Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 519 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2021-06-18 09:45:43 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION I No. CR-19-410 9.7.5
Opinion Delivered: November 6, 2019 CHRISTOPHER HOOTEN APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-17-1253] V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Christopher Hooten was convicted by a Crawford County jury of aggravated assault,
first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and fleeing (both on foot and by vehicle) and
was sentenced as a habitual offender.1 Hooten appeals only his criminal-mischief and
resisting-arrest convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a
directed verdict on those charges. We affirm.
On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. Robinson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 689, 537 S.W.3d 765. When the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and consider only the evidence supporting it under our standard of
1 Hooten was also charged with tampering with physical evidence; possession of drug paraphernalia; DWI; and possession of benzodiazepines. The State dropped the possession charges; he was acquitted of the tampering-with-physical-evidence charge; and the trial court directed a verdict on the DWI charge. review. Groomes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 408, 586 S.W.3d 196. We will affirm if the finding
of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of such
sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one
way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. With this standard in
mind, we turn to review the evidence presented to the jury.
On November 22, 2017, Hooten was involved in a high-speed chase on Interstate
40. State Trooper Ben Ibarra initially clocked Hooten’s vehicle traveling 87 miles per hour.
Trooper Ibarra activated his blue lights and attempted a traffic stop. Hooten refused to pull
over, and a chase ensued. During the chase, Hooten’s speed fluctuated between 80 and 130
miles per hour. Trooper John Bass joined the pursuit. Because Hooten refused to stop,
troopers then deployed spike strips along the interstate to deflate the tires on Hooten’s
vehicle. After hitting the spike strips, Hooten continued to travel over 90 miles per hour
on the vehicle’s rims. When the deployment of spike strips did not work, Trooper Bass
attempted to drive in front of Hooten to box him in, hoping to force him to slow down
and come to a stop. Instead of slowing down or stopping, Hooten attempted to pass Trooper
Bass. When he was unable to do so, he rammed Trooper Bass’s car multiple times.
Eventually, the troopers decided to perform a PIT2 maneuver to end the pursuit. Trooper
Bass executed the maneuver, which caused Hooten’s vehicle to stop in the median ditch.
2 PIT stands for “Precision Immobilization Technique.” A trooper executes a PIT maneuver by nudging the speeding vehicle’s rear end with the front quarter panel of the patrol car, forcing the vehicle to turn at a 90-degree angle. This causes the transmission to lock up so that the driver cannot put the vehicle back into drive. At that point, the vehicle is immobilized.
2 With his vehicle immobilized, Hooten exited the vehicle and fled on foot across the
eastbound traffic. Trooper Ibarra followed with his gun drawn. When Hooten reached a
tree line across the interstate, he encountered a fence. He stopped and turned to face
Trooper Ibarra. Trooper Ibarra holstered his weapon and attempted to restrain him. Hooten
refused to comply, and a struggle ensued. During the scuffle, Trooper Ibarra and Hooten
fell to the ground. The scuffle continued on the ground, making it difficult for Trooper
Ibarra to place Hooten in handcuffs. At some point during the struggle with Hooten,
Trooper Ibarra’s microphone clip broke off his belt. Hooten was eventually subdued and
placed under arrest.
Later, Trooper Bass had the damage to the passenger door of his vehicle repaired
with the costs exceeding $2,000. Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Hooten of
aggravated assault, first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and fleeing (both on foot
and by vehicle).
On appeal, Hooten challenges only his convictions for criminal mischief and resisting
arrest, contending that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support either
conviction.3 A person commits criminal mischief in the first degree if he or she “purposely
and without legal justification destroys or causes damage to any property of another.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-38-203(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). This offense is a Class D felony if the amount of
3 At the close of the State’s case and at the close of all the evidence, Hooten moved for a directed verdict on the charges of criminal mischief and resisting arrest. He did not make directed-verdict motions on the charges of aggravated assault, fleeing on foot, or fleeing in a vehicle. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the evidence as to these charges is not an issue on appeal.
3 actual damage is more than $1,000 but less than $5,000. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(b)(2).
A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if he knowingly resists a person known by
him to be a law enforcement officer effecting an arrest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103(a)(1)
(Repl. 2016).
