IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Dec 02 2024, 9:29 am Christopher Delgado, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Defendant Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
December 2, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-708 Appeal from the Porter Superior Court The Honorable Mary DeBoer, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 64D05-2205-F5-004232
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 1 of 30 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] A law enforcement officer attempted to execute an outstanding arrest warrant
on Christopher Delgado after noticing him walking on the side of the road.
Instead of complying with the officer, Delgado gave a false name. When the
officer attempted to arrest Delgado, Delgado repeatedly punched the officer in
the head. With the help of a bystander, the officer was able to arrest Delgado,
who was later charged with and convicted of battery, resisting law enforcement,
and false informing. The trial court sentenced Delgado to 12 years of
incarceration, with 2 of those years suspended to probation. Delgado now
appeals and raises four issues for our review:
1. Whether Delgado’s convictions for battery and resisting law enforcement violate Indiana’s protection against double jeopardy; 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Delgado’s conviction for false informing; 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial; and 4. Whether certain probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague or otherwise erroneous.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.1
1 On November 6, 2024, we held oral argument in this case at Indian Creek High School in Trafalgar, Indiana. We thank the faculty and staff of the school for their hospitality, the students who attended the oral argument for their thought-provoking questions after the argument, and counsel for both parties for the quality of their arguments and for remaining after the argument to answer the students’ questions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 2 of 30 Facts and Procedural History [3] On the afternoon of May 16, 2022, Corporal Jamison Smith of the Porter
County Sheriff’s Department was driving his fully marked patrol vehicle
southbound on Swanson Road when he spotted Delgado walking northbound
on the east side of Swanson Road. Delgado was wearing a white T-shirt and
had a backpack. Corporal Smith recognized Delgado as “somebody that
possibly had a warrant,” Tr. Vol. III at 73, but Corporal Smith could not recall
Delgado’s name. Corporal Smith stopped nearby so he could research a person
he knew to be associated with Delgado to determine Delgado’s name, which
was successful. Corporal Smith then pulled his patrol vehicle next to Delgado
and said, “Chris, I need to talk to you.” Id. at 75. Delgado responded, “I am
not Chris.” Id. So Corporal Smith showed Delgado a photo from the
outstanding arrest warrant and asked Delgado to confirm if the person in that
picture was him. Delgado said it was not. Corporal Smith again told Delgado
that he needed to speak with him, pulled over, and got out of his patrol vehicle
to do so.
[4] Delgado walked to the front of Corporal Smith’s patrol vehicle, and Corporal
Smith, who was standing approximately five to seven feet away from Delgado,
told him, “I know you’re Christopher Delgado,” and “made it very clear” that
Delgado was “not free to leave.” Tr. Vol. III at 78. Delgado again said, “I am
not Chris,” so Corporal Smith asked, “[W]ell, then who are you?” Id. Delgado
said his name was “Mark or Mike.” Id. Delgado could not produce any
identification when Corporal Smith asked him for one, but he did provide a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 3 of 30 Social Security number. Corporal Smith responded, “Chris, I know who you
are.” Id. at 79. At this point, Delgado “began to get very agitated that
[Corporal Smith] was calling him Chris,” telling Corporal Smith, “[S]top
f[*]cking calling me Chris. I am not Chris.” Id.
[5] Delgado then indicated that he was leaving. Corporal Smith told him he could
not leave. Nonetheless, Delgado began to walk away from Corporal Smith,
who “pushed” or “stiff arm[ed]” Delgado “to stop him from walking past” and
told Delgado, “You’re not f[*]cking leaving, get back to my car.” Tr. Vol. III at
123. Delgado responded by taking off his backpack and asking Corporal Smith,
“What are you going to f[*]cking do about it[?]” Id. at 79. Delgado took “a
fighting stance, balling his fists up.” Id. at 80. Corporal Smith radioed for back
up and then attempted to cuff Delgado, grabbing for Delgado’s right arm as he
was facing Corporal Smith. Delgado managed to “shrug . . . off” Corporal
Smith and then “delivered . . . three punches in a row that landed directly on
[Corporal Smith’s] forehead” before stepping back into the middle of the road.
