Christopher A. Nielsen, V. Island County Sheriffs

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 25, 2024
• Docket: 85989-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CHRISTOPHER A NIELSEN, No. 85989-7-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION ISLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Respondents.

DÍAZ, J. — Christopher Nielsen appeals the superior court’s denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the superior court lacked

jurisdiction to hear his federal constitutional claims and that Island County sheriff

deputies unconstitutionally stopped and searched his vehicle. We affirm the

superior court’s denial of the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2023, a sheriff’s deputy pulled over a blue Chevrolet

Caviler, which Nielsen was driving. The deputy mistakenly believed the vehicle’s

license number did not match its registration. Nielsen also claims the deputy asked

whether Nielsen resided at an address on Great Dane Lane. The deputy cited

Nielsen for driving with a suspended license but ultimately released him. No. 85989-7-I/2

On January 25, 2023, two sheriff’s deputies were investigating a report that

the same blue Chevrolet Caviler had been stolen. The deputies located vehicle

parked outside the Great Dane Lane address and found Nielsen asleep in the car.

The deputies searched the vehicle and arrested Nielsen for unlawful possession

of a stolen vehicle, unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled

substance, and introducing contraband in the second degree.

On January 26, 2023, Nielsen attended a preliminary appearance hearing

before the Island County Superior Court. The superior court found probable cause

for the crimes of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, possession

of a stolen vehicle, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

The court then ordered his release, on the condition he post a $50,000 bond, which

he did not. On January 30, 2023, the State charged Nielsen by way of information

of those crimes.

Nielsen proceeded pro se and filed two key documents with the superior

court. First, on August 28, 2023, Nielsen filed an “Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus” under a civil case number, arguing that the deputies violated the federal

and Washington constitutions during their seizures of January 23 and January 25. 1

He further requested the petition be forwarded to our Supreme Court under

Chapter 7.36 RCW.2 Second, on August 31, 2023, Nielsen filed a CrR “3.6 Motion

1 Nielsen cited to “the 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution” and “article 1 section 7 of the Washington state Constitution.” 2 On August 30, 2023, Nielsen also filed a “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” under the same civil case number. Nielsen handwrote his petition on a form provided by the federal government. Nielsen, however, reiterated the same arguments from his previous petition. However, Nielsen’s notice of appeal to this court did not list or include this petition. 2 No. 85989-7-I/3

to Suppress” the evidence obtained through those seizures. Nielsen filed this

motion under a separate criminal case number.

On September 5, 2023, the superior court held a hearing on Nielsen’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ultimately, the court denied his petition and

explained that “[h]abeas corpus is not a means that you can utilize to challenge an

unlawful search and seizure . . . without first exhausting your available State

remedies,” referring to Nielsen’s then pending motion to suppress. The court

further explained that the “Court did provide due process when the Court

considered the Preliminary Hearing issues” and that “[y]ou have already exercised

your due process right to have the Court consider whether the search and seizure

and the officer’s presence on the property was illegal . . . If the Court agrees with

you, that evidence will be suppressed.” On October 20, 2023, the superior court

issued a written order that denied Nielsen’s petition for the same reasons.

On Nov. 6, 2023, Nielsen appealed only the denial of his habeas petition

and not the denial of his motion to suppress. On March 1, 2024, Nielsen pleaded

guilty as charged.

II. ANALYSIS

We begin by noting that Nielsen continues to litigate his petition pro se.

“Courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys.” In re Vulnerable

Adult Petition of Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667 (2020); In re

Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993) (courts are “under

no obligation to grant special favors to . . . a pro se litigant.”). As such, a pro se

party’s failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure may preclude

3 No. 85989-7-I/4

appellate review. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999).

Even so, we liberally interpret those rules “to promote justice and facilitate the

decision of cases on the merits.” RAP 1.2(a).

A. Brief Overview of Habeas Corpus

In general, “habeas corpus” is a “writ employed to bring a person before a

court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not

illegal.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (12th ed. 2024). The “purpose of judicial

review of restraint, be it by writs of habeas corpus or by personal restraint

petitions, 3 is to protect against governmental oppression and power exercised

without law.” In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 214, 227 P.3d

285 (2010). Stated otherwise, habeas corpus is a “remedy for one illegally

deprived of his liberty.” In re Grieve, 22 Wn.2d 902, 904, 158 P.2d 73 (1945).

