Christopher Harris v. Felix, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, Case No. 1:25-cv-0029-JLT-BAM (PC) 7 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR 8 v. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 9 FELIX, et al., (ECF No. 16) 10 Defendants. FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 11 12 Plaintiff Christopher Harris (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 13 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed a complaint which 14 the Court struck for being unsigned. The Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, and 15 Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is before the Court 16 for screening. (ECF. No. 16.) 17 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 18 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 19 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 21 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 22 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 23 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 24 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 25 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 26 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 27 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 28 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 3 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 4 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 5 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 6 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 7 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 8 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 9 Plaintiff is currently housed at California Men’s Colony. Plaintiff alleges the events 10 occurred when he was housed at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“SATF”). 11 Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Felix, correctional sergeant, (2) Urban, correctional lieutenant, 12 (3) B. Phillips, Warden. 13 In claim 1, while not entirely clear, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation for 14 threat to safety. Plaintiff alleges that on 5/20/24 in unit #4 Plaintiff witnessed about 10 – 20 15 correctional officers, male and females, enter the unit, went immediately to inmate cell doors and 16 pulled them out and ordered them to line up by the benches. They told the inmates to strip all of 17 their clothing and in front of females with functioning cameras they were wearing and other 18 inmates. 19 The officers made it to Plaintiff’s door, and he and his cellie were ordered to come out and 20 strip out. Plaintiff was placed into the shower naked, although Plaintiff immediately presented 21 his “transgender access card.” It was not addressed. Defendants Sgt. Felix and Lt. Urban were 22 present and giving orders. Sgt. Felix and Lt. Urban had knowledge and acquiescence of the 23 violations of Plaintiff’s rights and were in a position to correct the violations but did not. 24 Defendants Urban and Felix had personal involvement through orders given at their 25 personal direction. They ordered subordinates to impose illegal acts and failed to correct a wrong. 26 They created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional actions occurred and allowed such 27 policy or custom to continue. 28 Plaintiff authored grievances about the problem. 1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Phillips had knowledge of and acquiescence of the issues. 2 (ECF No. 16 at 9.) Phillips was made aware of this incident and others and Plaintiff did not 3 receive any response from his office. Phillips’ conduct was intentional and purposeful. 4 Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff “does not object to defendants strip search procedures but to 5 the defendants deliberate acts of ‘prolonged nakedness’ which was unnecessary and unwarranted 6 pursuant to the circumstances of the search.” (ECF No. 16 at 10.) Leaving Plaintiff in the 7 dayroom shower and on the dayroom floor naked for an unjustifiable length of time. Defendants 8 Urban and Felix gave express and direct orders to have Plaintiff with other inmates placed naked 9 in the showers and on the dayroom floor for a long length of time with cameras attached to 10 officers’ vests and are therefore responsible for constitutional violations. 11 Plaintiff alleges that their aim was to intimidate Plaintiff, cause disorder, and dissuade 12 Plaintiff from taking further action against them legally. The actions were not justifiable and did 13 not further a penological interest. 14 The rest of Plaintiff’s complaint consists of legal argument and case citations. 15 Plaintiff attaches several exhibits to the complaint. The Court has reviewed these exhibits. 16 In a 602 grievance, Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the showers and stripped out. Plaintiff 17 states that the C/O never turned off his camera. The female C/O in the tower had a full view of 18 Plaintiff, and other C/O’s on the floor were recording all of the incident. 19 Plaintiff suffered humiliation, emotional distress, paranoia, and fear for his safety. As 20 remedies, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 21 III. Discussion 22 Supervisory Liability 23 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Warden, or any other defendant, based 24 solely upon his supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory 25 personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 26 superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th 27 Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 28 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 1 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 2 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 3 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 4 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established 5 when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 6 should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 7 570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official 8 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 9 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 10 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other 11 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory 12 position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be 13 specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 14 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement 15 of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 16 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 17 Plaintiff alleges vague and conclusory allegations and has failed to state factual support 18 for supervisory liability of the warden. 19 Fourth Amendment – Strip Searches 20 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 21 520, 558 (1979). Courts regularly recognize the importance and difficulty of keeping detention 22 facilities free from drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Id. at 559; see also Way v. Cty. of 23 Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006). However, courts also recognize the “frightening 24 and humiliating invasion” occasioned by a strip search “even when conducted with all due 25 courtesy.” Way, 445 F.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted); Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. 26 Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011). Although some visual body cavity searches 27 of prisoners may be reasonable, others can “be excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to 28 any legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) 1 (“[I]ncarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”). There is no precise definition 2 to assess reasonableness, and each case “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search 3 against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The prisoner 4 “bears the burden of showing that [prison] officials intentionally used exaggerated or excessive 5 means to enforce security.” Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 6 Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333) (finding visual body cavity search conducted in full view of other 7 inmates and intended to detect illicit drugs was reasonably related to a legitimate penological 8 interest). 9 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was “not authorized” to conduct an 10 unclothed search of his body, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable. Routine strip searches have been 11 held constitutional. See generally Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d at 333. However, Plaintiff 12 alleges that the strip search was done in a manner to invade his privacy by recording the search on 13 body worn camera. “The [Supreme] Court [has] obviously recognized that not all strip search 14 procedures will be reasonable; some could be excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any 15 legitimate penological interest.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332. 16 Plaintiff fails to state a Fourth Amendment violation for conducting the strip searches 17 with an activated body camera. It is unclear which of the Defendants, if any, had activated body 18 cameras in proximity to Plaintiff, when Plaintiff was placed in the shower. It appears that neither 19 Defendant was near Plaintiff with activated body camera. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that 20 Defendants were recording the strip search. Plaintiff appears to challenge that the cameras were 21 activated during the search but does not name specific actors. 22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Urban and Felix gave express and direct orders to have 23 Plaintiff with other inmates placed naked in the showers and on the dayroom floor for a long 24 length of time with cameras attached to officers’ vests and are therefore responsible for 25 constitutional violations. But Plaintiff fails to allege that the orders that were given by Defendants 26 Felix and Urban were to conduct searches with activated cameras. Rather, he alleges they gave 27 orders and subordinates violated Plaintiff’s rights, and therefore, Defendants Felix and Urban are 28 responsible. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that they “ordered subordinates to impose illegal 1 acts and failed to correct a wrong,” and “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional 2 actions occurred” are insufficient. Plaintiff fails to allege that the orders that were given by 3 Defendants Felix and Urban were to conduct searches with activated cameras. Rather, he alleges 4 they gave orders and subordinates violated Plaintiff’s rights, and therefore, Defendants Felix and 5 Urban are responsible. This is insufficient for Defendants’ individual liability. 6 Plaintiff appears to allege that because he is transgender he should not have been strip 7 searched in front of others or in front of other genders. An Eighth Amendment violation has been 8 found where the female prisoner plaintiffs, found to be particularly vulnerable to a severe 9 psychological injury from the search, are subjected to random cross-gender clothed body searches 10 unrelated to prison security. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525–28 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 11 cross-gender body search policy constituted unnecessary “infliction of pain” under the Eighth 12 Amendment where women inmates had “shocking histories of verbal, physical, and, in particular, 13 sexual abuse” by men). In the Fourth Amendment context, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 14 cross-gender strip search of a pretrial detainee in a non-emergency situation where same-sex 15 guards were available was an unreasonable intrusion on the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights. 16 Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also 17 Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1189 (9th Cir. 2018) (under Fourteenth Amendment challenge, 18 court concluded that county’s search practices were not entitled to deference where county did 19 not offer reason for leaving mentally ill female inmates shackled to their cell doors for hours, 20 virtually unclothed, and without access to meals, water or a toilet, visible to both male and female 21 prison guards on patrol). 22 Although a cross-gender strip search that involves touching the inmate’s genitalia and 23 searching inside his anus is unreasonable, Byrd, 629 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 24 that does not mean that all cross-gender searches are unreasonable, or that prisoners of one gender 25 may not be guarded by guards of the other gender. Uvalles v. Jaquez, No. C 09-5221 RMW PR, 26 2013 WL 1283390, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013). In Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 27 494 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit upheld a system of assigning female officers within a 28 correctional facility such that they occasionally viewed male inmates in various states of undress 1 and conducted routine pat-downs of fully clothed inmates. Id., citing Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1142. 2 Assigned positions of female guards that required only infrequent and casual observation, or 3 observation at a distance, of unclothed male prisoners and that are reasonably related to prison 4 needs are not so degrading as to warrant court interference. Id., citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 5 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (held that routine visual body cavity searches conducted in 6 hallways did not violate the Fourth Amendment after situations where inmates had been presented 7 with the opportunity to obtain contraband or a weapon); see also Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1524–25 (en 8 banc) (privacy interest in freedom from cross-gender clothed body searches not “judicially 9 recognized”). 10 Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff “does not object the defendants strip search procedures but 11 to the defendants deliberate acts of ‘prolonged nakedness’ which was unnecessary and 12 unwarranted pursuant to the circumstances of the search. (leaving Plaintiff in [the]shower and on 13 the dayroom Floor naked for an unjustifiable length of time.)” Given this allegation, it is unclear 14 what Plaintiff is complaining about for the search. Plaintiff fails to allege the duration of the time 15 he was in the shower during the search. His conclusory allegation of “prolonged” or lengthy is 16 insufficient. Temporary unconstitutional conditions of confinement do not necessarily rise to the 17 level of constitutional violations. See Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.), 18 opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by 19 Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 (in evaluating challenges to conditions of confinement, length of time the 20 prisoner must go without basic human needs may be considered)). 21 Retaliation 22 Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 23 petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 24 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 25 Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 26 Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 27 adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 28 such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did 1 not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567– 2 68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 3 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 4 Plaintiff has failed to allege the facts for each of the elements of a claim for retaliation 5 against any defendant. While Plaintiff alleges he engaged in protected conduct of filing 6 grievances, he does not allege if and how any defendant was aware of such appeals. The 7 allegations appear to lack an adverse action because every inmate was strip searched. Plaintiff 8 also fails to allege that any conduct chilled Plaintiff's First Amendment rights or that it did not 9 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff provides no further factual assertions 10 to support a claim for retaliation. Merely stating that actions were taken as retaliation for filing 11 complaints, without more, does not state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are 12 not sufficient. 13 Grievance Process 14 Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Phillips violated Plaintiff’s rights based on 15 actions he took in reviewing grievances regarding the incident at issue in the complaint. However, 16 Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against warden, staff or anyone else relating to their 17 involvement in the administrative processing or review of her prisoner grievances. The existence 18 of an inmate grievance or appeals process does not create a protected liberty interest upon which 19 Plaintiff may base a claim that she was denied a particular result or that the process was deficient. 20 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 21 Cir. 1988). 22 Doe Defendants 23 Plaintiff alleges that officers engaged in the strip search and included “et al” in the caption 24 of the case. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” 25 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe or Jane 26 Doe defendants (i.e., unknown defendants) cannot be served by the United States Marshal until 27 Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his complaint to substitute names 28 for John Doe or Jane Doe. 1 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 2 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3 1983. Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been 4 unable to cure the identified deficiencies. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. 5 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 6 Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure to 7 state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 8 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 9 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 10 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 11 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 12 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 13 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 14 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 15 limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 16 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 17 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 18 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20

21 Dated: April 8, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22

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