Id. at 81. Delgado’s punches “were pretty quick and brisk,” leaving Corporal
Smith with little to no time “to get out of the way.” Id. at 115. Once Corporal
Smith “regained [his] composure,” he again tried to gain control of Delgado’s
arms, this time attempting to bear hug him, but Delgado “was able to step back
and deliver more punches,” hitting Corporal Smith in the forehead three more
times. Id. at 81–82. After landing these last three punches, Delgado yelled,
“[C]ome on you p[*]ssy.” Id. at 82.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 4 of 30 [6] William Cassoday, a longtime Brazilian jiu-jitsu practitioner and former
bouncer, was driving on Swanson Road and saw Delgado punching Corporal
Smith. Cassoday pulled over and managed to put Delgado in a chokehold
before moving him to the side of the road. At this point, Corporal Smith “was
able to put [Delgado] into handcuffs with no issue.” Tr. Vol. III at 85. Backup
arrived soon thereafter, and Delgado was taken to jail.
[7] Immediately after the incident, Corporal Smith had swelling over his right
eyebrow where Delgado had punched him. Corporal Smith experienced
headaches and continued swelling for approximately two days after the
incident; he did not seek medical treatment.
[8] During the entirety of his encounter with Delgado, Corporal Smith was
wearing a black tactical vest with a metal Porter County Sherriff’s star on the
front and the word “sheriff” on the front and back. Corporal Smith was not
wearing his body camera before taking Delgado into custody; instead, it was
charging in his patrol vehicle.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 5 of 30 [9] The State charged Delgado with battery as a Level 5 felony2; resisting law
enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor3; and false informing as a Class A
misdemeanor4. The State also alleged that Delgado was a habitual offender5.
[10] At Delgado’s jury trial in January 2024, both Corporal Smith and Cassoday
testified to the events as described above. The State also offered and the trial
court admitted photos taken immediately after the incident that showed a
“goose egg” above Corporal Smith’s right eyebrow. Tr. Vol. III at 114.
Delgado testified in his own defense, and at the beginning of his direct
examination and again on cross examination, he admitted that he had several
prior convictions for burglary and theft, which he agreed on cross examination
were “crimes of dishonesty,” id.at 178–79.
[11] During his testimony, Delgado presented a different version of events than
Corporal Smith and Cassoday. According to Delgado, he was walking along
Swanson Road when he saw an “officer” drive by him, but he did not think
much of it “because nothing [was] wrong. And then, all of a sudden, I had him
kind of nudging me off the side of the road and he rolls down his window. And
he’s calling me David. . . . He says David twice. I tell him I am not David.”
Tr. Vol. III at 165–66. Delgado testified that he explained to Corporal Smith
2 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(5)(A) (eff. July 1, 2020, to June 30, 2023). 3 Id. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024). 4 Id. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1), (e)(1) (eff. July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024). 5 Id. § 35-50-2-8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 6 of 30 that David was his uncle and had recently passed away. Delgado did not recall
Corporal Smith showing him a photo and stated, “the way [Corporal Smith]
was saying David was just completely aggressive with me from the jump,” id. at
168. Delgado testified that Corporal Smith “didn’t look like an officer” because
he “didn’t have browns on,” id. at 169, and that he did not see a police badge
on Corporal Smith’s vest or other indications that Corporal Smith was a law
enforcement officer. Delgado also stated that he “didn’t even think [Corporal
Smith] was on duty,” id. at 171, and that he knew the vehicle Corporal Smith
was driving was a police vehicle.
[12] Delgado testified that Corporal Smith pulled over and that he and Corporal
Smith stood approximately two to three feet apart at the front of Corporal
Smith’s vehicle where Corporal Smith began asking him questions and again
addressed him as David. Delgado stated that he told Corporal Smith again that
he was not David, at which point Corporal Smith asked Delgado if he was
Chris. Delgado claimed that he explained to Corporal Smith that he has a
cousin whose name is also Christopher Delgado who looks like him and lives in
the area, but the cousin goes by “Chris” while he goes by “Christopher.” Tr.
Vol. III at 170–71. According to Delgado, he then attempted to give Corporal
Smith his Social Security number and Corporal Smith began “pushing me and
tells me to get to the back -- to get to the front of his f[*]cking car.” Id. at 173.
Delgado testified that Corporal Smith pushing him “triggered a response. I am
fight or flight.” Id. Delgado claimed that “everything still is kind of fuzzy from
there.” Id. at 174. Delgado recalled being choked, but stated, “I don’t know
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 7 of 30 when that other guy had a chance to choke me. I have no idea. This guy
choked me first. I had a backpack on me. I wake up on the side of the road.
My backpack ain’t on me no more.” Id.
[13] Delgado testified that he “never touched” Corporal Smith, Tr. Vol. III at 175,
he “did not punch that officer,” id. at 202, and that he did not have any injuries
on his hands that would have been consistent with punching someone.
Delgado also testified that he did not remember Corporal Smith telling him that
he was not free to leave; he did not tell Corporal Smith that he was leaving; he
did not remember responding to this by saying, “What are you going to do
about it,” id. at 193, 199; and he did not remember dropping his backpack.