As to his criminal-mischief conviction, Hooten argues that the State failed to
sufficiently prove the amount of damages to the vehicle or that he acted purposely in causing
the damage. More specifically, he claims that Trooper Bass did not testify to the actual dollar
amount of the cost for repairs made to the damaged vehicle, and because no other evidence
of the cost of repairs was introduced, there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction of criminal mischief. Admittedly, Trooper Bass did not testify to an actual dollar
amount of the repair costs. He did, however, testify that he took the car to be repaired and
that it cost over $2,000 to repair the vehicle. Trooper Bass’s testimony alone as to the cost
of repairs was sufficient to support the verdict. See White v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 302;
Andrews v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 597, 424 S.W.3d 349. Therefore, his argument fails in
this respect.
He also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he purposely
caused damage to the patrol car driven by Trooper Bass. He claims he was not purposely
trying to cause damage to the vehicle; he was simply attempting to flee the traffic stop. We
are not persuaded.
Clearly, Hooten engaged in a high-speed chase with speeds in excess of 90 miles an
hour. When officers attempted to slow him down, he rammed his vehicle into Trooper
Bass’s car, not once, but three separate times. By statutory provision, a person acts purposely
4 with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013). Further, we have held that it is axiomatic that one is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions and that a criminal
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Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 519 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2021-06-18 09:45:43 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION I No. CR-19-410 9.7.5
Opinion Delivered: November 6, 2019 CHRISTOPHER HOOTEN APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-17-1253] V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Christopher Hooten was convicted by a Crawford County jury of aggravated assault,
first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and fleeing (both on foot and by vehicle) and
was sentenced as a habitual offender.1 Hooten appeals only his criminal-mischief and
resisting-arrest convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a
directed verdict on those charges. We affirm.
On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. Robinson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 689, 537 S.W.3d 765. When the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and consider only the evidence supporting it under our standard of
1 Hooten was also charged with tampering with physical evidence; possession of drug paraphernalia; DWI; and possession of benzodiazepines. The State dropped the possession charges; he was acquitted of the tampering-with-physical-evidence charge; and the trial court directed a verdict on the DWI charge. review. Groomes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 408, 586 S.W.3d 196. We will affirm if the finding
of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of such
sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one
way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. With this standard in
mind, we turn to review the evidence presented to the jury.
On November 22, 2017, Hooten was involved in a high-speed chase on Interstate
40. State Trooper Ben Ibarra initially clocked Hooten’s vehicle traveling 87 miles per hour.
Trooper Ibarra activated his blue lights and attempted a traffic stop. Hooten refused to pull
over, and a chase ensued. During the chase, Hooten’s speed fluctuated between 80 and 130
miles per hour. Trooper John Bass joined the pursuit. Because Hooten refused to stop,
troopers then deployed spike strips along the interstate to deflate the tires on Hooten’s
vehicle. After hitting the spike strips, Hooten continued to travel over 90 miles per hour
on the vehicle’s rims. When the deployment of spike strips did not work, Trooper Bass
attempted to drive in front of Hooten to box him in, hoping to force him to slow down
and come to a stop. Instead of slowing down or stopping, Hooten attempted to pass Trooper
Bass. When he was unable to do so, he rammed Trooper Bass’s car multiple times.
Eventually, the troopers decided to perform a PIT2 maneuver to end the pursuit. Trooper
Bass executed the maneuver, which caused Hooten’s vehicle to stop in the median ditch.
2 PIT stands for “Precision Immobilization Technique.” A trooper executes a PIT maneuver by nudging the speeding vehicle’s rear end with the front quarter panel of the patrol car, forcing the vehicle to turn at a 90-degree angle. This causes the transmission to lock up so that the driver cannot put the vehicle back into drive. At that point, the vehicle is immobilized.
2 With his vehicle immobilized, Hooten exited the vehicle and fled on foot across the
eastbound traffic. Trooper Ibarra followed with his gun drawn. When Hooten reached a
tree line across the interstate, he encountered a fence. He stopped and turned to face
Trooper Ibarra. Trooper Ibarra holstered his weapon and attempted to restrain him. Hooten
refused to comply, and a struggle ensued. During the scuffle, Trooper Ibarra and Hooten
fell to the ground. The scuffle continued on the ground, making it difficult for Trooper
Ibarra to place Hooten in handcuffs. At some point during the struggle with Hooten,
Trooper Ibarra’s microphone clip broke off his belt. Hooten was eventually subdued and
placed under arrest.
