MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 04 2019, 6:21 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kimberly A. Jackson Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher J. Hamman, September 4, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 17A03-1708-CR-1870 v. Appeal from the DeKalb Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Monte L. Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 17D02-1610-FA-2
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 1 of 18 [1] Christopher J. Hamman appeals his convictions of Class A felony child
molesting 1 and Class B felony incest. 2 Hamman raises several arguments on
appeal, which we restate as:
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Hamman’s convictions;
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting some testimony of K.H. and Detective Rice;
3. Whether Hamman’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated;
4. Whether Hamman’s sentence was appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character; and
5. Whether the trial court erred in imposing Probation Condition 26.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History [2] K.H. is the child of Hamman and his wife. In November 2007, when K.H. was
eleven, Hamman’s wife left the family. In December 2007, Hamman began
molesting K.H. One night, Hamman laid down beside K.H. in her bed and
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007). 2 Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3(a) (1994).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 2 of 18 cuddled her as she tried to fall asleep. Hamman then moved his hand under
K.H.’s pajamas and inserted his fingers into her vagina. K.H. felt Hamman get
an erection as he touched her. The encounter lasted between ten and twenty
minutes.
[3] This kind of encounter occurred two or three times a month for several years.
Hamman would sometimes be naked. K.H. recalled waking up naked on
multiple occasions but having no recollection of what had happened. Hamman
often spoke with K.H. about keeping the molestations a secret. Hamman
would manipulate K.H. to stay silent by buying her gifts, including a pony, and
by giving her money. Once in middle school, K.H. told a counselor what was
happening, but Hamman told K.H. to drop the report, and the next day K.H.
told the counselor she had lied because she wanted attention.
[4] The molestations continued until 2010, when Hamman’s girlfriend moved in.
In 2016, when K.H. was nineteen years old, she moved in with her boyfriend.
K.H. returned to Hamman’s house to retrieve some of her belongings while
Hamman was on vacation. Hamman believed K.H.’s boyfriend had broken
into his home and damaged his truck, so Hamman reported the incident to the
police. The police interviewed K.H., who showed Detective Rice text messages
between herself and Hamman regarding what had happened at Hamman’s
house. After seeing the messages, Detective Rice became concerned and
questioned K.H. about her relationship with Hamman. K.H. became
withdrawn, but eventually told Detective Rice about the molestations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 3 of 18 [5] In September 2017, Detective Rice interviewed Hamman. The interview began
with discussion of Hamman’s truck, but shifted to Hamman’s relationship with
K.H. Initially, Hamman admitted cuddling with K.H. in her bed but denied
ever touching her inappropriately, and he also denied ever being naked while
cuddling with K.H. Then, Hamman admitted to touching K.H.’s vagina once,
but he claimed he did so to check if it was swollen after K.H. complained that it
was. Hamman denied ever digitally penetrating K.H. Finally, Hamman
confessed he rubbed K.H.’s vagina a few times because he was curious what it
felt like. Hamman also admitted he became aroused and went to his bedroom
to masturbate.
[6] The State charged Hamman with Class A felony child molesting and Class B
felony incest. A jury found Hamman guilty of both counts. The trial court
imposed a forty-year aggregate sentence with five years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision 1. Sufficiency of Evidence [7] Hamman argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
When considering the sufficiency of evidence, “a reviewing court does not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.” McHenry v.
State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must affirm “if the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have
allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 126 (internal citation omitted). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 4 of 18 [8] In particular, Hamman claims the evidence was insufficient because K.H. was
the sole witness and K.H.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. “Under the
incredible dubiosity rule, a court will impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to
judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently
improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony
of incredible dubiosity.” Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994).
“Application of this rule is limited to cases . . . where a sole witness presents
inherently contradictory testimony [that] is equivocal or the result of coercion
and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s guilt.”
Id.
[9] Hamman draws attention to a journal wherein K.H. wrote about the things that
occurred in her childhood. In these entries, K.H. wrote about how she lied to
get Hamman in trouble. (Ex. A.) Although K.H.’s trial testimony is
inconsistent with the journal entries, she did not contradict herself on the stand.