When the State asked Delgado if “What are you going to do about it” sounded
like something he would say, Delgado responded, “Absolutely not. . . . I don’t
like confrontation.” Id. at 199–200. When the State came back to this topic
later during cross examination, Delgado reiterated that he does not like
confrontation; the State then sought to impeach Delgado by asking him
questions about and playing another officer’s body camera video depicting
Delgado’s behavior after he was handcuffed (the “Post-Arrest Video”). The
State also wanted to use the Post-Arrest Video to impeach Delgado’s testimony
that he did not hit Corporal Smith. Delgado objected to the introduction of the
Post-Arrest Video as improper impeachment. The trial court overruled
Delgado’s objection and allowed the State to use the video to impeach
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 8 of 30 Delgado.6 The trial court then granted the parties’ request for it to instruct the
jury that such evidence was not substantive.
[14] The State played the first few minutes of the Post-Arrest Video for the jury,
which starts when another officer arrived on scene and ends when Delgado was
placed in a squad car. The video shows Corporal Smith on top of a handcuffed
Delgado on the side of Swanson Road. After that, Delgado can be heard saying
to Corporal Smith, “I’ll thump your [*]ss out again, d[*]ckhead.” Post-Arrest
Video at 00:35–00:39. Delgado also stated, “He f[*]cking choked me, and I hit
him. That’s what happened,” id. at 00:52–00:57, and “You need to teach your
officers how to f[*]cking be respectful,” id. at 01:04–01:07. Delgado repeatedly
called Corporal Smith a “racist motherf[*]cker,” id. at 01:41–01:44, 02:17–
02:19, and repeatedly accused Corporal Smith of calling him a “sp[*]c,” id. at
01:16–01:18, 01:20–01:22, 01:58–02:00. When Corporal Smith got off
Delgado’s back and helped him to his feet, Delgado told him, “You got beat up,
didn’t you? Let’s go again, motherf[*]cker. You ain’t nothing.” Id. at 01:30–
01:40. Before the officers put Delgado in the squad car, Delgado called
Corporal Smith a “rat wh[*]re” and stated, “I ain’t no snitch.” Id. at 01:46–
01:51. Delgado then resisted the officers’ attempts to get him into the squad
car.
6 During a bench conference, the trial court suggested that the Post-Arrest Video was relevant to the charged offenses; however, the trial court did not admit the video as substantive evidence, instead permitting its use only for impeachment purposes pursuant to the parties’ request.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 9 of 30 [15] After showing the above-described portion of the Post-Arrest Video to the jury,
the State asked Delgado if he remembered making several of the statements
heard in the video. Delgado testified that he remembered saying he was not a
snitch and telling the officers they needed to be respectful, but he did not
remember acknowledging that he hit Corporal Smith.
[16] During closing arguments, the State contended that this case hinged on a
credibility determination: “[Y]ou have the jury instruction for judging the
credibility of witnesses. Because that’s what this comes down to, you are
judging the credibility of the officer and Will Cassoday, and you’re judging the
credibility of the Defendant.” Tr. Vol. IV at 38. In making this argument, the
State referenced the Post-Arrest Video as an example of Delgado’s alleged lack
of credibility, and the trial court allowed the State to do so over Delgado’s
objection.
[17] The jury found Delgado guilty on all three counts, and Delgado admitted to
being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Delgado to a total of 12
years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction, with 2 of those years
suspended to probation. After imposing this sentence, the trial court asked
Delgado if he wanted the trial court to “read him the rules of formal probation
at this time,” and Delgado waived that reading. Tr. Vol. IV at 108. Delgado
now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 10 of 30 Discussion and Decision 1. Delgado’s Convictions for Resisting Law Enforcement and Battery Violate Indiana’s Protection Against Substantive Double Jeopardy
[18] Delgado contends his convictions for Level 5 felony battery and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement are contrary to Indiana’s protections
against double jeopardy. We review such questions de novo. A.W. v. State, 229
N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (citing Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind.
2020); Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020)).
[19] Indiana’s protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple
convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at
1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we
apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources.” Id. First, we look to the
statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits
multiple punishments,” then “there is no violation of substantive double
jeopardy” and we end our analysis. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Second, we
assess whether the charges are inherently included or factually included as
charged. Id. at 1068. When “‘neither offense is an included offense of the other
(either inherently or as charged) there is no violation of double jeopardy and the
analysis ends’—full stop.” Id. at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248).
