5 (D. 2 Idaho 2020); McBride v. Twp. of Washington, Civ. No. 19-17196 (NLH/JS), 2020 WL 13887544, at 3 *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2020). 4 The Court recommends all claims against the NFL, LVCVA, and Mr. Goodell be dismissed 5 with prejudice. 6 b. Claims Against the Steve Hill, Mark Davis, and the Las Vegas Raiders. 7 i. Wire Fraud 8 Plaintiff cannot state a claim for wire fraud as a matter of law. As the Central District of 9 California explained in Kraft v. Old Castle Precast Inc., Case No. LA-CV-15-00701-VBF, 2015 WL 10 4693220, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015), case law demonstrates there is no private right of action 11 for wire fraud. Schrager v. Aldana, 542 Fed.Appx. 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2013); Wisdom v. First Midwest 12 Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1999); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, 13 Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 636, 636 (5th Cir. 1974). This claim should be dismissed with 14 prejudice. 15 ii. Copyright and Federal Trademark Infringement 16 To establish copyright infringement, the holder of the copyright must prove both valid 17 ownership and that there was infringement of the copyright by the alleged infringer. If a plaintiff 18 states he owns a valid copyright, then the plaintiff must establish infringement by showing the 19 alleged infringer had access to its copyrighted material and that there is “substantial similarity not 20 only of the general ideas [of the works] but of the expressions of those ideas as well.” Sid & Marty 21 Krofft Television Productions, Inc., v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). 22 Caselaw establishes substantial doubt that a sporting event is a copyrightable work. To the extent 23 that courts have considered this question, most have concluded that a game itself (as opposed to a 24 broadcast of the game) is not copyrightable. National Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & 25 Tracking Sys., Inc., 931 F.Supp. 1124, 1142-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (analyzing a number of sources 26 including Nimmer on Copyright and the legislative history of the Copyright Act, and concluding 27 that an NBA game, as distinct from the broadcast of it, is not copyrightable), amended and 1 Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.09[F] (1996) (discussing problems that could arise if athletic 2 events themselves were treated as copyrightable). 3 Plaintiff’s SAC fails to plead facts necessary to establish that he owned a valid copyright or 4 trademark or, therefore, there was infringement on either a copyright he owned. Indeed, it is unclear 5 what copyright Plaintiff claims he owned. Plaintiff cannot copyright a football bowl game itself 6 and, thus, to the extent that is what he claims—copyright ownership of the Las Vegas HBCU Classic 7 bowl games—his copyright claims fails.3 Further, if the Court assumes Plaintiff is asserting what 8 was stolen is a copyright in the idea for an HBCU bowl game,4 Plaintiff pleads facts demonstrating 9 the idea for such a game was not his but an idea acted on in the form of the Celebration Bowl long 10 before 2022 when he alleges he first spoke to the president of the Raiders. ECF No. 15 at 1.5 That 11 is, Plaintiff admits that his idea was a rematch of an existing HBCU bowl game (the Celebration 12 Bowl). Id. at 2. Plaintiff says he called the president of the Las Vegas Raiders on an unknown date 13 to explain he wanted to “sponsor and promote The Las Vegas HBCU Classic at Alligent [sic] 14 Stadium”—not that he had come up with the idea for the game—and that this was a “rematch of the 15 ESPN celebration Bowl.” Id. 16 The fact that another HBCU football bowl had been played for seven years before Plaintiff 17 spoke about wanting to sponsor and promote the Las Vegas HBCU Classic strongly supports the 18 conclusion that Plaintiff did not have a copyright in The Las Vegas HBCU Classic. At most, on its 19 face, Plaintiff pleads he was primarily reformatting an existing idea with a new title and location. 20 There are no facts demonstrating Plaintiff contributed anything more than a desire to promote and 21 sponsor a football game that largely mirrored an existing bowl game. This does not demonstrate 22 3 ECF No. 15 at 3 stating: “Steve Hill and The Raiders have stolen Plaintiff’s game ….” 4 Not all ideas are patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 101 defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection and 23 contains an implicit exception for “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (internal citation and quote marks omitted). 