Christiansen v. Young

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: August 14, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00218
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 MGD 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Abel Christiansen, No. CV-22-00218-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Centurion Health, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Abel Christiansen, who was previously confined in the Arizona 16 Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (ADCRR), brought this pro se civil 17 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding ADCRR’s policy on gender affirming 18 surgery and denial of treatment for his gender dysphoria.1 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s 19 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 (Doc. 39) and Defendant Shinn’s 20 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80). Plaintiff was informed of his rights and 21 obligations to respond to Defendant Shinn’s Motion pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 22 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Doc. 86), and he opposes the Motion (Doc. 93). 23 I. Background 24 On screening the Complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court 25 determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment claims in Count One against former 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff states that he is a transgender male undergoing a transition from female to male. 1 ADCRR Director David Shinn,2 in his official capacity, and in Count Two against Assistant 2 Regional Medical Director Dr. Murray Young, in his individual capacity, and directed them 3 to answer the claims against them. (Doc. 11.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims 4 and Defendants. (Id.) 5 In an Order dated May 4, 2023, the Court granted a stipulated motion by Plaintiff 6 and Dr. Young to substitute Centurion of Arizona, LLC (“Centurion”) for Dr. Young and 7 dismissed Dr. Young from this action with prejudice. (Doc. 98.) The Court subsequently 8 dismissed Centurion and all claims against it with prejudice pursuant to the parties’ 9 stipulation. (Doc. 101.) 10 On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating he 11 had been released from prison and was now living in Phoenix, Arizona.3 (See Doc. 67.) 12 Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits before he was 13 released from prison, and Defendant Thornell filed his Motion for Summary Judgment 14 after Plaintiff’s release. 15 II. Legal Standards 16 A. Summary Judgment 17 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 18 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 20 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 21 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 22 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 23 24 2 Defendant Shinn stepped down as ADCRR Director in January 2023, and current 25 ADCRR Director Ryan Thornell, in his official capacity, was substituted for Shinn. (See Doc. 80 at 1 n.1; see docket entry dated March 7, 2023.) 26 27 3 ADCRR online records also show that Plaintiff was released to Community Supervision on November 30, 2022. See ADCRR, Inmate Data Search, available at 28 https://corrections.az.gov/inmate-data-search (search for Inmate Number 297023) (last visited Aug. 3, 2023). 1 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 2 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 3 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 4 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 5 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 6 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 7 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 8 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 9 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 10 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 11 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 12 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 13 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 14 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 15 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 16 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 17 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 18 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 19 B. Eighth Amendment 20 Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must demonstrate that a defendant acted 21 with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 22 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are two 23 prongs to the deliberate-indifference analysis: an objective prong and a subjective prong. 24 First, a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citations 25 omitted). A “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 26 result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 27 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds 28 by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal 1 citation omitted). Second, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s response to that need 2 was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. An official acts with deliberate 3 indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; to 4 satisfy the knowledge component, the official must both be aware of facts from which the 5 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 6 draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Even if deliberate 7 indifference is shown, to support an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must 8 demonstrate harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see Hunt v. Dental 9 Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (delay in providing medical treatment does not 10 constitute Eighth Amendment violation unless delay was harmful). 11 Additionally, to prevail on a claim against Defendant Thornell in his official 12 capacity, Plaintiff must meet the test articulated in Monell v. Department of Social Services 13 of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show that 14 an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 15 To make this showing, he must demonstrate that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional 16 right; (2) Corizon or Centurion had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted 17 to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom 18 was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 19 Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 III. Facts 21 Plaintiff is transgender and has been undergoing hormone replacement therapy, but 22 he has continued to report gender dysphoria symptoms. (Doc. 41 (Pl.’s Statement of Facts) 23 ¶¶ 1-3.) ADCRR Department Order (DO) 810, with an effective date of April 15, 2021, 24 stated that medical staff could not provide gender reassignment surgery. (Id. ¶ 4.) 