Trial testimony is not incredibly dubious simply because it contradicts pre-trial
statements. See Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. 1997) (although
witness contradicted his pre-trial statements, his testimony was not incredibly
dubious because he did not contradict himself while testifying), clarified on reh’g
on other grounds 696 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. 1998).
[10] The jury was made aware of the inconsistencies between K.H.’s testimony and
her journal entries. The jury is to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility
of witnesses in light of such inconsistencies. See id at 1231 (jury allowed to
evaluate testimony inconsistent with pretrial statements, and inconsistencies do
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 5 of 18 not automatically render testimony incredibly dubious). K.H.’s testimony was
sufficient to support Hamman’s convictions. 3 See, e.g., Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d
911, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding testimony inconsistent with prior
statements is sufficient to support conviction). See Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d
531, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (uncorroborated victim testimony sufficient to
support conviction) trans. denied.
2. Admission of Evidence [11] Hamman argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements
made by K.H. and Detective Rice. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial
court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “A trial court has
broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb
its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.” Turner
v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011).
3 The elements for Class A felony child molesting are: (1) a person, (2) at least twenty-one years of age, (3) with a child under fourteen, (4) performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct, (5) commits child molesting. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007). The elements for Class B felony incest are: (1) a person, (2) eighteen years of age or older, (3) who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate conduct with another person, (4) who is less that sixteen years of age, (5) when the person knows that the other person is related to the person biologically, (6) commits incest. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3(a) (1994). Hamman admits all elements except for having the requisite intent to commit crimes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 6 of 18 K.H.’s Testimony
[12] At trial, K.H. testified regarding a time when she helped Hamman masturbate.
Hamman objected, claiming the testimony violated Indiana Evidence Rules 403
and 404(b), because the testimony described an uncharged act and was unfairly
prejudicial to Hamman. On appeal, Hamman argues the trial court improperly
admitted this testimony in violation of Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), which
controls the admissibility of “Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts” evidence and
provides:
(1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and
(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
This rule is meant to prevent the jury from drawing the forbidden inference that
the defendant is guilty of the crime he stands accused of committing because the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 7 of 18 defendant committed other crimes in the past. Udarbe v. State, 749 N.E.2d 562,
564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
[13] In examining the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, courts apply a two-
prong analysis. Wages v. State, 863 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g
denied, trans. denied. “First, the court must assess whether the evidence has
some relevancy to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to
commit the charged act. Second, the court must weigh the probative value of
the evidence against its prejudicial effect, pursuant to Evidence Rule 403.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). By necessity, the court’s analysis of the admissibility
of evidence under Rule 404(b) includes the relevancy test of Rule 401 and the
balancing test of Rule 403. Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018).
[14] There are, however, exceptions that render admissible evidence that generally
would be inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). For example, the intent
exception in Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) is available only “when a defendant goes
beyond merely denying the charged culpability and affirmatively presents a
claim of particular contrary intent.” Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 455
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The State may then respond by offering evidence of
prior crimes, wrongs, or acts to the extent genuinely relevant to prove the
defendant’s intent at the time of the charged offense.” Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d
401, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 8 of 18 [15] At trial, Hamman testified he never inappropriately touched K.H. Hamman
said he only touched K.H.’s vagina to check to see if it was swollen “because
she was complaining.” (Tr. Vol. III at 186.) Hamman went on to deny being
aroused by touching K.H. K.H. testified to a separate encounter with Hamman
in which she helped him masturbate. K.H.’s testimony was relevant to
demonstrate Hamman’s intent when he touched her vagina.
[16] As for the second prong, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Ind. Evid.
R. 403. The trial court specifically instructed the jury to consider the prior bad
acts “solely on the issue of the Defendant’s motive, intent, plan or absence of
mistake or accident.” (App. Vol. II. at 118.) This instruction limiting jury’s use
of evidence reduces probability of improper use of the evidence. Accordingly,
we hold the probative value outweighed the prejudicial impact. See Iqbal, 805
N.E.2d at 409 (court did not abuse discretion in admitting 404 Evidence when
limiting instruction constrained jury’s use of prejudicial evidence).