Third, we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the
charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id. at 1071 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 11 of 30 [20] Here, Delgado and the State agree that the first step is not dispositive, so we
proceed to the second step. At this step, we first “apply our included-offense
statutes” to determine if one offense is inherently included it the other. A.W.,
229 N.E.3d at 1066 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). Delgado does not
argue that the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement charge is
inherently included in the Level 5 felony battery charge, so we assume for
purposes of this opinion that it is not and proceed to determine whether the
former is factually included in the latter, see id. at 1067.
[21] As instructed by the majority in A.W.: “[W]hen assessing whether an offense is
factually included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face
of the charging instrument. This includes examining the ‘means used to
commit the crime charged,’ which must ‘include all of the elements of the
alleged lesser included offense.’” 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30). This assessment also requires us to
determine if there is any ambiguity in the charging informations. Id. at 1070. If
ambiguities exist, we “must construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor,
and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation.” Id. at 1069.
[22] To determine if the charges are factually included or whether any ambiguity
exists here, we review the two charging informations. First, the charging
information for battery reads in relevant part as follows:
[O]n 5/16/2022 in Porter County, Indiana, CHRISTOPHER D DELGADO did knowingly or intentionally . . . touch [O]fficer [S]mith in a rude, insolent or angry manner, to wit:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 12 of 30 [C]hristopher resisted arrest by punching [O]fficer [S]mith in the head several times . . . resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official while the official is engaged in the official’s official duty. ...
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 18 (emphases in original). Second, the charging
information for resisting law enforcement reads in relevant part as follows:
[O]n 5/16/2022 in Porter County, Indiana, CHRISTOPHER D DELGADO did knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly resist, obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement officer while said officer was lawfully engaged in his duties. . . .
Id. at 21 (emphases in original). At a minimum, the State concedes that these
charging informations are ambiguous.7 Appellee’s Br. at 22. We conclude
there is a presumptive double jeopardy violation, see A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069,
and move to the third and final step of our analysis.
[23] Under step three, the State bears the burden of rebutting the presumptive double
jeopardy violation by using the facts presented at trial to demonstrate a
“distinction between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.”
A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071. It is at this step that we “probe the underlying
facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to
determine whether a defendant’s actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time,
place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
7 Even had the State not conceded ambiguity, it is not too far a stretch to conclude that the charging information for battery factually included the charge of resisting law enforcement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 13 of 30 transaction.’” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “If the underlying facts
reveal the two offenses are indeed ‘separate,’” there is no double jeopardy
violation. Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). If, however, the “facts show
only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the
other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. (quoting Wadle,
151 N.E.3d at 249).
[24] Here, the facts presented at trial indicate that Corporal Smith twice tried to
place Delgado in handcuffs, and Delgado punched Corporal Smith in the head
after both of those attempts. First, Corporal Smith grabbed for Delgado’s right
arm, and Delgado responded by hitting Corporal Smith three times. Second,
Corporal Smith tried to bear hug Delgado, and Delgado again responded by
hitting Corporal Smith three times. The time between these two events was
minimal at best—only one to two minutes passed between the first time
Corporal Smith reached for Delgado to arrest him until Cassoday took Delgado
to the ground.8 These events all occurred in essentially the same place—
Swanson Road in front of Corporal Smith’s vehicle. Delgado had the same
principal purpose in pulling away from and punching Corporal Smith both
times—to evade arrest.9 The information for the battery charge reflects this
compression of time, location, and principal purpose: “[C]hristopher resisted
8 At oral argument, the State conceded that only one to two minutes passed as described herein. 9 At oral argument, the State argued that the before the second round of punches, Delgado was not trying to evade arrest as much as he was wanting to fight Corporal Smith. We do not read the record in the same light.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 14 of 30 arrest by punching [O]fficer [S]mith in the head several times.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II at 18 (emphasis in original).
[25] Furthermore, during opening argument, the State told the jury that Delgado
“forcibly resisted” arrest “[n]ot only by pulling away, but also by punching
[Corporal Smith] in the head.” Tr. Vol. III at 63–64. There was, in fact,
evidence that both times Corporal Smith attempted to arrest Delgado, Delgado
pulled away from Corporal Smith before punching him. The State does not
make the same argument on appeal. Additionally, during closing argument,
the State argued only that although there was “overlap” between the battery
and resisting charges, there were “additional elements that separate the two,”
Tr. Vol. IV at 22–23; the State did not elaborate on what those distinguishing
elements were.10 The State’s opening and closing arguments here are indicative
of the lack of separation between the battery and resisting law enforcement
charges.