25 In an Informal Complaint dated September 23, 2021, Plaintiff wrote that ADCRR 26 policy discriminates against transgender prisoners because DO 810 prohibits gender 27 reassignment surgery. (Doc. 41 at 23.) Plaintiff then filed a grievance regarding DO 810 28 stating that the policy was preventing Plaintiff from being appropriately evaluated for 1 desperately needed medical care; the final response to Plaintiff’s grievance appeal stated 2 that, “a policy change is not being considered at this time.” (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 6-7.) Nevertheless, 3 the policy was changed after Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case. (Id. ¶ 8.) Despite 4 the policy change, “a blanket ban on gender confirming surgery is still contained in the 5 ADCRR Health Services Technical Manual which states ‘gender reassignment surgery is 6 not possible for inmates who reside in a correctional facility.’” (Id. ¶ 9.) 7 Defendant disputes that a change to DO 810 was the result of Plaintiff’s lawsuit and 8 asserts that ADCRR began the process of revising the April 5, 2021 version of DO 810 in 9 late Spring 2021. (Doc. 81 (Def.’s Statement of Facts) ¶¶ 4-5.) DO 810, with an effective 10 date of April 1, 2022, now provides that prisoners who identify as transgender or intersex 11 shall be afforded, upon request, “[m]edical Services, as needed, including diagnosis and 12 treatment for gender dysphoria . . . . that are consistent with evidence-based standards . . . 13 and without regard to the extent or type of treatment prior to intake.” (Id. ¶ 3.) The 14 ADCRR Medical Services Technical Manual (MSTM) was revised and no longer contains 15 the language regarding limitations on gender-reassignment surgery.” (Id. ¶ 10.) 16 On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff sent an inmate letter to Dr. Phillips requesting a 17 double mastectomy. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17; Doc. 41 at 16.) In response, Dr. Phillips reviewed 18 Plaintiff’s medical records, and Dr. Stallcup, ADCRR’s Mental Health Director, reviewed 19 Plaintiff’s mental health records to determine whether he was experiencing significant 20 distress because of his gender dysphoria and to assess his current level of mental health 21 functioning. (Doc. 81 ¶ 19.) Dr. Stallcup advised ADCRR’s Transgender Committee that 22 she saw no evidence that Plaintiff was experiencing significant distress because of his 23 gender dysphoria. (Id. ¶ 25.) Based on his own and Dr. Stallcup’s review and opinion, Dr. 24 Phillips concluded that gender confirmation surgery was not medically necessary for the 25 treatment of Plaintiff’s gender dysphoria at that time, and the Transgender Committee 26 decided not to recommend approval. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 IV. Discussion 2 In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and 3 punitive damages and a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to immediately schedule 4 him for a consultation with a gender identity disorder specialist to evaluate Plaintiff and 5 determine if a double mastectomy is medically necessary and to require ADCRR to revise 6 its Health Services Technical Manual. (Doc. 39.) 7 Defendant Thornell filed his Motion for Summary Judgment after Plaintiff’s release, 8 arguing that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot given his release from prison 9 and that Plaintiff cannot obtain monetary damages from Defendant in his official capacity 10 because the Eleventh Amendment bars damages claims against state officials sued in their 11 official capacities. (Doc. 80.) In his Response, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s 12 argument regarding monetary damages, but he does address the issue of mootness. (Doc. 13 93.) 14 Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for damages against Defendant Thornell in his 15 official capacity under § 1983 because “a suit against a state official in his or her official 16 capacity is not a suit against the official but . . . against the official’s office. As such, it is 17 no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 18 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment 19 protects states from being sued for damages in federal court). By its express terms, § 1983 20 applies to “person[s]” acting under color of state law, which does not include states. Hafer 21 v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 22 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983. 23 Likewise[,] ‘arms of the State’ such as the Arizona Department of Corrections are not 24 ‘persons’ under section 1983.”) (citation omitted). 25 As to Defendant’s argument regarding mootness, Plaintiff asserts the issue is not 26 moot because it is capable of repetition since Plaintiff is currently on parole “and is still 27 under the custody of ADCRR and could potentially be returned to an ADCRR facility at 28 any time.” (Doc. 93 at 1.) 1 Generally, a prisoner’s release or transfer from a prison while his claims are pending 2 moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because he “is no longer subject to 3 the prison conditions or policies he challenges.” Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th 4 Cir. 2012) (citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[a]n inmate’s 5 release from prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for 6 injunctive relief relating to the prison’s policies unless the suit has been certified as a class 7 action”); Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Once an inmate is 8 removed from the environment in which he is subjected to the challenged policy or 9 practice, absent a claim for damages, he no longer has a legally cognizable interest in a 10 judicial decision on the merits of his claim.”); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1988)). 11 An exception to the mootness doctrine exists if a violation is “capable of repetition, yet 12 evading review.” Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1368. This exception applies when (1) the duration of 13 the challenged action is too short to be litigated before cessation and (2) there is a 14 reasonable expectation that the injury will occur again. Id. Plaintiff’s release from 15 ADCRR custody renders his official capacity claim for injunctive relief moot, unless he 16 can present some indication that he expects to be transferred back to ADCRR custody. See 17 Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-403 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 18 (9th Cir. 1991). 19 Here, there is no reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will return to ADCRR custody 20 in the foreseeable future. The possibility that Plaintiff may be returned to ADCRR custody 21 is “too speculative to rise to the level of reasonable expectation or demonstrated 22 probability.” Wiggins v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, 23 Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot. 24 Because Plaintiff cannot obtain money damages in this action, and his request for 25 injunctive relief is moot, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 26 and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . ITIS ORDERED: 2 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 (Doc. 39) and Defendant Shinn’s Motion for 4) Summary Judgment (Doc. 80). 5 (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 (Doc. 39) is 6| denied. 7 (3) | Defendant Shinn’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) is granted, and 8 | this action is terminated with prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment 9| accordingly. 10 Dated this 14th day of August, 2023. 11 12 a 13 14 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28