24 5 “Celebration Bowl is a postseason HBCU Football National Championship featuring the conference champions from the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference (MEAC) and the Southwestern Athletic Conference (SWAC).” www. 25 thecelebrationbowl.com/bowl-history/ (Last visited on February 3, 2026). The Celebration Bowl website shows this bowl has been played every year since 2015. Id. It appears the Las Vegas HBCU Classic held its inaugural game in 26 2025 and the second game in 2026. www.raiders.com/news/inaugural-hbcu-classic-at-allegiant-stadium-unites-football- legacy-and-black-excellence (Last visited on Feb. 3, 2026). 27 In general, websites and their contents may be judicially noticed. Pac. Overlander, LLC v. Kauai Overlander, 1 ownership in a valid copyright. Sid & Marty Krofft Television, 562 F.2d at 1163 (internal citation 2 omitted). 3 To establish a likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement claim, a 4 plaintiff must establish he is “(1) the owner of a valid, protectable mark, and (2) that the alleged 5 infringer is using a confusingly similar mark.” Grocery Outlet Inc. v. Albertson’s Inc., 497 F.3d 6 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2007); A.L.M.N. v. Rosoff, 757 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Nev. 1988) (demonstrating the 7 requirement to demonstrate a trademark infringement claim mirror the federal counterparts) (internal 8 citation omitted). Applying this law to the possibility that Plaintiff intended to plead either a federal 9 statutory or Nevada common law trademark infringement claim, he offers nothing to suggest, and 10 certainly nothing that would allow the Court to conclude, he owned a valid protectable trademark in 11 the “The Las Vegas HBCU Classic” name. Said plainly, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are 12 insufficient to establish trademark ownership. ECF No. 15 at 1-3. 13 Moreover, “[t]he Lanham Act grants trademark protection only to marks that are used to 14 identify and to distinguish goods or services in commerce—which typically occurs when a mark is 15 used in conjunction with the actual sale of goods or services.” Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. 16 Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999). “The purpose of a trademark is to help 17 consumers identify the source, but a mark cannot serve a source-identifying function if the public 18 has never seen the mark and thus is not meritorious of trademark protection until it is used in public 19 in a manner that creates an association among consumers between the mark and the mark’s owner.” 20 Id. In short, “a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce ... on services when it used or 21 displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce.” 15 22 U.S.C. § 1127. Plaintiff pleads no facts demonstrating he ever used The Las Vegas HBCU Classic 23 in commerce at any time. Plaintiff further alleges no facts demonstrating he came up with the name 24 for the bowl; however, even assuming he did, Plaintiff offers nothing evidencing he ever did 25 anything with the name outside of discussions with a representative of the Raiders and various other 26 individuals. ECF No. 15 at 1-2. These facts do not support that Plaintiff owned a valid, protectable 27 mark. 1 The Court finds, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, that he does not and cannot allege copyright 2 infringement. That is, the proposed idea for an HBCU bowl game had long been established by 3 2022 when Plaintiff alleges he first spoke to the president of the Las Vegas Raiders. This is 4 Plaintiff’s third time attempting to plead a valid claim. The Court finds, under the facts and 5 circumstances of this case, a fourth opportunity to amend his allegations is not justified. 6 With respect to Plaintiff’s potential trademark claim, the Court notes that “[t]rademark rights 7 are not created by sporadic, casual, and nominal shipments of goods bearing a mark. There must be 8 a trade in the goods sold under the mark or at least an active and public attempt to establish such a 9 trade.” Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F.Supp.2d 946, 957 (C.D. Cal. 2004) quoting La Societe 10 Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2nd Cir. 1974). 11 Therefore, “[m]ere adoption of a mark without bona fide use, in an attempt to reserve it for the future, 12 will not create trademark rights.” Id. quoting Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Manuf. Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 13 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975). The totality of the facts alleged in the SAC—the third attempt by 14 Plaintiff to plead his claims—do not support that he states or can state continuous use of the alleged 15 trademark in commerce. Thus, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim be 16 dismissed with prejudice. 17 iii. In the Absence of Federal Claims, Plaintiff must Plead his State law claims (theft, fraud, and conspiracy) in State court. 