Detective Rice’s Testimony
[17] Hamman also argues the court abused its discretion by allowing testimony from
Detective Rice into evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is
“[a] statement that is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing; and is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c)(1)(2). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by
law or other court rules. Evid. R. 802.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 9 of 18 [18] Detective Rice testified about the conversation he had with K.H:
Q. All right. And, uh, did she progress to the point where she, uh told you about the allegations that he had been touching her sexually?
A. Yes.
(Tr. Vol. III at 15.) Hamman objected, arguing the testimony was inadmissible
hearsay, but the trial court overruled his objection.
[19] The State argues this admission was harmless error. An error in admitting
evidence does not require reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of a
party. Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 2001). “The improper
admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by
such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court
that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed
to the conviction.” Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied.
The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is
cumulative of other evidence admitted. Donaldson v. Indianapolis Pub. Transp.
Corp., 632 N.E.2d 1167, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
[20] Detective Rice testified after K.H. had testified, and she testified about the
allegations she made against Hamman. Therefore, Detective Rice’s statement
was cumulative of K.H.’s testimony. (Compare Tr. Vol. II at 199-202 with Tr.
Vol. III at 15.) Thus, any possible error of the admission of Detective Rice’s
statement was harmless. See, e.g., Davis v. Garrett, 887 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 10 of 18 App. 2008) (holding admission of evidence harmless because evidence was
cumulative of other evidence admitted), trans. denied.
3. Double Jeopardy [21] Hamman next argues his simultaneous convictions of child molesting and
incest violate his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. See Ind.
Const. Art. 1, § 14 (“No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense.”). Two offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Indiana’s
Double Jeopardy Clause if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the
challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements
of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another
challenged offense. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 832 (Ind. 2002). To
determine whether the statutory elements test is violated, we apply the federal
test: “whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180,
182 (1932).
[22] We review de novo whether a defendant’s convictions violate this provision.
Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1166 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied. “When two
convictions are found to contravene double jeopardy principles, a reviewing
court may remedy the violation by reducing either conviction to a less serious
form of the same offense if doing so will eliminate the violation. If it will not,
one of the convictions must be vacated.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 54
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 11 of 18 (Ind. 1999), holding modified by Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 2013)
(modification as to cases involving hung jury or acquittal).
[23] Hamman argues his convictions of both child molesting and incest violate the
“actual evidence” test. The actual evidence test requires us to “determine
whether each challenged offense was established by separate and distinct facts.”
Id. at 53. To determine what facts were used to convict, we consider the
charging information, the final jury instructions, the evidence, and the
arguments of counsel. Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind. 2002), reh’g
denied. The elements of Class A felony child molesting as charged against
Hamman were: (1) Hamman; (2) who was at least 21 years of age; (3) with
K.H.; (4) who was under the age of fourteen; (5) performed or submitted to
intercourse or deviate sexual conduct. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007).
The elements of Class B felony incest as charged against Hamman are: (1)
Hamman; (2) who was at least 18 years of age; (3) engaged in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual conduct; (4) with K.H.; (5) who was less than 16
years of age. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-3(a) (1994).
[24] In its closing argument, the State argued the evidence satisfied the fifth element
of Class A felony child molesting because Hamman “put his finger inside of her
vagina and moved it around.” (Tr. Vol. III at 207.) Later in closing, when
explaining the evidence to support a conviction of Class B felony incest, the
prosecutor said:
[T]he next element, engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct, we went through this two (2) seconds ago, two Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 12 of 18 (2) minutes ago, the definition is the same. All right? The finger penetrated her vagina. That’s all that’s required.
(Id. at 210.) Further into the argument, the prosecutor said:
He only did it once. I mean enough, that’s enough for this charge, for both charges.
(Id. at 213.) During his rebuttal argument to the defense’s closing, the
[W]e know there was at least one time this happened. [K.H.] testified about more, this is what this references, you don’t need to worry about all the other times, okay? What you need to worry about are the elements for this particular charge for one time.
(Id. at 241.)