Later, Trooper Bass had the damage to the passenger door of his vehicle repaired
with the costs exceeding $2,000. Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Hooten of
aggravated assault, first-degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and fleeing (both on foot
and by vehicle).
On appeal, Hooten challenges only his convictions for criminal mischief and resisting
arrest, contending that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support either
conviction.3 A person commits criminal mischief in the first degree if he or she “purposely
and without legal justification destroys or causes damage to any property of another.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-38-203(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). This offense is a Class D felony if the amount of
3 At the close of the State’s case and at the close of all the evidence, Hooten moved for a directed verdict on the charges of criminal mischief and resisting arrest. He did not make directed-verdict motions on the charges of aggravated assault, fleeing on foot, or fleeing in a vehicle. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the evidence as to these charges is not an issue on appeal.
3 actual damage is more than $1,000 but less than $5,000. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-203(b)(2).
A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if he knowingly resists a person known by
him to be a law enforcement officer effecting an arrest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103(a)(1)
(Repl. 2016).
As to his criminal-mischief conviction, Hooten argues that the State failed to
sufficiently prove the amount of damages to the vehicle or that he acted purposely in causing
the damage. More specifically, he claims that Trooper Bass did not testify to the actual dollar
amount of the cost for repairs made to the damaged vehicle, and because no other evidence
of the cost of repairs was introduced, there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction of criminal mischief. Admittedly, Trooper Bass did not testify to an actual dollar
amount of the repair costs. He did, however, testify that he took the car to be repaired and
that it cost over $2,000 to repair the vehicle. Trooper Bass’s testimony alone as to the cost
of repairs was sufficient to support the verdict. See White v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 302;
Andrews v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 597, 424 S.W.3d 349. Therefore, his argument fails in
this respect.
He also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he purposely
caused damage to the patrol car driven by Trooper Bass. He claims he was not purposely
trying to cause damage to the vehicle; he was simply attempting to flee the traffic stop. We
are not persuaded.
Clearly, Hooten engaged in a high-speed chase with speeds in excess of 90 miles an
hour. When officers attempted to slow him down, he rammed his vehicle into Trooper
Bass’s car, not once, but three separate times. By statutory provision, a person acts purposely
4 with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013). Further, we have held that it is axiomatic that one is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions and that a criminal
defendant’s intent or state of mind will usually be inferred from the circumstances of the
crime, since it is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence. Stearns v. State, 2017 Ark. App.
472, 529 S.W.3d 654. Since Hooten did not stop until his vehicle was disabled, and he
continued to flee on foot afterward, the jury could properly infer that Hooten acted
purposely when he hit and damaged Trooper Bass’s vehicle in his attempt to evade the
authorities.
Next, Hooten argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of resisting
arrest. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove he used or threatened to use
physical force or any other means that created a substantial risk of physical injury to any
person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103(a)(2) (Repl. 2016). He notes that physical injury is
defined as the impairment of physical condition, the infliction of substantial pain, or the
infliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with physical trauma. Ark. Code
Ann. § 5-1-102(14)(A)–(C) (Repl. 2013). He contends, however, that the evidence showed
no physical injury and no substantial risk that his conduct would create physical injury.
We note that Hooten’s arguments on appeal are much more specific than those made
at trial. In his motion for directed verdict, Hooten simply argued that “resisting requires
testimony that there was a substantial risk of physical injury and that to Officer Ibarra’s credit
he did not quite get to that level.” However, because Hooten did address the substantial-
5 risk-of-physical-injury argument below, we do not conclude that he is raising this argument
for the first time on appeal. We are simply not persuaded by his position.
Here, when Trooper Ibarra attempted to arrest him, Hooten refused to submit and
engaged in an extended struggle with Trooper Ibarra. Trooper Ibarra was eventually able to
subdue Hooten, but the struggle was apparently physical enough to break Trooper Ibarra’s
microphone clip off his utility belt. This type of prolonged physical struggle could have
easily resulted in bruising or other visible marks—a physical injury as defined by the statute.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Hooten’s struggle
with Trooper Ibarra created a substantial risk of physical injury. The fact that no physical
injury actually occurred is immaterial; the statute only requires a substantial risk of such
injury. Under these circumstances, there was substantial evidence to support Hooten’s
conviction of resisting arrest. Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 50, 972 S.W.2d 239, 243 (1998).
Affirmed.
GRUBER, C.J., and VAUGHT, J., agree.
Dusti Standridge, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.