18 19 The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claim based on theft as a common law claim of 20 conversion. In Wantz v. Redfield, the Nevada Supreme Court defined conversion “as a distinct act 21 of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with 22 his title or rights therein or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or rights.” 326 P.2d 23 413, 414 (Nev. 1958). Conversion does not require a manual or physical taking of property. Bader 24 v. Cerri, 609 P.2d 314, 317 n.1 (Nev. 1980), overruled, in part on other grounds by Evans v. Dean 25 Witter Reynolds, Inc., 5 P.3d 1043, 1050 (Nev. 2000). Indeed, tangible and intangible property alike 26 can be converted. M.C. Multi-Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 193 P.3d 536, 538-39 27 (Nev. 2008). 1 Under Nevada law, the elements of fraud include: (1) a false representation made by the 2 defendant; (2) defendant’s knowledge or belief that the representation is false (or insufficient basis 3 for making the representation); (3) Defendant’s intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain 4 from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4) plaintiff’s justifiable reliance upon the 5 misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from such reliance. Bulbman, Inc. v. 6 Nevada Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992) (citing Lubbe v. Barba, 540 P.2d 115, 117 (Nev. 1975)). 7 In addition, the plaintiff must prove each element of the fraud claim by clear and convincing 8 evidence. Id. 9 Nevada law defines civil conspiracy as “a combination of two or more persons, who, by some 10 concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another 11 which results in damage.” Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 662 P.2d 610, 622 (Nev. 1983) 12 (citing Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 35 Cal.Rptr. 652 (Cal. 1963) and Bliss v. Southern Pac. Co., 321 13 P.2d 324 (Ore. 1958)). “The gist of a civil conspiracy is not the unlawful agreement but the damage 14 resulting from that agreement or its execution. The cause of action is not created by the conspiracy 15 but by the wrongful acts done by the defendants to the injury of the plaintiff.” Eikelberger v. Tolotti, 16 611 P.2d 1086, 1088, n.1 (Nev. 1980). 17 Each of these causes of action arise under state law. When no federal claims are present, the 18 Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law causes of action. 19 Branch-Noto v. Sisolak, 576 F.Supp.3d 790, 806, n.100 (D. Nev. 2021) citing 28 U.S.C. § 20 1367(c)(3); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is generally 21 preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent claims to state court.”). This is the exact 22 circumstance here. Thus, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed without 23 prejudice, but without leave to amend in federal court. This will allow Plaintiff to pursue his state 24 law claims in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada. 25 III. Recommendations 26 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against the National Football 27 League, LVCVA, and Roger Goodell be dismissed with prejudice. ] IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's copyright and trademark infringeme 2 || claims be dismissed with prejudice. 3 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's theft (conversion), fraud, and ci 4 || conspiracy claims be dismissed without prejudice, but without leave to amend in federal cou: 5 || Dismissal without prejudice will allow Plaintiff to pursue his state law claims in the Eighth Judici 6 || District Court if he chooses to do so. 7 DATED this 5th day of February, 2026.

9 . ELAYWNA J. YOWC 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 Order Adopting R&R 13 The deadline for the plaintiff to object to this recommendation was 2/19/2026, and he 14 || neither filed one nor asked to extend the deadline to do so. “[N]o review is required of a 15 || magistrate judge’s report and recommendation unless objections are filed.” United States v. 16 || Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Having reviewed the report and 17 || recommendation, I find good cause to adopt it, and I do. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that 18 (1) The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 16] is ADOPTED in 19 || its entirety; 20 (2) All claims are DISMISSED as follows: plaintiffs claims against the National Footba 21 || League, LVCVA, and Roger Goodell, and his copyright and trademark infringement claims are 22 || dismissed with prejudice; his theft (conversion), fraud, and civil conspiracy claims are dismissed 23 || without prejudice to his ability to refile them in state court; and 24 (3) The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE THIS CASE. 25

27 US. DistrideJud ge Jenifer A. Dorsey □ Dated: February 24, 2026