Traditionally, when a “petitioner [for a writ of habeas corpus] is held under

a commitment issued pursuant to a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, the

authorized scope of the inquiry, unless it has been broadened by statute, is very

limited” with “but one question presented to the court for decision, and that is,—Is

this a judgment or a nullity?” Id. Our Supreme Court previously had held that

habeas corpus was not a “writ of error” and was limited to “whether a judgment

exists.” In re Newcomb, 56 Wash. 395, 396-97, 105 P. 1042 (1909); In re

Hannigan, 136 Wash. 60, 63, 238 P. 913 (1925) (“[i]f the sheriff hold the appellant

3 Personal restraint petitions are procedurally distinct from, and considered a “successor” to, habeas corpus. In re Pers. Restraint of Skone, 30 Wn. App. 2d 1, 42, 543 P.3d 842 (2024) (distinct); In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 153 Wn.2d 44, 57, 101 P.3d 854 (2004) (Chambers, J. concurrence) (successor). 4 No. 85989-7-I/5

by virtue of a commitment regular on its face, that is a complete defense.”). That

is, an order that was “valid and regular on its face” was “beyond the scope of

permissible inquiry” in habeas corpus proceedings. In re Palmer v. Cranor, 45

Wn.2d 278, 279-81, 273 P.2d 985 (1954) (holding it “examined the pleaded facts”

and “inquired into the legality of the judgment, where the petition alleged that rights

guaranteed by the constitution had been violated.”).

“However, by case law, court rule, and ultimately, by statute, consideration

of collateral challenges expanded.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123,

129, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). In Washington, chapter 7.36 RCW governs petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus before superior courts. “[I]n 1947 the legislature in

amending RCW 7.36.130(1) attempted to significantly enlarge the ambit of post-

conviction relief by way of petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.” Holt v. Morris, 84

Wn.2d 841, 843, 529 P.2d 1081 (1974) overruled on other grounds by Wright v.

Morris, 85 Wn.2d 899, 902-03, 540 P.2d 893 (1975) (discussing CrR 7.7). Based

on that enlargement, today RCW 7.36.130(1) which allows courts to review

allegations “that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution of the state of

Washington or the United States have been violated.” See also LAWS OF 1947, ch.

256, § 3.

Contemporaneously with these developments in Washington, this court

observed that “the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the

purpose of the writ should not be restricted to a determination of the legality of

detention, but that it may be utilized to secure relief from any restraint which

violates basic and fundamental freedoms.” Woods v. Burton, 8 Wn. App. 13, 15,

5 No. 85989-7-I/6

503 P.2d 1079 (1972). That said, this court also warned that “[w]e do not mean to

imply that every complaint by an inmate alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment

or article I, section 14 of our constitution necessarily forms a basis for a writ of

habeas corpus.” Id. at 16. After all, “[p]arties raising constitutional issues must

present considered arguments to this court.” State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 167,

171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992).

In sum, “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is an original action” where the petitioner

“sets forth allegations detailing the unlawfulness of detention.” Butler v. Kato, 137

Wn. App. 515, 520-21, 154 P.3d 259 (2007); RCW 7.36.030. However, while the

“writ of habeas corpus is available . . . for the purpose of inquiring into the legality

of the petitioner’s restraint,” it can also be used “to determine whether his

constitutional right to due process of law has been violated.” In re Allen v. Rhay,

52 Wn.2d 609, 611, 328 P.2d 367 (1958) (emphasis omitted); RCW 7.36.130(1).

“We review rulings on writs of habeas corpus de novo.” Wahleithner v.

Thompson, 134 Wn. App. 931, 935, 143 P.3d 321 (2006).

B. The Superior Court’s Jurisdiction to Deny the Petition

In first two assignments of error, Nielsen argues that the superior court did

not have jurisdiction to deny his habeas petition as “‘whether in an original

proceeding or upon [an] appeal, if any federal question shall be presented by the

pleadings, it shall be the duty of the supreme court to determine in its opinion

whether or not the petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by the

Constitution of the United States.’” (Emphasis added) (quoting RCW 7.36.140).