[26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the facts as presented in the charging
information and adduced at trial show that the acts underlying Delgado’s
battery and resisting arrest convictions were so compressed in terms of time,
place, and principal purpose that they draw from the same transaction under
our double jeopardy analysis. That is, the State has not carried its burden of
rebutting the presumptive double jeopardy violation by using the facts presented
10 While it is true that the statutory elements are different, the State essentially merged the two statutes by its wording of the charging information for battery.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 15 of 30 at trial to demonstrate a “distinction between what would otherwise be two of
the ‘same’ offenses.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071. Consequently, Delgado’s
conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement is included in
his conviction for Level 5 felony battery, and those convictions violate our state
constitutional protection against substantive double jeopardy.
2. The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence to Support Delgado’s Conviction for False Informing
[27] Delgado argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support
his conviction for false informing as a Class A misdemeanor. Our Supreme
Court has explained our standard of review for such a claim as follows:
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury’s determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).
Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024).
[28] In order to convict Delgado of Class A misdemeanor false informing under
Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-3, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Delgado (1) gave a false report of the commission of a crime or false
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 16 of 30 information to a law enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a
crime, (2) knew the report or information to be false, and (3) this false report or
information substantially hindered a law enforcement process or resulted in
harm to another person. See I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1), (e)(1)(A)–(B). Delgado
challenges only the third element, arguing that the false report or information
he gave did not substantially hinder a law enforcement process or result in harm
to another person.
[29] In particular, Delgado argues that denying his identity and providing Corporal
Smith a false name did not result in harm to another person because the only
harm the State established was the result of the battery and did not substantially
hinder a law enforcement process because Corporal Smith “repeatedly testified”
that he knew who Delgado was despite the false information, Appellant’s Br. at
27. The State does not contend that Delgado’s denial of his identity resulted in
harm to another person. Therefore, the State was required to prove Delgado’s
actions substantially hindered a law enforcement process.
[30] The State contends that “Delgado’s decision to deny his identity and provide
[Corporal] Smith with a different name . . . substantially hindered [Corporal
Smith]’s ability to effectuate that warrant for Delgado’s arrest.” Appellee’s Br.
at 24. In support, the State cites to this court’s decision in Jones v. State, 774
N.E.2d 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In Jones, the defendant was involved in a car
accident but denied there had been a collision when questioned by law
enforcement at the scene. Id. at 964. Witnesses provided statements to the
contrary. Id. The next day, the defendant admitted to law enforcement that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 17 of 30 there had been a collision. Id. The conflicting stories delayed law
enforcement’s processing of the accident scene, and it prevented an
investigation of potentially criminal conduct. Id. Another panel of this court
determined this was sufficient to show that the defendant’s false report or
information substantially hindered a law enforcement process. Id. at 964–65.
[31] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict
show that Delgado denied his identity and gave Corporal Smith a false name,
and this delayed—that is, hindered—Corporal Smith in executing Delgado’s
outstanding arrest warrant; however, the evidence does not support the
conclusion that the law enforcement process was substantially hindered. To
conclude otherwise on these facts would essentially render meaningless the
General Assembly’s use of the word “substantially” in Indiana Code section 35-
44.1-2-3(e)(1)(A). When reading statutes, we must “give effect to every word
and ‘eschew those [interpretations] that treat some words as duplicative or
meaningless.’” Cutchin v. Beard, 171 N.E.3d 991, 997 (Ind. 2021) (alteration in
original) (quoting Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., 140 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Ind. 2020)).
We also give the words and phrases used in statutes “their plain, or ordinary
and usual,” meaning. I.C. § 1-1-4-1(1); see also Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025,
1054 (Ind. 2024) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62
N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)) (“When interpreting words in a statute, this
Court’s ‘first task’ is to assign words their ‘plain meaning’ . . . .”), reh’g denied
(Apr. 22, 2024), cert. denied, -- S.Ct. --, 2024 WL 4426707 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2024).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 18 of 30 [32] “Substantially” originates from “substantial,” which generally means
“considerable in extent, amount, or value; large in volume or number,”
Substantial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); “of, relating to, or
involving substance; material,” id.; “[o]f ample or considerable amount or size,”
Substantial, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007); “of real
significance,” id.; and “considerable in quantity[,] significantly great,”
Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
Here, the delay caused by Delgado denying his identity was a fraction of time.
