Christopher Armstrong v. P United States of America

2021 DNH 072

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 8, 2021
• Docket: 20-cv-686-LM
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher Armstrong

v. Civil No. 20-cv-686-LM Opinion No. 2021 DNH 072 P United States of America

ORDER

Before the court is Christopher Armstrong’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus

petition. Armstrong challenges the validity of his conviction by the District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee. Armstrong’s petition is subject to

preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (“Section 2254 Rules”).

PRELIMINARY REVIEW STANDARD

The court conducts a preliminary review of habeas corpus petitions, including

petitions filed pursuant to Section 2241, to determine whether they are facially

valid and may proceed. See Section 2254 Rule 4; see also Section 2254 Rule 1(b)

(authorizing court to apply the Section 2254 Rules to Section 2241 petitions); Loc. R.

4.3(d)(4)(A). Because Armstrong proceeds pro se, his pleadings are construed

liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

DISCUSSION

Armstrong is serving a sentence following his conviction on charges of armed

robbery in the Western District of Tennessee. See doc. no. 1-2. In general, the court in which a federal defendant was convicted and sentenced has exclusive jurisdiction

over post-conviction proceedings challenging the validity of the conviction or

sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).

Under limited circumstances, however, a federal prisoner may challenge the

validity of his sentence by proceeding under Section 2241, as Armstrong seeks to do

here. This is because Section 2255(e) contains a “savings clause,” pursuant to which

the jurisdiction of the sentencing court to consider post-conviction challenges is not

considered exclusive where “it . . . appears that the remedy by motion [under

Section 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s]

detention.” Id. Where the savings clause is applicable, the petitioner may

challenge the validity of his conviction under Section 2241 in either the jurisdiction

where he was convicted and sentenced or the jurisdiction where he is incarcerated

at the time he files his petition.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). There is no timeliness

requirement for filing a petition under Section 2241. See id.; see also Neverson v.

Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2004).

Relief under Section 2255 is considered inadequate or ineffective for purposes

of savings-clause jurisdiction “when, in a particular case, the configuration of

[Section 2255] is such ‘as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial

rectification.’” Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 99 (1st Cir. 2008). Under

1 Armstrong is currently housed at the United States Penitentiary in

Leavenworth, Kansas, but was housed within this District at the Federal Correctional Institution, Berlin, at the time he filed his petition.

2 that standard, the First Circuit has determined that a petitioner may proceed under

Section 2241 via the savings clause of Section 2255(e) under two limited

circumstances. First, a petitioner may invoke savings clause when he makes a

“credible allegation of actual innocence.” Id. Second, a petitioner may invoke the

savings clause when the Supreme Court has overturned the interpretation of the

statute under which the petitioner was convicted, such that the petitioner is no

longer guilty of a crime under the Supreme Court’s new interpretation. See

Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2000). If neither of those

circumstances is present, a petitioner may not rely on Section 2241 to raise a

challenge that would have been foreclosed under Section 2255. See United States v.

Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1999).

Here, Armstrong has not shown that because of the configuration of section

2255, he lacked a prior opportunity to obtain judicial review of his challenges to the

validity of his conviction. First, although his petition before this court is silent as to

whether he has petitioned for relief under Section 2255 before the court for the

Western District of Tennessee, the court takes judicial notice that Armstrong has

previously filed an unsuccessful Section 2255 petition challenging the validity of his

sentence in that district. See 15-CV-2392-JPM-tmp, W.D. Tenn, doc. no. 30

(denying Armstrong’s petition); see also Maher v. Hyde, 272 F.3d 83, 86 n.3 (1st Cir.

2001) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of the docket of any court case).

Second, Armstrong makes no claim of actual innocence, and his petition does not

suggest the existence of evidence that would exonerate him. See doc. no. 1. Third

3 and finally, Armstrong does not argue that the conduct for which he was convicted

is no longer criminal under newly applicable Supreme Court jurisprudence. See id.

The Section 2255(e) savings clause thus does not provide this court with jurisdiction

to consider the merits of his petition.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed in this order, this court is without authority to

consider the merits of Armstrong’s petition. Armstrong’s petition (doc. no. 1) is

therefore dismissed without prejudice to his right to refile it in the Western District

of Tennessee, where he was convicted and sentenced.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge

April 8, 2021

cc: Christopher Armstrong, pro se