Nielsen’s reliance on RCW 7.36.140 is mistaken. First, the plain language

6 No. 85989-7-I/7

of RCW 7.36.140 does not state that only this court or our Supreme Court can ever

hear federal questions within habeas corpus proceedings. Rather, RCW 7.36.140

states that “whether in an original proceeding or upon appeal,” it is our Supreme

Court’s “duty” to determine such questions if they are before it. (Emphasis added);

see also Woods, 8 Wn. App. at 15 (“we believe no less of a duty falls upon this

court when a constitutional question is before it.”); see also RCW 7.36.040 (“[w]rits

of habeas corpus may be granted by the supreme court, the court of appeals, or

superior court.”).

In fact, this court considered a superior court’s denial of a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus that implicated both state and federal constitutional questions on

pre-trial release conditions. Butler, 137 Wn. App. at 519-520, 524, 530, 532. As

such, we reject Nielsen’s argument under RCW 7.36.140.

C. The Superior Court’s Denial of the Habeas Corpus Petition

In his final three assignments of error, Nielsen avers that the evidence

gathered on January 23 and January 25 was unlawfully obtained. In particular, he

alleges the sheriff’s deputies unlawfully entered the Great Dane Lane property and

searched the vehicle without a valid warrant.

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may be used “to determine whether

his constitutional right to due process of law has been violated.” Allen, 52 Wn.2d

at 611 (emphasis omitted); RCW 7.36.130. Even so, “[p]arties raising

constitutional issues must present considered arguments to this court.” Johnson,

119 Wn.2d at 171; State v. Johnson, 179 Wn.2d 534, 558, 315 P.3d 1090 (2014)

(“‘[n]aked castings into the constitutional seas are not sufficient to command

7 No. 85989-7-I/8

judicial consideration and discussion.’”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting State v. Blilie, 132 Wn.2d 484, 493 n.2, 939 P.2d 691

(1997)).

Nielsen’s petition is insufficient regardless of whether we consider the facial

validity of the superior court’s orders or the modern statutory grounds described in

Allen, 52 Wn.2d at 611. Nielsen does not assert the orders are facially invalid, nor

does he explain how his commitment “violate[d his] basic and fundamental

freedoms.” Woods, 8 Wn. App. at 15.

As to the latter, Nielsen’s briefs mention only in passing the superior court’s

finding of probable cause or order of conditional release. His petition failed to

directly reference either. Instead, his petition presented only generalized

assertions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights violations

alongside claims of article I, section 7 of Washington’s constitution violations,

without further citation to authority. Nielsen’s briefs cite two authorities that

reference the Fourth Amendment to define the terms “search” and “curtilage.”

Otherwise, his briefs only generally allude to the various constitutional provisions

asserted in his petition. In other words, Nielsen does nothing to connect his

generalized complaints about the court’s probable cause finding or its order on

conditional release to any basic or fundamental freedom.

Further, when the superior court held a hearing on Nielsen’s petition,

Nielsen had already filed a motion to suppress under CrR 3.6 the evidence

obtained on January 23rd and 25th. Nielsen chose to resolve the matter without

appealing the denial of his suppression motion here or previously. As our Supreme

8 No. 85989-7-I/9

Court has explained, “habeas . . . is not a substitute for an appeal.” Grantham,

168 Wn.2d at 210-211; see also Williams v. McCauley, 7 Wn.2d 1, 5, 108 P.2d

822 (1940) (“a writ of habeas corpus cannot be permitted to perform the functions

of an appeal or writ of error to review the errors or irregularities of a court of

competent jurisdiction.”).

In sum, Nielsen’s arguments do not explain, or cite to any authority, why his

complaints about the seizures affect basic or fundamental freedoms. Nor does

Nielsen explain why a habeas corpus petition is the proper avenue for relief, rather

than an appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress. Indeed, Nielsen’s petition

simply does not address the superior court’s orders underlying his detention. 4

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the superior court’s denial of Nielsen’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus.

WE CONCUR:

4 In an additional assignment of error, Nielsen argues, without citation to any authority, that “[i]f there is a pre-deprivation remedy available and within the three guidelines of due process, it needs to be utilized.” However, we need not reach this argument. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”). 9