While there was a delay between Corporal Smith confronting Delgado and
placing him under arrest, that delay was not a result of Delgado’s dishonesty; it
was a result of Delgado’s physical attack on the officer. Any delay did not
result in preventing law enforcement from an investigation, nor did it prevent
the ultimate goal—arresting Delgado. Throughout his encounter with Delgado,
Corporal Smith knew who Delgado was and knew Delgado had an outstanding
arrest warrant. In other words, Delgado’s denials of his identity and giving of a
false name resulted in only an inconsequential delay. By contrast, in Jones, the
defendant’s false report or information caused an approximately one day delay
in law enforcement’s ability to process a scene and investigate potentially
criminal conduct. 774 N.E.2d at 964–65.
[33] Based on the foregoing, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the verdict do not establish that Delgado’s false information or
report substantially hindered a law enforcement process. Accordingly, the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to support Delgado’s conviction for false
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 19 of 30 informing as a Class A misdemeanor. Sufficient evidence was presented for the
Delgado to be convicted of false informing as a Class B misdemeanor. See
W.H. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 900, 905 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Alexander
v. State, 13 N.E.3d 917, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)), trans. not sought.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Allowing the State to Play the Post-Arrest Video for the Jury
[34] Delgado claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain
evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v.
State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied. “[W]e may affirm the trial
court’s decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201
N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2
(Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858
(quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).
[35] Delgado specifically challenges the trial court’s decision to allow publication of
the Post-Arrest Video because he claims it was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial,
and improper impeachment evidence. However, Delgado’s statements in the
Post-Arrest Video were admissible as statements of a party-opponent. See Ind.
Evid. R. 801(d)(2); Means, 201 N.E.3d at 1163 (citing Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at
190 n.2). For instance, in the Post-Arrest Video, Delgado admitted to hitting
Corporal Smith, and those statements were relevant. Any prejudice caused by
seeing Delgado’s conduct post-arrest was not substantially outweighed by its
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 20 of 30 probative value. While the Post-Arrest Video was used for impeachment
purposes only, even if it had been admitted as substantive evidence, we would
find no error. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by allowing the State to
play the Post-Arrest Video for the jury.
4. Delgado’s Challenges to his Probation Conditions Are Not Waived, and the Challenged Conditions Are Erroneous
[36] Finally, Delgado contends three of his probation conditions are
unconstitutionally vague or otherwise impermissible. Before we review those
challenges, we first address the State’s waiver argument.
a. Delgado Did Not Waive Appellate Review of His Probation Conditions
[37] The State contends that Delgado waived appellate review of his probation
conditions by waiving formal reading of and not objecting to them. In support,
the State cites this court’s decisions in Patton v. State, 990 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013); Hale v. State, 888 N.E.2d 314, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); and
Stott v. State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. Ct. App 2005). Meanwhile, Delgado
cites this court’s decisions in Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 936 (Ind.
App. 2016), and Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind. App. 2013), in
support of his position that he has not waived this issue for our review.
[38] We acknowledge that this court has issued differing opinions concerning
whether a defendant’s failure to object to probation conditions at the trial level
waives appellate review of those conditions. In Patton, Hale, and Stott, three
panels of this court held that the individual defendants had waived appellate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 21 of 30 review of their probation conditions because they had not objected to those
conditions at their sentencing hearings. Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 514; Hale, 888
N.E.2d at 319; Stott, 822 N.E.2d at 179. However, the Patton, Hale, and Stott
panels still chose to review the defendants’ challenges despite this holding.
Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 515; Hale, 888 N.E.2d at 319; Stott, 822 N.E.2d at 179.
[39] By contrast, in Meunier-Short and Bratcher, two panels of this court relied on the
reasoning set forth in Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
to hold that the individual defendants had not waived appellate review of their
probation conditions despite not objecting thereto at their sentencing hearings.
Meunier-Short, 52 N.E.3d at 936; Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 874. The Piercefield
court concluded that an appeal of a probation condition is similar “to an appeal
of a sentence, which we may review ‘without insisting that the claim first be
presented to the trial judge,’” 877 N.E.2d at 1218 (quoting Kincaid v. State, 837
N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2005)), and further concluded that a defendant’s
“signature on the probation terms does not serve as a waiver to challenge any
terms on appeal,” id.
[40] Like the panels in Meunier-Short and Bratcher, we agree with the logical
reasoning of Piercefield and conclude that Delgado did not waive appellate
review of his probation conditions despite his failure to object to those
conditions and his choice to waive formal reading of them. Our conclusion is
further bolstered by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spells v. State, in
which it held that “[n]o objection was required to preserve a challenge to [the
defendant’s] fine, because a fine, like restitution, is part of the sentence.” 225
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 22 of 30 N.E.3d 767, 771 n.5 (Ind. 2024) (citing Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959, 962 (Ind.