[25] When the State asked the jury to find Hamman guilty of child molesting and
incest, the prosecutor explicitly told the jury it could rely on one act of deviate
sexual conduct to support both charges. Thus, there is a reasonable probability
the jury relied on the same evidence to find Hamman guilty of child molesting
and incest. Accordingly, we vacate Hamman’s conviction of Class B felony
incest. See Clark v. State, 732 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (vacating
two attempted arson convictions when all three convictions were based on one
act).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 13 of 18 4. Sentence Appropriateness [26] Hamman also argues his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character and
the nature of his offense.
We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). In addition to the “due consideration” we are required to give to the trial court’s sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Couch v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans.
denied. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is
inappropriate. Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011),
trans. denied.
[27] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
point for determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 14 of 18 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The
sentence for a Class A felony is a fixed term of between twenty and fifty years,
with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (2005).
Hamman was sentenced to forty years, thus receiving below the maximum but
above the advisory sentence for his child molesting conviction. 4
[28] Regarding the nature of Hamman’s offense, the trial court noted Hamman was
in a position of trust. K.H. was Hamman’s daughter and lived with him alone
after her mother left. See Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1093, 1101 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (defendant violating position of trust with victim allowed for an
enhanced sentence), trans. denied.
[29] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the
defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). Hamman has no criminal history. However, due to the heinous
nature of the crime and K.H. being his daughter, we do not find Hamman’s
elevated sentence to be inappropriate. See Harlan v. State, 971 N.E.2d 163, 172
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (enhanced sentence appropriate for defendant who
repeatedly sexually abused child he cared for).
4 Hamman was ordered to serve his sentences concurrently, therefore our vacation of his Class B felony incest conviction does not alter the time he was ordered to served.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 15 of 18 5. Probation Condition [30] Finally, Hamman argues the trial court erred when it imposed Probation
Condition 26, which has been held unreasonable. “The trial court’s broad
discretion in determining the conditions of probation is limited only by the
principle that the conditions must be reasonably related to the treatment of the
defendant and protection of public safety.” Stott v. State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 179-
80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Probation Condition 26 states:
You shall not access the Internet or any other on-line service through use of a computer, cell phone, iPod, Xbox, Blackberry, personal digital assistant (PDA), pagers, Palm Pilots, televisions, or any other electronic device at any location (including your place of employment) without prior approval of your Probation Officer. This includes any Internet service provider, bulletin board system, e-mail system or any other public or private computer network . . .
(App. Vol. II at 187.) In Weida v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court held this
language in Probation Condition 26 is unreasonable because it does not
reasonably relate to a defendant’s “rehabilitation and protecting the public.” 94
N.E.3d 682, 694 (Ind. 2018).
[31] As the Court noted in Weida, Probation Rule 26 underwent significant revision
and now states:
You are prohibited from accessing, viewing, or using internet websites and computer applications that depict obscene matter as defined by IC 35-49-2-1 or child pornography as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). You shall not possess or use any data
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 16 of 18 encryption technique or program to conceal your internet activity.
Id. at 692 (quoting Sex Offender Special Conditions). See also Ind. Code § 35-38-
2-2.2(4) (2012) (requiring trial court to include same language). Here, the trial
court imposed the former version of Probation Condition 26 restricting
Hamman’s lawful conduct on the internet. As such, we remand for the trial
court to impose the revised version of Probation Condition 26. See Weida, 94
N.E.3d at 694 (probation conditions restricting internet access must be
reasonably related to rehabilitation and public safety).
Conclusion [32] K.H.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious and, therefore, was sufficient to
convict Hamman of Class A felony child molesting and Class B felony incest;
however, because the prosecutor argued the jury could rely on the same act of
penetration to convict Hamman of both crimes, we must vacate his conviction
of incest on double jeopardy grounds. Additionally, K.H.’s testimony
regarding an uncharged crime Hamman allegedly committed was not a
violation of the Indiana Rules of Evidence, and the admission of Detective
Rice’s hearsay testimony was harmless error. Finally, Hamman’s forty-year
sentence is not inappropriate, but we must remand for the trial court to amend
Hamman’s probation conditions to include the most recent version of Probation
Condition 26. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with
instructions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 17 of 18 [33] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A03-1708-CR-1870 | Septmeber 4, 2019 Page 18 of 18