2016)). Probation conditions were part of Delgado’s sentence here, so the same
logic applies. Accordingly, we will review Delgado’s challenges to his
probation conditions.
b. All Three Challenged Probation Conditions Are Erroneous
[41] “When criminal defendants receive probation, they ‘agree to accept conditions
upon their behavior in lieu of imprisonment.’” Weida v. State, 94 N.E.3d 682,
687 (Ind. 2018) (alterations omitted) (quoting Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 873). The
stakes for a probationer are “high”: “If a probationer violates even one
condition, he risks probation revocation and return to jail.” Id. Even though
“probationers ‘do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as law-abiding
citizens,’” the conditions of their probation may not unduly intrude on their
constitutional rights, id. (quoting Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 873), and “must
describe with clarity and particularity the misconduct that will result in penal
consequences,” id. (quoting Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. 2008)).
[42] Delgado specifically challenges three of his probation conditions: (i) the
condition requiring him to avoid “individuals of bad reputation” and to “not
associate with anyone who is likely to influence me to commit any crime,”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 221, (the “Bad Reputation & Influence Condition”);
(ii) the condition requiring him to avoid “[f]ormer inmates of Penal
Institutions,” id., (the “Inmate Condition”); and (iii) the condition requiring
him to “always consult with my Probation Officer and obtain his/her written
permission before obtaining a Driver’s License,” id. at 220, (the “Driver’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 23 of 30 License Condition”). We address Delgado’s arguments regarding each of these
conditions in turn.
i. The Bad Reputation & Influence Condition Is Unconstitutionally Vague
[43] Delgado argues that the Bad Reputation & Influence Condition is
unconstitutionally vague. “[T]o the extent a defendant challenges a probation
condition on constitutional grounds (either a vagueness or as-applied
challenge), our review is de novo.” Weida, 94 N.E.3d at 687 (citing Smith v.
State, 8 N.E.3d 668, 676 (Ind. 2014)). When a defendant challenges a probation
condition as unconstitutionally vague—that is, the defendant claims “the
condition lacks the requisite clarity and particularity”—we evaluate that
condition using the same standard we use to evaluate criminal statutes for
vagueness. Id. at 688 (citing Hunter, 883 N.E.2d at 1163). “We will find a
probation condition unconstitutionally vague ‘only if individuals of ordinary
intelligence would not comprehend it to adequately inform them of the conduct
to be proscribed.’” Id. (quoting Patton v. State, 990 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013)) (citing Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ind. 2007)). Like
criminal statutes, probation conditions “sufficiently inform probationers of
restricted actions when they identify ‘the generally proscribed conduct.’” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516) (citing Brown, 868
N.E.2d at 467). “Fastidious specificity is not required. In other words,
probation conditions ‘need not list, with itemized exactitude, every item of
conduct that is prohibited.’” Id. (quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 24 of 30 [44] Furthermore, in considering a vagueness challenge, we look to only “the facts
and circumstances of the case before us.” Weida, 94 N.E.3d at 688 (citing
Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467). We will not consider “hypothetical situations that
might demonstrate vagueness.” Id. (quoting Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516). We
also “take the challenged probation provisions or language in context, not in
isolation.” Id. (citing Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467).
[45] Delgado specifically claims the Bad Reputation & Influence Condition lacks the
requisite clarity and particularity to put him on notice of “the specific people
that he must avoid.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. In support, Delgado relies primarily
on this court’s decision in McCarty v. State, 94 N.E.3d 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
In McCarty, the defendant challenged a term of his probation that required him
to “avoid persons and places of harmful character, or a person who is likely to
influence you to commit a crime.” Id. at 355. The McCarty court concluded
that “person and places of harmful character” were “subjective terms” and “not
readily defined,” so that provision was impermissibly vague. Id.
[46] In reaching this conclusion, the McCarty court relied heavily on Clemons v. State,
83 N.E.3d 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. In Clemons, the defendant
argued the following probation condition was unconstitutionally vague: “You
shall not associate with any person of bad character or reputation or with any
person who is likely to influence you to commit a crime or crimes.” Id. at 107.
The Clemons court determined this condition was vague, stating:
The condition does not define what “associate” or “bad character or reputation” mean in this context, nor is it clear how to identify Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 25 of 30 a person who could “influence” Clemons to commit a crime. Because each of the terms in this condition is subjective, the condition fails to inform Clemons what conduct would subject her to revocation of her probation.
Id. at 109.
[47] The State argues that when read in the context of the other probation
conditions, the Bad Reputation & Influence Condition forbids Delgado only
from associating with “individuals previously or currently involved in criminal
activity or individuals who would encourage Delgado to return to criminal
activity.” Appellee’s Br. at 28. While it is true that the other probation
conditions generally prohibit Delgado from associating with persons on
probation, on parole, or who were previously incarcerated, the inclusion of
those specific prohibitions does not adequately define a person of “bad
reputation” or who might “influence” Delgado to engage in criminal activity.
[48] Therefore, reading the Bad Reputation & Influence Condition in the context of
the other probation conditions, we conclude that the Bad Reputation &
Influence Condition suffers from the same subjectivity and lack of definition as
the probation conditions at issue in Clemons and McCarty. We thus agree with
Delgado that they are impermissibly vague.
ii. The Inmate Condition Is Not Reasonably Related to the Goals of Probation
[49] Delgado also claims that the Inmate Condition reaches beyond what is
reasonably necessary to rehabilitate him. Trial courts have “broad discretion in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 26 of 30 fashioning defendants’ probation conditions.” Weida, 94 N.E.3d at 687 (citing
Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ind. 2010)). We will disturb a trial court’s
probation order only if the trial court abused its discretion. Id. (citing Bailey v.
State, 717 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1999)). In this context, a trial court “abuses its
discretion when the probation conditions imposed are not reasonably related to
rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public.” Id. (citing Bratcher v.
State, 999 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)). Thus, our review focuses on
“whether imposed probation conditions ‘reasonably relate to attaining these
goals.’” Id. (quoting Bratcher, 999 N.E.2d at 873).
[50] According to Delgado, the Inmate Condition is “impractical” and may “run
counter to his rehabilitation by, for instance, prohibiting him from certain
lawful employment in the event a co-worker has a long-ago, minor conviction
that resulted in incarceration.” Appellant’s Br. at 30–31. The State counters
that the Inmate Condition “increases the rehabilitative efforts of probation to
transform Delgado into a law-abiding citizen” and does not prevent Delgado
from working with or being in the same location as a former inmate because
these are “incidental contacts.” Appellee’s Br. at 31–32.
[51] While prohibiting Delgado from associating with former inmates may aid in his
rehabilitation by limiting his exposure to people who engage in criminal
activity, prohibiting him from associating with former inmates may also hinder
his rehabilitation by limiting his exposure to people who no longer engage in
criminal activity and actively help others to do the same. As written, without
any exceptions for incidental contact, the Inmate Condition is overly broad and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 27 of 30 thus not reasonably related to the goals of probation. We therefore conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the Inmate Condition.
iii.The Driver’s License Condition Is Not Reasonably Related to the Goals of Probation
[52] Delgado claims the Driver’s License Condition is not reasonably related to the
goals of probation because it allows the probation officer “unfettered authority
to withhold permission for a driver’s license,” which “neither helps [Delgado]’s
rehabilitation nor protects the public” because obtaining a driver’s license “is
important to his reintegration in society.” Appellant’s Br. at 32. In response,
the State argues that the Driver’s License Condition is necessary to ensure
probation can provide an adequate level of supervision of Delgado based on his
mobility.
[53] Here, Delgado was neither charged with nor convicted of any traffic-related
offenses; in fact, Delgado’s criminal history is devoid of driving-related
offenses. We agree with Delgado that the opportunity to earn his driver’s
license will be important as he reintegrates into society, and we see no reason to
limit that opportunity as set forth in the Driver’s License Condition. We thus
conclude that the Driver’s License Condition is not reasonably related to the
goals of probation such that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing it.
Conclusion [54] First, Delgado’s convictions for resisting law enforcement and battery violate
Indiana’s protection against double jeopardy; we therefore reverse Delgado’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 28 of 30 conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, and we
remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate this conviction. Second,
the State did not present sufficient evidence to support Delgado’s conviction for
false informing as a Class A misdemeanor; we therefore reverse his conviction
for false informing as a Class A misdemeanor, and we remand with instructions
for the trial court to vacate that conviction and enter judgment of conviction
and sentence Delgado on one count of false informing as a Class B
misdemeanor11. Third, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
the State to play the Post-Arrest Video for the jury; we therefore affirm the trial
court on this issue. Finally, the Bad Reputation & Influence Condition is
unconstitutionally vague, and the Inmate and Driver’s License Conditions are
not reasonably related to the goals of probation; we therefore reverse and
remand with instructions for the trial court to clarify all three of these
conditions with greater specificity.
[55] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT James Harper Harper & Harper, LLC Valparaiso, Indiana
11 At oral argument, Delgado proposed this result as an appropriate remedy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 29 of 30 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-708 | December 2, 2024 Page 30 of 30